

HEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES

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KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

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HEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

A Study of the Aim and Method of
Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*



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In studying logic, you hope to correct your present ideas of what reasoning is good, what bad. This, of course, must be done by reasoning Some writers fancy that they see some absurdity in this They say it would be a '*petitio principii*' Let us rather state the case thus. At present you are in possession of a *logica utens* which seems to be unsatisfactory. The question is whether, using this unsatisfactory *logica utens*, you can make out wherein it must be modified, and can attain to a better system. This is a truer way of stating the question; and so stated, it appears to present no such insuperable difficulty, as is pretended.

—C. S. Peirce

I am convinced that progress in philosophy, as in science, can come only through continual mutual criticism, self-criticism, and attempts at improved approaches.

—R. Carnap

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PREFACE

The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to reintegrate Hegel's theory of knowledge into main stream epistemology. Hegel's views were formed in consideration of Classical Skepticism and Modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with other views and the difficulties they face. Setting Hegel's discussion in the context of both traditional and contemporary epistemology is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his issues, arguments, and views. Accordingly, this is an issues-oriented study. I analyze Hegel's problematic and method by placing them in the context of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston.

I discuss Carnap, rather than a Modern empiricist such as Locke or Hume, for several reasons. One is that Hegel himself refutes a fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism, the doctrine of "knowledge by acquaintance," in the first chapter of the *Phenomenology*, a chapter that cannot be reconstructed within the bounds of this study. Second, philosophers still tend to turn positivist when criticizing Hegel. Thus it is important to show that Carnap's program fails to handle the relevant problems. Third, I believe that Hegel has much to offer the contemporary philosophical scene. In this regard it is important to show that Hegel and (e.g.) Carnap are, after all, working within the same philosophical arena. Finally, Carnap is the last figure in the analytic tradition who addresses the relevant issues as issues in (or at least about and against) epistemology rather than formulating them mainly as issues in philosophy of language. Pursuing the issues of this study into contemporary philosophy of language would exceed manageable bounds.

Hegel's expositors face a difficult dilemma. Hegel's corpus is so vast that it is well nigh impossible to cover all the texts relevant to the issues of any particular investigation or to any one Hegelian text, so that an expositor risks omitting something crucial. On the other hand, attempting to treat Hegel's views synoptically inevitably leads to a superficial treatment of his particular statements and arguments, thus leaving an expositor at risk of misconstruction. It is my firm conviction that Hegel has suffered far too much from this second shortcoming. Attempts to treat his philosophy, or even one of its major components, synoptically has led expositors to misconstrue Hegel's views, sometimes drastically. Hegel insists that there is no way to understand the very pungent and suggestive (and sometimes absurd) statements he makes in the latter parts of his expositions without understanding how the meaning of his terms and the justification of his statements have been developed from the beginning of his discussion. I'm convinced that Hegel needs to be taken at his word about this point. To do this, however, requires understanding how he proposes to develop his points from the beginning to the end of any one of his expositions. To follow his development of his views thus requires what has seemed most difficult of all: to follow the development of his arguments from one statement to the next, and from one paragraph to the next.

This study provides a complete, detailed analysis and reconstruction of an important portion of one of Hegel's most important texts. The portion I consider, principally the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, concerns Hegel's philosophical aims and method in the *Phenomenology*. Thus the purpose of this study is to provide a detailed understanding of his procedure in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, an interpretation intended to

facilitate an exacting and philosophically sensitive reading of Hegel's very interesting book. The modesty of the present study lies in its subtitle: It is a study of the aim and method of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and not an exhaustive treatment of his whole book.

What many may find surprising is my contention that the "absolute idealist" Hegel defends the view that there is a way the world is that does not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity and that we can know the way the world is. Hegel's idealism is an ontological holism that is, and is intended to be, consistent with what I call "epistemological realism." This view is obviously a realism. I call it "epistemological realism" in order to draw attention to the fact that this view involves both an ontological thesis—there is a way the world is which does not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity—; and an epistemological thesis—we can know the way the world is. Providing this label distinguishes this view, as an issue in epistemology, from what is called "scientific realism," the view that the theoretical entities posited by scientific theories exist. Hegel has views which bear on the issue of scientific realism, but they cannot be discussed at length in this study. Hegel's issue is the Modern issue of the "external world," the existence of which is typically granted in debates about scientific realism. This is also to say, Hegel's issues are prior to those concerning scientific realism. It is thus important to note that Hegel's criterion of truth analyzed in this study concerns the truth of epistemological theories of knowledge, and neither does nor is designed to apply to problems of theory selection or the underdetermination of theory by observation.¹

Those who find incredible my contention that Hegel is an epistemological realist might first read G. W. Cunningham's essay, "The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge."² Cunningham valiantly attacks numbers of mistaken impressions of Hegel's philosophy, many of which still have unwarranted currency today. Henry Harris, Hegel's most dedicated and sensitive expositor, remarks:

The balance of social influence has shifted so drastically between Hegel's time and ours ... from the religious to the scientific establishment, that Hegel's own contribution to this shift has itself become an obstacle to the right understanding of what he said. *He* wanted to swing religious consciousness into full support of a scientific interpretation of human life His own choice of language was conditioned by the Christian teaching, but also by the knowledge that the Christian doctrine of spirit was derived from Stoic sources.³

The Stoics were, of course, thoroughgoing materialists and naturalists. Strong evidence of Hegel's epistemological realism is interlaced throughout Harris's magnificent reconstruction of Hegel's early metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of nature. The present study aims to establish a proper understanding of Hegel's mature approach to defending epistemological realism in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and so to provide access to Hegel's very interesting views about empirical knowledge and its philosophical analysis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have worked on this study for a long time and in many places. I gratefully thank my friends, teachers, and colleagues who have contributed to my endeavors. I wish to extend special thanks to a number of them. Robert Brandom kindly allowed me to sit in on his stimulating seminar on Hegel's *Phenomenology* in the summer of 1983. For their kindness and perseverance in commenting on a very rough draft of this study written at that time, I thank Allen Wood, Peter King, and Frederick Beiser. Peter and Fred have been especially generous with their conversation, support, and enthusiasm. Peter also brought Sextus Empiricus to my attention and read over my discussion of Descartes. Michael Theunissen graciously supported my application to the DAAD and provided many insights into Hegel's philosophy in his seminar (co-taught with Ernst Tugendhat) on the "*Vorbegriff*" to Hegel's *Enzyklopädie*. Hans Friedrich Fulda kindly discussed with me a preliminary account of Hegel's criterial inference. Matthias Kettner has been a real source of stimulation and insight. Michael Hardimon spurred me on at crucial moments and stimulated many improvements in the final chapter. Ron Laymon insightfully suggested that I focus on Carnap for the purposes of Chapter Four and discussed and commented on drafts of that chapter. I heartily thank Robert Turnbull for many hours of friendly and fruitful conversation and for his comments on my treatment of Sextus Empiricus. William Alston stimulated several improvements in my discussion of his views. Bill Rowe and Rod Bertolet provided very helpful remarks on a number of points. None of these people is responsible for my failure to make better use of their advice.

Two people deserve very special thanks. My eternal gratitude goes to Alice Mae Westphal, who taught me at an early age not to settle for easy answers. And I extend my deepest gratitude to Frederick Will, whose writings and correspondence have provided much guidance and insight. He has been for me something most rare—an abiding source of philosophical wisdom.

The Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst generously supported my year at Die Freie Universität Berlin. I thank Nicholas Rescher, Editor of *The History of Philosophy Quarterly*, for permission to reprint material which appeared in Vol. 5 No. 2 of that journal under the title "Hegel's Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion." This material is dispersed through Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine. I thank Robert Turnbull, Editor of *Philosophy Research Archives*, for permission to reprint material which appeared first in Vol. XIII of that journal under the title "Sextus Empiricus *Contra* René Descartes." This material is reused in Chapters One and Two. Quotations from *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) are used by permission. Dianne deVries did a marvelous job of copy editing under relentless time constraints. Her services were funded by a Liberal Arts Faculty Research Support Grant at the University of New Hampshire. David Rohde of the university's Printing Services provided calm, friendly, and expert assistance in producing the final print-out of the book. The costs incurred in that printing were generously borne by a Projects and Programs Grant from the Center for the Humanities of the University of New Hampshire. I am grateful to each of these parties for their support.

NOTE ON CITATIONS

A list of abbreviations for frequently cited texts other than Hegel's appears in Appendix IV, pp. 204-206. Abbreviations used for citing Hegel's works are listed below. Full bibliographical information appears in the Bibliography. Kaufmann's translation of the Preface to the *Phenomenology* has been used. I have translated the brief Introduction to the *Phenomenology* in full. My translation appears in Appendix I, pp. 189-196. With the exception of the Preface, where no translator is named in the notes, the translation is my own. In all citations references are provided for the corresponding passages in the original German and in a standard English translation. (I have additionally provided references to Kaufmann's translation of the Preface and to Dove's translation of the Introduction, should the reader wish to consult their renderings.) Those of Hegel's texts that are divided into sections are cited by section number and, where relevant, by the Remark or *Zusatz* appended to each section. Hegel's Remarks are indicated by an "r" suffix following a section number; a *Zusatz* by a "z" suffix. Countenancing this bit of bilingualism avoids the ambiguity of "a" between "addition" and "*Anmerkung*."

Hegel's writing is notoriously dense and convoluted. Citing merely a page number is frequently insufficient to pick out the statement to which one intends to refer. This problem has been alleviated in part by the magnificent new critical edition of Hegel's *Gesammelte Werke*, in which the editors have provided line numbers. I have gratefully availed myself of these line numbers when referring to passages in Hegel's *Phänomenologie*. Referring to an English translation of the *Phenomenology* is not so easy, for no translator has provided such line numbers. Counting lines of text is a tedious process. I have therefore devised a simpler method for referring to line numbers in Miller's translation. I have used a "ruler," marked off in line numbers from 1 to 40, which can be laid down a page of text in order to determine line numbers. Such a ruler may be made by laying a strip of paper or card stock down a full page of text in Miller's translation, numbering each line of text along the edge of the strip. In using this gauge I have allowed simplicity to override accuracy in the following regards. First, if a heading appears at the top of a page, I have set the gauge at the first line of text, and not at the heading. Second, where a heading interrupts the body of the text, I have ignored the gaps this produces and "measured" from the top line of text on the page. Since the point of adopting line numbers is to facilitate a commentator's referring readers to Hegel's text, ease of use is paramount. I hope my readers will find my method useful, or at least useable. Where a whole paragraph is cited, I have included the paragraph numbers used in Miller's translation.

GW *Gesammelte Werke*. Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed.

Werke *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, eds.

G *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*. *Gesammelte Werke* Vol. 9.

M *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. A. V. Miller, tr.

- K 'The Preface to the *Phenomenology*.' W. Kaufmann, tr.
- D 'The Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.' K. R. Dove, tr.
- WL *Wissenschaft der Logik*. 2nd ed. *Werke* Vols. 5 and 6.
- SL *Hegel's Science of Logic*. A. V. Miller, tr.
- Enz. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*. *Werke* Vols. 8—10.
- = *Hegel's Logic*. (*Enzyklopädie* Vol. I.) W. Wallace, tr.
- + *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*. 3 Vols. (*Enzyklopädie* Vol. II.) M. J. Petry, tr.
- + *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*. (*Enzyklopädie* Vol. III.) W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, trs.
- VGP *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. *Werke* Vols. 18—20.
- LHP *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. 3 Vols. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, trs.

INTRODUCTION

Is there a way the world is regardless of how we think about it? If so, can we know the way the world is? Is knowledge a socio-historical phenomenon? Various philosophers in various periods have answered these questions differently, but rarely has it been thought that all three questions could be answered affirmatively. Hegel holds the controversial position that all three questions can be answered affirmatively. In so doing, Hegel rejects both skepticism—there may be a way the world is, but we can't know it—and what I call "subjectivism"—we can know the way the world is, but its structure or characteristics depend upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. I argue that Hegel defends what I call "epistemological realism": we can know the way the world is, even though it is not dependent upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. Many may find my contention surprising, but what is interesting is that he defends this realism by grounding it in a social and historical account of empirical knowledge.

Hegel recognizes that his position is controversial, and he recognizes that any position on these issues makes claims to know what empirical knowledge is. For these reasons, Hegel addresses a question that no one else has faced so directly: How can a theory of empirical knowledge be shown to be true, and so end the controversy within epistemology, without begging the question? One aim of Hegel's Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to pose this question in the course of enumerating some desiderata of any successful theory of empirical knowledge. The chief aim of his Introduction is to sketch a method for answering this question while providing an account of empirical knowledge that meets the desiderata he establishes. The main aim of the present study is to elucidate the desiderata Hegel establishes for the adequacy of any theory of empirical knowledge and to reconstruct the method Hegel proposes for meeting those desiderata.

Reconciling epistemological realism with a socially grounded theory of knowledge is a large project. It is a project that Hegel carries out not only through the whole of the *Phenomenology*, but also in his philosophy of mind and social philosophy.⁴ The full sweep of Hegel's project cannot be adequately recounted within the bounds of a single study. However, three important steps towards reconstructing Hegel's theory of empirical knowledge are made here. The first of these is to show that Hegel's project is to reconcile realism and a socio-historically grounded theory of knowledge. The second is to note several theses about knowledge and theories of knowledge, implied by Hegel's methodological considerations in the Introduction, which are important for reconciling realism with a socially grounded theory of knowledge. The third is to set out the structure of Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology* for a socio-historically grounded realist theory of knowledge.

Hegel's approach to these issues can best be understood by examining them in relation to three familiar, classic theories of knowledge: Rationalist Foundationalism, Critical Philosophy, and Empiricism. Hegel derives his epistemological desiderata from reflection on earlier theories of knowledge and on the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus. After summarizing Sextus's skeptical challenges to empirical knowledge and to epistemological claims about empirical knowledge, I show that, consciously or not, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston each respond to the skeptical problems Sextus poses. Demonstrating that these skeptical challenges are common concerns among Hegel and these other

epistemologists helps reintegrate Hegel's views with the main stream of theory of knowledge. I further emphasize the importance of Sextus's challenges by showing that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap each failed to handle them. I argue further that William Alston's view of the justification of epistemological claims about empirical knowledge fails to rebut Sextus's challenges to the justification of such claims and that his view supplies insufficient answers to some important questions. I then show that Hegel's method for analyzing empirical knowledge can handle both Sextus's challenges to empirical knowledge and his challenges to the justification of epistemological claims about empirical knowledge, and that it supplies more thorough answers to the questions left unresolved in Alston's view of the justification of epistemological claims.

Two more benefits are offered by examining these other theories of knowledge here. I argue that in their failures to answer Sextus's challenges, Descartes, Kant, and Carnap violate one or another of the desiderata Hegel establishes for epistemology. This shows that Hegel's desiderata carry important philosophical weight. One charge Hegel makes against traditional epistemology is that epistemologists have answered Sextus at the first-order level of concerns about empirical knowledge only to fall prey to Sextus's charges of circularity, dogmatism, or question-begging at the second-order level of concerns about the status of philosophical theories of knowledge. I show that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap are guilty of Hegel's charge. Part of Hegel's response to this is to hold that philosophical theories of knowledge must be knowable in accordance with their own principles.⁵ I show that Hegel's requirement of reflexive self-consistency undoes both Kant's and Carnap's rejections of realism.

A key tenet in Hegel's program for overcoming "subjectivism" (the view that the way the world is depends upon our cognitive or linguistic activity) is to reject the common tendency within epistemology to hold empirical knowledge claims answerable to philosophical theories about what empirical knowledge is. This tendency is due to granting epistemology priority over ontology. I show that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap did grant epistemology priority over ontology, and that this priority generates subjectivist accounts of knowledge in each of these cases.

Examining the failure of each of these theories of knowledge also provides an occasion for explaining and defending some important substantive points in Hegel's own theory of knowledge. Discussing the failure of Descartes's foundationalism allows me to show Hegel's rejection of the Modern Way of Ideas, and it allows me to show that Hegel's theory of knowledge is a deliberate alternative to foundationalism, in part because he rejects the ideal of incorrigibility and adopts fallibilism. Discussing Kant allows me to show that Hegel rejects transcendental idealism, an important point for understanding Hegel's own brand of "idealism," and also to suggest that transcendental *arguments* might be made independently of transcendental *idealism*, which is what Hegel proposes to do. Discussing Carnap allows me to show that there has been considerable confusion concerning "correspondence" as a criterion of truth and as an analysis of truth. Rejecting the former does not entail rejecting the latter. More importantly, I show that Hegel was well aware of the issues in philosophy of mind that engendered this *non sequitur*, namely, the recognition that we're incapable of "knowledge by acquaintance" and so are incapable of using correspondence as a criterion of truth. It is an explicit aim of Hegel's argument to reconcile a correspondence analysis of truth with a complex social philosophy of mind, a philosophy of mind incompatible with "knowledge by acquaintance." A final important point, implied by Hegel's analysis of self-criticism, is the rejection of descriptionalist theories of reference, that is, of the linguistic heirs to the Fregean slogan that "sense determines reference." Such theories of reference figure prominently in many current

arguments against realism. Hegel holds that this is only part of the story concerning reference, and that because it is only part of the story, we're in a position to critically revise the descriptionalist "senses" of our terminology.

The third step towards reconstructing Hegel's theory of empirical knowledge made in this study is to outline the structure of his argument for epistemological realism and its social bases as he propounds it in the *Phenomenology*. On Hegel's view, knowledge as a social phenomenon is possible because it is an activity engaged in a naturally structured world. By explicating this natural basis, Hegel avoids subjectivism in the course of developing his social account of empirical knowledge.

Hegel's Introduction divides into three parts. The first part sets out the problems Hegel address in the *Phenomenology* and his desiderata for their successful solution. A second part sketches the structure of Hegel's "phenomenological" program answering these problems and meeting these desiderata. A final part concerns the course and results of Hegel's argument as it is carried out. Hegel's Introduction is as brief as it is wide-ranging, so that considerable stage-setting and reconstruction is required in order to understand it. This study attempts to provide that reconstruction, and thus to provide access to Hegel's very interesting views about empirical knowledge and its philosophical analysis presented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The problems Hegel addresses and his desiderata for their solution are set out in Chapter One. This chapter analyzes the first part of Hegel's Introduction in connection with some general features of Modern epistemology and in close consideration of Sextus Empiricus. The character and significance of Hegel's issues are elaborated in Chapters Two through Five, which examine his problems and desiderata by analyzing their bearing on Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and Alston. The second and third parts of Hegel's Introduction, concerning the structure of his "phenomenological" program and the course of the argument he presents in the *Phenomenology*, are analyzed and reconstructed in Chapters Six through Nine. Chapter Ten sketches Hegel's basic ontology, showing that Hegel's "idealism" is an ontological holism that is, and is intended to be, fully consistent with epistemological realism. Chapter Eleven analyzes the structure of Hegel's argument presented in the *Phenomenology* for epistemological realism and the social and historical bases of empirical knowledge.

CHAPTER ONE

PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBLEMS WITH EPISTEMOLOGY

I. Knowledge as an "Instrument" or a "Medium"

At one point Hegel describes the task of the *Phenomenology* as "an investigation and critical examination into the reality of knowledge [*Erkennens*]."¹ Although this is a traditional topic in epistemology, Hegel objects strenuously to traditional approaches to it. Hegel's casual formulation of these issues stems from his desire to address both a general reading public as well as his often less than incisive philosophical contemporaries.² The casual tone of the opening paragraphs of the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, however, disguises both the complexity of the issues Hegel raises as well as the sophistication of his approach to them. As these paragraphs initiate Hegel's replacement of "epistemology" with a "phenomenology," I will examine them with some care.

Hegel opens his discussion by stating that

It is a natural idea that, in philosophy, one must first come to an understanding of knowledge before taking up the real subject matter, namely, the actual knowledge of what in truth is. Knowledge tends to be regarded as the instrument with which one seizes the absolute or as the medium through which one discovers it. The concern seems justified, partly that there may be various kinds of knowledge, one of which might be better suited than another for reaching that end goal, partly that by making an erroneous choice among them one would thus grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth; partly, too, when knowledge is taken to be a faculty of a determinate kind and scope, the concern seems justified that error would be grasped instead of truth unless the nature and limits of this faculty are still more precisely determined.³

The image of knowledge as a medium or instrument is recognizably Kantian, and the contrast between "clouds of error" and the "heaven of truth" recalls Kant's effort to chart a path between dogmatism and skepticism.⁴ Nevertheless these images are general ones; they could just as well refer to the medium of the "modern way of ideas" or to the instruments of various verification principles. Indeed most of the major figures in the modern period (and thereafter) were motivated to do epistemology as a first philosophy in order to clear away what they saw as clouds of error surrounding other substantive topics. Descartes sought the foundations of knowledge in order to establish something lasting in the sciences.⁵ Locke came to write his *Essay* due to controversies in theology.⁶ Berkeley argued for "immaterialism" on epistemological grounds in order to stem the atheism which results from materialism.⁷ And Hume endeavored in his *Treatise* to provide a "study of man" as a foundation for all other sciences.⁸ Each of these philosophers took epistemology as the foundation for settling other substantive philosophical disputes, and the vigorous philosophical reaction to Kant offered a whole range of theories of knowledge (e.g., those of Fichte, Jacobi, Krug, Rheinhold, Schulze, and Schelling).⁹ Hegel recognizes the need to sort through this welter of alternatives and achieve some consensus about and comprehension of what knowledge is. Though generally not mentioning these philosophers or their

views by name, one of Hegel's chief aims in the *Phenomenology* is to develop just this comprehension and consensus. Hegel's Introduction accordingly sketches a method for attaining such comprehension—without prejudicing the issue.

If Hegel seeks to avoid prejudicing the issue of his investigation, how can he introduce the term "the absolute" in his opening sentence? Another look at that sentence supplies the answer: "the absolute" as used here is simply a term for "what in truth is"—nothing more and nothing less. This characterization is abstract enough not to prejudice the issue of what knowledge and its objects are.¹⁰ Hegel's own (very elaborate) doctrines concerning the character of "what in truth is" must be developed out of an investigation of what there is, just like any one else's account. I will speak of "the world" in my discussion in order to use a term less ponderous than "the absolute"; Hegel's meaning will not be affected by this minor colloquialization.

Another point of interest in Hegel's opening paragraph is his describing epistemologists as holding that knowledge is an "instrument" or a "medium." The metaphor of knowledge as an "instrument" suggests an activist epistemology while that of knowledge as a "medium" suggests a passive account of knowledge. What does Hegel say about these metaphors? He charges that commitment to these metaphors already commits one to skepticism about the world. The passage quoted above continues:

Indeed, this concern must transform itself into the conviction that there is an absurdity in the concept of even beginning to obtain for consciousness that which is in-itself through knowledge, and that a strict limit divides knowledge from the absolute.¹¹

Skepticism results from either of these models:

For if knowledge is the instrument to seize the absolute essence, one recalls immediately that the application of an instrument to a thing does not leave the thing as it is, but brings about a forming and alteration of it. Or, if knowledge is not an instrument for our activity, but more or less a passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive this truth as it is in itself, but as it is in and through this medium.¹²

Loose as these characterizations may be, upon reading this passage it is hard not to take Kant as a representative epistemological activist and Locke as a representative passivist and to recall their similar predicament: Kant's unknowable "thing in itself" and Locke's embarrassing "thing I know not what." The general result is the same whether one is an epistemic activist or passivist:

In both cases we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its aim; or, rather, the absurdity lies in our making use of a means at all.¹³

If knowledge is a connection between us and the world, then we can be sure that we don't take in the world as it is. We may as well capitulate to the skeptic. Though the extent to which reliance on such metaphors can support philosophical conclusions can (and shortly will) be questioned, Hegel's discussion first should be followed a bit further.

Hegel emphasizes the skepticism implicit in these metaphors by indicating the futility of three responses to these difficulties that stop short of rejecting the metaphors. One response is to determine what alterations are incurred by applying a cognitive instrument to the world and factoring the distortions out of the resulting knowledge.¹⁴ Hegel remarks:

Unfortunately, this improvement would only bring us back to our point of departure. If we remove what the instrument has done from a formed thing, then the thing (in this case the absolute) is to us just as it was before this superfluous effort.¹⁵

This is to say, in such a revision the world becomes disconnected from our knowledge altogether, for making this connection was the chief alteration effected by our cognitive instrument.

If instead we suppose that our cognitive instrument simply brings the world closer to us without otherwise altering it, "like a bird caught by a lime-twig,"¹⁶ then our instrumental and critical efforts are a ruse: If knowledge were so easy to achieve, the whole problem never would have arisen; there would be disputes neither about how the world is nor about what knowledge is. Commitment to the instrument metaphor for cognition is commitment to distorted cognition.

Alternatively, if one drops the image of epistemic instruments and tries instead to correct the refraction of one's cognitive medium, Hegel says that this, too, is useless because

{K}nowledge, through which the truth reaches us, is the ray of light itself rather than its refraction; and if this be removed, then no more than an indication of pure direction or empty place would be indicated to us.¹⁷

Subtracting the ray of truth itself results in cognitive darkness. Both metaphors for knowledge are at best paradoxical and at worst skeptical capitulations. Using a cognitive means at all is apparently self-defeating.

What conclusions follow from the difficulties involved in these metaphors? Does anything follow from them? Hegel seems to construe the difficulties too categorically: either one applies a means and incurs its distortions, or one refrains from its application, avoids its distortions, but forgoes any knowledge. Why not make a more careful response, one that distinguishes between those aspects of the use of a cognitive means to comprehend the world and those aspects of that usage that distort one's comprehension? And having done so, why not 'subtract' the distortion from the comprehension? If there is a remainder—and Hegel hasn't shown that there wouldn't be—this would be objective information, even if mediated.¹⁸ On the face of it this is a plausible rejoinder, insofar as dealing in such metaphors is plausible at all, and so Hegel's objections to them are not, so far as they go, convincing. Has he failed to make his case right from the start?

II. Four Assumptions of Epistemology

I suggest that Hegel has not gone astray from the start, for he doesn't so much wean philosophical conclusions from metaphorical considerations as prepare his readers for several specific questions concerning the epistemological enterprise. The principal issue in Modern (as well as contemporary) epistemology is the nature of our knowledge and its objects. Taken at an extreme, it is the problem of whether we have knowledge of the "external world": the problem of whether the objects of empirical knowledge exist and have characteristics not dependent on our cognitive activity. This is the concern expressed in the metaphors of knowledge as an instrument or a medium. This problem was especially pressing for post-Kantians of all stripes, for Kant famously denied the "transcendental reality" of the objects of empirical knowledge. On his view, transcendentally real objects—objects that existed and had characteristics independent of our cognitive activ-

ity—were unknowable "things-in-themselves." "Things-in-themselves" were viewed by post-Kantians as absolute reality, reality unqualified by reference to ourselves, and Hegel's use of the term "the absolute" reflects this view. This reaction to Kant raises the issue of the "reality" of knowledge. "Real" knowledge would be knowledge of "real" objects, objects not dependent on us for their existence or characteristics. This is the view I have labeled "epistemological realism."

In pursuing this issue, Hegel makes a radical break with traditional epistemology by claiming that the issue of epistemological realism cannot be adequately addressed by treating epistemology as first philosophy. He works up to this claim gradually, beginning with the suggestion that the philosophical mistrust which generates the demand for an epistemological certification of knowledge should itself be mistrusted:

As a matter of fact, this [epistemological] fear [of error] presupposes something, indeed a great deal, as truth; and it bases its hesitations and inferences on assumption whose truth should be examined first. It presupposes, namely, [1] *notions* about *knowledge* as an *instrument* and a *medium*, and also [2] the notion that there is a *difference between ourselves and this knowledge*; but above all, it presupposes that [3] the absolute stands *on one side* and that *knowledge*, although it is *on the other side*, for itself and separated from the absolute, is nevertheless something real. Hence it assumes that [4] knowledge may be true despite its presupposition that knowledge is outside the absolute and so outside the truth as well. By taking this position, what calls itself fear of error reveals itself as a fear of the truth.¹⁹

Hegel's general point is that the skeptical concerns motivating epistemology, especially epistemology conceived as a foundational propaedeutic to empirical knowledge (the "natural idea" mentioned in the first sentence of the Introduction), is only plausible if certain assumptions legitimating that epistemological project are tenable. Hegel claims that these assumptions themselves need to be examined and assessed.

Specifically, he indicates first that the epistemological project supposes that knowledge is some sort of connection between knowers and the world, an "instrument" or "medium" (however construed) through which we come to know the world. This supposition requires clarification and examination at least as much as do the problems that these suppositions are to guide us in addressing. Of course this supposition was made much clearer in Modern theories of knowledge. This supposition is the "Modern way of ideas," a view according to which we are directly aware of mental representations, which, when veridical, give us indirect awareness of the worldly objects that cause them or that they resemble. Hegel rejects this view, and he begins to call it into question by calling for the clarification of its underlying presupposition, namely, that the 'means' of knowledge intervenes between us and the objects of knowledge.

Hegel's second point is harder to decipher. What does it mean to say that there is a "difference between ourselves and this knowledge"? One of Hegel's letters to his editor Niethammer sheds some light on this point:

[Fries's] pure general logic ... starts out: "The first *means* employed by the understanding in its process of *thinking* are concepts," as if chewing and swallowing food were merely a means of eating, and as if the understanding still did much else besides thinking.²⁰

Hegel apparently objects to the image of knowledge as an instrument because it presumes that, knowledge being an instrument, the cognizing subject is something other than this instrument, something that employs this instrument, and thus something that could pick it

up or set it down at will, perhaps in order to examine it. Similarly, the image of knowledge as a medium presumes that the object and subject of knowledge stand on opposite sides of an intervening medium—knowledge—the subject being an independent entity attempting to decipher the object through this medium. In contrast to the separations presupposed by these metaphors, Hegel will be arguing that the subject just *is* its thinking (and willing, etc.) and that, as Quentin Lauer has put it, "the concept is not a means employed in order to grasp; it is the very activity of grasping the object."²¹ It is no accident that Hegel generally uses the word "*Erkennen*," a substantive form of the infinitive for a German verb "to know" ("*erkennen*"), for "knowledge." This word bridges the process/product ambiguity and helps Hegel to suggest that skeptical worries about knowledge as a product stem from abstracting that product from the process or activity of knowing. To anticipate a bit, Hegel holds that representations are not introspectable psychological states, but are signs (mental or otherwise) which are used in organizing our interaction with and experience of things.²²

Hegel's third point, that these epistemological images presuppose that knowledge is something "real" even though it is "separated from the absolute," is harder to interpret. It seems that Hegel is making the point that these epistemological metaphors presume—as has been presumed in Modern and contemporary epistemology—that human knowledge is something that can be investigated by epistemology without invoking any commitments to whether anyone knows anything about the world and without investigating the actual activity of knowing the world.²³ The point can be put by borrowing a distinction from Kant between knowledge of objects and transcendental knowledge. Kant states:

I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*.²⁴

As mathematical and logical knowledge is not a topic of the present discussion, Kant's distinction will be taken in a sense restricted to knowledge of worldly objects, *i.e.*, to empirical knowledge. If empirical knowledge is designated as "first-order knowledge," then transcendental knowledge is second-order knowledge about certain aspects of empirical knowledge. The relevant aspects of empirical knowledge are those which can be known *a priori*. This restriction is necessary, transcendental or second-order knowledge must be *a priori*, because the existence and status of first-order empirical knowledge is in question and so recourse to empirical, *a posteriori* knowledge would either be circular or question-begging. Borrowing this terminology, Hegel's third point is that the epistemological project assumes that one can pursue transcendental knowledge without commitment either to the existence or to the validity of first-order empirical knowledge. I shall show below that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap do assume that some such level and kind of analysis is possible.²⁵ Is this a legitimate or even tenable assumption? To anticipate a point that can only be developed later, Hegel's answer is that this is not. Indeed, he goes further and maintains that conceiving of epistemology as first philosophy in this way involves granting epistemology priority over ontology, and that granting priority to epistemology leads ineluctably to contending that the objects of knowledge depend for their existence or characteristics on our cognitive activity. Granting epistemology priority over ontology leads to subjectivism.

Hegel's fourth point is open to a milder and a stronger reading. The milder reading construes his point as follows. The task of epistemology is to determine what empirical knowledge is and whether we have any. It seeks to fulfill this task without committing itself either to the existence or to the investigation of actual empirical knowledge (following

the previous point). Rather it assumes that the epistemologist should remain neutral on these points. However, to study something effectively one should study it in its "true" form, or as it really is. Hence the epistemological project assumes that knowledge is what it "truly" or "really" is even when it is taken in abstraction from its putative object, the world. Is this a legitimate or even tenable contention?

A stronger reading of Hegel's fourth point builds on the second and third points and puts the issue more reflexively and critically. Following Hegel's third point, epistemologists propose to examine the existence and nature of first-order empirical knowledge, and to do so while leaving open the question of whether there is any such knowledge. However, an epistemological investigation purports to secure second-order, transcendental knowledge about first-order empirical knowledge. Hegel's fourth point is to ask: Is it legitimate to harbor serious doubts about first-order empirical knowledge without considering analogous doubts about second-order transcendental knowledge? If a theory of knowledge is skeptical; if it harbors serious doubts about knowledge of the world, whether these doubts are methodological, hypothetical, or substantive; shouldn't that theory be equally skeptical about its own claims and ability to know anything about what knowledge is? If there is the sort of difference between ourselves and our knowledge that these metaphors presume (*per* point two), if we were to set down our cognitive instrument, what would we have left to use in investigating that instrument? In the limiting case of supposing that we know nothing of how anything really is, we also cannot know the putative fact that we know nothing about how anything really is. As will be shown below (Chapters Two—Four), epistemologists who have entertained grave doubts about our knowledge of the world or who have argued that there are serious limits to that knowledge have at the same time given far too little attention to the question, How can such epistemological claims be known? And they have given even less attention to answering that question. This is an important Kantian desideratum for any theory of knowledge that Hegel fully endorses. Any theory of knowledge that cannot itself be known in accordance with the principles it lays down for knowledge is *ipso facto* inadequate because it cannot legitimate its own claims to (transcendental) knowledge.²⁶ Though it may not be logically impossible to defend second-order transcendental knowledge while rejecting first-order empirical knowledge (an *a priori* defense of empirical skepticism *may* be possible), many philosophical theories of knowledge founder on this requirement, especially those that are subjectivist.

Hegel contends that epistemology conceived as a preliminary to empirical knowledge presumes that knowledge can be studied independently of actual cognition of the world, a presumption that leads quickly in a skeptical direction. He further points out that the notions of knowledge as an instrument or a medium *follow from* a basically skeptical position, a position that presumes that knowledge is cut off from the world. He states that

[N]otions ... and locutions about knowledge as an instrument to take hold of the absolute or as a medium through which we discover the truth, and so on— ... all these notions of a knowledge separated from the absolute and an absolute separated from knowledge no doubt lead to some such talk about knowledge as a relation.²⁷

With this aside Hegel notes if only in passing the fundamentally skeptical orientation of Modern epistemology—a point well worth noting if one is out to defend epistemological realism, and to do so by replacing epistemology with phenomenology.²⁸ Hegel rather bluntly admonishes epistemology for harboring skeptical assumptions by charging that, "by taking this position, what calls itself fear of error reveals itself as the fear of the truth,"²⁹

thereby answering affirmatively his earlier question of whether such fear of error is not itself the error of epistemology.³⁰

These four challenges to traditional epistemology pose serious considerations for any account of knowledge to meet. However, these desiderata alone do not suffice to distinguish adequate from inadequate theories of knowledge, for they do not exhaust the relevant criteria of adequacy for theories of knowledge. This topic is broached by the central challenge to epistemology considered in Hegel's Introduction: the dilemma of the criterion.

III. The Problem of Adjudicating Between Fundamentally Different Conceptual Schemes

A thicket of problems confronts anyone interested in adjudicating between fundamentally different conceptual schemes. Such problems arise in Hegel's attempt to discriminate between what knowledge really is and what it merely appears to be. How can such a discrimination be made without begging the question? Hegel poses these problems directly, if briefly, in the Introduction, for he seeks to distinguish the actual knowledge contained in philosophical "science" [*Wissenschaft*] from its sham opponents. The German term "*Wissenschaft*" refers to any systematically organized body of knowledge, and thus not only to the natural and social sciences but to philosophy as well. Hegel's ultimate aim is to defend his claims to philosophical knowledge. I focus on Hegel's approach to the problems of empirical knowledge and especially to the problems of the justification of second-order epistemological claims about empirical knowledge, because on Hegel's view philosophical knowledge includes a kind of empirical knowledge and indeed philosophical knowledge presupposes the results of empirical science. This point deserves emphasis. Hegel's ultimate rejection of the priority of epistemology over metaphysics does not, as many critics have charged, lead Hegel to pursue metaphysics unbridled by any cognitive concerns. On the contrary, Hegel's view is that "speculative" metaphysics is answerable to actual scientific and historical knowledge of the world: "It is not only that philosophy must accord with the experience nature gives rise to; in its *formation* and in its *development*, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics."³¹ To be answerable to actual knowledge, however, is importantly different than being answerable to a *philosophical theory* about what that knowledge is. Hegel's defense of claims to philosophical knowledge thus involves facing skeptical and subjectivist challenges to empirical-scientific knowledge, and accordingly these epistemological issues take up much of the body of the *Phenomenology*. The *Phenomenology* is, after all, Hegel's introduction to and propaedeutic for the positive exposition of his philosophical views given in the *Science of Logic*, the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, and in his lectures. There has been controversy concerning whether the *Phenomenology* retained this introductory status in Hegel's eyes and in his system, but Hans Friedrich Fulda has argued convincingly that it should and does remain the point of entry to Hegel's philosophy.³² I concur with Fulda's judgment and propose to provide a point of entry to Hegel's *Phenomenology* by analyzing the problems to which it responds and the method Hegel employs in his response.

In posing the problem of distinguishing genuine knowledge from its illusory alternatives, Hegel takes knowledge as a human phenomenon—an aspect of human life—and asks how to determine if apparent knowledge is the genuine article.³³

[I]f this presentation [conducted in the *Phenomenology*] is regarded as a relation of science to apparent knowledge, and as an investigation and examination of the reality of knowledge, it seems that it cannot occur without one or another presupposition which would serve as the fundamental standard. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard and in determining, on the basis of the resulting agreement or disagreement with the standard, whether what is being tested is correct or incorrect. Thus the standard as such, and science too, were it the standard, is accepted as the *essence* or the *in itself*. But here, where science first arrives, neither science nor anything else has justified itself as the essence or as the in itself; and without something of this sort it seems that an examination cannot occur.³⁴

What is to be made of this dilemma? Is this a problem to be solved or avoided? An appreciation of this problem can be gained by considering its classical formulation as an argument purporting to show that no such criterion can be established, the "dilemma of the criterion" propounded by Sextus Empiricus.³⁵ The obvious congruence between Hegel's and Sextus's dilemmas is no surprise, for Hegel wrote an extended analysis of Modern and classical skepticism for the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, though his understanding of the significance of Sextus's tropes shifts importantly by the time Hegel wrote the *Phenomenology*.³⁶ At the time he wrote the "Skepticismus" essay (1801), Hegel was still largely an orthodox Schellingian and he used Sextus's tropes to subvert conceptual knowledge in order to prepare his audience for having direct "intellectual intuitions" of reality. Hegel's shift away from the dogmatic self-confidence of Fichte and Schelling and towards a self-critical stance is marked by the fragment bearing the incipit "Anmerkung 1. Die Philosophie," written probably in the summer of 1804, in which he notes the problem of question begging.³⁷ The *Phenomenology* of 1807 marks Hegel's express break with Fichte's and Schelling's intuitionism, for here he argues against intuitive knowledge and defends the conceptual grasp of reality. Thus in the *Phenomenology* he views Sextus's skepticism as a challenge to be answered. The next section of this chapter summarizes several central features of Sextus's Pyrrhonism, in addition to the dilemma of the criterion. The problem of skepticism has been so central to the Modern epistemological turn that it is worth examining these additional points in Sextus's presentation of Pyrrhonian skepticism, for they will help clarify the range of problems Hegel addresses.³⁸

IV. Some Principles of Pyrrhonian Skepticism

A. SOME DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN APPEARANCE AND REALITY

All of Sextus's arguments in his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* presuppose a distinction between appearance and reality.³⁹ This contrast has such a varied history that it requires some consideration. There are several different distinctions between appearance and reality at issue in Sextus's writings. One of these is a roughly Platonic distinction between the appearances of things and the reality of the eternal forms in which they participate. Another is a materialist distinction between the molar characteristics of common objects and the fundamental reality of their physical microstructure. A third is a distinction between the apparent qualities of things and the qualities they really have by nature. A fourth distinction between appearance and reality is one involved in any (broadly construed) representational theory of perception between the sensory qualities a perceived object produces in us and the qualities that object has independent of its being perceived. These distinctions concern different kinds of issues and should not be conflated.

Sextus's skepticism aims to convince us (or at least his contemporaries) of three general points.⁴⁰ First, there is no adequate Platonic or atomistic explanation of the world as it appears to us, so there is no point in engaging in interminable dispute about the realities postulated by such theories. Second, there is no way of legitimately attributing characteristics of things apparent to us to the "real nature" of those things, and so there is no point in disputing which characteristics of things apparent to us are ones that they *really* have.⁴¹ Finally, there is no way of insuring that sense impressions present the actual characteristics of things to us, so there is no point in engaging in interminable dispute about the real (as opposed to the merely apparent) characteristics of the world. Being convinced of these views does not, however, preclude Sextus or any other (classical) skeptic from having opinions about everyday objects and events. The opinions Sextus expresses are those he is compelled to have, not ones that he rationally justifies. Sextus shares the opinions of his fellows, even opinions about how things are, with two qualifications. Sextus doesn't take his opinions about how things are in any sense of "are" which contrasts with a philosopher's sense of "mere appearance" and so makes no claims about how things *really* are,⁴² and he doesn't take his being compelled by nature to believe certain things as any sort of evidence that those beliefs might be true.

Another distinction important to Sextus's skepticism is one between what is evident and what is non-evident. The distinction might be rendered in ordinary English as one between what is obvious and what is obscure, where what is obvious is known non-inferentially and without relying on signs or any mediating indicator.⁴³ The dogmatic effort to make knowledge claims about what is real involves two claims: something's being evident involves knowledge of that thing, and knowledge of such things can ground arguments that support knowledge of non-evident or obscure things. Sextus's skepticism attacks the canons of inference used in mounting such arguments, and it attacks the claim that something's being evident involves knowledge of that thing. What is obvious or evident on Sextus's view are things as they appear to us, but their appearing to us in certain ways does not license claims about what things really are like. With these points in mind, some of Sextus's main arguments may be considered.

B. SKEPTICISM AND REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

Stoic epistemology developed a variety of doctrines analogous to the "Modern way of ideas," and Sextus challenged these doctrines on two fundamental counts. The comparison between classical, Modern, and contemporary philosophy of mind is a delicate affair, but Sextus's challenges are so fundamental that they survive translation into these different contexts. Thus the details of the differences between the philosophies of mind current in these periods need not be a hinderance.⁴⁴ The terms Bury translates as "sense impressions" or "affections of the senses," "mental states," and "mental conceptions" are, in most cases, *phantasiai*, *pathé*, and *ennoiai*, respectively. The sense of *phantasia* varies from thinker to thinker, but when not used to designate a faculty (*i.e.*, the imagination) it generally connotes a sensory or imaginary presentation, often one that can be affirmed or denied. *Pathé* are literally passions or affections of the mind, including pains, pleasures, grief, and perhaps all moods and emotions. *Ennoiai* are general discursive conceptions. Associating these latter two with our sense of "mental" is troublesome, because "mental" is currently too Cartesian.⁴⁵

One of Sextus's challenges to the epistemic reliability of "ideas" or (re)presentations is that there is no way to determine whether or not such states are similar to their putative objects. The problem Sextus poses for sensory affections is quite general:

Nor, again, is it possible to assert that the soul apprehends external realities by means of the affections of sense owing to the similarity of the affections of the senses to the external real objects. For how is the intellect to know whether the affections of the senses are similar to the objects of sense when it has not itself encountered the external objects, and the senses do not inform it about their real nature but only about their own affections ... ?⁴⁶

It is worth pointing out that Sextus's claim that the senses do not inform the intellect about the real nature of objects, but rather about the states of the senses, contains a confusion often found in the Modern period: the shift from claiming that we are aware of outer objects by means of sensory states that (re)present them to claiming that we are aware of our (re)presentations.⁴⁷ This point aside, Sextus has fingered a real difficulty for any theory undertaking the establishment of the resemblance or representational reliability of the senses, namely, proving that sensory states are reliable when there can be no independent access to the relation between those states and their putative objects.⁴⁸ This is the problem Hegel discusses under the metaphors of knowledge as an instrument or a medium. Shifting from the view that we are aware of outer objects by means of sensory states that (re)present them to the view that we are aware of our (re)presentations is virtually inevitable if one takes epistemology as a first philosophy aimed at defeating skepticism.

Sextus points out that sensory presentations cannot all be accepted because there are apparent inconsistencies among them.⁴⁹ The problem is that it is then difficult to determine on what basis to accept them piecemeal:

[I]f we are to believe some [presentations], how shall we decide that it is proper to believe these and disbelieve those? ... [I]f [those who make knowledge claims] say "by aid of presentation," how will they select the presentation which they are adopting for the purpose of judging all the other presentations? Once again they will need a second presentation to judge the first, and a third to judge the second, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to judge an infinite series⁵⁰

The need indicated here is for an applicable standard to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sensory states.⁵¹ This problem generates two kinds of regresses. One is a regress of claims at the same epistemic level: e.g., one perceptual belief is cited to justify another perceptual belief. Another is a regress of epistemic levels: e.g., a perceptual belief is justified by citing a principle concerning the justificatory status of perceptual beliefs, and this principle is justified by some still higher-level principle. Sextus presses each of these kinds of regress.

C. THE PROBLEM OF REGRESS AND CIRCULARITY

Sextus deploys some seventeen modes of argument in three groups in order to confute various claims to knowledge. The second group of five modes is of particular interest here for it contains a classical formulation of the justificatory regress argument and two associated alternatives. Sextus states:

The [second] Mode based upon regress *ad infinitum* is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a proof of the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that the consequence is suspension, as we possess no starting-point for our argument We have the [fourth] Mode based on hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being forced to recede *ad infinitum*, take as their starting-point something which they do not establish by argument but claim to assume as granted simply and without demonstration. The [fifth] Mode of circular reasoning is the form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter of inquiry requires confirmation

derived from that matter; in this case, being unable to assume either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.⁵²

The regress argument and its adjuncts concerning circularity and mere assumption plainly concern *demonstrating* that knowledge claims are true. Demonstrating that and how we have empirical knowledge has been and remains a central preoccupation of epistemology. The endlessness of a chain of justification is not itself the crucial point of Sextus's tropes; the pressing problem is one of avoiding dogmatism and question-begging at whatever point one takes justification to be final.

D. THE DILEMMA OF THE CRITERION

Sextus presses the problem of a regress of levels of justification by posing the following dilemma:

[I]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who make knowledge claims] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress *ad infinitum*. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning.⁵³

This dilemma is the model for the problem Hegel posed in the passage quoted above.⁵⁴ The problem cited is one of settling disputes—disputes about the principles appropriate for settling disputes, more specifically, for settling disputes about appropriate criteria for assessing knowledge claims. Though this type of dispute is a meta-level or (in the present case) transcendental dispute, insofar as the claims at issue concern what knowledge is, it is plain that such meta-level disputes could quickly develop from disputes about first-order knowledge claims—or so it would seem from the variety of epistemological positions developed by philosophers in their concern over establishing first-order knowledge claims.⁵⁵ Insofar as establishing first-order knowledge claims involves demonstrating that those claims are warranted, transcendental claims about what knowledge is and how to distinguish it from error would be invoked. Of course these transcendental claims, too, require warrants. Thus the problem of adjudicating among different claims to first-order knowledge recurs on a higher level as a problem of adjudicating among differing claims to transcendental knowledge. At this point, when what is called for are coordinated warrants for three types of claims (first-order claims, transcendental claims about the principles warranting those first-order claims, and claims warranting these transcendental claims), the problem can look insoluble, if not infinitely regressive. The threat of an infinite regress is not the main problem. That threat is only a way of emphasizing the fact that the problem of dogmatism or question begging and the issue of a claim's justification arise any time a claim is made, even, or especially, when those claims are about what empirical knowledge is. Halting the regress of levels of justification would require reaching some level of analysis that can explain and justify itself as well as the preceding level. Sextus may well seem the wiser for having been compelled to suspend judgment by the multitude of divergent first principles propounded by various philosophies.⁵⁶ Sextus's arguments are best construed as attacks on attempts to provide analyses and defenses of claims to empirical knowledge. It

is at this second-order level that Hegel poses and addresses Sextus's challenges. This problem of the justification of epistemological claims is central among the issues of this study.

E. CONTRAPOSITION ARGUMENTS

In actually attacking claims made by others Sextus does not focus simply on the putative inadequacy of their proofs. He also offers arguments or claims opposed to and equiplausible with the arguments or claims made by an opponent.⁵⁷ The point of such equiposed counter-arguments is not the establishment of some other position, but rather to induce a suspension of judgment in the face of an apparently undecidable pair of options. This is perhaps Sextus's favored method, a method typical of classical skepticism although almost lost to the Modern, and certainly to the contemporary, period.⁵⁸ (One reason that the method of contraposition may have fallen into disuse among modern and contemporary skeptics is that later periods have enjoyed a greater consensus about what would count as adequate canons or principles of proof.⁵⁹) One of the reasons Hegel reconsiders classical skepticism is that he takes seriously the charge that adopting any particular set of principles may prejudice the issue or beg the question against dissenters—even dissenters who deny the law of non-contradiction.⁶⁰ Since Hegel's project is one of determining how basic principles of reasoning can be assessed, revised, and justified, his project can benefit from reexamining classical skepticism precisely because principles of reasoning were not taken for granted in that period.⁶¹

F. KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, AND SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT

It is important to note that Sextus shares with his dogmatic opponents the Platonic notion that there is a truth about things and that knowledge of it would be knowledge of something constant and self-consistent. He is quite explicit in his rejection of any sort of Protagorean identification of things with their various appearances.⁶² This needn't be viewed as a careless bit of dogmatism on his part, for the Greek notion of truth involved not only a propositional sense of truth but also a sense found in calling someone a true friend: Something's being true involves its being constant and thus being dependable.⁶³ His point is only that, by any account of knowledge and nature that he's seen yet, knowledge of the changeless truth of things is not humanly attainable. Unlike the Academic skeptics, who claim that we actually cannot know anything, Sextus patiently goes on looking.⁶⁴ The skeptical way of life is to follow "appearances" dispassionately and to avoid making pointlessly contentious claims about "reality." Sextus states:

[C]oncerning matters of dispute which admit of no decision it is impossible to make an assertion.⁶⁵

Non-assertion, then, is avoidance of assertion in the general sense in which it is said to include both affirmation and negation, so that non-assertion is a mental condition of ours because of which we refuse either to affirm or to deny anything. Hence it is plain that we adopt non-assertion also not as though things are in reality of such a kind as wholly to induce non-assertion, but as indicating that we now, at the time of uttering it, are in this condition regarding the problems before us now. ... [W]e yield to those things which move us emotionally and drive us compulsorily to assent.⁶⁶

In view of his closing remark about compulsory assertion, one wonders what Sextus might say about a causal-reliability account of knowledge. It is plain that it does not appear to

him that compulsory assent involves any sort of knowledge, at least not of how things really are.

VI. Summary and Prospects

The next four chapters have four related aims. One aim is to show the importance of Sextus's challenges to empirical knowledge and to the justification of philosophical theories of knowledge by showing that the problems he poses are addressed, explicitly or implicitly, by Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and Alston. Showing this and showing that Hegel responds to these same problems should help to reintegrate Hegel substantially with the main stream of epistemology.

The second aim is to show that Hegel has something to offer epistemology insofar as he has identified difficulties in epistemology that have so far been unresolved, if not unaddressed, and has offered solutions to them. I substantiate these claims by examining four widely diverse responses to Sextus's challenges. The difficulties faced by these theories of knowledge are typically faced by their variants and near-relatives, a number of which will be discussed in passing. Descartes accepts the skeptical challenge and attempts to respond to it directly by defending a realist epistemology. Kant accepts a large measure of skepticism in his combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism; in defending the "empirical" objectivity of knowledge, he defends a subjectivist account of empirical knowledge. Carnap attempts to undo both epistemology and the issue of realism by replacing epistemology with the logical analysis of scientific languages. Alston attempts to undo Sextus's skeptical challenges by rejecting the conception of justification on which they depend. I shall argue that neither Descartes, Kant, nor Carnap succeed in resolving Sextus's challenges to empirical knowledge. (Alston has not offered a substantive epistemology, and so cannot be considered in this regard.) More importantly, I shall argue that none of these philosophers, including Alston, have resolved Sextus's challenges to the justification of philosophical theories of knowledge.

The third aim of the following four chapters is to develop strong support for three of Hegel's specific theses about epistemology and its status. First, I will show that his requirement that an epistemology be reflexively self-consistent is a strong and important desideratum insofar as both Kant and Carnap fail to meet this desideratum with dire consequences. Moreover, this desideratum is important for defending realism, for in each case their failure to meet this desideratum directly undermines their subjectivist accounts of knowledge. Second, I will show that Hegel is right to reject the status of epistemology as first philosophy, because granting epistemology priority over ontology results in a subjectivist account of knowledge, not only in the views of Kant and Carnap but in Descartes as well. Third, examining the failure of Descartes's views will give much support to Hegel's contention that epistemology cannot be pursued independently of commitments to the existence and nature of empirical knowledge. I will show that there is substantial agreement on many points between Hegel and Alston concerning the justification of epistemological claims about empirical knowledge. However, I will argue that Alston has not undone Sextus's challenges to the justification of epistemological claims. Thus I will defend the legitimacy of Hegel's addressing those challenges, and I will show that Hegel's method supplies more thorough answers than Alston to some important questions concerning the justification of second-order epistemological claims.

The fourth aim of the following chapters is to provide some explanation of and support for several substantive points of Hegel's epistemology. These points are revealed by noting

some crucial failures of the analyses offered by Descartes, Kant, and Carnap. The failure of Descartes's analysis of empirical knowledge gives strong support to Hegel's rejection of foundationalism and of representational accounts of perceptual knowledge. The failure of Kant's arguments for transcendental idealism allows me to show that Hegel is not a transcendental idealist, although he does adopt something similar to a transcendental mode of argumentation from Kant. The failure of Carnap's attempt to undo the issue of epistemological realism allows me to show two important points. First, unlike many twentieth-century epistemologists, Hegel realizes the importance of distinguishing between correspondence as an analysis of truth and correspondence as a criterion of truth. Second, Hegel realizes that a primary desideratum for a realist theory of knowledge is to reconcile a correspondence analysis of truth with the kind of complex philosophy of mind that undermines "knowledge by acquaintance" and thus undermines correspondence as a criterion of truth.

CHAPTER TWO

DESCARTES'S DEFENSE OF THE METAPHYSICAL CERTAINTY OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

I. Descartes's Problematic

A. INTRODUCTION

Descartes quite consciously set out to defend not only the objectivity but even the "metaphysical" certainty of knowledge against classical skepticism, claiming that ancient doubts about mathematics would have been allayed had the ancients done what they could well have done, namely, to recognize the existence of God.¹ Though he doesn't explicitly identify classical skepticism as his target in the *Meditations*, in the *Replies* and elsewhere he refers to "skeptics" and to "Pyrrhonians",² and he describes his injunction to rely only on clear and distinct ideas as a rule for searching after truth and as a "criterion" of truth.³ These remarks are not just afterthoughts, for the Cartesian program does respond to Sextus's challenges—even if it cannot meet them.⁴ Sextus's challenges come roughly to three: positive knowledge claims cannot avoid the dilemma of being either circular or dogmatic; for any positive claim made, an equiplausible, incompatible alternative is available; and once a distinction between appearance and reality is made, there is no legitimate way of discriminating between veridical and non-veridical appearances. Although it has become a veritable industry among commentators to clear Descartes of the charge of circularity, I will argue that taken at his philosophically most penetrating, Descartes is guilty of circularity, that clearing him of this charge can only be achieved at the expense of desiccating the interest of his epistemology (for he is rendered naively dogmatic), and that he fails to elude the Pyrrhonist equi-position of a counterpoised view. The result will be to show that the classic rationalist—foundationalist attempt to defend the objectivity of empirical knowledge fails, so that some other approach to this task is required, and also to provide an occasion to reflect on why the Cartesian program *must* have failed.

Descartes's attempt to defend the reliability of clear and distinct ideas as conveyors of truth begins from the moment he introduces the notion of clear and distinct ideas in the third Meditation. It is important to examine this passage carefully because it undercuts a number of defenses of Descartes, including his own. The relevant passage occurs in the second paragraph of the third Meditation, after Descartes sums up the knowledge gained in the second Meditation and as he begins to reflect on that knowledge and its status:

I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required for my being certain about anything? In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me certain of the truth of the matter, if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with such clarity and distinctness was false. So now I seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.⁵

The "first instance of knowing" is, of course, the *cogito*, which gives Descartes the knowledge that he exists and that he is a thinking thing. It is important to note first that these insights concern particular propositions, that Descartes *himself* (of whom there is only one—especially so far as he knows!) exists and that *he* is a thinking thing. Second, note that Descartes worries that these particular claims might not be reliable—as he would admit to be the case if anything else that he perceived "so clearly and distinctly" were false.⁶ Third, his apparently wild induction, to have postulated the general rule that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true on the basis of one instance of such "perception," is based on some Cartesian philosophy of mind which plays a crucial if unannounced role in his defense of the reliability of clear and distinct ideas. It is Descartes's view, namely, that "it is in the nature of our mind to construct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones."⁷ The fundamental question Descartes poses is how reliable his "nature" is when it comes to matters of truth,⁸ and indeed whether his nature can demonstrate its own reliability.

B. DESCARTES'S DILEMMA

The dilemma generating Descartes's "metaphysical" doubt stems from his own nature as a thinking being, for when he considers the idea of an omnipotent being he "cannot but admit" that such a being could have given him a nature such that he might be deceived "even in matters which seemed most evident"⁹—such as the *cogito*. Yet on the other hand, when he attends directly to those things that he perceives clearly and distinctly he is "so entirely persuaded by those things" that he cannot but believe them to be true. It is worth quoting his own statement of this dilemma:

[W]henver my preconceived belief in the supreme power of God comes to mind, I cannot but admit that it would be easy for him, if he so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind's eye. Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something ... or anything of this kind in which I see a manifest contradiction.¹⁰

The issue Descartes poses is whether or not he could be in error about what is most clear and distinct, even while attending to it, and the issue is complicated by the fact that his nature is such that he cannot disbelieve that which he clearly and distinctly perceives.¹¹ This circumstance, it should be noted, gives Descartes good grounds to doubt even singular clear and distinct claims.

Before considering how Descartes proposes to extricate himself from this problem, two points need to be made. First, although Descartes introduces his metaphysical doubt by use of the demon hypothesis, namely, that an omnipotent being could have made him to be epistemically unreliable even in those "perceptions" which are clear and distinct, he holds that this problem arises for atheists as well. This is because atheists have to attribute their being to a lesser cause, and so their nature, too, may not be so perfect as to avoid error even in clear and distinct perceptions.¹² This claim recalls Descartes's comment on how the later Greeks could only have been skeptics insofar as they did not recognize the existence of God.

Second, although Descartes does not directly discuss the relation between the "light of nature" and that which is "clear and distinct," it may be assumed for present purposes that

those things known by the former are a subclass of the latter. The range of the clear and distinct extends to truths known by syllogism, whereas "the light of nature" provides non-syllogistic, non-inferential, immediate knowledge of common notions, and, at least in the case of the *cogito*, of the object to which these notions apply. Though this relation between the two cannot be established here, it is sound and it is helpful in tying Descartes's argument together.¹³

C. DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT FOR THE TRUTH OF CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS

Descartes proceeds by arraying a variety of claims concerning ideas and their causes, each of which is alleged to be known clearly and distinctly by the light of nature. Among these he isolates an idea of an all-perfect being and argues that only a being instantiating all the perfections represented in that idea could be the cause of that idea. He further argues that he himself could not be the cause of the content or "objective reality" of that idea and concludes therefore that an all-perfect being does exist, did create Descartes, and could not be a deceiver. Such a being would be a deceiver were it the case that Descartes's nature is such that he cannot disbelieve what he clearly and distinctly perceives while that which he clearly and distinctly perceives is false. Descartes thus concludes that what he clearly and distinctly perceives is true. More exactly, his argument is this:

- (1) An idea cannot have any more objective reality than its cause actually has formally. (premise)¹⁴
- (2) Descartes has an idea of God; that is, of an infinite, independent substance, omnipotent, and creator of everything. (premise)¹⁵
- (3) Descartes knows that he cannot have created this idea. (premise; defended by a sub-argument)¹⁶

Therefore:

- (4) A being actually exists that is other than Descartes and that contains as much formal reality as Descartes's idea of an omnipotent being contains objectively. (from (1)—(3))¹⁷
- (5) An independent, omnipotent being—having that perfection—would have all other perfections as well. (premise)¹⁸

Therefore:

- (6) An all-perfect being, creator of everything, (namely, God) exists. (from (4), (5))¹⁹

Therefore:

- (7) Descartes is dependent on this being in all respects for his existence and nature. (from (6))²⁰

Therefore:

- (8) The nature and contents of Descartes's understanding are due to God. (from (7))²¹
- (9) Descartes's understanding perceives some things clearly and distinctly. (premise)
- (10) If x is clearly and distinctly perceived, then x is something. (premise)²²
- (11) If x is something, then God authored x . (from (6))²³
- (12) Deception can only stem from imperfection. (premise)²⁴

Therefore:

- (13) God is not a deceiver. (from (6), (12))²⁵

Therefore:

- (14) If x is clearly and distinctly perceived, then x is true. (from (10)—(13))²⁶

D. THE PROBLEM OF CIRCULARITY

The problem of circularity, briefly, is this. If to have innate ideas is to have as part of the nature of one's mind the capacity to represent certain conceptions,²⁷ how can one rely on such capacities to infer that there must be things in the world corresponding to any of those representations? The most one could show are the logical relations between the conceptions represented, that is, one could show (perhaps) that and how the represented conceptions mutually imply one another, but how could any of this show that there are extant things corresponding to any of these conceptions?²⁸ Now this way of stating the problem is a bit too strong, in that Descartes can plausibly escape the circle of his ideas in the case of the *cogito*. But beyond that he absolutely needs the causal principle, which relates the objective order of ideas to the formal order of their causes, in order to take any of his ideas as representing truths.²⁹ Even if it is part of Descartes's nature to have an innate idea that represents this causal principle, this does not suffice to show that this principle is true: Descartes could have this idea innately without this idea's being true—and similarly in the case of each of his putative ideas of simple natures. To see that Descartes faces a crippling difficulty at each step of his argument, and to see what this problem is, requires closer consideration of four central Cartesian doctrines.

E. FOUR CARTESIAN DOCTRINES

1. *Representationalism*. One of Descartes's philosophical innovations is his representationalism, his view that "we cannot have any knowledge of things except by the ideas we have of them."³⁰ This doctrine, that ideas are needed in any and all cases of knowledge, is part of what makes him Descartes and no longer an orthodox Augustinian. The Augustinian view is that for a range of eternal truths, we have direct intuitive access to a realm of abstract eternal objects.³¹ L. J. Beck cites Descartes's replacement of this view by his own doctrine of clear and distinct ideas as one of the main developments of his mature thought.³² Thus Descartes holds that our knowledge of eternal truths requires having ideas of them.

Innate ideas, like all ideas according to Descartes, are representational. Ideas are the direct objects of thought or awareness; the objects represented by those ideas are only indirectly objects of thought or of awareness. In Descartes's own words, an idea is

[T]he thing which is thought of, in so far as it has objective being in the intellect Hence the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect—not of course formally, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, *i.e.* in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect.³³

In this passage from the first *Replies*, Descartes states affirmatively that ideas do represent their ideata. However, the problem posed by the evil demon is whether or not the objects represented by Descartes's ideas (the indirect objects of thought that exist actually or "formally") are as his ideas of them represent them to be. This is the problem he must solve.³⁴

Descartes's confidence in the representational character of innate ideas broaches the problem of the status of unicorns and the like, on which he takes a bold stand:

Everything in a chimera that can be clearly and distinctly conceived is a true entity. It is not fictitious, since it has a true and immutable essence³⁵

The tricky case is that of an imagined machine, for this is pretty plainly a constructed idea ("fictitious," as Descartes calls them), so that it represents no "eternal truth" or "immutable essence."³⁶ These examples point out why Descartes needs to be as concerned as he is to determine which of his ideas are fictitious and which are innate, for only the latter could represent eternal truths.³⁷ Mounting an argument for the existence of God (or anything else) using fictitious ideas would beg the question.³⁸

Descartes says some apparently incompatible things about just what ideas of eternal truths are ideas *of*.³⁹ However, it is not necessary for present purposes to adopt a particular position on this issue, which is fortunate given how little Descartes says about it.⁴⁰ A second point of Cartesian doctrine provides a workable solution to this quandary.

2. *The Divine Creation of Eternal Truths.* Descartes holds that the truths represented by innate ideas are created, one and all, by God's having thought-and-willed them.⁴¹ (I write this with hyphens, for Descartes held that these are one simple action of the deity.⁴²) This point is important here, for it provides a univocal sense in which innate ideas are representational, whether these ideas represent objects or not. For in the case of logical or metaphysical truths, one could resist an objectual interpretation of these truths while recognizing that these "truths" or principles are ones God ordained, and that Descartes's innate ideas represent these divine ordinations.⁴³ Indeed, it is Descartes's view that his innate ideas—the capacities he has to represent certain putative eternal truths clearly and distinctly—are part of his thinking nature because God has given him that nature, a nature allowing him to represent the divinely ordained truths, or at least those truths God deigns us to know.⁴⁴ To call attention to the representational function of Descartes's ideas, I will speak below of, *e.g.*, his idea *of* the causal principle.

3. *Denotative and Connotative Aspects of Ideas.* There are two components to the representational character of ideas, analogous to the familiar Fregean distinction between sense and reference.⁴⁵ An idea's having objective reality involves its having a content or "sense"—a connotative or descriptive component—but this is not all. Ideas also have causes, and in many cases ideas represent or refer to those causes.⁴⁶ (An idea may not

represent its cause if that cause contains the objective reality of the idea "eminently" rather than "formally,"⁴⁷ or if an error is made.) There is thus a denotative aspect to ideas concerning the reference of ideas to their referents, that is, to what those ideas are ideas of.⁴⁸ The referential or semantic aspect of the representational character of innate ideas enters into Descartes's problematic in this way. To take an example, Descartes has an innate idea of the causal principle formulated in the first premise of his argument (as I have presented it) for the reliability of clear and distinct ideas. Now this principle, that an idea cannot have any more objective reality than its cause actually has formally, will not serve Descartes's purposes if it is simply a nifty principle he's innately disposed to think up. This principle is only of service if it applies to or holds true of ideas, both itself and others.⁴⁹ For example, if this principle does not hold true of Descartes's idea of God, he can make no argument for the existence of God at all. Descartes needs the referential or semantic component of the representational character of his ideas in order to carry his argument through.

4. *Logical Voluntarism.* A fourth important element of Descartes's problematic is his logical voluntarism. Holding that a being would only be omnipotent if it were the creator of *everything*, that the independence of anything from a being would entail that that being wasn't omnipotent,⁵⁰ Descartes held that eternal truths, whether mathematical, logical, or metaphysical, are not independent of an omnipotent creator. Rather, any and all of these principles are true only because the creator thought-and-willed them.⁵¹ Indeed, if an omnipotent creator thought-and-willed it, even contradictions could be true, although we couldn't comprehend such truths. This is a radical doctrine finding frequent expression in Descartes's writings, and though it is only obliquely indicated in the *Meditations* as doubts about mathematical truths, it appears in his *Replies to the Objections*.⁵² This view is not a simple *misologic*. Rather, Descartes holds that human thinking must conform to the law of non-contradiction, but he recognizes the possibility that what holds good of human thought may not, at least for that reason alone, hold true of the objects created by God and denoted by human ideas;⁵³ they might be self-contradictory, at least by our lights. Of course Descartes also held that God did not, as a matter of fact, make contradictions true.⁵⁴

II. FIVE CIRCULARITIES IN DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT

The question emerging from these four points is not whether Descartes is guilty of circularity, but rather, how many circles there are in his argument. I now argue that there are five distinct circularities in Descartes's argument. One of these concerns divine logical voluntarism. Another concerns the semantic component of innate ideas. A third arises from his natural inability to disbelieve whatever he clearly and distinctly perceives. A fourth circularity arises in Descartes's proof that he cannot have generated his idea of God. A final circularity concerns Descartes's attempt to verify the reliability of his thinking nature by employing that very same thinking nature.

A. CIRCULARITY AND LOGICAL VOLUNTARISM

The problem emerging from the doctrine of logical voluntarism is this. Descartes grants that an omnipotent being could make contradictions true. Yet he also introduces several key premises, especially the causal principle (premise 1), on the basis of their denials being self-contradictory. If both of these are true, however, then his appeal to the putative truth

of that, the negation of which is a manifest contradiction, can carry no justificatory weight. If an omnipotent being could make contradictions true, then the fact that the denial of an alleged eternal truth is a manifest contradiction does not entail that the principle in question is in fact true. Nonetheless, Descartes appeals, explicitly or implicitly, to the falsehood of the denial of each putative clear and distinct idea in the *Meditations* because their denial is alleged to be a manifest contradiction.⁵⁵ The real deceiver hypothesis, on these grounds, is that an omnipotent creator did make some "manifest" contradictions true (or at least some clear and distinct ideas false), but gave Descartes the very same nature as he actually had. In such a situation Descartes would ineluctably believe all the same principles—all of his innate ideas would have the same contents—but none of them (with the possible exception of his thoughts of his existence and of his thinking) would be true—none of them would have their putative referents or ranges of application. Hence Descartes's upbraiding of the narrator of the *Meditations* for entertaining a contradiction when supposing that an absolutely powerful being could be bent on deceiving him⁵⁶ can carry no weight, and similarly when he claims in the second set of *Replies* that "it is self-contradictory that men should be deceived by God"⁵⁷ (cf. premise 13). Were Descartes to reply to this criticism by appealing to the premise that a being having one perfection must have them all (premise 5), this would be no help. Its denial is, to Descartes's mind, a manifest contradiction.⁵⁸ But that is Descartes's problem, not ours. For by his own principles, manifest contradiction is not a limit on the competence of an omnipotent being. Hence an omnipotent being could be malicious precisely by giving Descartes an innate disposition to think that a being having one perfection (such as omnipotence) must have all perfections (including not being a deceiver). Having removed what is (to Descartes) manifestly contradictory as a limit on what an omnipotent being can do, he has likewise removed "manifest contradiction" as a limit on what is possible. In adopting divine logical voluntarism, Descartes has undermined any possibility of proving anything, and yet he claims to proceed analytically.⁵⁹ If that which Descartes is incapable of conceiving to be true can nevertheless be true, then none of Descartes's premises can be accepted merely on the ground that they express what Descartes cannot but conceive to be the case. (This affects premises 1, 3, 5, and 12, especially.) Because he cannot rule out this hypothesis Descartes fails to meet the contraposition argument offered by a Cartesian skeptic, at least not by one who has understood Pyrrhonism: Descartes's certainties are explained just as well by the revamped demon hypothesis just offered.⁶⁰ (For convenient reference I dub this revamped demon hypothesis the "severe demon hypothesis.") That he cannot withhold affirmation from clear and distinct ideas only worsens his dialectical plight (see §C below).

One might try to extract Descartes from this quandary by kindly ignoring his logical voluntarism and granting him a realist position on the status of logical truths. One could even do this without having to countenance "limiting" the competence of an omnipotent being by arguing that contradictory descriptions describe no states of affairs, possible or otherwise, so there is nothing described by self-contradictory descriptions for an omnipotent being to be barred from doing. However this favor is worked out, it would require revising Descartes's notion of "manifest contradiction" and it would disturb the parity status of logical, mathematical, and metaphysical principles Descartes effected by adopting divine voluntarism.⁶¹ The problem facing this reconstruction is that some of the causal principles essential to Descartes's argument do not have contradictory denials. Hume is right that it is not a self-contradiction for something to just pop into existence.⁶² It wouldn't be caused; we could have no knowledge of how this could or did happen, but our not being able to understand this event does not make it logically impossible. Without his causal principles (especially premises 1 and 3), Descartes cannot know that his idea of God did not just pop

into his mind, and so he could not mount his argument for the existence of God. Again, the denial of premise (5), that a being having one perfection would have all perfections, is not a logical self-contradiction. But without this premise, Descartes cannot argue for God's veracity. The loss of either of these premises, of course, destroys Descartes's argument for the truth of clear and distinct ideas.

B. CIRCULARITY AND THE DENOTATION OF IDEAS

Some of Descartes's critics charged that his argument was impossible because it presupposed knowledge of what thinking, existence, and other simple universals are.⁶³ In defense against this charge Descartes claimed that such knowledge was so obvious and noncontroversial that it was not worth mentioning.⁶⁴ It was obvious because it is prereflectively available to anyone and can be made explicit upon reflection,⁶⁵ and it was noncontroversial insofar as such knowledge does not involve knowledge of the existence of anything.⁶⁶ The common notions thus known all fall into the range of things known "without affirmation or denial."⁶⁷ It is in this way that Descartes distinguishes, in effect, between transcendental knowledge about what knowledge is, and empirical knowledge of how the world is. Contemplating his ideas about ideas, judgments, and causes informs him of what knowledge is, but he has no first-order empirical knowledge until he judges that one or another of his ideas is correctly referred to some extra-mental existent.⁶⁸

This view leads to a circle based on the semantic aspect of innate ideas alone, a circle involved in affirming the existence of things to which Descartes's ideas correspond. Having progressively retreated to knowledge solely of the contents of his ideas through the first Meditation doubts, and having found in the *cogito* two claims involving knowledge of the existence of something, namely, his own existence and his being a thinker, it is then Descartes's project to muster certain notions which are themselves known without affirmation or denial into a sound argument for God's existence, an argument allowing him to affirm God's existence. Now each premise of his argument is introduced as being undeniable, although several of the premises require each other for support. The plan is to construct an argument that can be intuited as a whole so that no single premise need be introduced prior to any other.⁶⁹ Taking the argument in a single intuition avoids problems of memory and also the problem of needing to defend any one premise prior to another. The whole set of premises must then be either affirmed or denied *in toto*. The problem, however, is that the fact that these premises mutually support one another (by mutual implication) doesn't show that any of them correspond to the way the world is. His idea of God's veracity must be true of God Himself in order to infer the correspondence of his idea of the causal principle to actual causal relations, and his idea of the causal principle must be true of causality itself in order to infer the correspondence of his idea of God to an actual being. That these two ideas imply each other does nothing to show that they are either individually or collectively true. Of course, the individual premises in Descartes's argument do hang together and reinforce each other—but this only reaches as far as their contents, and Descartes needs their denotative component in order to mount a proof of God's existence and veracity.⁷⁰ The semantic aspect of innate ideas thus leads to another circle. Descartes needs it to be true that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true in order to be able to place any epistemic weight on any of his premises; but unless and until the whole set is referentially in order, he cannot rule out the severe demon hypothesis formulated above.⁷¹ For this reason, too, Descartes cannot rule out the possibility of a truly malicious omnipotent deceiver, and so cannot meet the contraposition argument offered by a Cartesian *cum* Pyrrhonian skeptic. The real problem with the Cartesian circle is that

logically there is no way of breaking into it; no premise in the argument can serve as a starting point for introducing or inferring any of the others.

C. CIRCULARITY AND DESCARTES'S INABILITY TO DISBELIEVE WHAT IS CLEAR AND DISTINCT

One might object to the construal of the task of Descartes's argument just given, since Descartes cannot withhold his assent from the premises of his argument once he understands each of them; that's what it is to be taught by the light of nature. As Descartes emphasizes to Burman, when one pays attention to clear and distinct truths, even in the absence of knowledge of the existence of God, one cannot be in any doubt about these truths.⁷² This suggestion leads to a circle stemming solely from Descartes's doctrine of indubitability. Not being in any doubt about these clear and distinct ideas is insufficient evidence of their truth, given that it is Descartes's nature not to be able to withhold assent from that which he clearly and distinctly perceives. The fact that he cannot but affirm the concatenation of clear and distinct ideas constituting the argument for the existence of God, given that he cannot but affirm each of the premises severally, does nothing to show that any of the premises, concatenated or not, are true. The aim of the argument is to show that such ideas must be true because they come from God. It is an explanatory argument, but a divine origin is hardly the only possible explanation of these ideas. His inability to doubt his premises while conceiving of them in no way alleviates the question of their being true once he has introduced the possibility of an omnipotent deceiver who might give him indubitable, though false, ideas.⁷³ His inability to disbelieve his clear and distinct ideas certainly entails that he would *believe* these ideas to be true, but this does not entail that those ideas *are* true, at least not without begging the question. Descartes's problem is in fact worse than I presented it in the preceding section (§B). It does not suffice for Descartes's idea of God's veracity be true of God Himself in order for him to infer the correspondence of his idea of the causal principle to actual causal relations. It also does not suffice for his idea of the causal principle be true of causality itself in order for him to infer the correspondence of his idea of God to an actual being. For Descartes to make these crucial inferences he must *know* that his ideas are true of their putative objects in order to employ his claims in a demonstrative proof, that is, in a valid argument whose premises are known to be true. But he cannot know that his ideas are true of their objects simply on the basis of their being clearly and distinctly perceived, because he has recognized in the very dilemma he attempts to resolve that his inability to disbelieve clear and distinct ideas is insufficient evidence of their truth. In brief, he must assume the truth of his conclusion in order to argue for the truth of his conclusion.

D. CIRCULARITY AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF DESCARTES'S SELF-KNOWLEDGE

One might try to defend the introduction of some of Descartes's premises by pointing out that they are introduced on the basis of his knowledge of an existing entity, namely, himself. For example, the crucial claim that he cannot be the cause of his idea of God (premise 3) is based on an inspection of his own nature, which reveals that he is not an infinite substance. Hence he cannot be the cause of an idea of an infinite substance (by premise 1). More fully, the reasons Descartes gives to defend the third premise of his argument are these:

- (a) Descartes, being a finite substance, cannot be the formal cause of an idea of an infinite substance.⁷⁴
- (b) It is only in contrast to his idea of infinitude that Descartes can notice his own finitude.⁷⁵
- (c) Descartes's very doubts and ignorance shows that he is less than perfect.⁷⁶
- (d) Descartes is a dependent being, having no power to conserve his own existence.⁷⁷

Two remarks are called for. First, this defense can do nothing to support the crucial causal principle itself. On the contrary, this defense presupposes it, for only on the basis of this principle can Descartes infer from his own finitude that he cannot cause his idea of God. Second, this defense only adds another epicycle to the circularity of Descartes's argument, one involved in the doctrine of self-transparency. This is because Descartes's claims to self-knowledge, and in particular to negative claims about himself, presuppose the reliability of clear and distinct ideas. In order to infer that he has no unknown, hidden faculty which might in some unknown way produce his idea of God,⁷⁸ Descartes must be perfectly transparent to himself—or at least transparent enough not to make mistakes of this magnitude. The problem is that his defense of the thesis of self-transparency ultimately rests on supposing that God is not a deceiver. As Descartes himself states:

I do not deny that there can be in the soul or the body many properties of which I have no ideas; I only deny that there are any which are inconsistent with the ideas that I do have, including the idea that I have of their distinctness; for otherwise God would be a deceiver and we would have no rule to make us certain of the truth.⁷⁹

Thus Descartes needs to know that clear and distinct ideas are reliable (line 14) in order to be able to inspect himself and to determine that he cannot cause his own idea of God (premise 3), and so to be able to argue that God exists (premise 6). Yet he also needs to know that God exists (premise 6) in order to know that the clear and distinct ideas he needs for self-inspection are reliable (line 14).

E. CIRCULARITY AND THE SELF-VERIFICATION OF DESCARTES'S THINKING NATURE

Annette Baier has quite plausibly suggested that Descartes's ground for the causal principle relating objective and formal reality (premise 1) lies in the particular match found in the *cogito* between the objective reality of his idea of his existence and the formal reality of himself as an extant meditating thinker. On this basis, Descartes forms a general principle, that in no case does the formal reality of the cause of an idea exceed the objective reality represented by the idea. This generalization is another instance of the generalizing ability of his thinking nature, first explicitly exemplified in his generalization from the clarity and distinctness of the *cogito* to the general rule that clear and distinct ideas are true.⁸⁰ Baier's suggestion on this point is, I think, of considerable merit, but it raises what may well be the most fatal circularity of all. Descartes attempts to demonstrate that his thinking nature is reliable, at least when used properly, that is, when he relies solely on clear and distinct ideas. To demonstrate that his thinking nature is reliable, he must make the generalization Baier indicates, from the single instance of the match between

formal and objective reality in the case of the *cogito* to the general causal principle (premise 1), and he must apply this general principle to the whole range of his clear and distinct ideas. Furthermore, if his demonstration is to prove the conclusion he draws, then his generalization must be true, and he must know that his generalization is true. This is to say, he must already know that his conclusion (line 14) is true in order to infer the truth of the causal principle (premise 1) and in order to infer the truth of his premises concerning the dependence of the contents and reliability of his thinking nature on God (premises 7—13, plus line 14).

The problem of Descartes's validating the reliability of his own thinking nature by using that very nature after having cast that reliability into radical doubt affects more than just the causal principle just discussed. It is quite general. For as premise (8) indicates, all of Descartes's clear and distinct common notions are alleged to be due to God, and he relies on these notions throughout his argument to prove that they are due to God and so are reliable. (Such ideas are used in premises 1, 2, 5, 9, 12, and in his defense of 3.) But his having called the truth of clearly and distinctly perceived common notions into doubt entails that he cannot rely on the veracity of his own thinking nature for arguing his way out of this radical doubt. This point is only reinforced once the question of Descartes's ability to draw inferences is raised.

III. Some Defenses of Descartes

A. DOUBT, CIRCULARITY, AND MEMORY

In his own defense Descartes frequently claims that the only range of doubt about clear and distinct ideas that he would either countenance or attempt to argue against concerns the reliability of our memory of such ideas and their deductions.⁸¹ He does indeed discuss memory in the fifth Meditation,⁸² but it has always seemed that this was disingenuous: he had clearly posed a much larger problem than simply that of memory. His frequent insistence that one is certain that one is not deceived so long as one is attending to clear and distinct ideas is simply an insufficient response in the face of his own contention that we cannot refrain from believing that clear and distinct ideas are true. Indeed, it flatly denies the very problem that officially motivated him to inquire into the existence of God.⁸³ As noted above, Descartes first poses the problem of the reliability of clear and distinct ideas in connection with the *cogito*. Hence his later claims only to have doubted memory are misleading. Memory is introduced only because he can call particular clear and distinct perceptions—including the *cogito*—into question only after the fact, due to his inability to disbelieve those perceptions while having them. The question of memory is a red herring. Descartes knows full well that he had clearly and distinctly perceived, say, the *cogito*, and that this involved no syllogism. Hence his retrospective attempt to connect the doubt to be dispelled with memory through doubts about syllogism (or *vice versa*) is simply a misstatement of the problem.⁸⁴

Furthermore, these attempts to delimit the range of doubt to memory are counterposed by several repetitions of the offending circularity. One such passage comes from the second *Replies*:

In the case of our clearest and most careful judgments, however, this kind of explanation would not be possible, for if such judgments were false they could not be corrected by any clearer judgments or by means of any other natural faculty. In such cases I simply assert that it is impossible for us

to be deceived. Since God is the supreme being, he must also be supremely good and true, and it would therefore be a contradiction that anything should be created by him which positively tends towards falsehood. Now everything real which is in us must have been bestowed upon us by God (this was proved when his existence was proved); moreover, we have a real faculty for recognizing the truth and distinguishing it from falsehood, as is clear merely from the fact that we have within us ideas of truth and falsehood. Hence this faculty must tend towards the truth, at least when we use it correctly (that is, by assenting only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive, for no other correct method for employing this faculty can be imagined). For if it did not so tend then, since God gave it to us, he would rightly have to be regarded as a deceiver.⁸⁵

Following very closely after contending that he had addressed and handled the problem of memory, this statement testifies to Descartes's conviction of his dependence upon a benevolent God, but in this form his argument clearly falls to the severe demon hypothesis formulated above.

B. THE DIDACTIC AIM OF THE MEDITATIONS

Another possible recasting of the argument would suggest that, on Descartes's view, that which is clear and distinct is true, but the narrator of the *Meditations*, like the audience, doesn't initially know this. Thus the project of the *Meditations* is to rid readers of prejudice and to enable them to learn, either about any particular clear and distinct idea or about clear and distinct ideas generally, that they are capable of having such ideas and that they are true.⁸⁶ If this is Descartes's real aim, then his "argument" has only a pedagogical or didactic function, namely, to lead us away from intellectual dependence on the senses to the point where we, too, will be blessed by "the great illumination" of the neo-Augustinian truth as Descartes conceives it.⁸⁷ In this regard, Descartes's program is sensitive to William Alston's point that, if there is to be immediate justification at all, it must be first-person.⁸⁸ An important epistemological reason for Descartes writing *meditations* is that by meditating each reader can come to have his or her own set of clear and distinct ideas. Such a recasting of the project cannot, however, save the argument from the charge of circularity.⁸⁹ Descartes, as narrator of the *Meditations*, claims not to admit anything "that is not necessarily true."⁹⁰ His use of this phrase shows that what it requires is that no claim can be allowed unless it survives the demon hypothesis. In effect, this hypothesis commits Descartes to the view that in order to know something, one must know that one knows it (the "K-K" thesis), for only a demonstrative proof that a claim is true could repulse the demon hypothesis, and such a proof would generate the knowledge that one knew the claim in question to be true. Given this stricture, however, Descartes cannot rely on the putative semantic grip that clear and distinct ideas have on their objects (and so on the truth) in order to construct an argument that shows they have such a grip. For the only way that clear and distinct ideas can form a proof, an argument which is known to be sound, is if they are known to have at least enough range of application so as to be applicable to one another. Hence no amount of juggling clear and distinct ideas which are as a matter of unknown fact true can add up to a proof; strict analogues of the problems pointed out above recur here as well. Discussion of a further point of Descartes's program makes this clear.

C. THE ABSURDITY OF QUESTIONING ONE'S HIGHEST COGNITIVE FACULTY

Another possible rejoinder is to cite Descartes's claims that the "light of nature" is the highest faculty we have, so we must rely on it and we cannot call it into question.⁹¹ Now

given his claims about our not being able to disbelieve what we clearly and distinctly perceive, on this construal of the *Meditations* Descartes propounds a simple dogmatism, for there is no independent effort to demonstrate that what one cannot disbelieve (due to its clarity and distinctness) is also true, and none is attempted. Indeed, Descartes gives evidence of just such a dogmatism, insofar as he constantly charges those who misunderstand or disagree with him with prejudice, which he attributes to one or another source.⁹² When one compiles all of his remarks about prejudice and what is manifest to an unprejudiced mind, it becomes apparent that the only people whom Descartes would consider to be unprejudiced are neo-Augustinians.⁹³ The problem is not that there are limits to how much one can cast into doubt and still be able to think; some of these limits will be discussed in chapter five. The problem is where Descartes sets those limits, for he builds into his account of "our highest faculty" many extremely controversial epistemological and metaphysical principles and then tries to shield these principles from doubt by arguing that one cannot doubt one's highest rational faculty. This is a wholly inadequate defense of his claims to transcendental knowledge. Indeed, this construal of Descartes's program makes his putative response to skepticism a sham from the start. Hegel's curt dismissal of Cartesian skepticism, as "casting about in disbelief of this or that presumed truth only to return to that same truth once the doubt is appropriately dissipated,"⁹⁴ seems more than fair. One can hardly imagine the scorn Sextus Empiricus would coolly though sanguinely have poured on the whole undertaking. On a didactic construal of the *Meditations*, Descartes raises the problem of whether clear and distinct ideas correspond to reality only to go on to ignore this problem and to implore us to trust clear and distinct ideas anyway. Descartes begs the question at the transcendental level. Hegel's charge that epistemologists have presumed without scruple that they have transcendental knowledge is, in this prominent case, warranted.

IV. Some Inherent Limits of the Cartesian Program

Seeing that Descartes's strategy for defending the objectivity of knowledge goes awry does not amount to seeing why it would have to fail. Four remarks on this point may be offered here.

A. REPRESENTATIONALISM AND SKEPTICISM

A feature of Descartes's representationalism is that the direct objects of awareness are mental events (ideas) and that the indirect objects of awareness are extant objects that cause or occasion those ideas. This feature of the "Modern way of ideas" is shared by many empiricist and sense-data theories, and the semantic difficulty plaguing Descartes plagues them as well. Retreating from knowledge of the world to knowledge of representations of the world in an effort to build one's way back to knowledge of the world is doomed to failure for just the reason Sextus gives. Once the semantic or causal relation (or both) between the world and one's representations of it is broken, there is no way to reestablish it. Conjoining this kind of representationalism with the "K-K" thesis and a serious worry about skepticism must break the relation between representations and the world. If one's only cognitive relation to anything external is by means of representations of which alone one is directly aware, one cannot observe or apprehend the relation between any or all of one's representations and the world putatively causing them or denoted by them. However, on these principles, only if one can apprehend this relation can the relation be legitimately

reestablished. Descartes has failed to meet two of Sextus's fundamental challenges to representationalism, namely, to prove that the direct objects of our awareness (our ideas) accurately represent the putative indirect objects of our awareness (e.g., worldly objects), and to establish a criterion for sorting reliable from unreliable representations.⁹⁵ The philosophical moral is simple: To defend the thesis that empirical knowledge is possible requires concerning oneself with the world, not retreating from it in order to attempt to climb out of a hermetic circle of representations. The example of Descartes's failure thus gives substance and weight to Hegel's suspicion about the possibility of wholly *a priori* epistemology, especially when based on a representationalist account of knowledge as a "medium" or an "instrument." Hegel's suspicion is reinforced by the following considerations.

B. THE PAUCITY OF SELF-EVIDENT FOUNDATIONS

Descartes's strategy for halting the skeptical regress without shirking questions of justifying each claim is to propose a realm of basic claims such that to know them at all is to know that one knows them. If one had knowledge of such a claim, no further claims would be needed in order to justify that claim. One trouble with this strategy is that there are extraordinarily few claims meeting these specifications. One claim that does meet these specifications is the *cogito*. There is, however, a very special reason that the claim that one exists is infallibly true, namely, one has to exist in order to make the claim at all. Thus the condition of the truth of the claim is among the conditions for the possibility of making the claim. Thus making the claim at all entails that one's claim is true. Unfortunately for Descartes, this same very strong condition is not satisfied by any other of the premises and principles to which he appeals in assembling his argument for the reliability of clear and distinct ideas. In this regard, Descartes is wrong to claim that the only thing guaranteeing the truth of the *cogito* is "simply a clear and distinct perception" of his assertion.⁹⁶ There is a reflexive element that insures the truth of the *cogito*, and that distinguishes it from all of the other ideas which Descartes claims to perceive clearly and distinctly.⁹⁷

One range of claims that might be infallible and indubitable are claims made about certain abstract principles. In the case of abstract principles, one might well grant the reliability of the clear and distinct perception of those principles the denials of which are contradictory. However, this range of principles includes at best only logical and mathematical principles (or perhaps some principles about linguistic meaning), and the validity of empirical knowledge doesn't follow from such principles alone. One needs some further, substantive claims to establish the validity of empirical knowledge (where substantive claims are claims that do not have contradictory denials). The problem with Descartes's substantive principles (e.g., his causal principles [premise 1] and his claims to have certain ideas of God [premises 2 and 5] and of the contents of his thought [premises 8 and 10]) is that they have virtually no plausibility in absence of a divine origin. This is especially true of his general rule that whatever is clear and distinct is true. Clarity and distinctness may be necessary conditions for truth, but they certainly are not sufficient conditions in absence of a divine guarantee of their connection. The criteria of truth for substantive principles will have to rely heavily, not on alleged antecedent "self-evidence" alone, but on also consequent explanatory power.⁹⁸

A standard sort of substantive claim adduced in foundationalist attempts to validate empirical knowledge is claims about how ordinary objects appear to be, where such appearances might be analyzed as sensory ideas (whether or not they are occasioned by

God), impressions of sense, sense data, or the 'phenomena' reported in terminating judgments. The trouble confronting this kind of foundationalism is twofold. On the one hand, physical objects cannot be analyzed without remainder into sets of appearances, and the spatial and temporal framework required for referring to and reporting on such appearances cannot itself be analyzed without remainder into relations among appearances.⁹⁹ On the other hand, appearances and reports about them do not imply much of anything about the future course of events (experienced or not), whereas physical objects and reports about them do, and no set of reports about something's seeming to be an object entails that it is an object. The substantive premises of phenomenalist ontologies, sense-data, or Cartesian sensing "strictly speaking,"¹⁰⁰ lack explanatory power because they lack implications for empirical knowledge.¹⁰¹

C. THE UNTENABILITY OF "SELF-EVIDENCE"

A further part of the problem with a doctrine of the reliability of clear and distinct ideas or of the infallibility of reports of "immediate" sensory experience is that one needs to be able to distinguish systematically between the following two possibilities:

Apprehending the object of a claim and on that basis being certain that the claim is true.

Being "certain" that a claim is true and on that basis believing that the object of that claim must have existed (or occurred).

Without a means of systematically distinguishing between these two epistemically quite different kinds of episode, any content or claim might be seized upon. The problem facing any epistemology that bases empirical knowledge on some sort of basic self-validating kind of claims is to render the distinction between these two kinds of episode unequivocally decidable and yet to have strong enough claims to actually ground empirical knowledge.

Having pursued Descartes this far in his own terminology, it is permissible to introduce some other terminology useful for formulating this fundamental difficulty with his program. One may distinguish between indubitability, infallibility, and incorrigibility as follows.¹⁰² That which is *indubitable* is incapable of being doubted; that which is *infallible* is incapable of being mistaken; and that which is *incorrigible* is incapable of being corrected. Descartes attempts to demonstrate his infallibility (at least in the domain of the clear and distinct) by building on what is (to him) indubitable, aspiring to have them be identical, both episodically and logically. Descartes's reply to Sextus is to postulate a set of self-verifying cognitive states. However, he mistook the validity of most of his claims, thereby revealing his failure systematically to distinguish the two kinds of cognitive episode stated above.

Alan Gewirth has offered a careful attempt to show how Descartes moves from a "methodological" moment, in which the clarity and distinctness of Descartes's ideas psychologically compel belief, to a "metaphysical" moment, in which clarity and distinctness of ideas involve their truth. He explicitly addresses the question of "how a metaphysical certainty [involving truth and infallibility] can emerge from propositions whose certainty, at the point at which they occur in the demonstration, is only psychological [involving indubitability]."¹⁰³ Unfortunately, the "logical impossibility" of metaphysical doubt (doubt about the truth of clear and distinct ideas) which he goes on to demonstrate occurs within the "methodological" moment, and so can involve only psychological certainty, that is, indubitability.¹⁰⁴ This may show that Descartes cannot doubt his proof of

God's existence and veracity, but it does not entail the *truth* of those conclusions. As James van Cleve has argued, the "metaphysical certainty" Gewirth develops is one that can be defined only in terms of Gewirth's premises concerning adequate grounds of doubt, but these grounds are defined solely in the psychological or methodological "moment." The resulting "metaphysical certainty" is only an extension of psychological certainty and not a guarantor of truth.¹⁰⁵ In the terms I have used above, infallibility has not been shown to follow from indubitability. This regrettable result is an expectable consequence of a point Gewirth recognizes, namely, that "there can be clearness and distinctness without truth."¹⁰⁶ This problem lends substance and weight to Hegel's suggestion that the error of epistemology is its fear of error. Descartes's fear of error drove him to postulate a set of privileged epistemic states that ultimately cannot distinguish at all between conviction and truth.

The way out of the logical circle of justification is not to postulate states or situations in which the apprehension and the justification of a claim or belief occur together but (as Peirce remarked in response to this problem¹⁰⁷) to *temporalize* the distinction. Even if one's explicit criteria of evaluation remain stable over some period of time, alterations in contexts of use can ground the possibility of self-critical revision of these explicit criteria. This points epistemology away from the foundationalist ideal of certainty toward the idea of fallibilism, away from incorrigibility toward self-critical revision of knowledge and its standards. Emphasizing explanatory power over alleged self-evidence allows for the possibility of revising higher-order principles. To anticipate a later discussion, part of what Hegel achieves by adopting a socially based theory of knowledge is a social means of sustaining and utilizing the contrast between contexts of assertion and contexts of evaluation in order to make collective self-criticism and revision of criteria possible.

To follow this line a bit further, it is worth noting that the logical independence that Descartes attributes to (completely conceived) common notions is not an accidental feature of their privileged epistemic status.¹⁰⁸ If the simple notions were not logically independent, then they would have implications bearing on one another. Were any of these implications inconsistent, the notions bearing those implications would be put into question. Now it might be plausible to suppose that such a set of common notions, if there were one, would have to be self-consistent.¹⁰⁹ The interesting point, however, is that so long as such notions have implications bearing on one another, then there are facts other than any given notion relevant to its acceptability, for to have implications is also, by *modus tollens*, to be corrigible (or at least fallible). In order to be certain that my present apprehension of some simple idea (whether of sense or reflection) is veridical (not to say infallible), I must apprehend all the features of the content of that idea, for if I do not, then I cannot be sure that my apprehension is veridical. Thus if the content of the idea in question has implications for ideas or states-of-affairs not currently apprehended, then I cannot be sure that my apprehension is infallible because I do not know at the time of that apprehension that the relevant implications obtain. Infallibility is achieved at the expense of implicative nullity. (The same problem infects Descartes's "strict" notion of sensing.) To anticipate again, the mutual independence of basic claims is only an evaluative virtue if there is a way of individually checking each such claim directly against reality. Atomistic accounts of meaning or of ideational content and doctrines of self-evidence or of knowledge by acquaintance are twins. But if there can be no such piecemeal examination, then the logical, semantic, or evidential interdependence of basic claims needs to be made an evaluative virtue rather than a vice. Hegel is sensitive to this issue and directly addresses it.

D. SUBJECTIVISM AND THE PRIORITY OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Another problematic feature of Descartes's program is central to the Modern period's epistemological turn, namely, the priority given to epistemology over ontology. Despite Descartes's statement that his "thought imposes no necessity on things,"¹¹⁰ his principles of explanation have him doing just that. He takes it as a brute given that no explanatory regress is possible¹¹¹ and his handling of causal principles has him insisting, in effect, that any and every thing has a causal explanation. Certainly he's right in saying that there's nothing for which a causal explanation cannot be *asked*,¹¹² but it is quite another thing to insist in the way he does that "something cannot come into existence from nothing."¹¹³ In a certain way Descartes is right, nothing can *come* into existence from nothing—but Hume's critique of the causal principle belies Descartes's fixation on the idea of everything being created by God. If one were convinced that everything is created, then it makes sense to ask by whom, using what means, and out of what? But it is perfectly possible logically for something to simply begin to exist with no process of generation. To put the point in Kantian terms, Descartes has taken a regulative principle of explanation, that to explain anything requires seeking its causes, and treated it as a constitutive principle, namely, that anything there is has in fact a cause into which one could inquire. Being antecedently convinced of theism would, of course, make this tempting, even plausible. What is interesting to note is the apparent result of Descartes's theistic conviction in combination with the priority of epistemology over ontology, for it appears to be this combination which led Descartes to postulate a range of epistemically privileged cognitions in order to ground a mathematicized model of explanation on a theological basis. Believing that God is on one's side would certainly bolster self-confidence, but it is noteworthy that Descartes's epistemic self-confidence stems from the prior conflation of indubitability with infallibility. Conflating these two must lead to incorrigibility, not because one is incapable of erring and hence not open to correction (the realm of the incorrigible includes incorrigible error, too), but rather because nothing would be taken to count as a reason or basis for revising one's claims. Such immunity from revision may be expected to generate a subjectivist epistemology, and indeed Descartes exemplifies this, both in his claims about mind and body as distinct substances, and also about the non-existence of a vacuum in nature.¹¹⁴ In both cases his basic inference is the same: "the world must be such-and-so because this is what my theory of knowledge entails." Descartes's most serious and obvious subjectivist inference is his postulation of ideas which are introspectable, incorrigible, and infallible, a view entailed by the requirements of his epistemology. In this connection it is worth recalling that Descartes's first readers were quite baffled by Descartes's theory of ideas. If ideas had the epistemic properties Descartes attributes to them, they should not have been so mysterious.

CHAPTER THREE

KANT ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

I. Introduction

Kant took the challenge of skepticism about empirical knowledge very seriously, declaring it a scandal to philosophy that there was no known proof of the existence of the external world.¹ What is troubling about Kant's discussion of skepticism is its apparent generality. In the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* he speaks of it without distinguishing among various kinds and representatives of skepticism, and his considering Hume to be perhaps the most profound (*geistreichste*) of the skeptics doesn't betray an appreciation of the varieties of skepticism.² In fact, however, the unfolding of Kant's philosophical program displays distinct, systematically related responses to the distinct kinds of skepticism concerning the external world represented by Sextus Empiricus, Descartes's demon, and Hume. This chapter considers Kant's program for responding to skepticism about the external world and, with that, for defending the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims in the first *Critique*. After sketching Kant's program, I will argue first, that the position he defends constitutes a distinctively subjectivist epistemology, and hence makes an unsatisfactory defense of the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims; second, that the direct argument for his position is not sound, so that he has not defended the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims; and third, that Kant fails to address second-order questions about the justification of his philosophical theory of knowledge.

II. Kant's Copernican Response to Skepticism

In Chapter One it was noted that the general strategy of skepticism is to exploit a common distinction between how things actually are and how they appear to be, to contend that there is nothing among those appearances that indicates any particular appearance (or set thereof) is intrinsically more trustworthy than any others, and to generalize this point by contending that none of the appearances of an object can be known to be epistemically trustworthy. Sextus tops this off with an elegant dilemma showing the impossibility of justifying any criterion for discriminating among appearances if all claims are disputed.³

Kant is known for attempting to respond to Hume and, though less often distinguished, to the Cartesian demon.⁴ A few words about Kant's responding to Sextus are in order, however.⁵ Although Sextus is not mentioned in any of the *Critiques*, Kant's *Reflexionen zur Logik* designate Sextus as the paradigm skeptic.⁶ Kant knew well the characteristic of ancient as opposed to Cartesian skepticism: the equipoise of opposed arguments.⁷ The skeptical result of such arguments was supposed to be indifference, and such indifference is plainly at issue in the first *Critique*. Not only is skeptical indifference mentioned in the first edition Preface,⁸ but skeptical suspension of judgment is also the forerunner of what Kant graphically designates "the euthanasia of pure reason."⁹ Furthermore, the arguments of the Antinomies are modeled on classically equipoised skeptical arguments. Lastly, Kant

directly rejects the notion of a general non-formal criterion of empirical knowledge as incoherent, and so rejects the demand to supply one.¹⁰

The core of Kant's philosophy, his response to skepticism and his defense of empirical knowledge, consists in his changing the grounds of epistemological debate in a fundamental and sophisticated manner. His diagnosis of the ills of previous philosophies, whether skeptical or not, is their failure to make a fourfold distinction between empirical ideality, empirical reality, transcendental ideality, and transcendental reality. Something is "empirically real" if it is an attribute of a spatio-temporal object. Something is "empirically ideal" if it is a content or sensation of an individual mind which corresponds to no feature of an outer object that causes it. Something is "transcendentally real" if it is an attribute of something independently of that thing's relation to human experiencers. Something is "transcendentally ideal" if it is a universally necessary *a priori* condition of human experience that does not obtain independently of human experiencers. These glosses are not, perhaps, entirely exact, but they will serve present purposes.¹¹

Kant's position concerning the status of space, time, and the fundamental categories of human thought is an innovative combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. Kant argues that space and time are not "transcendentally real," they are not features of things independently of human experiencers. Because we can only apply concepts to spatio-temporal objects, we cannot apply our concepts to things-in-themselves in the transcendental sense.¹² Correlatively, Kant argues that space and time are "transcendentally ideal," they are universally necessary *a priori* conditions of human experience. Because space and time are forms of human intuition, and because we can only apply concepts to intuited objects, any object of outer experience we can encounter can be known *a priori* to be spatio-temporal and to be subsumable under the fundamental categories of human thought.

The arguments of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Transcendental Analytic" aim to prove the following thesis: The conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness include the conditions for identifying perceptible spatio-temporal substances.¹³ Kant's answer to Cartesian skepticism is that wholesale deception is impossible, because wholesale deception, the failure ever to correctly identify an outer object, would eliminate the possibility of identifying oneself as anything distinct from outer objects, and with that, self-consciousness would collapse. The very ability to pose Descartes's skeptical hypothesis, once understood, suffices to show that the hypothesis is false.¹⁴ Now Kant's philosophy does not prove that we're empirically infallible. Kant is a fallibilist of sorts, and certainly not a foundationalist, but his transcendental considerations rule out the skeptical ploy of generalizing from occasional mistakes to universal ignorance. Blocking the possibility of universal ignorance solves the transcendental issue of whether or not we are capable of, and in fact have, empirical knowledge, and it redirects attention to the common sense ways of distinguishing perceptual knowledge from error. How, after all, would the occasional mistakes exploited by skeptics be detected, were it not for the reliability of some of our sense perceptions?

The pressing question is, What constitutes a veridical relation between our perceptions and empirical objects? This question is answered in the "Analogies of Experience," especially in the second "Analogy". The question is fundamental enough to recall Sextus's formulation of it; Kant's answer responds not only to Sextus, but to Hume as well. Sextus argues that it is impossible to accept all "perceptions" wholesale because the whole set is inconsistent, and it is impossible to accept them piecemeal because it is impossible to identify any one perception as veridical, and so to use it as a suitable standard for judging the reliability of other perceptions.¹⁵ Kant is fully aware of this problem, and formulates it even more sharply:

We have representations in us, and can become conscious of them. But however far this consciousness may extend, and however careful and accurate it may be, they still remain mere representations, that is, inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time. How, then, does it come about that we posit an object for these representations, and so, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, ascribe to them some mysterious kind of objective reality? Objective significance [*Bedeutung*] cannot consist in the relation to another representation (of that which we desire to entitle object), for in that case the question arises, how did this latter representation go out beyond itself, acquiring objective significance in addition to the subjective significance which belongs to it as determination of the mental state?¹⁶

Kant's answer to this problem results from analyzing the fact that the order in which we apprehend outer objects (through various perceptions of them) is always successive,¹⁷ whereas the temporal order of the properties of perceived objects is either (in the case of states of affairs) simultaneity or (in the case of events) irreversible succession independent of the succession of our apprehension.¹⁸ The general point of Kant's examples in the second "Analogy" is that, first, we do discern such differences as those between events and states of affairs, and second, we do distinguish between the objective order of the empirical world and the subjective order of our apprehension of that world. Recognizing full well that such an ability to make this distinction cannot rely on singling out some central representation and relating other representations to it, Kant argues that such distinctions are only possible if there is an objective temporal order to the world. Furthermore, because sensory representations do not come dated and cannot be dated by reference to time itself,¹⁹ and because the successive order in which the world is taken in of itself cannot distinguish between objective succession and coexistence,²⁰ objectively determinate temporal relations among appearances (in the empirical sense) can obtain only insofar as subsequent states of worldly affairs are causally contingent upon something in preceding states.²¹ Moreover, we can experience the objective relations among objects and events only by applying concepts of substance and causality to the objects we experience.

It should be noted that by insisting upon the distinction between the subjective order of apprehension and the objective temporal order of the world, and upon subsequent states depending causally on something in preceding states, Kant disavows any phenomenalist reduction of physical objects to perceptions or sense-data. He is, as he so often insists, not an empirical idealist.²²

Kant's response to Hume's skepticism about causality, briefly, is simply to point out that this rule-governed succession and its attendant distinction between the order of apprehension and the order of actual occurrence shows that causality is a feature of the empirical world, not merely in the sense of constant conjunction, but in the stronger sense of empirical substances having dispositional properties. Not being a concept empiricist, Kant isn't moved by Hume's challenge to derive our conception of causality from the experience of caused events.²³ Indeed, Kant's argument shows that we couldn't have the concept of causality—not even Hume's concept of causality—if Hume's empiricism were true. Only on the basis of the principle that each event has a cause are we able to develop beliefs about causal relations between particular kinds of causes and effects. This is because we experience both a cause and its effect far less often than we experience one without the other.²⁴

Against Sextus, who would restrict statements to the "evident" and not even allow such statements to count as assertions, Kant holds that empirical substances are no less manifest to us than are sensations, and that the best we can get (and this is fully adequate for empirical knowledge) is intersubjective agreement concerning empirical substances.

Thinking that one needs more than this is to succumb to transcendental illusion. Likewise, settling for less is to overlook just how rich the presuppositions of the possibility of self-consciousness are.

Much has been left unsaid about Kant's response to the various skeptical challenges to the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims, and none of the interpretive debates about whether he can sustain this much have been entered.²⁵ But enough has been said to show that Kant developed a complex and sophisticated response to these issues. Now it is time to see that even if he succeeded, the results would not be satisfactory.

III. Kant's Subjectivism

Kant announces his subjectivism in his famous "Copernican Revolution," a revolution constituted by the following reversal in epistemic hypotheses:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.²⁶

Kant's plan to grant epistemology priority over ontology is plain. That he does not leave this suggestion as a mere hypotheses can be gleaned from seeing how seriously he takes his version of Vico's thesis that "we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them."²⁷ What we are said by Kant to contribute to the structure of our experience of things is, in the first place, spatiality and temporality. Furthermore, we can apply our categorial concepts to things only insofar as they are intuited as spatial or temporal (or both). The subjectivist aspect of Kant's view comes from his contention that space and time, being nothing but forms of our intuition, qualify objects only insofar as we intuit them.²⁸ This entails that objects are radically different when intuited by us and when not so intuited. Because our experience of transcendently real objects is structured by our spatial and temporal modes of intuiting them, and because we can only apply our concepts to those objects insofar as we intuit them, any knowledge we have of such objects pertains to them only in their relations to us, and not to them as they are in themselves. Kant's formulation of the relations among empirical realism, transcendental idealism, and transcendental realism insures that our empirical knowledge has nothing to do with transcendently real features of objects. Kant, to his credit, did not mince his words on the point:

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or time, and therefore all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations, which, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. This doctrine I entitle transcendental idealism.²⁹

Again,

[T]his space and this time, and with them all appearances, are not in themselves things; they are nothing but representations, and cannot exist outside our mind.³⁰

Kant's aim to "deny knowledge in order to make room for faith"³¹ has skeptical implications, as is shown by his remarks on the existence of noumena, "intelligible entities," which we cannot know:

If we entitle certain objects, as appearances, sensible entities (phenomena), then since we thus distinguish the mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in themselves, it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter ... in opposition to the former, and that in so doing we entitle them intelligible entities (noumena).³²

If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot even comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in the positive sense of the term. The doctrine of sensibility [concerning space and time as forms of intuition] is likewise the doctrine of the noumenon in the negative sense³³

Since ... such a type of [intellectual] intuition ... forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge, it follows that the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the objects of experience [phenomena]. Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities³⁴

This is not to take a stand on any particular interpretation of what this skeptical strain amounts to; it is only to note that there is such a strain, that it involves a real limit on what knowledge of the world humans can have, and that Kant himself is serious about it. This is enough for current purposes.³⁵

Complaining about the implications of a view is one thing. Criticizing its supporting arguments or results is another. The point of this section has simply been to highlight Kant's subjectivism, his contention that the objects of empirical knowledge are structured by our cognitive activity, and thereby to make plain what an epistemological realist would find objectionable in Kant's views. These passages point out the skeptical side of the Critical philosophy, and they make plain why Hegel's program for defending the objectivity of knowledge rests on a rejection of Kant's arguments for transcendental idealism. Hegel explicitly addresses Kant's arguments in many places. However, his criticisms are rarely as carefully or clearly presented as one would want. For this reason I will forego their exegesis and reconstruction here and instead directly attack Kant's main argument for transcendental idealism.³⁶ The following section recounts Kant's main argument for transcendental idealism. The section thereafter is directly critical, arguing that Kant's argument for transcendental idealism, and with that, for his subjectivism, are unsound. This will show that Kant failed to handle Sextus's challenges to empirical knowledge, even to the satisfaction of Critical philosophy. This will also remove a prime obstacle to defending epistemological realism, an obstacle prominent in Hegel's day and still defended in our own,³⁷—namely, Kant's objections to such realism.

IV. Kant's Direct Argument for Transcendental Idealism

Kant's multifaceted response to skepticism rests on his case for transcendental idealism, for only if he can make this case can Kant steer his middle course through traditional debates by deploying his innovative combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. Kant offers two basic arguments for transcendental idealism, a direct argument in

the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and an indirect argument in the first "Antinomy." Only the direct argument of the "Aesthetic," and indeed only half of that, will be considered here, the half dealing with space.³⁸ The decision to focus on Kant's arguments about space is not arbitrary, for he ultimately rests the ideality of time on that of space.³⁹ As the exact interpretation of Kant's arguments in the "Aesthetic" is a matter of dispute, and as this study is not solely of Kant's philosophy, the recent, careful, and sympathetic reconstruction by Henry Allison will be used as a basis for this discussion.⁴⁰

Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of space may be set out in five steps:

- (1) Our representation of space is *a priori*.
- (2) (1) is possible if the content of our representation of space is a form of our (human) sensibility.
- (3) (1) is possible only if the content of our representation of space is a form of our (human) sensibility.

Therefore:

- (4) Space is a form of human sensibility.

Therefore:

- (5) Space is transcendently ideal (though empirically real).

The first premise is defended in the "Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space," the second and third premises in the "Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space" (and in the "Conclusions from the above Concepts"), and the conclusions are drawn, not surprisingly, in the "Conclusions." The crux of the argument is clearly premise (3), which is defended by eliminating the following three alternatives:

- (A) Our representation of space is innate.
- (B) Our representation of space is *a posteriori*.
- (C) We have direct acquaintance with space itself.

The last of these alternatives is unpromising enough that it will not be considered further: no one would reasonably argue that space itself is given to us as an object of experience, rather than things in space.⁴¹ Before considering the two principle alternatives, some of Kant's terminology should be reviewed in order to understand just what is being argued in the "Transcendental Aesthetic." (I follow Allison's helpful clarifications of Kant's terms.⁴²)

"Appearances," as it occurs in Kant's arguments, must be taken in an ontologically neutral sense in order to allow discussion to get off the ground. It is, in this role, neutral in the way that "phenomena" is neutral in speaking of, say, natural phenomena. Here it is agreed that outer objects are experienced as spatial. The issue is what accounts for the spatiality of the objects of outer experience.

"Form" denotes a condition of items that allows them to be ordered, in this case spatially; "matter" is that which is conditioned by a form. Several terms concerning "form" and "intuition" need to be distinguished. "Form of intuition" is ambiguous between 'form of intuiting' and 'form of intuited,' both of which are distinct from "formal intuition."

(Not being directly relevant here, this last will not be considered.⁴³) The rendering of the former distinction almost suffices to give its sense. A "form of intuiting" is a formal feature of some mode of intuiting, in the case at hand, a formal feature of our mode of intuiting outer objects. A "form of an intuited" is a formal feature of something intuited (in this case outer objects). As in the case of "appearance," this second sense of form is ontologically neutral. Closely related to these are two senses of "form of sensibility." One sense of the term is what Kant calls a "form of receptivity," or a form of sensibly intuiting. The second sense of the term is a form of objects *qua* sensibly intuited. (Following Allison, these will be distinguished with subscripts as "form of sensibility₁" and "form of sensibility₂," respectively.⁴⁴) Neither of these is ontologically neutral, in that they each refer to an intuer.

Kant's argument, cast in this terminology, aims to show that space, as a formal feature of intuited outer objects, is a feature we know *a priori* those objects to have because space pertains to outer objects *qua* sensibly intuited (that is, because space is a form of sensibility₂). This is because space is a form of our receptivity of outer objects, a form of intuiting or a form of sensibility₁. Distinguishing Kant's terminology in this way keeps Kant's argument from seeming to be a matter of definition and shows that the burden of proof rests on showing that space is a form of sensibility₂, that is, that spatiality pertains to objects only insofar as they are intuited by us outwardly. Kant's doctrine that space is a form of sensibility₁, and hence a feature of objects *qua* sensibly intuited, is presented by him as the only view that can account for our *a priori* knowledge that all objects intuited outwardly are spatial.⁴⁵

Allison adduces Kant's likely objection to the claim that our representation of space is innate from Kant's remarks about a similar claim concerning the categories.⁴⁶ Assuming parallel treatment, Kant objects that such a claim is entirely *ad hoc*, in that it indicates no particular grounds concerning why this representation would be innate and it sets no limits to what other representations might similarly be claimed to be innate. Furthermore it presupposes divine preordination, a providential adjusting of our cognitive faculties to the structure of the world.

Against the claim that our representation of space is *a posteriori*, Kant points out that this claim simply denies what was established in the "Metaphysical Exposition" of the concept of space, namely, that the representation of space is an *a priori* condition of our experience of outer objects, and hence cannot be abstracted from our experience of outer objects.

The particular point agitating Kant throughout the "Aesthetic," whether it concerns *a priori* knowledge that the objects of our outer experience are spatial, synthetic *a priori* knowledge of geometry, or our "knowledge" (such as it may have been) that geometry holds of the objects of experience *a priori*, is sharply formulated in his essay, "On the Progress of Metaphysics." There he contends that if space were the form of objects as they are in themselves, then "our synthetic *a priori* judgments would be empirical and contingent, which is contradictory."⁴⁷

V. Criticism of Kant's Direct Argument for Transcendental Idealism

As an argument by elimination, Kant's argument is singularly disappointing. Though there is more to his discussion of space than has been mentioned here, his further arguments concern geometry and only multiply his difficulties. I will criticize Kant's argument by suggesting a transcendentially realist account of space that grants that the form of our

outer intuition is spatial, in the sense that our capacity to intuit outer objects is receptive only to objects having spatial location or extension, and that denies that space itself is a form of intuition. By granting that the form of our outer intuition is spatial in this sense, I elude Kant's arguments from geometry altogether. By offering this alternative, Kant's case for transcendental idealism will be undermined, and with that, so will be both his defense of the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims and his Critical subjectivism *cum* skepticism.

The first option, that our representation of space is innate, could be reconstructed on naturalistic, evolutionary lines. One might argue that only creatures having cognitive capacities that organize experience spatially could comprehend a macro world of spatio-temporal objects. Not God's preestablished harmony, but evolutionary accommodation to the spatial world necessary to make creatures like ourselves biologically viable, is responsible for our having a representation of space playing the fundamental role in our cognition and organization of experience which it does. This sort of explanation need not be *ad hoc* because it gives a good reason for a representation of space (or at least a disposition to represent space) to be innate, a reason that does not rely on divine preordination. On this view, our representation of space can be "*a priori*" with respect to empirical knowledge, the form of our outer intuition can be spatial, and spatial characteristics can be (transcendentally) real features of objects. Hence Kant's dismissal of the innateness hypothesis is too hasty.

My second objection rests on an equivocation concerning "experience." If experience is taken to be organized knowledge (as Kant would have it), indeed, even if experience were only to mean conscious awareness of objects, then there would be a contradiction in supposing that our representation of space could be *a posteriori*. However, if "experience" is taken in a minimal sense as postnatal interaction with the world (whatever character it may have), then it would only be necessary to assume that the representation of space is developed through a pre-cognitive, pre-conscious interaction of infants with the spatial world, after the development of which they could begin spatially organizing their nascent conscious experience of things. In this way, the representation of space could be "prior" with respect to conscious, organized experience, though that fact would not be properly explained by recourse to our form of outer intuition. On this view, too, our representation of space can be "*a priori*" with respect to empirical knowledge, the form of our outer intuition can be spatial, and spatial characteristics can be (transcendentally) real features of objects. Kant's dismissal of the *a posteriori* hypothesis is also too hasty.

As these criticisms show, Kant's contention that the transcendental ideality of space is a necessary implication of our synthetic *a priori* geometrical knowledge overlooks a possibility that Allison himself overlooks elsewhere.⁴⁸ Instead of insisting that we can know *a priori* of things only that which we ourselves put into them, one might argue for the thesis that we can know *a priori* certain things about the objects of outer experience because there are certain *a priori* conditions of our knowledge of outer objects, conditions which outer objects must meet if we are to experience them. Only objects meeting such conditions would be possible objects of outer experience; any objects not meeting those conditions could not be objects of our outer experience.⁴⁹ This view would allow that *spatiality*, as a form of intuiting (form of sensibility), might be an *a priori* condition for the possibility of our experiencing any outer object, while also allowing that *space*, as a form of the intuited, is an ontological condition for some range of objects (regardless of their being objects of experience). Only objects of that kind would be possible objects of our outer experience. This view makes space a transcendentially real feature, an ontological

condition, of some, but not all, objects, thereby avoiding the affront of inflicting spatiality on the deity.⁵⁰

Patricia Kitcher has argued convincingly that Kant's theory of perception is central to his arguments in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, and that in offering those arguments Kant could take it for granted by his contemporaries that three-dimensional spatial properties of objects cannot be wrought from sensations, so that the three-dimensionality of our outer perceptions must be something contributed by our cognitive activity.⁵¹ Her reconstruction has much merit, though she thinks Kant's view is mitigated by a faulty understanding of geometrical proof.⁵² Another problem facing the perceptual phase of Kant's argument is more relevant here. Even on Kitcher's reconstruction, the argument to show that we contribute a form of spatiality to our outer perceptions does not entail that space itself is nothing but a form of intuiting or form of sensibility.₁ Kant claims that

[N]o determination ... can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited *a priori*.⁵³

However, there is no need to "intuit" the determinations of empirical objects prior to their existence. On the view I am suggesting, one needs merely to establish that we are only capable of intuiting objects of a certain type, namely, those that are spatio-temporal. This thesis provides, one might say, an entirely natural(istic) answer to Kant's question, "How ... can there exist in the mind an outer intuition which precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be determined *a priori*?"⁵⁴ Hence there is another, very straightforward basis upon which the foundational role of the representation of space in our experience could be understood. There is no "manifest"⁵⁵ need to turn transcendental idealist, because Kant's proposed argument by elimination manifestly fails. Yet without that need, there is no defense of the objectivity of knowledge claims available from Kant's innovative combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, but neither is there any Critical subjectivism or skepticism to contend with. Kant's attempt to ground ontological conclusions on epistemological premises fails.⁵⁶

VI. Reflexive Difficulties with Kant's First Critique

In Chapter One it was noted that a meta-level defense of an account of knowledge needs to be consistent with the kinds of knowledge legitimated by the account itself, on pain of using cognitive abilities to propound a theory of knowledge that are in conflict with the abilities alleged by that theory. Furthermore, it was noted that, although there may be a number of kinds or levels of knowledge involved in analyzing empirical knowledge, at some point a level must be reached where an account of some order of knowledge can account for itself, as well as the order just below it, on pain of meta-level dogmatism, question-begging, or regress. To pose these points as Nietzsche might have, Kant forgot one question: How is Immanuel Kant possible? Kant has official doctrines concerning arithmetical, geometrical, and empirical knowledge, augmented by a kind of "practical knowledge" that might allow for the "extension" of the use of the concepts of pure reason to certain ethical domains.⁵⁷ Nowhere does Kant explain what sort of knowledge, or, for that matter, what kind of investigation, is involved in developing and comprehending these Kantian doctrines.⁵⁸ The havoc wrought by trying to legitimate Kant's critical claims on the basis of his critical doctrine was familiar to Hegel, as can be seen from pursuing his oblique reference to it in the Introduction.

In the Introduction, Hegel recognizes Kant's attempt to combine transcendental idealism with empirical realism into a unique position defending the knowledge of "empirical substances" as somehow intermediate between mere collections of sensations and things-in-themselves in the transcendental sense. After despairing of defending knowledge of transcendently real objects, one might reject these realist pretensions by

distinguishing between knowledge of the absolute, which is the aim of science, and a knowledge which, though it indeed does not know the absolute, might be capable of some other truth.⁵⁹

Hegel makes an apparently weak two-part rejoinder to this proposal, the first part of which is that

[S]uch talking back and forth only leads to an obscure distinction between an absolute truth and a truth of some other sort⁶⁰

Though this shifting back and forth can be found in many of Kant's doctrines, perhaps none of these is more acute than in the case of Kant's claims to transcendental knowledge. Hegel develops this point somewhat more in the *Science of Logic*:

The [Kantian] criticism of the forms of understanding has had the result already mentioned, that these forms have no application to things-in-themselves. This can have no other meaning than that these forms are in themselves something untrue If they cannot be determinations of the thing-in-itself, still less can they be determinations of the understanding, to which one ought at least to concede the dignity of a thing-in-itself.⁶¹

Hegel's terse rebuke contains the following argument: The categories of the understanding (officially) cannot be applied to things-in-themselves, but only to things as they appear (phenomena). If they can be applied only to phenomena, then they can be applied only to the phenomenal or "empirical" ego and not to the noumenal ego. Since the empirical ego is a phenomenon, it (like all phenomena) is held to be determined by causality. Since it is determined by causality it is not free. Freedom of theoretical reason is necessary for cognition.⁶² Therefore not the empirical ego, but the noumenal or transcendental ego, is the cognizing ego. But since we cannot apply categories to the noumenal ego,⁶³ we cannot know that the analysis of cognition propounded in the first *Critique* holds of our actual cognitive faculty. Hence Kant is faced with a serious dilemma: Either we have knowledge of the cognizing, noumenal ego as a thing-in-itself and the analysis of cognition provided in the first *Critique* can be known to hold of it (in which case, why couldn't we have knowledge of some other noumena as well?), or else we do not have knowledge of any things-in-themselves and we also cannot know whether the analysis of cognition given in the first *Critique* is true or even defensible.⁶⁴ This is what results by running the claims to transcendental knowledge made in the first *Critique* through the strictures on first-order knowledge made by that *Critique*. One might object that this would have Kant doing what he denies he is doing, namely, empirical psychology, but if the knowledge contained in the first *Critique* is not gained by subsuming intuitions of objects under concepts, how is it gained? What Hegel points to is Kant's naive and distinctly unCritical assumption that claims to transcendental knowledge are any less problematic than claims to first-order knowledge of objects. This is one of the assumptions of epistemology which Hegel questions in the opening paragraphs of his Introduction.⁶⁵

One might respond on Kant's behalf by pointing out that Kant tried to argue that there are certain *a priori* conditions for human knowledge—namely, space and time as forms of sensibility and the categories as logical forms of judgment—by arguing from the contrapositive: without these conditions obtaining, the merest self-consciousness would be impossible. Two problems still arise. One problem concerns the kind of cognition involved both in understanding Kant's appeals to radically counter-factual situations and in developing his positive account of knowledge. This knowledge is gained through what Kant calls "transcendental reflection," defined as:

The act by which I confront the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive faculty to which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other⁶⁶

This sort of reflection belies a great confidence in the powers of something very like introspection, recalling Kant's remark that the *Critique* has "to deal with nothing but reason itself and its pure thinking, and to obtain complete knowledge of these there is no need to go far afield, since I come upon them in my own self."⁶⁷ Compare Kant's remark in the Introduction to the first *Critique* about constructing his system of knowledge of the *a priori* conditions of our knowledge of objects:

That such a system is possible, and indeed that it may not be of such great extent as to cut us off from the hope of entirely completing it, may already be gathered from the fact that what here constitutes our subject-matter is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of things; and this understanding, again, only in respect of *a priori* knowledge. These *a priori* possessions of the understanding, since they have not to be sought for without, cannot remain hidden from us, and in all probability are sufficiently small in extent to allow of our apprehending them in their completeness ... and ... of rightly appraising them.⁶⁸

Two problems face Kant's methodological optimism. It seems that Kant's notion of transcendental reflection is somehow exempt from the phenomena/noumena distinction (note his talk of confronting "the cognitive faculty" to which representations belong in the previous quotation). As Lewis White Beck notes, Kant "has no explicit theory of how we come to know the operations and faculties or abilities of the mind."⁶⁹ That Kant has no such theory is not surprising, once one notes that the capacity to reflect transcendently is not accounted for in any of Kant's accounts of sensibility, understanding, or reason; and his later account of "reflective judgment" does not address the issue either. Retreating to an unexplained transcendental level is, of course, just the move Sextus is waiting for.

A second problem concerns the contingent, factual status of the *a priori* conditions of human knowledge Kant sets out in the first *Critique*. When a Pyrrhonian skeptic moves from challenging particular empirical claims to challenging the validity of our way of judging empirical matters generally, this is where Kant supposes that the regress must stop: We have no forms of intuition other than spatial and temporal, and we have just those twelve judgmental categories specified in the Table of Categories, according to Kant. The problem is that these remain brute facts within Kant's account. Kant himself acknowledges this, claiming that these are in fact just that, brute facts about the human understanding:

This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce *a priori* unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as

why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition.⁷⁰

One might allow that Kant has argued effectively that our forms of intuition are spatial and temporal, but even Allison's very favorable reconstruction of Kant's derivation of the categories runs into admitted snags.⁷¹ Few have been satisfied with Kant's contention. The problem is that Kant needs to be able to show that these are the *only* categories and forms of intuition that we could have. Post-Kantians of many stripes, dissatisfied with the skeptical strictures of the Kantian critique of discursive reasoning, simply denied that all reasoning is discursive, and virtually everyone has a different list of categories than Kant. Most notably, Jacobi and Schelling claimed that humans have a direct, intuitive cognition of the world, thereby flatly denying Kant's claim that we have no "intellectual intuition." Of course Kant points out that such "fundamental powers" are not to be assumed arbitrarily,⁷² but he fails to address the problem of how to distinguish legitimate from arbitrary postulation of such abilities. The skeptical conflict of opposed viewpoints has not been settled by Kant's Critical philosophy. It has only been moved up a level to disputes about what knowledge is and how to theorize about it, where Kant has little or nothing to say in his own metaphilosophical defense. This kind of project was first enunciated by J. G. Hamann, who responded to Kant with a brief attempt at a "metacritique" of pure reason.⁷³ This kind of project captured the attention of German post-Kantians, and Hegel's *Phenomenology* is the most thorough and successful effort to carry it out.

VII. Coda: Hegel's Debt to Kant

Hegel recognized that Kant's transcendental idealism was the source of his subjectivism. In order to refute Kant's subjectivism Hegel makes many specific criticisms of Kant's arguments for the distinctions between phenomena and noumena and between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism in four extended "Remarks" in the *Science of Logic*.⁷⁴ Hegel's rejection of this portion of Kant's philosophy poses two questions. One question is what Hegel's idealism amounts to, if it is not some sort of Kantian transcendental idealism. This question is addressed in Chapter Ten. The second question concerns Hegel's debt to Kant. My sketch of a naturalistic alternative to Kant's doctrines of space suggests that it might be possible to extract Kant's transcendental mode of argumentation from his framework of transcendental idealism. Such refurbished transcendental arguments would purport to demonstrate that certain natural features of the world must be the case in order that we could be self-conscious, or in order that some other ubiquitous, uncontentious feature of our experience could occur.⁷⁵ I know of no place where Hegel states outright that his aim is to salvage transcendental arguments from Kant's transcendental idealism. However, some remarks of his about Kant in the *Science of Logic* strongly suggest that he is aware of and advocates this strategy, for Hegel explicitly distinguishes between Kant's "Aesthetic" and "Analytic," rejecting the former while emphasizing the latter.⁷⁶ More to the point, I argue in Chapter Eleven that Hegel explicitly employs a style of argument very much like this. Furthermore, Hegel turns this style of argument to good dialectical use by purporting to show that the conditions for the possibility of the experience had by any form of consciousness are not accounted for by the principles adopted by that form of consciousness, unless those principles contain conceptions that correspond with the actual structure of the world and of knowledge. This is the key to Hegel's solution of the dilemma of the criterion.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOME ASPECTS OF EMPIRICISM AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

I. Introduction

Though it might seem unusual to postpone a discussion of empiricism until after a discussion of Kant, there is a simple reason for doing so. Hegel himself addresses a, if not the, fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism in the first chapter of the *Phenomenology*, "Sense-Certainty": the thesis that we are capable of non-conceptual cognitive apprehension of objects.¹ Section II of this chapter discusses this doctrine along with its two main purposes, indicates some of the twentieth-century adherents of these doctrines, and defers thorough analysis of the topic to an analysis of the "Sense-Certainty" chapter—a project lying beyond the bounds of the present study. Despite this deferral, several reflexive problems for empiricism are implied by the questions (discussed above in Chapter One) Hegel raises in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*. The gist of the issue is: Can Empiricism be known to be true on empiricist grounds? This issue is discussed in section III of this chapter after considering several formulations of principles of empiricism. Section IV expounds Carnap's empiricism, for he offers a direct solution (or dissolution) of the problems posed in sections II and III by adopting a liberalized notion of observation and a syntactical construal of the principle of empiricism, a construal rendering that principle non-cognitive and so avoiding the reflexive challenge posed by Hegel. I argue in section V that Carnap's program fails to replace epistemology with the logic of science and fails to undercut the issue of epistemological realism and so neither handles nor avoids the problems Hegel addresses.² Specifically, I show that Carnap's syntactic analysis of science must be supplemented by what he calls "descriptive semantics," which must refer to unreconstructed empirical facts (§VA). In §VB I argue that Carnap's attempt to "naturalize" epistemology fails because it presupposes rather than gives answers to questions about how we are able to understand signals or protocol statements. In §VC I argue that Carnap relapses into holding that there is non-conceptual apprehension of objects. In §VD I argue that Carnap has implicitly provided criteria of truth, and so has in effect responded to Sextus's challenge. In §VE I argue that Carnap's criteria of truth lead to subjectivism. In §VF I argue that Carnap failed to diagnose the source of difficulties with epistemological realism. In §VG I argue that he also failed to undo the issue of epistemological realism. In §VH I urge reflexive difficulties against Carnap's program. In the final section of this chapter (§VI) I show that Hegel recognized the source of difficulties with epistemological realism that Carnap overlooked. In a word, rejecting "knowledge by acquaintance," and so rejecting correspondence as a criterion of truth, does not entail rejecting correspondence as an analysis of truth. I show that Hegel was aware of the issues in philosophy of mind that led to this prevalent *non sequitur*.

II. Empiricism and Non-Conceptual Apprehension of Objects

Modern, as well as much twentieth-century, empiricism requires that we be capable of non-conceptual cognitive apprehension of objects, either for the purpose of concept acquisition or for (dis)confirmation of statements and of theories that imply those statements. This way of formulating the doctrine shows that it is plainly an epistemological doctrine, and so a doctrine that could hold of a wide variety of kinds of objects. The range of objects said to be known in this "direct" or "immediate" way has included mental occurrences, impressions, sense-data, ideas of sense or reflection, universals, spatio-temporal particulars, and the "phenomena" ("appearances to me") said to be reported in "phenomenal reports" or judged in "terminating judgments." Thus the refutation of the doctrine of non-conceptual cognitive apprehension of objects constitutes *ipso facto* a refutation of a wide range of epistemological views, including Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance' (to which Ayer, Carnap, and Schlick all, at one time, pledged allegiance³), C. D. Broad's account of concept acquisition,⁴ and C. I. Lewis's phenomenism.⁵ Whether or not we are capable of non-conceptual cognition of objects is thus an important issue and ought, insofar as a discussion of it is pursued in exegesis and defense of Hegel, to be taken up with Hegel's own discussion of it. Although this issue will be touched upon again below, I defer detailed discussion to a sequel insofar as this study focuses on the aim and method of the *Phenomenology*.⁶

III. Some Principles of Empiricism

"Empiricism" is far from a univocal term, and no attempt will be made here to canvas all of its important senses. Set aside, for example, are the empiricisms of Aristotle, Brentano, and Sellars; any of these would require a study unto itself. Of interest here is a group of four closely related kinds of empiricism prominent in the Modern and twentieth-century periods. They may be formulated as follows:

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| Concept Empiricism: | Every term in a language is either a logical term, a term defined by ostending a sensory object, or can be defined by means of these two kinds of terms. |
| Verification Empiricism: | <p>(1) For any (non-logical) proposition that is known to be true, there is a sensory experience that confirms the proposition.</p> <p>(2) For any (non-logical) proposition that can be known to be true, there is some possible sensory experience that would confirm the proposition.</p> |
| Meaning Empiricism: | Any non-tautologous proposition can <i>be</i> either true or false (= be meaningful) if and only if there can be some sensory experience that confirms or disconfirms it. |
| Judgment Empiricism: | All judgments are either analytic and <i>a priori</i> or else synthetic and <i>a posteriori</i> ; there are no synthetic <i>a priori</i> judgments. |

These construals of empiricism are not identical and do not entail one another. For example, one might accept any or all of the first three while rejecting the notion of "judgment" and so not accepting the last. Also, Locke held concept empiricism while rejecting both versions of verification empiricism. Hume held both concept empiricism and at least the second version of verification empiricism. The early Vienna Circle seems to have held the first three kinds of empiricism, and the history of logical positivism *cum* logical empiricism can be seen as an effort to retain meaning empiricism in the face of the untenability of concept empiricism and the need to liberalize the notion of verification from that given above.⁷ Carnap's empiricism is of this variety.

Chapter One noted Hegel's proposal of an important desideratum for any theory of knowledge: any account claimed to be an account of human knowledge must be able to be known in accordance with its own principles. Put negatively, any account of knowledge that entails that we cannot know the account to be true *ipso facto* undermines its claim to be an account of human knowledge. If the account were true, it would be on its own principles unknowable and hence (at a minimum) radically incomplete insofar as it cannot account for how anyone could propound it as an account of human knowledge or give reasons in its defense. Kant laid it at the door of Hume's study that Hume's account of knowledge falls to this difficulty. Indeed, were Hume's account of cognition true, the *Treatise* could not have been written.⁸ Hegel was suitably impressed by this strategy and used it, in turn, against Kant.⁹ What is important here is the observation that none of the principles of empiricism formulated above can survive this reflexive challenge; none of them can be known to be true (or can count, *e.g.*, as meaningful) on their own grounds.

To be brief, the concept "concept" cannot be defined in accordance with concept empiricism. Hence concept empiricism cannot explain its own principle. The principle of verification empiricism (in either of its versions) is neither a logical proposition nor a proposition which admits of sensory verification. Hence on verification empiricist grounds there is at least one proposition of which verification empiricism is false. Similarly, the principle of meaning empiricism is not itself a tautology, and yet there is no sensory experience (or set of such experiences) that would confirm or disconfirm it. Hence on meaning empiricist grounds there is at least one proposition of which meaning empiricism is false. Lastly, the judgment that all judgments are either analytic and *a priori* or else synthetic and *a posteriori* is itself neither analytic and *a priori* nor synthetic and *a posteriori*. There is therefore at least one synthetic *a priori* judgment on this view; thus judgment empiricism is false. These refutations may look cheap, but they are no less sound than the principles they attack. The feeling that something has been left out of account is, however, legitimate and behooves a closer look at the matter.

The first point worth recalling is one made in the first chapter, namely, that all theories of knowledge have at least implicitly recognized a distinction between first-order knowledge of the world (the kind and level of knowledge for which an account is sought) and second-order, "transcendental" knowledge about first-order knowledge (the kind of knowledge exercised in accounting for first-order knowledge). Making such a distinction between orders of knowledge fits well with a maneuver made familiar by Russell's type-theory for dissolving reflexive dilemmas generated by universal quantifiers.¹⁰ The reflexive paradoxes faced by the principles of empiricism formulated above arise from the circumstance that these principles include an apparently unlimited universal quantifier ranging over all concepts, all propositions, or all judgments, and therefore over themselves. Distinguishing between first- and second-order knowledge and claiming that these principles represent principles *about* the first order but *known* on the second removes these paradoxes.

Such a resolution of the paradoxes involves, however, difficulties of its own. Another point made in Chapter One was that if philosophers have scruples about what counts as first-order knowledge, they should be no less scrupulous about the second-order cognitive means by which they defend their principles of first-order knowledge. Removing the paradoxes in the manner suggested leaves entirely open the question of how any of the stated principles are or could be known to be true at the second order. At this point another feature of those principles is pertinent, namely, all of them claim to be exhaustive accounts of, respectively, concepts, verification, meaning, and judgments.¹¹ If this is true, then there are no further kinds of principles to which to appeal at the second level in order to defend these principles about the first level. If this is the case, strict analogues of the above paradoxes recur, if in a more complex form, at the second level. Adding levels upon levels will not relieve the problem, for the last level introduced would remain in principle unaccounted for, and the principles would do no better at accounting for themselves at this level. Thus there would be good reason to suppose that there is, after all, some mode of cognition, some sort of concept, proposition, or judgment, available to us at this level but excluded at the previous levels. Otherwise these various principles couldn't be propounded. And were such an additional mode of cognition found, a serious question about why that mode is legitimate at level n and not at level $n-1$ (for all n) would have to be answered. This is not to say, over-confidently, that no such question could be answered. But it is to recall Hegel's point about the paucity of philosophical efforts simply to pose, much less to address, such questions about second-order knowledge. Part of the genius of Carnap's empiricism is to construe these second-order issues in non-cognitive terms.

IV. Carnap's Empiricism

A. SUMMARY OF CARNAP'S ATTEMPT TO UNDO THE ISSUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

Before delving into details, a brief survey of Carnap's views will indicate their importance for the issues of this study. According to Carnap's syntactic program for analyzing scientific knowledge, sentences (including observation sentences) are compared with other sentences, not with "facts" or "reality."¹² The "theses" discussed in the previous sections are confused expressions in the material mode of speech of syntactical propositions, propositions that ought, for clarity's sake, to be formulated in the formal mode of speech as relations said to hold between statements, predicates, and other elements of a specified language.¹³ Syntactical propositions do not express facts but rather are either rules or proposals for a language of science we are to (re)construct (depending upon whether the language is extant or yet to be built), and so are matters of practical decision rather than of knowledge.¹⁴ Carnap takes empiricism for granted,¹⁵ but since any principle of empiricism is a principle formulated in the meta-language that specifies the syntax of a specific (re)constructed language, it is not a matter requiring theoretical justification.¹⁶ Accepting a principle of empiricism is part of accepting one or another linguistic framework, and such acceptance is a practical rather than a cognitive matter.¹⁷

The question of realism divides into a question internal to a specified language and a question external to that language.¹⁸ The internal question about the "reality" of a kind of entity is whether or not there is a specified set of objects over which variables of that language range. The answer to this question is analytic and trivial. The external question

about the "reality" of a kind of entity is non-sense because any *kind* of entity can only be specified with respect to a specific linguistic framework. Such is the gist of Carnap's program, and with it he would seem to have circumvented the question about non-conceptual apprehension of objects mentioned above in section II, the question about the knowability of any principle of empiricism, the questions about the justification of any criterion of knowledge and about question-begging,¹⁹ and indeed even the question fundamental to this study about epistemological realism. Having thus noted the import of Carnap's views, it is time to examine his project more closely.

B. CARNAP'S MATURE VIEWS ON CRITERIA OF MEANINGFULNESS AND ON REALISM

"Testability and Meaning" (1936), "Truth and Confirmation" (1936), and "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950) will be taken as central texts for discussion because in them Carnap is most explicit about the so-called "observation language" of a syntactically (re)constructed scientific language and about the issue of epistemological realism. As my later criticisms will focus on problems with the observation sub-language, it is important to be thorough about it and its relation to the so-called "theoretical language." Others of his essays will be used to elaborate certain aspects of his views, though his later liberalization of the theoretical sub-language and its relation to the observation sub-language is not germane to the present discussion.²⁰

Three components of Carnap's empiricism may be distinguished. One of these is a purely syntactical analysis of the sentences of a (re)constructed language and their relations, as represented by his *Logical Syntax of Language*.²¹ A second part he calls "descriptive semantics," which has to do with identifying the sentences actually uttered by an historically given community, especially of scientists. This component is contained within the empirical psychology of knowledge. The third component is a logical theory of semantics founded on the work of Tarski and importantly qualified in "Truth and Confirmation" and "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology."

The nub of Carnap's point of departure is his rejection of traditional philosophy, including traditional epistemology, based on his claim that traditional philosophical questions combine metaphysical, logical, and psychological aspects in an inherently confused and confusing manner.²² Modern logic (first propounded in Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*) is the last science to separate itself from traditional philosophy, leaving "philosophy" behind as so much metaphysical non-sense.²³ The legitimate remainder of "epistemology" is to be divided between empirical scientific psychology and the logical analysis of science.²⁴ The logical analysis of science, in turn, is the study of the logical syntax of the language of science.²⁵ Thus the legitimate philosophical remainder of epistemology is a branch of applied logic.²⁶

The general task of Carnap's syntactical analysis is to work out a liberalized version of meaning empiricism in terms of verification empiricism (as defined above).²⁷ Hence the central problem Carnap addresses is establishing criteria of cognitive significance for various kinds of sentences.²⁸ This task is divided into two parts. One is to establish criteria of significance for a certain group of sentences the meaning of which can be fully specified on the basis of observation. The other is to establish criteria of significance for another group of sentences the meaning of which can be only partially specified on the basis of the first group of sentences.²⁹ These two groups of sentences are observation sentences and theoretical sentences, respectively. In each case, determining the criteria of significance for a group of sentences divides into two problems, one of specifying criteria

of significance for the descriptive terms used in those sentences and one of specifying the acceptable logical forms of those sentences.³⁰ After settling each of these questions, Carnap proposes to adopt the most liberal criteria of significance compatible with the solutions to these two problems.³¹ I begin, as does Carnap, with observation sentences. (I do not, however, follow his order of exposition, nor do I discuss all of the technical refinements of his formulations.)

Carnap's construal of the observation sub-language relies on two concepts not defined within his syntactic theory but borrowed from behavioristic theory of language. The two basic concepts are *observable* and *realizable*.³² Descriptive terms (predicates) are specified by their occurrence in a certain kind of sentence, a sentence attributing the term to an observable object within an observer's immediate vicinity. A predicate of a specific language L_1 is "observable" for an organism if the organism

is able under suitable circumstances to come to a decision with the help of a few observations about [the designated state of affairs] to a confirmation of either [the sentence or its negation] of such a high degree that [the organism] will either accept or reject [the sentence].³³

This pragmatic notion of "observable" apparently skirts the issue about non-conceptual apprehension of objects mentioned in section II above; insofar as an issue remains, Carnap leaves it to psychology. Carnap grants that his explication of "observable predicate" is vague and makes no sharp distinction between observable and non-observable predicates because different organisms will have different abilities to readily decide for or against the acceptance of a simple sentence containing an observation predicate.³⁴ None of the objections to Carnap's program made below turn on this vagueness, so I propose not to discuss it further.

The second primitive concept, "realizable," specifies predicates denoting properties that an organism can, in suitable circumstances, produce in a suitable object. "Realizable" predicates thus concern properties for which experimental conditions and tests can be constructed and performed.³⁵ This contrasts with predicates designating properties for which an organism must wait upon suitable circumstances in order to observe or confirm, e.g., a predicate occurring in astronomical observations. This distinction of kinds of terms marks the difference between experimental and (merely) observational sciences.

In constructing a scientific, empiricist language L_1 it is important that every predicate in the language be confirmable, and so all the primitive predicates (that is, all predicates not defined in terms of other predicates) must be observable predicates in the sense just specified.³⁶ (Designating the reconstructed language as " L_1 " serves as a reminder that all terms are defined or are meaningful only within a specified language.³⁷) "Atomic sentences" are elementary sentences predicating one (perhaps multi-place or relational) predicate of a physical object or objects.³⁸ (An example of a relational observation term is "next to," said of observable objects.) To insure that L_1 fulfills empiricist requirements, then, the primitive predicates occurring in atomic sentences must be observable predicates.³⁹ For reasons not pertinent here, it is unimportant to Carnap exactly which predicates are taken to be observable ones; what is important is that there be some such predicates (and that they be sufficient for, say, instrument reading⁴⁰). Exactly why this is important will be returned to shortly.⁴¹

Atomic sentences are not very complicated and hardly adequate for daily life, much less for scientific discourse. In accordance with the logical "formation" rules of *Principia Mathematica*, compound or "molecular" sentences can be built out of atomic sentences. Thus sentences with multiple predicates or multiple objects (grammatical subjects) or both

can be obtained by combining elementary sentences by means of negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions. The empiricist's question then arises, On the basis of what are such sentences verifiable? The answers Carnap gives are based on the logical relations holding between molecular sentences and atomic sentences. The basic idea is that a general statement of a natural law implies particular instances of that law, and these particular instances can be formulated in individual atomic sentences. The confirmation or disconfirmation of these implied atomic sentences (called "test sentences"⁴²) then reflects logically on the confirmation or disconfirmation of the general law.⁴³

There are two basic ways in which the (dis)confirmation of test sentences (dis)confirms general laws, called "testability" and "confirmability."⁴⁴ Both the testability and the confirmability of general laws rests on what Carnap calls the "direct confirmability" or the "direct testability" of test sentences.⁴⁵ It is important to note that in speaking of such "direct" confirmation of sentences Carnap is borrowing from a putative psychological theory of language, for the sentences said to be directly confirmed are observation or "protocol" sentences issuing from the observation conditions specified above.⁴⁶ From a purely syntactic point of view of the logic of science there is no talk of observation or of direct confirmation; there is only the listing of protocol sentences and the analysis of the relations between these sentences and a scientific theory. Carnap's claims about statements that are directly confirmed can be read from a purely syntactic point of view simply by substituting phrases stating tokens of protocol sentences. To make this distinction is also to recognize that in "Testability and Meaning" Carnap is working with both purely syntactical and with pragmatic naturalized epistemological concepts. Why he needs the latter in addition to the former will be shown below (§VA).

Atomic sentences containing observation predicates are directly confirmable, and so make suitable test sentences for statements of general laws that imply them. Truth-functional molecular sentences composed of such atomic sentences are also directly confirmable and so may serve as test sentences, provided that the total number of their component subsentences is finite or (in the case of quantified sentences) that the variables involved range over a finite domain of objects. This is to say, if a sentence contains or implies an infinite number of mutually distinct test sentences, then it cannot be completely verified because it is impossible to complete an infinite series of observations.

One important kind of sentence that admits of no complete verification is a sentence stating that something is a physical object. This is because something's being identified as a physical object entails an infinite number of possible observations of, or protocol sentences about, that object.⁴⁷ Carnap recommends that the interest in complete verifiability be overridden and a physical thing-language that identifies objects as physical objects be adopted in the interests of simplicity and intersubjective communication.⁴⁸ Being a presupposition of either conducting or analyzing science, this requirement will not be discussed further.⁴⁹ A second kind of sentence admitting of no complete verification is a statement of a universal law of nature. This is because laws of nature hold for an infinite range of spatio-temporal instances. These two cases suffice to show the untenability of complete verification for analyzing natural science, but one more important case should be considered before turning to Carnap's analysis of confirmability and testability.

A common kind of sentence both in science and in daily life states a dispositional property of some object, that is, a property of the object that is manifest only under certain variable conditions. Solubility is a favorite example. A problem with analyzing dispositions with the material conditional of *Principia Mathematica* is that the consequent of a conditional holds true whenever the antecedent is false. Taking wood and water as an example, and "If x is placed in water, x dissolves" as the definition of "soluble," then given

the peculiarities of the material conditional, any piece of wood that is not in fact placed in water is by this definition soluble.⁵⁰ This shows that a simple use of the material conditional for explicating dispositional statements is inadequate. Moreover, it is impossible to completely verify a disposition statement. Dispositions are effects that occur only given the occurrence of suitable triggering conditions. This entails that the non-occurrence of those conditions is relevant to the testing of any statement of a disposition, for given the non-occurrence of the triggering conditions the dispositional effect should not occur either. Thus a statement of a disposition concerns both the occurrence of the effect given the triggering conditions and its non-occurrence if the proper conditions do not occur. This entails that for any occurrence (or non-occurrence) of the triggering conditions, a disposition statement makes a claim not only about the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of the effect, but also about the counter-factual circumstance of the triggering conditions not occurring (or occurring) and the effect not occurring (or occurring). However, both sets of conditions cannot occur simultaneously, and so disposition statements cannot be completely verified. To put it crudely, at best only half of their possible instances could be observed because only half of the relevant (triggering and normal) conditions can occur. Thus for this reason, too, complete verification is an impossible ideal for scientific knowledge.

Carnap met this difficulty about disposition terms by developing what he called "reduction sentences," a form of sentence that embeds the conditional stating the disposition inside another conditional stating the occurrence of the appropriate circumstances. Reserving the notion of "definition" for terms the meanings of which can be completely specified in ways admitting of complete verification, Carnap calls the use of reduction sentences for specifying the sense of terms the "introduction" of those terms.⁵¹ The concept of solubility can be introduced as: "if any thing x is put into water at any time t , then, if x is soluble in water, x dissolves at the time t , and if x is not soluble in water, then it does not dissolve at time t ."⁵² A consequence of this way of specifying the meaning of disposition terms is that their meaning is left entirely unspecified for conditions other than those in which the dispositional effect should occur. This does not satisfy many intuitions about counter-factual circumstances, but it is clearly an improvement over the simple use of the material conditional rejected above.

There are thus at least two kinds of sentences within science that cannot be completely verified: universal laws of nature and statements that include dispositional terms. Carnap's problem, then, is to develop empiricist criteria of cognitive significance for concepts and statements that cannot be completely verified. The task of incorporating such sentences into an empiricist scientific language is the task of specifying something weaker than full verification without relinquishing an empiricist account of cognitive significance, that is, of specifying the cognitive significance of these kinds of sentences in terms of the cognitive significance of those sentences that can be fully verified and that bear logically on the sentences that cannot be fully verified. General laws and statements of dispositions imply more test sentences than can in principle be verified, though some of the statements they do imply can be completely verified. Although exactly how much confirmation can be transmitted from directly tested test sentences to the incompletely verifiable statements of laws or dispositions that imply them is a difficult point central to the positivist program, it will not be pursued here. The criticisms I make below would hold even if positivists could solve this problem. What is important for now are the logical *cum* syntactic relations between those statements that are completely verified and those that imply the former without themselves being completely verified.

Carnap expresses these relations in terms of "partially reducing" the confirmation of one kind of sentence to another.⁵³ To avoid confusing this notion with that of "reduction

sentence," Carnap's own term for the confirmation relation will be replaced in the present discussion by the phrase "incomplete verification," serving as a general rubric covering the special cases of testability and confirmability. Combining the distinction between complete and incomplete verification with the distinction between realizable and (merely) observable predicates results in four empiricist requirements for admissible non-logical sentences, the Requirement of Complete Testability, the Requirement of Complete Confirmability, the Requirement of Testability, and the Requirement of Confirmability.⁵⁴

The Requirement of Complete Testability holds that no synthetic sentence is admissible that cannot be completely verified by using only testable predicates, that is, by manipulating test conditions so as to cause the occurrence of properties in objects. This requirement is not as strong as complete verification, for it allows the introduction of terms by reduction sentences, provided that the first predicate of the reduction sentence (the one specifying the relevant test circumstances or triggering conditions) is one the meaning of which can be observationally defined and one for which we can manipulate the specified test circumstances at will. Like the requirement of complete verification, this requirement does not allow unrestricted universal statements.⁵⁵ If the predicate specifying relevant circumstances ranged over an infinite domain, there could be no complete testing of the sentence.

The other three requirements may be described as liberalizations of the preceding one. The Requirement of Complete Confirmability is somewhat weaker than the previous requirement, in that it allows the use of reduction sentences the first predicate of which is observable but not realizable, though it does not admit unrestricted universal statements.⁵⁶ The Requirement of Testability admits universal generalizations, but not merely observable predicates. The Requirement of Confirmability admits both unrestricted universal statements as well as (merely) observable predicates, and so is the most liberal of the four requirements.⁵⁷

The point for the present discussion is this. The incomplete confirmation of any of the kinds of sentences just discussed is possible only insofar as the observation sentences that they imply are directly testable where this involves their complete verification. Similarly, the incomplete specification of meaning for any of the sentences just discussed is only possible and tenable insofar as the meaning of the elementary sentences they either comprise or imply can be completely specified. This entails that there must be sentences the meaning of which can be completely specified and the truth of which can be directly tested.⁵⁸ In turn, there being such sentences entails that there must be predicates the meaning of which can be completely specified and the occurrence of the properties they designate can be completely verified. Thus the whole program of partial interpretation, reduction sentences, and incomplete verification rests on the complete interpretation and complete verification of elementary sentences containing observable predicates. The complete interpretation and verification of such sentences is only possible if their predicates are confirmed directly, without regard to other predicates or other sentences containing other predicates. As Carnap puts it,

[I]f confirmation is to be feasible at all, this process of referring back to other predicates must terminate at some point. The reduction must finally come to predicates for which we can come to a confirmation directly, *i.e.* without reference to other predicates. ... [T]he observable predicates can be used as such a basis.⁵⁹

The introduction of theoretical terms and the specification of their meaning, partial though it may be, is a sequential, cumulative procedure on Carnap's view and must begin with

predicates that are introduced without reference to other predicates.⁶⁰ Only statements formulated with such predicates could be completely verified.⁶¹

V. Criticism of Carnap's Program

Emphasis has been placed on the crucial role played by the observation language in Carnap's analysis in order to focus attention on the observation language and on observable predicates. Though Carnap takes these aspects of his program for obvious and agreed upon,⁶² I show in this and the following sections that not all is well with Carnap's account of the observation sub-language and observable predicates.

A. SYNTACTIC ANALYSIS MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY SEMANTIC ANALYSIS

A. J. Ayer posed a penetrating reflexive objection to Carnap's specification of which sentences count as observation or "protocol" sentences. His objection shows clearly why Carnap's syntactic program must be supplemented by a semantics in order to analyze natural science, but it needs a bit of stage-setting. Schlick had objected to Carnap's and Neurath's views that they involved a coherence theory of truth and, such a view leading to absurdities, hence should be rejected. The absurdity involved is that Carnap and Neurath, using formal criteria alone, can do nothing more than sort internally coherent from internally incoherent syntactically (re)constructed languages, and so cannot distinguish between an elegantly coherent fairy tale and the scientific truth.⁶³ In his essay, "On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Carl Hempel raises and responds to Schlick's objection on behalf of Carnap and Neurath. Hempel concedes that Carnap and Neurath have adopted, indeed argued for, a coherence theory of truth, but a "restrained" coherence theory.⁶⁴ The central question, according to Hempel, is how Carnap and Neurath propose to distinguish true from false protocol statements, and thus between the protocol statements of natural science and those of a fairy tale.⁶⁵ The difference between these two systems of statements is not formal or logical, but empirical:

The system of protocol statements which we call true, and to which we refer in every day life and science, may only be characterized by the historical fact, that it is the system which is actually adopted by mankind, and especially by the scientists of our cultural circle; and the "true" statements in general may be characterized as those which are sufficiently supported by that system of actually adopted protocol statements.⁶⁶

Furthermore, it is a contingent fact that scientists do agree on theoretical as well as protocol statements, though this empirical coincidence is aided greatly by the conditioning that science students receive as part of their training to make regular, "true" protocol statements.⁶⁷ Exception was taken to these frankly historicist assertions by Béla von Juhos.⁶⁸ In reply Hempel explained his statement and translated it into the formal mode:

The term "historical fact" serves to express a reference to that which is *acknowledged* as factual by *our science*. For the translation into the formal mode, we have ... "The following statement is sufficiently confirmed by the protocol-statements adopted *in our science*: 'Amongst the numerous imaginable consistent sets of protocol-statements, there is in practice exactly one which is adopted by the vast majority of instructed scientific observers; at the same time, it is just this set which we generally call true'."⁶⁹

Ayer's objection is that Hempel needs to have this claim about historically accepted protocol statements figure in both the formal and the material mode at once, which is both impossible and illegitimate.⁷⁰ If Hempel formulates the claim about the historical acceptance of a set of protocol statements in the material mode, then he can make a claim about which protocol statements are in fact accepted by scientists of some specified historical period. Accepting these protocols would prohibit the acceptance of fairy tales that are incompatible with those accepted protocols. However, this rejection of alternative fairy tales involves a claim about what is actually the case, about what observation statements actually issued from said flesh-and-blood human beings. This claim, to be relevant at all, must be true in a correspondence sense of truth. The protocol sentences contained in the reconstructed language must be about those protocols issued by scientists. This is a semantic, not a syntactic, relation. Reliance on the correspondence sense of truth can be avoided by translating into the formal mode the statement about which protocols are accepted by what scientists when. However, this translation renders that statement a syntactical element of a formally reconstructed language, and nothing prevents any and all competing fairy tales from including an analogous syntactical element in their languages. Hence formulating the statement in the formal mode insures that the statement cannot distinguish between the language of actual scientists and the languages of various competing fairy tales. Therefore the attempt to propound a "constrained" coherence theory of truth fails, much to the detriment of the rejection or avoidance of the correspondence analysis of truth.⁷¹

Carnap's aim, as has been mentioned, was to replace epistemology with a logical analysis of the syntax of reconstructed scientific languages and empirical psychology. In responding to Ayer, Hempel overlooked an important component of Carnap's empirical psychology, namely "descriptive semantics."⁷² Descriptive semantics is charged with the task of determining which protocol sentences are actually uttered by any historically given group of scientists.⁷³ Determining which system of science is the actual system is not a matter of pure logic,⁷⁴ but a matter, first, of which system or systems are compatible with those protocols actually issued by the scientists of a given "cultural circle,"⁷⁵ and second, of which of those systems humans are physiologically capable of constructing.⁷⁶ Thus distinguishing between "real" science and fabricated alternatives is an empirical matter, and Carnap's position in this regard is frankly socio-historical. Even if the "philosophical" task in analyzing science is a syntactic analysis of scientific language, this does not mean that this task is all that is involved in analyzing science. For a complete analysis of science, a psychology of knowledge—a "naturalized epistemology"—is also required.

B. THE INADEQUACY OF CARNAP'S PSYCHOLOGY OF OBSERVATION SENTENCES

I now argue that Carnap's attempt to naturalize epistemology does not work because the psychology he appealed to is not equal to the task and I suggest that the task remains amenable to philosophical analysis. Pursuing this line of criticism requires focusing on Carnap's earlier essays, for in "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" he says little about the observation sub-language because there seemed to him to be no significant philosophical disagreement about it, and in "Testability and Meaning" he avows a behavioristic theory of language but does not elaborate.⁷⁷

In Carnap's early account of language he treats verbal or written utterances on an exact par with meter-indications and natural signs. In "Psychology in Physicalist Language" (1931) he says:

The assertions of our fellow men contribute a great deal to extending the range of our scientific knowledge. But they cannot bring us anything *basically* new, that is, anything which cannot also be learned in some other way. For the assertions of our fellow men are, at bottom, no different from other physical events. Physical events are different from one another as regards the extent to which they may be used as signs of other physical events. Those physical events which we call "assertions of our fellow men" rank particularly high on this scale. It is for this reason that science, quite rightly, treats these events with special consideration. However, between the contribution of these assertions to our scientific knowledge and the contributions of a barometer there is, basically, at most a difference of degree.⁷⁸

A pressing question is, What kind of ability enables us to generate protocol statements on the basis of sensory stimulation? Neurath, Carnap, and Hempel take it for granted that we can do so, and apparently presume that any questions there may be about this ability are to be answered by psychology.⁷⁹ Carnap explicitly states that language-speaking is not learned by learning rules but by having one's verbal utterances selectively reinforced. Any rules that could be given would only be intelligible to someone who already understood language.⁸⁰ However, recognizing that humans do learn to make utterances regularly and reliably that covary with their circumstances does not entail, as Carnap would have it, that the covariance manifest in competent linguistic behavior is merely a fancy version of the covariance of tree-toads or barometers with atmospheric pressure.⁸¹ Regularity of correlations may entail that one state of affairs carries information about other covarying states of affairs,⁸² even when one set of those states of affairs is a person uttering vocables, but sheer covariance of worldly events and the audible output of a human mouth does not constitute the mouth's or the person's recognition or decoding of that information. Although our recognition of received information *as* informative about some event in the world is a regular response to the receipt of information, this does not entail that any regular response to an information source is a recognition of that information's being the information it is. A barometer, to take Carnap's example, has a meter scale and a pointer that covaries with atmospheric pressure. However, no barometer picks out atmospheric pressure as something to covary with, nor does it pick out the fact or even indicate the fact that its pointer covaries with atmospheric pressure. In contrast to this, we who use barometers *do* pick out the fact that their pointers covary with atmospheric pressure, and we use such devices *because* they do so covary and because we know that they do so covary. There's lots of covariance in the world, but recognizing a covariance (*i.e.*, taking it to be informative) is another matter. The point to notice is that this is a matter Carnap ignores and covers over rather than analyzes. Saying (as he does in the passage quoted above) that the assertions of our fellows "cannot bring us anything ... which cannot also be learned in some other way" *presupposes* rather than explains our being able to learn anything in the first place. Carnap emphasizes the fact that organisms are reliable indicators, but to emphasize this fact fails to explain *how* organisms, especially human organisms, are capable of being reliable indicators, much less how they can understand reliable correlations as informative. Moreover, since behaviorist psychology deals strictly with stimulus/response correlations, it does not and cannot attempt to explain what is involved in the occurrence of such correlations. This is, however, the very question at issue.⁸³ Especially at issue is how I am (or you are, or any relevant first-person is) able not only to reliably issue verbal or written sign sequences, but how I am able to understand sign sequences (those issued by myself as well as by others) as meaning anything and as asserting anything about the world. As Carnap admits, his analysis does not address this problem,⁸⁴ but this problem needs to be addressed in order to provide an account of

scientific knowledge.⁸⁵ Carnap's program thus presupposes a theory of knowledge rather than substituting the logical analysis of scientific language for it.

A die-hard positivist might reply that science is not a matter of predicting meter-readings (instrumentalism) but rather is a matter of predicting the protocol sentences of a scientific community.⁸⁶ Such a reply does nothing to address the problem of "first-person" understanding of sign sequences: What makes a sign sequence a *prediction*, and how does it lead to *anticipating* an event? These are not syntactical questions. Furthermore, this reply restricts the aim and usefulness of science in a quite peculiar way. On this account, science is concerned with an extremely limited range of phenomena, namely the phenomena of the issuing of protocol sentences, and not at all about other natural phenomena. If this were true, it would be very hard to see how science could provide a basis for anticipating anything about the world at large.

C. CARNAP'S RELAPSE TO NON-CONCEPTUAL APPREHENSION OF OBJECTS

By 1936 Carnap came to re-emphasize some of the epistemological doctrines which he had earlier relegated to empirical psychology. However, his revived notion of the "confrontation of a statement with observation" shows that what he gave up in rescinding knowledge by acquaintance is only the claim to incorrigibility. In "Truth and Confirmation" Carnap describes this "confrontation" as follows:

Observations are performed and a statement is formulated such that it may be recognized as confirmed on the basis of these observations. If, *e.g.*, I see a key on my desk and I make the statement: "There is a key on my desk", I accept this statement because I acknowledge it as highly confirmed on the basis of my visual and, possibly, tactual observations.⁸⁷

Confrontation is understood to consist in finding out as to whether one object (the statement in this case) properly fits the other (the fact); *i.e.*, as to whether the fact is such as it is described in the statement, or, to express it differently, as to whether the statement is true to fact.⁸⁸

As Sellars notes, Carnap uses the philosophical jargon of perceptual givenness without having explicitly discussed, much less rejected, the epistemological views that jargon embodies.⁸⁹ Rescinding the claim to incorrigibility does not do away with the question discussed in section II of whether we are capable of non-conceptual apprehension of objects. For Carnap's notion of "confrontation" to make any epistemological sense, he needs to claim that we are capable of such apprehension. Otherwise, the sentence I utter cannot be completely verified in the way he describes simply on the basis of my perceptual experience because the concepts expressed in my sentence would already have been applied to my sensory intake. The best I could do would be to make sure that I hadn't mis-spoken, that I hadn't used the wrong words for the thought ("that's my key") that I had. I could not, in addition, check the use of those concepts against a concept-free perception of the desk and, if it's there, the key. (Note Carnap's talk of checking the "fit" of statement and fact in the above quotation.) Furthermore, because the psychological etiology of the utterance of any protocol statement can always be questioned, there can be no complete verification of *any* protocol statement.⁹⁰ This entails that there is no such thing as the "complete confirmation" that is supposed to ground the incomplete confirmation of higher-order scientific statements.⁹¹ Insofar as Carnap's writings amount to purely methodological tracts in the philosophy of science, none of these oversights is objectionable. As Bas van Fraassen has recently remarked in just this connection, one needn't settle all

epistemological problems while pursuing philosophy of science.⁹² However, Carnap plainly claimed and intended much more for his position, namely, to have *replaced* epistemology with the logic of science *cum* the logical analysis of the syntax of scientific language. Such a replacement is precisely what he did not achieve; he merely stopped asking these questions.⁹³ This is not the place to show that the issue at hand can be settled by philosophical means, but the reader is referred to the texts cited in note 6 that carry this out.

D. CARNAP'S IMPLICIT CRITERIA OF TRUTH: TRUTH WITHIN A SPECIFIED FORMALLY (RE)CONSTRUCTED LANGUAGE

Despite his avoidance of talk about criteria of truth, Carnap has in fact supplied an answer to Sextus's dilemma of the criterion. This is because he has propounded criteria of the meaningfulness or cognitive significance of sentences in terms of (partial) verification, that is, in terms of what would be required to find out if a sentence is *true*.⁹⁴ The obvious implication is that actually applying these criteria of testability, confirmability, or of cognitive significance to any synthetic sentence should result in determining whether or not the sentence is true. This is precisely the function of a criterion of truth. In this way and to this extent Carnap in fact responds to Sextus's first-order challenge to provide a criterion of truth, though Carnap of course does not attempt to defend any one such criterion as correct.

It should not be surprising that Carnap has not addressed the task of defending or justifying such criteria, for his approach is not to give proofs for all claims precisely because he holds that proofs can only be given within a specified formally (re)constructed language. Prior to the adoption of such a language the most that can be done is to assess the merits of the language and to recommend it, that is, to motivate its acceptance.⁹⁵ There is no criterion of truth for assessing linguistic frameworks; such would be "ungrammatical." If Carnap's arguments for adopting any of his strategies seem weak, it's because they're not arguments but rather proposals and motives stated within certain constraints (e.g., "empiricism"). There is no single correct language that we all must adopt, according to Carnap. On the contrary, he counsels singular tolerance regarding the development of linguistic forms.⁹⁶ Of those who dissent from his proposals he makes the modest request that they make good sense of their alternative.⁹⁷ For reasons now to be explored, Carnap dismisses Sextus's second-level challenge to justify a criterion of truth, and he dismisses Sextus's challenge to avoid question-begging and dogmatism because he dismisses Sextus's Greek presumption that there is a single unchanging truth about the world.

E. CARNAP'S SUBJECTIVISM

Carnap's formal semantics renders truth as truth in a specified formally (re)constructed language.⁹⁸ This is not just a matter of what one can say about the world being a function of what language one uses to speak. The problem is that his semantics makes the way the world is a function of the language applied to it. He states this implication explicitly in "Truth and Confirmation" in the course of criticizing talk of the comparison of statements with reality and recommending talk of "confrontation" instead:

Furthermore, the formulation in terms of 'comparison', in speaking of 'facts' or 'realities,' easily tempts one into the absolutistic view according to which we are said to search for an absolute reality whose nature is assumed as fixed independently of the language chosen for its description. The

answer to a question concerning reality however depends not only upon that 'reality', or upon the facts but also upon the structure (and the set of concepts) of the language used for the description.⁹⁹

However ontologically benign the last of these sentences might be interpreted, Carnap here quite explicitly eschews the notion of a reality the nature of which is what it is ("fixed") independently of the language chosen for its description, and thus "absolute." And should anyone hope for the contrary, he goes on to talk about the impossibility of complete translatability between different theoretical languages in a way which prefigures Kuhn.¹⁰⁰

Consider Carnap's 1958 statement: "[T]he structure can be uniquely specified but the elements of the structure cannot. Not because we are ignorant of their nature; rather, there is no question of their nature."¹⁰¹ Warner Wick noted that given the emphasis on choice in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," the absurdity of metaphysics cannot be a philosophical thesis but only a line of policy.¹⁰² Similarly, the pointlessness of epistemology is also a policy. What statements like the above indicate is that Carnap simply hasn't thought his policy out very thoroughly. The "elements" of the structure are ultimately supposed to be the objects studied by a science. But if there is *no* question of the nature of the objects studied by natural science, then how is it that events have a determinate frequency such that some theories do a better job predicting events than others, so that some frameworks are more efficient than others? This question merits closer consideration.

It is not surprising that Carnap speaks in a manner that presages Kuhn, for the syntactical form of protocol sentences is to be set by decision. These decisions, of course, are subject to constraints imposed by the larger theory of the framework to which they belong. Consideration of a simple example shows that such constraints on the syntactic form of observation sentences can affect the content of those sentences.¹⁰³ Take the apparently simple sentence, "This object is red," said of a visible object in my immediate vicinity. No sentence could be more straightforward and amenable to being "confronted" with observation. Now consider three different background theories of color:

- (1) Colors are emitted by self-luminescent objects. (No reflected light or Doppler effect in this view.)
- (2) Colors are emitted by self-luminescent objects and are subject to Doppler-shift at high relative velocities.
- (3) Colors result from differential reflection of (mixed) white light from variously micro-textured surfaces of objects.

According to the first of these theories, color terms are one-place predicates and are observation terms. According to the second, color terms are relational predicates and are *not* observation terms because one needs sophisticated equipment in order to accurately determine relative velocities. (Even at low relative velocities, color terms are relational, so (2) does not "reduce" to (1) at low relative velocities.) According to the third theory, color terms are relational, but may also be observation terms. (Wait till the Doppler effect is discovered by this community.) The important point is that the syntactic forms of the observation sentences containing color terms in these three frameworks all report on an object's being (what we would preanalytically take to be) "red," but because of their differing syntactical structures and because of their differing background theories, these statements license different inferences and so their meanings differ.¹⁰⁴ No peroration about "confronting" protocols with observation can do anything to change this situation, and it is

not on the basis of such "confrontation" alone that the syntactical forms for protocols are chosen.¹⁰⁵ Because the "meaning" of these predicates is a function of the larger framework in which they are embedded, statements containing these predicates cannot, as Carnap would have it, be directly confirmed, that is, confirmed "without reference to [statements containing] other predicates."¹⁰⁶ However, there is no more likely a predicate to be "introduced" in this way than "_____ is red." If Carnap can't get this predicate to ground his procedure for partially specifying the meaning of higher-order statements, then there is no starting point for his procedures at all.

Moreover, on this basis a fundamental subjectivism may be ascribed to Carnap. On his view, too, the structure or characteristics of the world as an object of empirical knowledge is a function of the linguistic framework used in discussing it. And on his view, again, this subjectivism stems from granting epistemology or, more exactly, Carnap's alternative to epistemology, the logical analysis of scientific languages, priority over ontology. The priority of logical analysis over ontology stems from two sources. One of these is the semantic doctrine just discussed, given its implications for the "reality" with which protocol statements are confronted.¹⁰⁷ The other is the freedom of choice allowed in selecting linguistic frameworks. Carnap makes no attempt to constrain this choice beyond one's assessment of utility. Thus no kinds of views are ruled out of bounds. Because the "facts" depend upon the linguistic framework one chooses to adopt, the way the world is is a matter of choice. As Warner Wick noted:

Another sort consequence of [Carnap's] position is that ... no issue, with its accompanying framework, can be simply ruled out of court. If I wish to introduce a framework of substances, accidents, substantial forms, and essences, I need fulfill but two conditions. I must supply definite rules for their use and I must convince my peers in the "republic of letters" that we can illuminate experience or promote science and the arts by using them. It is as simple as that. Carnap has granted me as much in conversation, although I suspect that he remains serene in his faith that of course the conditions could not be met "in practice."¹⁰⁸

As Wick points out, Carnap's emphasis on such practical constraints is curious because although logical empiricism is a radically practical philosophy, it formulated no philosophy of the practical.¹⁰⁹ Wick notes the need for a pure pragmatics and claims that Kant almost alone had theorized about the practical in a searching way.¹¹⁰ Against Wick I claim that, although he formulated no pure pragmatics, Hegel has done much more than Kant in discerning the social and historical structure of practical reason—on this basis, after all, Hegel had searchingly criticized Kant's practical philosophy.¹¹¹ In later chapters I attempt to make out the structure of Hegel's account of the pragmatics of knowledge acquisition. It will be shown that (and some of how) although *answers* to a question concerning reality depend on the language chosen to discuss it, the structure of that language depends greatly on the structure of the natural world in which speakers live and act. This will be a key to recouping epistemological realism.

F. CARNAP'S FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE THE SOURCE OF DIFFICULTIES WITH EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

I now argue that Carnap's effort to undermine the issue of epistemological realism rests on a faulty understanding of what the issue is. Substantiating this claim requires setting the debate about protocol sentences that transpired during the beginning of logical positivism into part of its historical context. So doing shows how that debate was part of the

same debate between Russell and his critics concerning "knowledge by acquaintance" and the correspondence theory of truth.

Frederick L. Will has shown that the "problem of truth"—the problem of what truth is—is less than a century old and stems from reaction to Kantian-Hegelian idealism and its later-day exponents.¹¹² It is a specifically philosophical puzzle not afflicting practicing scientists and nary a pre-critical philosopher.¹¹³ The Kantian tradition had discredited the Cartesian model of knowledge as revelation by adumbrating a highly complex philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, the very complexity of which seemed to undermine the possibility of making, much less making truly, such statements as "the cat is on the mat." Once such statements became problematic, so did the correspondence notion of truth. Russell was inclined to affirm his ability to make such statements and on that basis to reclaim the correspondence sense of truth and to reject by *reductio* any philosophy of mind that entailed his inability to correctly judge the cat's location. Schlick and Ayer followed suit:

I have maintained ... [that statements can be compared with facts]. I have often compared propositions to facts; so I had no reason to say that it couldn't be done. I found, for instance, in my Baedeker the statement: "This cathedral has two spires." I was able to compare it with "reality" by looking at the cathedral, and this comparison convinced me that Baedeker's assertion was true ... I meant nothing but a process of this kind when I spoke of testing propositions by comparing them with facts.¹¹⁴

In claiming this ability to distinguish ordinary states of affairs and make statements about them, Schlick and Ayer take no more notice than Neurath, Carnap, or Hempel of the philosophy mind presupposed by such abilities.

In heated opposition to Schlick, Hempel emphasized that the comparison Schlick claimed to make was a comparison between Baedeker's statement and the *result* rather than the act of inspecting the cathedral (namely, a comparison with the achieved recognition of the cathedral's two spires) and hence in effect compared two statements after all.¹¹⁵ Since the actual comparison was between statements, and since all statements are corrigible because the psychological etiology of any observation report can always be questioned, the alleged correspondence between "facts" and propositions had to be relinquished. These ideas "obviously" implied a coherence theory of truth.¹¹⁶

Will summarizes the crux of the issue in the following conditional statement, compelling to the parties on both sides of this debate:

If there are no archetypes which may be conceived as both independent of our cognitive processes and yet somehow accessible to us for the purpose of conceiving and judging the fidelity of our ... propositions, judgments, hypotheses, [or] allegations, then the notion of truth itself as applied to these [cognitive] products must be revised to dispense with such archetypes, either [as] ... 'objects' or 'things', or [as] ... 'facts' or 'states of affairs.'¹¹⁷

As Will notes, those influenced by Kantian philosophy tended to affirm the antecedent, their opponents to deny the consequent.¹¹⁸ Hempel's connection to the critical tradition comes through the Marxist Neurath, who first emphasized and convinced him and the Vienna Circle generally of the corrigibility of all statements, and who avowed a coherence theory of what truth is.¹¹⁹ Schlick and Ayer followed Russell's frank rejection of the critical tradition and reaffirmed an eighteenth-century confidence in our ability to identify common states of affairs individually and make true statements about them.¹²⁰ The

consequent of the conditional statement quoted above does not follow from the antecedent, but this did not keep the conditional from being compelling. Its being a *non sequitur* does, however, cut the ground out from under the debate between the two sides, especially when a clear distinction between a criterion of truth and the nature of truth is not only noted but maintained.¹²¹ The upshot points to a coherence criterion of truth combined with a correspondence analysis of truth. Such at least will be argued in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Eleven.

Applying this analysis of the debate to Carnap's efforts to undo epistemological realism requires care, for unlike many who rejected "knowledge by acquaintance" Carnap did not avow a coherence theory of what truth is. Between 1932 and 1936 Carnap appears to have avoided speaking of truth as correspondence, but not to have repudiated it. What he repudiated was the debate between realists and their detractors. He did not adopt a coherence notion of empirical truth. In 1936 he affirms a semantic conception of truth (after Tarski) and avows an "empirical realism" (after Feigl).¹²² Before turning to these essays, the main difficulty involved in applying the above analysis to Carnap's realism needs to be mentioned. In 'Truth and Confirmation' Carnap seems to have pointed out the same faulty inference to which Will calls attention.¹²³ However, the particular inference Carnap criticizes turns out to be, in the language of 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,' an "internal" issue, so that his position in the two papers is nominally consistent. In the next section I show that in 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' Carnap makes a very similar kind of inference with regard to "external questions" as was criticized by Will, and that the inference is no less tenable than in the previous case.

G. CARNAP'S FAILURE TO UNDO THE ISSUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

Carnap's rejection of epistemological realism comes to a head in 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' in the distinction between internal and external questions—a distinction whose cognitive import Carnap himself traces back to the early Vienna Circle and his own essay on *Scheinprobleme* (pseudo-problems).¹²⁴ Carnap claims that the question, Are there any *x*'s? is ambiguous and divides into three questions: a question internal to a linguistic framework, a question about adopting a linguistic framework, and a question about the utility of adopting a linguistic framework.¹²⁵ He holds that the answer to the internal question is analytic and trivial: within a framework what it is for there to be *x*'s is for the framework to contain variables ranging over a specified domain of objects. If there are such variables, then there are such things. The answer to the second question of whether or not to adopt a framework is a practical rather than a theoretical question and thus a matter for decision rather than an assertion.¹²⁶ Thus it is not a matter for proof, for proofs conclude in assertions.¹²⁷

Sellars tersely comments:

The external question, "Shall I accept such and such a form of language is, as Carnap points out, a practical question in that it calls for "decision rather than assertion." But although a question of the form "Shall I ... ?" calls indeed for decision, it is generally sensible to ask of a decision "Is it reasonable?" or "Can it be justified?" and *these* questions call for assertion rather than a decision. Thus, the question inevitably arises, Is it proper to ask of a decision to accept a framework of entities, "Is it reasonable?" "Can this decision be justified, and if so, how?" This is the crux of the matter, and on this point, it must be remarked, Carnap's discussion is less than incisive.¹²⁸

According to Carnap, the question of whether or not the decision to adopt a framework is justified is a matter of the fruitfulness, convenience, efficiency—in short, the utility of adopting that framework. This is the third of his three questions, and in discussing it he draws the inference from the answer to this question being a matter of degree to the answer's not having a determinate (note: not determinable) truth-value and so not admitting of a correspondence notion of truth. It is worth quoting two of Carnap's statements on the matter at length:

The decision of accepting the thing language, although itself not of a cognitive nature, will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge, just like any other deliberate decision concerning the acceptance of linguistic or other rules. The purposes for which the language is intended to be used, for instance, the purpose of communicating factual knowledge, will determine which factors are relevant for the decision. The efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the decisive factors. And the questions concerning these qualities are indeed of a theoretical nature. But these questions cannot be identified with the question of realism. They are not yes-no questions but questions of degree. The thing language in the customary form works indeed with a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of our experiences. However, it would be wrong to describe this situation by saying: "the fact of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world;" we should rather say instead: "This fact makes it advisable to accept the thing language."¹²⁹

[The question] may be meant in the following sense: "Are our experiences such that the use of the linguistic forms in question will be expedient and fruitful?" This is a theoretical question of a factual, empirical nature. But it concerns a matter of degree; therefore [*sic!*] a formulation in the form "real or not" would be inadequate.¹³⁰

The inference Carnap draws in these statements is quite curious. He denies bivalence (and hence a truth-value) for the question of whether or not any statements of the framework are true because the question of efficiency of the use of a linguistic framework is a matter of degree.¹³¹ The theoretical question of whether a linguistic framework would be effective may well be answerable only by indicating degrees. But this does not meet the realist's contention. The realist may ask about two possible correspondences here. One of these concerns the efficiency of the framework. The question asked of any statement concerning the efficiency of the framework (whether this be a matter of stating degrees to, or aspects in, which the framework would or would not be efficient) is, Is the statement true or false? Does it accurately represent the degree or the aspects of the framework's efficiency or inefficiency? It is important to note that the last sentence quoted above misstates the issue. The question of the "reality" of the objects denoted by a variable in a linguistic framework is the question that is supposed to be a yes-or-no matter; the efficiency of adopting a linguistic framework containing this variable is a question of degree. The range of latitude allowable in the latter in no way entails a lack of bivalence of the former. Unfortunately, this is the principal argument Carnap offers for rejecting bivalence for the question of the reality of objects denoted by the variables of a linguistic framework or for rejecting the question of the nature of these objects.¹³² As his inference is a *non sequitur*, he has failed to undermine the issue of epistemological realism.

Moreover, Carnap cannot undo the question of realism and of a determinate "externally" characterized truth-value for the answers to these questions by reinvoking the distinction between internal and external questions. Invoking this distinction would require formally reconstructing the language in which the questions of the utility of a proposed framework

are posed and answered. However, doing this would generate in turn the same kinds of questions about the fruitfulness, utility, *etc.*, of adopting this second framework. These questions would be "external" to the newly reconstructed framework and so would want (for reasons given in the preceding paragraph) a straightforwardly realist answer. Carnap could in turn reconstruct this language, but an infinite regress is in the offing. The regress, however, is damaging to Carnap's position, for any such reconstructed language poses the same unreconstructed external questions about the utility of its adoption, and Carnap has no good argument to show that the answers to these questions do not have a determinate truth value.¹³³

H. REFLEXIVE DIFFICULTIES FACING CARNAP'S PROGRAM

Carnap's view is open to strong objections stemming from the reflexive questions discussed in Chapter One which Hegel poses for epistemology generally.¹³⁴ Carnap's program cannot meet Hegel's desideratum that a view be knowable or, in this case, formulable and statable, consistently with its own principles. Carnap's idea that there are alternative linguistic frameworks among which we choose implies that there is some goal we have that is independent of the frameworks we choose, and indeed that we exist independently of the frameworks we choose. (If not, who is supposed to choose between alternative frameworks, what abilities enable one to make such choices, and what reasons could one have for choosing between frameworks if one had no goals independently of those frameworks?) Exactly what goals these might be is hard to say, but at a minimum it would seem that organizing experience effectively is among them. This implies that there is, in addition to ourselves and our goals, some experience we have that is independent of any particular framework. The problem for Carnap is that if we, our goals, or our experience exist independently of (or at least in addition to) any particular framework, then there are some truths (namely, these) which are independent of frameworks. But if there are such framework-independent truths, they require some means of expression other than Carnap's, for on his view meaningful statements can only be made within some particular linguistic framework. Furthermore, Carnap's views are expressed in language. Do his statements about linguistic frameworks belong to some particular framework, or are they about all or any possible framework? If the former, why couldn't we adopt a different framework? If the latter, do his statements express truths which are framework independent? And if his statements are framework independent, if they are not internal to some particular framework, how are they meaningful? If his statements are analytically true, of what concepts are they the analyses, and wouldn't this show that his statements belong after all to a particular framework containing those concepts? Carnap hasn't answered these questions, and he cannot answer them without either giving up his views or else restricting their scope in such a way that they cannot account for themselves. To account for his views, Carnap would have to make claims about the real nature of language; in order to avoid making claims about the real nature of language, he must forego explaining both the status of his own claims about language and his ability to make those claims. Furthermore, without answering these questions, he cannot dismiss the issue of epistemological realism because that very issue is involved in understanding and assessing his own statements about truth and linguistic frameworks. His views do not offer an *independent* grounds for deciding this issue; hence the issue of epistemological realism remains open for investigation.

Insofar as Carnap has a further, more general argument against taking the realism issue seriously, it rests on condemning it as a *Scheinproblem*, a status earned by the failure of discussions on the topic. However, it has just been shown, following Will, that these

discussions have been predicated on a *non sequitur*, on a misformulation of the source of the difficulty. Rejecting epistemological realism is not entailed by rejecting the testing of individual protocol sentences against individual states of affairs with which we are directly acquainted. What rendered the connection between these two rejections plausible was some uncritical philosophy of mind. As was shown, Carnap did not notice and did not seek to understand this source of the difficulty. Clarifying this point removes some of the *Schein* from the problem of epistemological realism and offers the prospect of answering it rightly.

VI. Coda: Hegel's Sensitivity to the Source of Difficulties with Epistemological Realism

In the preceding section it was suggested that the unrecognized but nevertheless central problem lying behind the debate between realism and non-realism in early logical positivism was that of reconciling a realist correspondence notion of truth with a complex philosophy of mind.¹³⁵ It is important to see that Hegel had recognized and set out to solve precisely this problem. He expresses both of these points explicitly while lecturing on the Introduction to the *Encyclopedia*:

What results from reflection is a product of our thinking. On the other hand, we view the universal, the laws [of nature], as the opposite of something merely subjective and in them [we know] what is essential, truthful, and objective about things. Mere attention does not suffice to experience the truth of things, rather it requires our subjective activity, which reforms the immediately given. At first glance this seems perverse and to go against the aim of knowing. But one can just as well say that it has been the conviction of all ages, that the substantial is first reached through reflection's reworking of the immediate. The business of philosophy consists only in expressly recalling to consciousness what has always been held concerning thought.¹³⁶

The reason why the confidence of former times in our powers of reflection needs to be recalled is that in recent times (*i.e.*, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) severe doubts had been raised about the fitness of the 'products of reflection' (*i.e.*, conceptions and language) for grasping the nature of things themselves. The source of these doubts is none other than Kant,¹³⁷ though Hegel knew well that the Kantian assessment of the complexity of our cognitive abilities had been far exceeded by Herder's socio-historical linguistic account of human thought.¹³⁸ There was no such problem for pre-critical philosophers, he says,¹³⁹ and there still is no such problem for scientists.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, Hegel, the supposed *bête noire* of the correspondence notion of truth and of realism, excoriates Kant for dismissing the correspondence notion of truth as a mere verbal definition. Against Kant, Hegel holds the correspondence notion of truth to be of utmost value.¹⁴¹ The task of Hegel's epistemology is precisely that of reconciling a realist epistemology, including a correspondence conception of truth, with a very complex social and historical philosophy of mind.¹⁴²

CHAPTER FIVE

WILLIAM ALSTON ON JUSTIFICATION AND EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY

I. Introduction

In a series of articles William Alston has done much to clarify the concept of epistemic justification and to delineate some limits and presuppositions of epistemology. It is important to examine his discussion here, for he objects to Sextus's dilemma of the criterion. Considering his objection will help bring out some important features of Hegel's response to this dilemma. Alston considers three basic kinds of belief justifiers: neurophysiological "mechanisms" that reliably cause beliefs; "direct" or "immediate" belief justifiers, such as conscious states or sensory experiences; and "mediate" or "indirect" belief justifiers, other justified beliefs that justify a particular belief.¹ As a special case of mediate justification, the justification of a belief by means of demonstrative argument will be of central concern here. Alston presents a defense of "direct justification" that favors reliabilist accounts of knowledge.² His defense involves arguing that the fundamental conception of justification in epistemology cannot be a "deontological" conception, according to which a belief is justified insofar as adopting it violates no intellectual obligations, and that the "K-K" thesis, the thesis that one must know that one knows that *p* in order to know that *p*, is to be rejected. This is the key to his rejection of Sextus's dilemma and regress arguments and to Alston's solution of problems of epistemic circularity.

Hegel is in agreement with Alston's points about empirical knowledge, and he insists on some of the same points about second-order "transcendental" knowledge, the knowledge involved in knowing epistemological claims about empirical knowledge. However, Alston's views on the justification of epistemic principles only touch on some very important questions, questions to which Hegel's method supplies systematic answers. More substantively, I will argue that being justified in second-order beliefs about empirical knowledge, such as epistemic principles, requires mediate justification, either by proof or at least by strong supporting reasons. Such justification involves what Alston calls a second-level or iterative requirement: *being* justified in the belief requires being justified in believing *that* one is justified in this belief. I will show, first, that Alston's objections to this iterative requirement on justification do not hold in the case of justifying epistemological claims by proof or by strong supporting reasons. Second, I will argue that Alston's objections to Sextus's dilemma, when formulated at the second-order level of making epistemological claims, contravene his own more considered views about the justification of epistemic principles. These points entail that Sextus's dilemma must be met in making claims to transcendental knowledge. Alston's reasons for contending that the circularity horn of Sextus's dilemma is more pressing than the regress horn will be considered and accepted. The chapter concludes by endorsing Alston's recent pragmatic turn at the meta-epistemological level and by suggesting that Hegel has provided a more systematic and powerful approach to addressing the problems of assessing the justification of epistemic principles than Alston.

II. Alston's Rejection of "Perspectival Internalism"

Alston makes his case for direct justification and the rejection of the K-K thesis by criticizing what he calls "perspectival internalism," the view that only the justified beliefs of a subject can justify other beliefs of that subject.³ The label for this view derives from its contention that justification must rely only on beliefs within a subject's total set of beliefs, so that justification must be something "internal" to that subject's "perspective" on the world. Alston claims, rightly I think, that the strongest argument in favor of this view is one that presents perspectival internalism as following from a deontological conception of justification, a conception that emphasizes the intellectual standards one ought to honor in accepting beliefs. The basic idea behind a deontological conception of justification is that one cannot take evidence into account if one is unaware of it or if one is unaware of its bearing on the belief in question. Conversely, if one has taken all of one's evidence into account, one has done all one could to determine the warrant of the belief in question.⁴ Now certain restrictions are needed to make this view of justification plausible. Among these are that only justified beliefs can justify other beliefs,⁵ and that evidence unknown to a subject that the subject could be expected to know is relevant to the justificatory status of the belief in question. Acquitting one's intellectual duties responsibly involves collecting readily available evidence; justification cannot be generated by willful ignorance or mere inattention. These points require modifying perspectival internalism so that overriding evidence is relevant to the justificatory status of a belief if a person should have been aware of it.⁶

Perspectival internalism involves requirements on justification at two levels. At a lower level, this view of justification requires that the belief in question *be* adequately supported by other justified beliefs of the subject, and at a higher level, this view requires that the subject *justifiably believe* that those other beliefs do support the belief in question in the required manner.⁷ The mainstay of perspectival internalism is the conception of justification on which it rests. This concept of justification centrally concerns basing new beliefs on the evidence and epistemic principles one already believes. The justification of belief is thus conceived as an activity of justifying beliefs by self-consciously basing them on what amounts to one's best available reasons or argument. If one failed to meet the higher level requirement of justifiably believing that one's belief was justified, one wouldn't know whether one was meeting one's intellectual obligations. The higher level requirement thus implies the K-K thesis, for justifiably believing that one's other beliefs stand in the proper evidential relation to some given belief would constitute not only the knowledge (justified belief) involved in that belief itself, but also the iterated knowledge (justified belief) that that belief is known (justified).

Alston objects to perspectival internalism on each of these counts, arguing that it is too restricted a conception of justification to be the fundamental conception of justification in epistemology, and also that it involves an impossible requirement on justification. Referring frequently to perceptual beliefs, he points out that typically our beliefs are not under voluntary control and even less often are they adopted by choice.⁸ Since deontological conceptions apply only to voluntary actions (or at least to decisions), they do not typically apply to beliefs. Worse yet, the higher level requirement embodied in this concept of justification runs afoul of the fact that few ordinary people so much as have beliefs about epistemic principles.⁹ Alston further argues that perspectival internalism generates an infinite hierarchy of beliefs consisting of beliefs about what principles support what other, lower level beliefs. According to perspectival internalism, the justification of a belief requires justifying it by appeal to higher level beliefs about the principles and

evidence that justify a given belief. This requirement entails that any higher level belief about the principles and evidence that justify a given belief is itself justified only on the basis of a still higher level belief about what justifies beliefs at the preceding level. This regress must be a hierarchical regress, and it must be infinite because

[a]t each stage what is required is a justified belief to the effect that the "reason for" relationship *at the immediately previous stage* is an adequate one; and no earlier beliefs of that sort in the hierarchy will have been concerned with that particular "reason for" relationship.¹⁰

If people at best rarely have beliefs about epistemic principles, it is even less likely for them to have an infinite hierarchy of them.

Another set of problems for a deontological conception of justification is that it provides too much latitude for unwarranted beliefs in its stipulation that a belief is justified when properly based on the evidence that the subject could reasonably be expected to have.¹¹ This conception of justification focuses on the requirements for satisfying one's intellectual obligations. As a deontological conception, it focuses on what one is able to do to satisfy those requirements. The limits of one's abilities are thus also the limits of one's obligations. Under conditions that might be called "cultural isolation," one might not be reasonably expected to break with one's community's provincialism.¹² Alternatively, a subject deficient in reasoning abilities or deficient in intellectual training cannot reasonably be expected to avoid a superficial understanding of an issue.¹³ In any of these circumstances, one could easily meet one's intellectual obligations to one's maximum ability and still have wildly erroneous beliefs. A deontological conception of justification thus involves too weak a connection between justification and truth-conducive grounds of belief. For these reasons, Alston argues, a deontological conception of justification cannot be the fundamental conception for analyzing empirical knowledge.

III. Alston's Defense of an "Epistemic" Conception of Justification

Alston defends a conception of epistemic justification which analyzes the justification of beliefs as a matter of basing them on adequate grounds, where these grounds need not be beliefs and where the belief in question may be based on those grounds without the subject's knowing the epistemic principle governing the relation between those grounds and the belief. The adequacy of the grounds of a belief consists in those grounds being related to the belief in such a way that if those grounds obtain or are true, then the belief is at least probably true. To have such grounds requires believing those grounds (if they are beliefs) or experiencing those grounds (if they are psychological states), and it requires knowing or at least being justified in accepting those grounds.¹⁴ Alston requires that a justified belief actually be based on adequate grounds because it is possible to have adequate grounds and yet either not to hold or even to have the belief in question, or to adopt or retain it for spurious reasons.¹⁵ He also notes that it is possible to have adequate grounds for a belief, to recognize those grounds, and yet to withhold assent due to countervailing considerations. Hence Alston includes a condition that one is justified in believing something only if one lacks sufficient overriding reasons.¹⁶ His defense of this conception of justification consists of showing that it avoids the difficulties confronting deontological conceptions of justification and yet involves a strong relation between a justified belief and adequate grounds, where adequate grounds are grounds conducive to

truth. His conception of justification thus provides a strong relation between grounds and truth without getting snarled in impossible requirements.

Alston rejects "higher level" requirements, requirements that a subject must know that the grounds of his or her belief are adequate and are properly related to the belief in question, by pointing out that the relation between *being* justified in a belief and knowing that one is justified in that belief is not symmetrical. Knowing that one is justified in a belief entails that one is justified in that belief, but not knowing that one is justified in a belief does not entail that one *is not* justified in that belief. Crucial to his enterprise is thus a distinction between simply *being* justified in a belief and showing, demonstrating, proving, or justifiably believing *that* one's belief is justified.¹⁷ However often it may have been blurred or overlooked in the literature,¹⁸ Alston's distinction between being justified and being able to show that one is justified in believing that *p* is simple. The phenomenon of having justification for beliefs without being able to show that one has such justification is not uncommon. My belief that I'm now seeing a printed page may *be* justified given my health, alertness, location *vis à vis* the printed page, and the direction of my open eyes.¹⁹ All of this may be the case without my being able to articulate these facts of the situation and their relations. However, such articulation would be necessary *to show that* I'm justified in believing that I see a printed page in front of me. There is no logical entailment holding between being justified and being able to show one's justification. Certainly if one can show that one is justified in believing something then one is justified in believing it. But it is quite another thing to hold that if one cannot show that one is justified in believing something then one *is not* justified in believing it. Justifiably making a claim and being able to defend that claim may not be the same capacity, and a defense of a claim may be far less detailed and extensive than the actual warrant someone has for that claim. Compare the relative crudity of my list of physiological factors bearing on my belief that I see a printed page in front of me now with the complexity of the scientific account one would give to explain how I see the printed page and so to show that and how it is that I *am* justified in believing that I see a printed page. (The K-K thesis might be brought forth in defense of the coextensiveness, if not the identity, of having justification and being able to show that one has justification for believing something. However, this thesis is no more [and no less] acceptable than the supposed coextensiveness; any grounds supporting the one support the other as well. Hence appeal to the K-K thesis does not advance the discussion.²⁰) The ubiquity of these kinds of perceptual beliefs renders Alston's distinction between being justified and knowing or showing that one is justified quite plausible, and so make plausible his contention that this conception of justification is the fundamental conception for analyzing empirical knowledge where various kinds of direct justification can readily be envisaged.

IV. Alston on the "Internality" of Justification

Alston's notion of being justified, especially by such occurrences as perceptual appearances or conscious states, is closely allied to current views that the reliable causal production of a belief constitutes epistemic justification. On such views, the relevant "reliability" is that the belief is of a kind that generally occurs only if and when the state of affairs that makes the belief true obtains. (The specification of relevant "kinds" of belief and the requisite degree of reliability of those kinds is subject to much debate, but these issues are irrelevant to the present discussion.) Alston rejects the identification of justification with reliable causal production, contending that the grounds on which beliefs are based must be

grounds a subject in some sense *has*, and so the grounds must be other psychological states (typically beliefs or experiences) of the same subject.²¹ More importantly, it is possible for someone to have strong considerations which override the justification of a belief, even if that belief is in fact reliable (for example, if your perceptual system is working fine, but you have been convinced, say by pranksters, that you're subject to hallucinations, perhaps chemically induced). In this way, and to this extent, justification has an "internal" character; it is a function of events "internal" to the subject's "perspective on the world."²² According to Alston, this is in part because the concept of justification has developed within a social context of challenging beliefs, critically reflecting on beliefs, and responding to such challenges:

[T]he idea is ... that what it is for a belief to be justified is that the belief and its ground be such that it is in a position to pass such a test; that the subject has what it takes to respond successfully to such a challenge. A justified belief is one that *could* survive a critical reflection. But then the justifier must be accessible to the subject. Otherwise the subject would be in no position to cite it as what provides a sufficient indication that the belief is true.²³

The reliable causal production of beliefs or of "direct" experiential justifiers is a relation between such psychological states and worldly states of affairs. It constitutes a presupposition of the justificatory efficacy of psychological states, but it does not itself constitute or exhaust epistemic justification, for such relations are not themselves "accessible to the subject" in any way that allows them to be cited in response to challenges. Justification thus is not identical to reliability. Insofar as much of the justification for our simple empirical beliefs is direct, there are limits to how much one can respond to challenges to one's beliefs. One can be justified in a perceptual belief and not be able to show that one is justified in that belief.

V. Alston on the Justificatory Regress Argument

The distinction between being justified and knowing that one is justified or showing that one is justified bears on Sextus's regress argument in a very direct manner. Sextus's argument demands showing the justification of claims insofar as it demands a proof for any claim asserted by anyone, and it counsels suspension of judgment if the demand cannot be met. A proof involves adducing grounds for a claim that are epistemically independent of that claim and are adequate to show that the claim is true. Sextus demands such proof, not only for any given claim, but also for any claim made in the course of proving that claim. Such a regress is in principle interminable because by the very nature of showing, one must appeal to claims other than those which are to be validated. However, the interminability of such a regress of *showing* the justification for some claim does not entail that the claim is *not* justified. Any and every step in the demonstration may appeal to facts that obtain and that support the disputed claim(s) in the required manner. In such a case the initial claim would be justified—but if so, it would have been justified even before the demonstration of it got started. Furthermore, the assumption that in order to show that some claim is true one must show that each claim made in the course of the demonstration is true can itself only be defended by appeal to the K-K thesis (or perhaps to its cousin, a "J-J" thesis to the effect that one is justified in believing that *p* if and only if one is justified in believing that one is justified in believing that *p*). However, any iterative thesis

about justification entails that a justificatory regress must be a regress of showing that one is justified, which insures that the regress is interminable. As Alston notes,

[T]he extreme skeptic who refuses to accept anything until it has been shown to be true and who will not allow his opponent any premises to use for this purpose, obviously cannot be answered whatever one's position. Talking with him is a losing game.²⁴

Alston makes plain what one problem with answering such a skeptic is, and this holds for answering Sextus as well. I may be justified in believing that I see a printed page in front of me because of the current state of my perceptual apparatus. However, to show that I am justified in believing something requires adducing grounds independent of that belief. Moreover, the skeptic who wants me to show that I'm justified in believing that I see a printed page now does not have my current perceptual states, and so the skeptic does not have any direct justification for my claim. Any justification one could provide to another person would be mediate justification; it would be justification which rests on further claims and beliefs.²⁵ If a skeptic won't allow one to make a claim without proving that any and all of one's claims are true, then there's no possibility of settling the dispute. This does not show, of course, that you are not now justified in believing that there is a printed page before your eyes; you're seeing it none-the-less.

One important lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that the problem of settling disputes about knowledge claims is not the same problem of there *being* any knowledge. Alston is right to point out that the failure to prove that one knows something does not entail that one does not know it. This opens the prospect that we may have some range of knowledge even if we don't know that we have it. It also makes plain that there are some kinds of justification that one can only have first-hand. These points are exploited in Alston's own resolution of problems of epistemic circularity, and as will be seen later, they are exploited by Hegel's phenomenological method as well.

Another important lesson to be drawn from Alston's discussion is that because *showing* something to be the case (or some belief to be justified) requires appealing to grounds that are epistemically independent of the belief or claim at issue, Sextus's regress argument is in principle unstopable. Each claim made requires other epistemically independent claims in order to be shown, *ad infinitum*.²⁶ This interminability, however, is not a reflection on our ignorance or dogmatism, but rather reflects an impossible presupposition on the part of his skeptical challenge. This series of appeals to distinct grounds for each claim made involves adding at least one claim to each claim made. And of course there is no final member of the series $n+1$. Our inability to answer the demand of Sextus's regress is no more a demerit than our inability to specify the largest integer. To insist that one must answer it is to insist on satisfying a self-contradiction. Part of a proper response to Sextus's skepticism is to criticize the presumptions about knowledge made by his tropes, rather than to take the skeptic's challenge at face value, as Descartes did.

It is equally important not to overestimate the importance of these lessons. Alston's distinction between being justified and knowing or showing that one is justified does not, of itself, provide a positive answer to Pyrrhonian skepticism because it only opens a logical possibility that we have some empirical knowledge even if we don't know that we have it. Sextus counsels suspension of judgment in cases where we don't know whether we have knowledge, and so he would be unmoved by this distinction. Alston grants that in order to answer skepticism we need reflective knowledge that we have some empirical knowledge.²⁷ Even if Alston's distinction were granted and Descartes's, Kant's, and Carnap's analyses were reinterpreted as attempts to answer a more restricted question of accounting for the

knowledge we do have, their analyses would fail—and fail for the same reasons given in the preceding chapters. Moreover, Alston's distinction between being justified and showing that one is justified does nothing to settle the disputes canonized in Sextus's regress and dilemma, whether these disputes concern empirical knowledge claims or the philosophical analysis of empirical knowledge. Resolving disputes requires finding a mutually acceptable starting point for argument.²⁸ Accordingly, every epistemology has attempted to locate and exploit an uncontentious point of departure. Even Sextus is willing to grant that various things appear to us. The problem is to locate an uncontentious point of departure sufficient to generate a justification for theories of empirical knowledge. The difficulty is that different theories of knowledge disagree categorically about the construal of common-sense experience, so that an adequate though uncontentious point of departure is hardly to be found. Moreover, for reasons to be discussed below, the infinite regress horn of Sextus's dilemma is not likely to be a real difficulty because justificatory arguments for epistemic principles are much more likely to suffer circularity first. Much therefore remains to be said about the justification of epistemic principles.

VI. Alston on the Justification of Epistemic Principles

The (putative) phenomenon of direct justification puts us in an excellent position for gathering quite a range of common sense empirical knowledge. How do things stand with regard to second-order epistemological claims about empirical knowledge? Alston recognizes that things are not so easy at this level. He considers an epistemic principle formulating the causal reliability that underwrites the direct justification we have on the basis of perceptual experience:

We and the world about us are so constituted that beliefs about the immediate physical environment, that are based on sense experience in the way such beliefs generally are, and that are formed in the kinds of situations in which we typically find ourselves, are or would be generally true.²⁹

For the sake of discussion, this principle may be simplified in the following way, which I will refer to as "the reliability of perception":

Sense experience is a reliable source of perceptual beliefs.³⁰

How can such epistemic principles be known? If they are to be known, it must be on the basis of adequate reasons. Principles such as these are not self-evident; their denials are not self-contradictions, and they certainly could be believed without being true. They are not "self-warranted" in the way that, *e.g.*, claims about one's current conscious states are self-warranted. And they are not themselves justified in any "direct" way as are simple perceptual beliefs. Thus there is no alternative to having adequate reasons for justifying such epistemic principles.³¹ The problem, then, is to understand what sorts of reasons could be given to justify epistemic principles, and how those reasons can be adequate to justify them.

The problem with justifying an epistemic principle about the reliability of perception is that we apparently have no way of learning about perception or its reliability other than by relying on actual sense perception.³² This threatens to issue in circularity, which threatens to undermine any possibility of justifying principles about the reliability of perception. The burden of Alston's discussion is to show that the circularity of arguments supporting such

principles does not undermine the possibility of justifying such principles. Alston discusses an inductive "track record" argument for the principle of the reliability of perception. This argument enumerates a large number of reports about people forming simple perceptual beliefs on particular occasions, along with the claims that what they believed on those occasions was (or occasionally was not) in fact the case, and inductively infers on this basis the conclusion that sense perception is a reliable source of belief.³³ The circularity involved in such an argument is not a logical circularity, for the conclusion of the argument doesn't appear among the premises, nor is the conclusion a semantic or syntactic presupposition of the argument.³⁴ The circularity is an epistemic one, stemming from our epistemic situation as human beings. In collecting reports about people's perceptual beliefs, and especially in making claims about the truth of their beliefs, one presumes that perception is a generally reliable source of one's own beliefs and so "practically assumes" the conclusion to the argument, whether or not one has antecedently inferred that principle on the basis of a "track record" argument or indeed whether one had previously formed a belief about the principle at all. One may simply have formed perceptual beliefs unself-consciously.³⁵

Alston's notion of "direct justification" and the fact that direct justification allows one to be justified in certain beliefs without requiring one to know or to show or even to justifiably believe that one is justified in those beliefs grounds Alston's approach to the problem of epistemic circularity.³⁶ If his view of direct justification is granted, then one can be justified in various perceptual beliefs without having first to be justified in believing the principle that perception is a generally reliable source of beliefs. One can then become justified in believing this epistemic principle by inferring it on the basis of one's collection of directly justified perceptual beliefs.³⁷ Such an argument is not logically circular because the conclusion does not appear among the premises of this argument.³⁸ Circularity is a problem if the justification of a belief requires justifying one's belief that that belief is justified; circularity is not a problem if this requirement is rejected.

Rejecting the requirement of mediate justification involves resting content with the mere holding of a condition that in fact confers justification on some range of beliefs, without also requiring that one be justified in believing that the condition holds.³⁹ Allowing this entails that epistemically circular arguments cannot confer justification on principles that one antecedently refuses to accept. Someone who denies that perception is a reliable source of beliefs would not be convinced otherwise by an epistemically circular argument.⁴⁰ On the other hand, allowing this does not entail that there is any particular proposition we're incapable of justifying.⁴¹ We must only recognize that demonstrating the justification of any particular proposition will involve at least practically assuming other premises for the purpose of that demonstration.⁴² Alston remarks:

An examination of the epistemic status of one's beliefs is a highly sophisticated exercise that presupposes a massive foundation of less rarefied cognitive achievements.⁴³

Alston's position comes close to pragmatist contextualism (the view that beliefs can be justified only relative to a particular given context), except that he recognizes, as contextualism does not, that one can *be* justified in various beliefs absolutely, and not merely relative to some context, even if one cannot *show that* one's beliefs are justified except relative to some context.⁴⁴

What is the bearing of all this on Hegel's views about epistemology? Hegel concurs that the philosophical analysis of empirical knowledge presupposes a wide range of empirical knowledge, both ordinary and scientific. Indeed, he goes further, for reasons indicated

below, and insists that it presupposes a knowledge of the history of philosophy as well. Similarly, he concurs that one needs a range of beliefs that are in fact justified in order to come to know that those beliefs are justified. (Recall his remark that perhaps the error of traditional epistemology was not its fear of error but its fear of truth.⁴⁵) The most direct bearing of Alston's views on Hegel's project lies in Alston's objections to Sextus's dilemma of the criterion. Examining Alston's objections to Sextus's dilemma will allow us to reconsider the significance of that dilemma for establishing second-order epistemological claims and will allow us to critically evaluate the tenability of Alston's distinction between being justified and demonstrating that one is justified in beliefs about epistemic principles. I will argue that a level of epistemological analysis must be and is quickly reached at which the only tenable mode of justification of beliefs is inference from other beliefs, and that for this mode at this level, justification does involve the iterative element Alston has attempted to eliminate. *Having* justified beliefs about epistemic principles requires *knowing that* (or at least justifiably believing that) one's beliefs about those principles are justified. If I am right about this, then a solution other than Alston's must be found for Sextus's dilemma when formulated at the level of justifying epistemological analyses.

VII. Rebuttal of Alston's Objection Concerning Doxastic Voluntarism

As was noted above, one of Alston's main objections to iterative conceptions of epistemic justification is that they are best defended by appeal to "perspectival internalism," the view that only beliefs internal to a person's "perspective on the world" (and those beliefs that the subject should have included in that perspective) are pertinent to the justificatory status of a person's belief. "Perspectival internalism" is in turn best defended by appeal to "deontological" conceptions of justification, according to which a belief is justified if one meets the relevant intellectual standards in adopting or retaining that belief. Alston objects to deontological conceptions of justification on the ground that we have little significant direct control over our beliefs, and where voluntary control is lacking, deontological conceptions are inapplicable. I think his points about our lack of significant direct voluntary control over our beliefs are well taken. Alston is apparently right that in cases of explicit or self-conscious acceptance or retention of a belief, belief responsibly arises not by choice, but out of (what appear to be) the strongest considerations in its favor. However, I think he's wrong to infer that because we exercise little direct voluntary control over our beliefs, notions of meeting proper intellectual standards do not apply to a significant range of belief formation, in particular, to that range at issue here, to cases of accepting or retaining a belief on the basis of explicit argument or persuasive reasons.

Only some kinds of moral evaluation of agents and their actions are obviated when an agent could not have performed an alternative action. This is reflected in the point that even those actions performed by agents who couldn't do otherwise are nonetheless open to moral assessment. The appropriateness of such actions (whether in terms of right, permission, benefit, utility, or other moral standards) can be assessed by appealing to the relevant circumstances and principles. Only because such assessment is possible do agents on occasion need to be exonerated because they could not refrain from their actual course of action. Involuntary manslaughter is nevertheless manslaughter, despite being involuntary, and it is manslaughter even if the agent had no choice of an alternative course of action.⁴⁶ More to the point, a mainstay of moral evaluation of action concerns not voluntarily choosing to act, but rather deliberation prior to acting. Moral evaluation of agents does not only concern *akrasia* or other failures to carry out one's resolution. A major element in

moral evaluation of action is intellectual criticism focusing on whether an agent took all the relevant circumstances and standards into account during deliberation. Furthermore, having no choice of an alternative course of action is the exception, not the rule, and agents are responsible for considering what their options are and what are the likely consequences of their actions. This responsibility is not obviated in any particular case by lack of choice of alternative acts, and agents are open to evaluation and criticism regarding their attitude towards and their deliberation about even such a circumstance. Appealing to lack of choice of alternative actions is no excuse for lack of attention or deliberation. Agents may be criticized for negligence even in cases where in fact they could not have done otherwise. Thus issues concerning whether agents have met relevant moral standards are not obviated by lack of voluntary control over their acts. Alston's appeal to the converse of the "ought implies can" principle is too indiscriminant.

Morally responsible "choice" of action is supposed to arise directly from the weightiest considerations bearing on the issue at hand. The will enters the picture at the point of executing a resolution, not during deliberation or at the point of resolving what to do. In this way, the cases of deliberating about action and of judging what belief is most warranted are parallel. Indeed Alston himself makes this parallel quite plain:

To return to our philosopher, gardener, and military commander, I would suggest that in each case the situation is better construed in some way other than as initiating a belief at will. The most obvious suggestion is that although in these cases the supporting considerations are seen as less conclusive, here too the belief follows automatically, without intervention by the will, from the way things seem at the moment to the subject. In the cases of (subjective) certainty belief is determined by that sense of certainty, or, alternatively, by what leads to it, the sensory experience or whatever; in the cases of (subjective) uncertainty belief is still determined by what plays an analogous role, the sense that one alternative is more likely than the others, or by what leads to that. Thus when our philosopher or religious seeker "decides" to embrace theism or the identity theory, what has happened is that at that moment this position seems more likely to be true, seems to have weightier considerations in its favor, than any envisaged alternative. Hence S is, *at that moment*, no more able to accept atheism or epiphenomenalism instead, than he would be if theism or the identity theory seemed obviously and indubitably true.⁴⁷

Precisely because belief is not initiated at will in any of these cases, whether doxastic or active, Alston's lengthy and persuasive arguments showing that belief is subject to little direct voluntary control are beside the point. Surely he is right to point out that many ordinary (though not for that reason unimportant) perceptual beliefs are formed entirely unself-consciously and involuntarily, and, I would add, non-deliberately. But beliefs of the kind at issue here, justified or reasonable beliefs about epistemic principles, are beliefs that are responsibly formed or retained only in light of the relevant considerations. Satisfying intellectual standards is pertinent on occasions, such as these, where one must determine as best one can what position on an issue is most warranted by the available evidence and the relevant principles. This is true whether that position concerns a belief about a matter of fact or a belief about the best course of action in a given situation. The extent to which one considers the evidence, *etc.*, is a voluntary matter and one can be held responsible for doing an adequate job of it, whether one is deliberating about action or reflecting on the merits of a theoretical belief. Satisfying intellectual standards will thus involve, in the way Alston has made plain, an iterative requirement on justification. The justification of self-consciously or deliberately accepted beliefs requires not only that those beliefs be justified, but also that the subject justifiably believe that those beliefs are justified. Otherwise the subject would be unaware of whether she or he were satisfying the relevant

intellectual standards.⁴⁸ This arm of Alston's attack on deontological conceptions of justification, and through that, on "perspectival internalism" and on iterative conceptions of justification, fails. These points will be reinforced in the following discussion of the use of inference and epistemic principles in justifying beliefs.

VIII. Rebuttal of Alston's Objections to the Dilemma of the Criterion

Alston quotes Sextus's dilemma of the criterion, reformulates it in terms more to his liking, and rejects it as a simple confusion of levels between being justified and showing that one is justified. It is worth quoting his discussion in full:

[Sextus's] argument has no tendency to show that my being justified in believing that *p* depends on conditions that give rise to an infinite regress. On the argument's own showing, what my *being* justified in believing that *p* depends on is the existence of a valid epistemic principle that applies to my belief that *p*. So long as there *is* such a principle, that belief *is* justified whether I know anything about the principle or not and whether or not I am justified in supposing that there is such a principle. What this latter justification is required for is not my being justified in believing that *p*, but rather my being justified in the higher-level belief that *I am justified in believing that p*. I can be justified in that higher-level belief only if I am justified in supposing there to be a principle of the right sort. But it is only by a level-confusion that one could suppose this latter justification to be required for my being justified in the original lower-level belief. The regress never gets started.⁴⁹

Alston is right that failing to demonstrate one's justification does not of itself entail failing to have justification, so that Sextus's dilemma does not show that no one has any first-order empirical knowledge. His response is too glib, however, insofar as he omits the point that one's belief is justified only insofar as one has adequate grounds and only insofar as one's belief is properly based on those grounds. The mere existence of an appropriate epistemic principle does not entail that one's beliefs are based on one's grounds by recourse to that principle. But such "basing" is required for grounds to confer justification on a belief. Now in cases like perceptual knowledge, the burden of theories of direct justification is to show how perceptual beliefs can be properly grounded on sensation even though one may not know that these conditions hold. Similarly, in cases of knowledge of one's conscious states, the burden of Alston's views on "self-warrant" is to show that one's beliefs about such states are directly justified by the occurrence of those states, and similarly in the case of other self-evident propositions. Insofar as there are direct, non-iterating modes of justification, Sextus's regress and dilemma do not entail that one has no knowledge.

Sextus's arguments seem to show that one cannot know that one has any first-order empirical knowledge. Thus they appear to raise difficulties for the epistemological effort to determine whether and how we have such knowledge. Similar problems would seem to confront the justification of epistemic principles. Alston argues that such difficulties do not arise. He continues:

This would seem to leave open the possibility that being justified in a higher-level belief, such as the belief that *I am justified in believing that p*, does give rise to an infinite regress or circularity. But that would be a mistake of the same kind. To be justified in that higher-level belief, there has to be a (higher-level) epistemic principle of justification that applies in the right way to the belief in question. But again, all that is required is the *existence* of such a principle. For the justification of that (first-order) higher-level belief, it is not necessary that I be justified in supposing that there is

such a principle; only that there be such. Again, what this last justification is needed for is the justification of the still higher-level belief that *I am justified in believing that I am justified in believing that p*. At each stage I can be justified in holding a certain belief provided there is a valid epistemic principle that satisfies certain conditions. My knowing or being justified in believing that there is such a principle is required only for the justification of a belief that is of a still higher level *vis-à-vis* the belief with which we started.⁵⁰

Alston's criticism of Sextus's dilemma, as applied to the justification of second-order epistemic principles, is unsound. First, Alston grants that problems of circularity arise if the requirements of justification include showing that one is justified. His general strategy for evading problematic justificatory circularity rests on the reliable production of beliefs underwriting their being justified:

What about *knowing* that one has justified [the principle of the reliability of perception]? Well, if knowledge requires justification, that will be the only requirement of knowledge that might fall victim to epistemic circularity. ... Whereas if what converts true belief into knowledge is not justification but rather something like reliability, it seems clear that the circularity of an argument cannot prevent it from being the case that beliefs of a certain type are reliably formed under certain conditions.⁵¹

Unfortunately for this general strategy for evading iterative requirements on justification, when it comes to beliefs about what knowledge is, the history of widespread disagreement within epistemology shows that we're notoriously *unreliable* at forming or adopting beliefs about epistemic principles. Reliability cannot, at least by itself, underwrite the justificatory status of beliefs about epistemic principles. Second, Alston's way of objecting to Sextus's dilemma at this level ignores his own views about how mediately justified beliefs are based on other beliefs. As stated in his criticism of Sextus, Alston's view would leave it open that lucky epistemological guesses were knowledge, because there could be a principle and premises justifying it, even though the guesser was utterly unaware of them. Consider someone in the eighteenth century who believed Fermat's last theorem on the basis of reading Fermat's marginalia.⁵² If Fermat's claim to have had a proof were true, then there would be a principle that justified Fermat's as well as our marginalia reader's belief, but our reader could not have based his or her belief on those principles and so his or her belief would not be justified. As indicated earlier, Alston recognizes that the mere existence of an applicable epistemic principle (which is how he phrases the requirement in the above passage on Sextus) does not entail that the subject in question bases his or her second-order belief about knowledge on his or her evidence in accordance with the relevant epistemic principle.⁵³ The subject must make use of the relevant principle in the appropriate way to base a second-order belief on whatever evidence the subject has.

As indicated earlier, Alston grants that for the justification of epistemic principles there is no direct justification and there is no alternative to justifying them by argument or by giving adequate reasons.⁵⁴ Mediate justification by adequate reasons or proof is required for having reflective, second-order "epistemological" knowledge. Granting that one way of being justified in a belief is to hold it on the basis of a demonstrative proof⁵⁵ and that epistemic principles can only be justified on the basis of adequate reasons, the controversial point that now needs to be examined is whether having justified beliefs about epistemic principles requires an iterative conception of justification. The question can be put in either of two ways. Does justifying an epistemic principle by means of proof require an iterative achievement of knowing that one has justified the principle by means of that proof? or, Does justifying an epistemic principle on the basis of adequate reasons require

justifiably believing that one has grounds that adequately support the likelihood of the truth of that principle? For the sake of simplicity, I will concentrate on the case of demonstrative proof. The main issue concerns the iterative level of self-conscious justification, and analogous points hold for justification by proof as for a weaker notion of having adequate (or reasonable) grounds of belief.

Alston sets out the requirements for someone's (S's) justifying a belief by proof as follows:

- (A) S is justified in believing the premises, q .
- (B) q and p are logically related in such a way that if q is true, that is a good reason for supposing that p is at least likely to be true.
- [C] S knows, or is justified in believing, that the logical relation between q and p is as specified in (B).
- (D) by virtue of S's inferring p from q , justification is conferred on S's belief that p .⁵⁶

Alston rejects [C] but accepts (D), contending [C] requires more sophistication than people ordinarily have.⁵⁷ This is to say, Alston rejects this requirement for analyzing ordinary empirical knowledge. About this I will not quarrel here, for ordinary empirical knowledge is not the topic of present concern. Here my concern is with what epistemologists need for having justified beliefs about epistemic principles or about empirical knowledge more generally. Although Alston is willing to grant [C] for the sake of discussion, it is important to see why, in this domain, [C] is required for having justification.

Consider how an epistemologist is to infer the conclusion from the premises, as in (D), without knowing or justifiably believing that the premises and conclusion have the kind of logical relation specified in (B). Even at this level, knowledge requires true justified belief (at least), but the only available grounds for justified beliefs about what knowledge is are other beliefs. Mediate justification is the only kind of justification to be expected in this domain. What is required for the mediate justification of epistemic principles? Merely having correct beliefs about what knowledge is and about what valid argumentation is, which if properly set out in deductive form would constitute a sound argument for an epistemic principle, does not suffice for actually having knowledge about what knowledge is. Not until an epistemologist actually sets his or her beliefs into the proper order does he or she have the relevant relation among his or her beliefs to constitute a justification. As (D) indicates, justification is conferred *by virtue of* inferring a conclusion from premises. Now what is involved in making such an inference? Having put his or her beliefs into the proper order and having stated the conclusion, an epistemologist must understand the principles of the argument at least well enough to understand that the argument is valid. To be justified, beliefs must be based on adequate evidence in the proper way. When the relevant basing relation is a demonstrative proof, only an argument that is recognized to be sound will do; proof is constituted by an argument which is recognized to have true premises and to be valid. Someone who, for example, correctly writes down or utters solutions to mathematical equations may or may not understand the principles of the relevant mathematical reasoning. Unless one understands the reasoning involved in the proof, one doesn't understand one's own utterances or inscriptions and thus cannot be said to have mathematical knowledge. I recall such a situation from my first calculus course. I solved the problem sets correctly, but I most certainly did not understand the reasoning

during that course; calculus was presented as techniques for manipulating numbers, and manipulate I did. I certainly had no knowledge of calculus during that course. Or consider students in lower-level philosophy courses who manage to repeat arguments as presented in class, but do so only by rote recall. Such students do not have the relevant knowledge, even if the arguments they inscribe or recite are sound. Proper understanding of an argument requires recognizing its validity. Deriving justification of a belief from an argument requires not only that the premises are true and are justified, but also accepting the argument on the basis of recognizing its validity. Therefore, one's belief is justified by proof only when one is justified in believing that one's belief is justified by a valid argument. (I consider the further condition of having justified beliefs about the justificatory status of the premises of such an argument shortly.) Not until this iterative level of understanding is achieved has one properly based one's belief on one's evidence by demonstrative argument. Analogous points hold for the weaker case of basing one's beliefs on reasonable grounds, where those grounds are "truth conducive" but not conclusive.

This point is obscured in Alston's discussion because he speaks loosely of "giving" an inductive argument for the reliability of sense perception, of "laying out" a large "carefully chosen" sample of perceptual beliefs, and "reporting" in each case that the belief is true. This inductive "track record" argument is as follows:

(IV) 1. At t_1 , S_1 formed the perceptual belief that p_1 , and p_1 .

2. At t_2 , S_2 formed the perceptual belief that p_2 , and p_2 .

.....

Therefore, [II] sense experience is a reliable source of belief.⁵⁸

This argument is "used" or "taken" to establish that perception is a reliable source of belief. Alston contends that an additional argument is required to justify the belief that one has justified the principle of the reliability of perception. That argument is as follows:

(VI) A. S has presented (IV) [the "track record" argument].

B. S is justified in believing the premises of (IV).

C. The premises of (IV) imply (deductively or inductively) the conclusion.

D. S is justified in believing C.

E. By virtue of S's deriving the conclusion of (IV) from the premises, the conclusion, (II), could thereby acquire previously unpossessed justification.

[Therefore:]

F. S has justified S's belief that (II).⁵⁹

Alston's separation of these two arguments is artificial, for if one "used" or "took" the first argument (IV) to justify the reliability of sense perception, one would have to do more than simply utter or inscribe its premises in the proper order. One would have to under-

stand the logical relations among its premises. One would have to understand that one was justified in accepting its enumerative premises. (Recall that those premises were said to present a "well chosen" selection). One would have to present the argument in view of these two points. And to take the "track record" argument as showing that perception is generally reliable, one would have to understand that deriving the conclusion of the argument on the basis of its premises can confer previously unpossessed justification on that conclusion. Notice that Alston speaks of someone's belief in the reliability of sense perception becoming justified by "bringing it into inferential connection with the premises of this [track record] argument [IV]."⁶⁰ This is to say, to "use" or to "take" the inductive argument (IV) in the way Alston describes requires considering and propounding all the points contained in Alston's second argument (VI), either explicitly or implicitly. Perhaps no one would explicitly state the second argument (VI), but that's because we generally understand that these points (or their analogues) are presupposed by the use of any argument to justify any conclusion. Having justification for epistemic principles on the basis of argument (or on the basis of other adequate reasons) thus involves being justified in believing that one is justified in believing that principle. The justification of epistemic principles is therefore iterative.

The requirement that I have been defending, that an epistemologist recognize the validity of his or her proof by recognizing the incompatibility of the denial of the conclusion with the affirmation of the premises, does not generate the infinite regress of levels of principles that Alston urges against perspectival internalism. This is because I have required mediate justification in the form of demonstrative proof only at this second-order, epistemological level. This is quite compatible with recognizing a variety of forms of direct justification at the first-order level of empirical knowledge. More importantly, it is compatible with halting the regress of levels of justification at that level at which an epistemologist recognizes the validity of his or her argument. Stopping at this level, before requiring epistemologists to know meta-logic, is neither arbitrary⁶¹ nor unreasonably stringent. It is not arbitrary, because to infer one proposition from another requires believing that it is inconsistent to deny the consequent while affirming the antecedent. Having such a belief may be regarded as a "connecting belief," a belief that "connects" a belief about the antecedent and a belief about the consequent in light of their logical relation. There is no need to regard this connecting belief as itself a premise in one's argument. Such a belief involves grasping whatever logical or evidential relation obtains between the antecedent and the consequent, so that no "higher level" belief concerning that relation and its relata is required.⁶² Some connecting beliefs may require justification and may best appear as explicit premises in an argument. But some connecting beliefs require no more justification than recognizing the logical incompatibility between the antecedent and the negation of the consequent. Compare Alston's remarks in defense of his claim that all justification of belief involves adequate grounds, even in the case of "self-evident" propositions, such as the mathematical commutation principle:

[O]ne may treat these as limiting cases in which the ground, though real enough, is minimally distinguishable either from the belief it is grounding or from the fact that makes the belief true.⁶³

If it is allowed that the ground for accepting a self-evident proposition is the same as the reason for accepting it, namely, that it "seems obviously true,"⁶⁴ I see no reason not to allow the recognition of the incompatibility of denying the conclusion while affirming the premises of an argument to count as the ground for knowing that an argument is valid. Such beliefs need not appear as premises in the argument, and if they do not, no regress of

levels is generated.⁶⁵ This way of formulating this requirement of second-order knowledge concurs with Alston's contention that at some point one must rest content with certain conditions simply holding. Among those conditions would be, for example, the law of non-contradiction, one's understanding of the terms used in formulating an issue or argument, and one's abilities to reason in accordance with logical principles.⁶⁶

IX. The Problem of Epistemic and Logical Circularity

The problem with using the "track record" argument to justify the reliability of perception is that when one takes the perceptual beliefs one has gathered as premises in a putative proof, then one has to assess whether one is justified in these perceptual beliefs. Using the perceptual beliefs reported in the premises of the "track record" argument as evidence employed in an explicit argument for the reliability of perception requires an explicit consideration of whether those beliefs are justified (and so, whether the premises which report those beliefs are justified). Here is the iterative level concerning the justification of beliefs about the justificatory status of one's perceptual beliefs, and it is not bridged by Alston's distinction. His non-iterative principle of justification, that

If one believes that p on the basis of its sensorily appearing to one that p , and one has no overriding reasons to the contrary, one is justified in believing that p ,⁶⁷

does not entail that one is justified in believing that one is justified in believing any of the premises of the track record argument. Indeed, Alston has designed this principle not to have this entailment. However, this self-conscious, iterated level of justification is needed in order to use these perceptual beliefs in a proof. This is what prevents the "track record" argument from being used to show or to establish that perception is generally reliable. Alston claims that there is no problem with this use of the argument.⁶⁸ But earlier in his paper he comes close to recognizing the problem. He states:

I manifest an acceptance of [the reliability of perception] in my practice. ... This is reflected in the dialectical point that if my premises [for the track record argument] were challenged I would have to appeal to the reliability of sense perception to answer the challenge, at least if it were pushed far enough. At the first stage I could simply point out that I had heard S , testify that he had formed the belief that p_1 on the basis of sense experience, and that I had seen that p_1 for myself. But if the challenger persists by asking why anyone should suppose *that* is any basis for that first premise, I would have to appeal to [the principle of the reliability of perception].⁶⁹

The problem is that one doesn't need to wait to be challenged to reflect on one's beliefs about the general principle in question. The occasion for this reflection occurs in assessing whether or not the "track record" argument constitutes a proof because this reflection is needed in order to recognize whether the premises are warranted. Justification is not so easily transferred from direct to self-conscious, iterated levels of justification. It seems the best the argument can prove is a biconditional implication between the reliability of particular perceptual beliefs and the general reliability of perception. If the general principle is true, then the particular beliefs generated in accordance with it are justified, and if those particular beliefs are justified, then one can infer that the general principle of reliability is true. It appears that this is true for any epistemically circular argument.

Alston has come to see this difficulty more recently. He puts it in two different ways, each of which are worth quoting in full:

What I take myself to have shown in "Epistemic Circularity" is that epistemic circularity does not prevent one from showing, on the basis of empirical premises that are ultimately based on sense perception, that sense perception is reliable. But whether one actually does succeed in this depends on one's being justified in those perceptual premises, and that in turn, according to our assumptions about justification, depends on sense perception being a reliable source of belief. In other words, *if* (and only if) sense perception is reliable we can show it to be reliable. And how can we cancel out that *if*?⁷⁰

Here is another way of posing the problem. If we are entitled to use belief from a certain source in showing that source to be reliable, then any source can be shown to be reliable. For if all else fails, we can simply use each belief twice over, once as testee and once as tester. ... Thus if we allow the use of mode of belief formation M to determine whether the beliefs formed by M are true, M is sure to get a clean bill of health. But a line of argument that will validate any mode of belief formation, no matter how irresponsible, is not what we are looking for. We want, and need, something much more discriminating. Hence the fact that the reliability of sense perception can be established by relying on sense perception does not solve our problem.⁷¹

Alston illustrates this latter difficulty by reference to crystal ball gazing, but we have already seen a more prominent example of the same problem in Descartes's circularity. Alston's suggestion that any source of belief can be shown to be reliable by recourse to epistemically circular arguments is admittedly too glib.⁷² "Show" is a success term, implying that a source of belief in fact is reliable and an argument for that reliability is not only valid but sound and so has both true premises and conclusion. This is part of the problem. Epistemically circular arguments succeed only in cases of reliable belief sources. How might it be determined that an epistemically circular argument in fact concerns a reliable source of belief? The other part of the problem is illustrated by Descartes. He took clear and distinct ideas to be reliable and on that basis argued in an epistemically circular fashion that they were reliable. However, he erred about his source (or so I have argued), and yet didn't detect his error. The other part of the problem with epistemically circular arguments is that unsound epistemically circular arguments may too easily be mistaken for sound. Note that each part of this problem concerns second-level beliefs about our beliefs or about the sources of our beliefs. Our sources of beliefs are whatever they are; they include perception, memory, sensation, deduction, induction, authority, and others. How might we discern which sources are generally reliable, or under which conditions they are generally reliable? The first step is to modify our epistemic aspirations by rescinding the traditional ideal of fully reflective justification of empirical knowledge and epistemic principles. The second step will be to examine what sorts of criteria might be established in order to evaluate the merits of various epistemically circular arguments. Examining Alston's steps in these directions will lead back to Hegel, for he agrees with Alston in rejecting the ideal of fully reflective justification, yet his criteria for evaluating epistemic principles, whether supported by epistemically circular arguments or not, are considerably more powerful.

X. Alston's Rejection of "Fully Reflective Justification"

Sextus's Dilemma reflects an ideal of justification according to which to be fully justified, each belief must be justified by demonstrative proof, and each premise and inference in each proof must itself be justified by demonstrative proof. Alston labels this ideal "Fully Reflective Justification,"⁷³ and he argues that there are severe limits to its feasibility. Sense perception, memory, introspection, and deductive and inductive reasoning, taken as sources of belief, all seem to share the feature that their reliability must be practically presupposed in any justification of epistemic principles concerning those sources.⁷⁴ Such epistemic circularity precludes fully reflective justification of these sources of belief as well as of any particular beliefs derived from those sources.⁷⁵ The quest for fully reflective justification of beliefs leads directly to circularity or infinite regress, along the lines of Sextus's tropes. However, it is important to note that because the number of sources of human beliefs is limited, it is far more likely that circularity would be encountered long before an infinite regress begins.⁷⁶ This is why the regress horn of Sextus's dilemma may be ignored. Attempting to reflectively justify all our beliefs by argument all at once is impossible.⁷⁷ The impossibility of fully reflective justification does not, of course, preclude our justifying any particular belief we may choose. It's just that such justification is only possible by assuming the justification of other beliefs used in showing that the selected belief is justified.⁷⁸ The pressing problem is to address the problems of epistemic circularity.

In his most recent work, Alston has taken a pragmatic turn at the meta-epistemological level, arguing that the proper purview of epistemology is the critical reflective analysis of extant "doxastic practices," of socially developed, naturally based practices of generating beliefs. Alston's short story for adopting this view is that trying to be more "objectivist" about epistemic principles hasn't worked.⁷⁹ He hasn't yet told the long story of his conversion, but surely many of its elements have been reviewed in the foregoing. His new approach is inspired in part by Wittgenstein and Thomas Reid. The general outline of this approach, I hope to show, shares much with Hegel as well.

According to Alston, we engage in a plurality of interrelated doxastic practices that are themselves set in the context of wider spheres of practice. These practices are socially developed, monitored, and shared, though they are based on natural capacities and dispositions.⁸⁰ Alston's "doxastic practice" approach to epistemology emphasizes the fact that we are engaged in practices that generate beliefs long before we come to reflect on them:

These [doxastic] practices are acquired and engaged in well before one is explicitly aware of them and critically reflects on them. When one arrives at the age of reflection one finds oneself with a mastery of these practices, and ineluctably involved in their exercise. ... Philosophical reflection and criticism builds on the *practical* mastery of doxastic practices. Practice precedes theory; and the latter would be impossible without the former. ... If we hadn't learned to *engage* in inference, we could never develop a system of logic; we would have nothing either to reflect *on* or to reflect *with*. If we had not learned to form perceptual beliefs, we would have no resources for formulating the philosophical problems of the existence of the external world and of the epistemic status of perceptual beliefs.⁸¹

A problem facing this view is, if one acknowledges the thorough entrenchment of our epistemological thinking in extant doxastic practices, how can epistemology critically reflect on those practices? And even if epistemology had some distinct, autonomous practice of critical assessment, what would legitimate its claim to judge other practices?⁸² Alston's

way out of this "antinomy" between descriptive and normative approaches to epistemology (he labels them "heteronomism" and "autonomism") rests on distinguishing the more tightly structured character of various (what might be called "first-order") doxastic practices from the more free-wheeling, less structured activity of (second-order) philosophical reflection.⁸³ That philosophy is less structured does not mean that it is unstructured, and Alston does recommend some criteria for assessing various epistemic principles and their doxastic practices.

XI. Alston's Criteria for Evaluating Epistemic Principles

In Alston's new approach, the evaluation of epistemic principles is effected by evaluating the rationality of engaging in the practices constituted by those principles. He grants that assessing the rationality of engaging in doxastic practices is an "internalist" affair that doesn't allow for direct demonstration of the truth of epistemic principles. Having shown that direct demonstration of, *e.g.*, the reliability of any particular perceptual belief or of the general reliability of perception is vitiated by epistemic circularity (and a dearth of *a priori* or transcendental proof), he holds that it can be shown that participation in and acceptance of some practices is rational. However, showing that a doxastic practice is rational requires taking modes of belief formation "*concretely*", as an aspect of a practice that is socially established and that plays a central role in human life.⁸⁴ Viewing modes of belief formation abstractly, he avers, undermines prospects of answering the question of why it is more rational to instantiate one such mode over another. Because we are entrenched in such practices, the burden of proof lies more on the side of those proposing their abandonment than on those supporting their maintenance.⁸⁵

Viewed in this light, several criteria for accepting doxastic practices emerge. According to Alston, it counts in favor of a practice if it is more firmly established, where that involves a practice being more widely accepted, more definitely structured, more important to guiding action, more difficult to abstain from, more innately based, or having principles that seem more obviously true.⁸⁶ To be acceptable a doxastic practice should not generate massive inconsistency, and persistent massive inconsistency between two practices indicates that at least one is faulty.⁸⁷ Alston adopts a sort of negative coherentism, according to which an established doxastic practice is *prima facie* rationally acceptable in the absence of significant disqualifying reasons.⁸⁸ More positively, practices may or may not generate "self-support," in the sense that a practice may ground our abilities to investigate how that practice is possible or ground our abilities to engage in other effective practices. The more such self-support a doxastic practice generates, the more that counts in its favor. The failure to generate such "self-support" is a demerit.⁸⁹ Analyzing doxastic practices in light of these criteria may help establish a rank ordering to which to appeal when massive conflicts arise among or within them.⁹⁰ (Presumably, honoring such a ranking would be among the intellectual standards one would need to meet in order to form justifiable beliefs, and so to form justified beliefs, in such a situation.) The aspirations of such "free-wheeling" philosophical analysis, within which every claim is open to criticism,⁹¹ are thus modest. Can these modest strands of assessment be strengthened?

XII. Some Strategic Suggestions for Justifying Epistemic Principles

One general point suggested by the apparent impossibility of providing demonstrative proof of epistemic principles based on premises warranted independently of the warrant of the desired conclusion is to adopt a coherence criterion of justification for epistemic principles. Exactly what form such a criterion might take is not immediately obvious (I reconstruct Hegel's candidate in subsequent chapters), but some points about such a criterion may be noted here. First, a coherence criterion for epistemic principles is not the same as, nor does it entail, a coherence analysis of the justification of those principles. A coherence criterion may discern justified principles, even though the analysis of their justification may be externalist or naturalist, either in part or in whole. Thus a coherence criterion for the justification of epistemic principles may be sensitive to the source of first- or second-order beliefs in a way that coherence theories of justification typically are not.⁹² Second, to adopt a coherence criterion for the truth (or at least for the justification) of epistemic principles doesn't entail adopting a coherence analysis of the truth of such principles. Combining a coherence criterion with a correspondence analysis of truth helps solve the problem that undermined Hempel's coherence theory of truth.⁹³ One constraint on the acceptability of epistemic principles is that they coherently account for the warranted first-order empirical claims people actually make and have made. This requirement also would help tie the justification of epistemic principles to truth-conducive grounds, namely, those grounds conducive to the truth of first-order empirical claims and to the practices in which they are generated. Important as this constraint is, it does not solve a standard kind of problem facing coherence criteria. There may be more than one set of coherent epistemic principles, and coherence alone does not seem to distinguish between truth and falsehood even, perhaps especially, when epistemic principles are concerned. Biconditionals are easy to construct; the problem is evaluating their warrant. Logic alone cannot do this.

One point worth recalling here is that the putative general reliability of perception does not involve perceptual infallibility. How do we sort true from false perceptual beliefs? Part of the answer is that we have a variety of sense modalities and we can use information from distinct sensory organs to check one another. Alston says that appeal to the multitude of sense modalities only staves off logical circularity a little while.⁹⁴ However, justifying the reliability of perception *in toto* all at once is what cannot be done, as Alston shows in his rejection of "fully reflective justification" and as was shown above in discussing Descartes.⁹⁵ Simply noting that this route for justifying the reliability of perception is barred, however, distracts from an important point. The multiplicity and coordinated use of distinct sense modalities enables us to critically assess the warrant for many ordinary (but not for that reason unimportant) perceptual beliefs. Sometimes what confers justification on perceptual beliefs is not simply their being produced by generally reliable psycho-physiological processes, but also the use of self-conscious abilities we have to discriminate true from false perceptual beliefs. Rejecting some perceptual beliefs as false or spurious on the basis of accepting others that contradict them displays a kind of negative coherence criterion for perceptual beliefs. When several or many perceptual beliefs from various sense modalities contradict one or a small set of perceptual beliefs (that might be unrepeatable, or based on one, perhaps less acute sensory mode), the rejected beliefs are dismissed because they don't cohere with the larger set of perceptual beliefs. However, the role of coherence needn't be merely negative. Often it is possible to discern what one is perceiving only on the basis of other perceptual beliefs about one's current situation. (Consider adverse or complex perceptual conditions.) In such cases, coherence takes on a more positive form, justifying perceptual beliefs that could not be

generated, at least not reliably, without reliance on other perceptual beliefs. Part of a positive coherence criterion at the second level of epistemic principles may lie in what Alston calls the "self-support" which some doxastic practices generate. Some doxastic practices enable us to investigate how those same practices are possible. No such investigation avoids epistemic circularity (hence my appeal to coherence), but the self-support that some practices generate is an impressive positive factor in their warrant. Of course, something needs to be said about how to distinguish genuine from disingenuous "self-support," in order to eliminate Alston's crystal ball gazer. ("Self support" may also introduce coherence elements into the analysis of the justification of epistemic principles.)

Reliance on the coherence of perceptual beliefs reflects a certain elementary form of self-criticism. As shall be seen below, the possibility of self-criticism is central to Hegel's theory of knowledge and especially to his method for justifying epistemic principles. If he is right that we are fundamentally self-critical beings, then another solution to Alston's "antinomy" between descriptive and normative epistemology emerges. The alleged antinomy dissolves if a doxastic practice can be criticized internally or if self-criticism is a part of doxastic practices. Such self-criticism would enable grounding a coherence criterion for epistemic principles solidly in experience, and so tie the warrant for such principles to truth conducive grounds, precisely because it would be based on whatever reliable belief generation occurs within any given set of doxastic practices. Part of the point of self-criticism, after all, is to discriminate reliable from unreliable beliefs generated within a (generally reliable) doxastic practice.

Furthermore, the phenomenon of self-criticism needn't be construed narrowly as an individual activity. Recall that the person offering the "track record" argument didn't claim that perception was infallible. Alston calls the premises a "well-chosen" set of perceptual beliefs, reported by a number of subjects, and for the sake of discussion offers the figure of 97 percent reliability.⁹⁶ These remarks suggest the common phenomenon of our often being in a position to correct or corroborate one another's perceptual beliefs. The self-critical process of evaluating the warrant of various perceptual beliefs may thus be a social process by taking the reports of others into account. Alston grants that "some degree of inconsistency pops up in all practices, and it is undoubtedly healthy that it should,"⁹⁷ but he fails to notice that this hints at the presence (and so the possibility) of self-criticism within those practices. Now I grant that these strands of self-critical assessment are modest, but they suggest the prospect that coherence criteria of truth may be powerful ones if they are used by self-critical beings, which according to Hegel we are.

What else might be done to bolster the warrant for epistemic principles? Alston stresses the point that if one's evidence is not in fact adequate then that evidence cannot justify a belief based on it.⁹⁸ This constraint is central to a conception of justificatory grounds that are conducive to truth. An important hint concerning a difficulty lurking here can be found in the clause that distinguishes *prima facie* justification from unqualified justification. One can have *prima facie* justification for a belief, even on the basis of evidence adequate to entail the truth of that belief, and yet not be justified in that belief. This can occur in situations in which the totality of one's evidence does not adequately support that belief because one has overriding considerations.⁹⁹ (Recall the chemical-wielding pranksters mentioned earlier.) Unqualified justification requires adequate evidence plus insufficient overriding reasons to the contrary.¹⁰⁰ Alston develops this point with regard to a conception of epistemic justification useful for analyzing first-order empirical knowledge, but the point is equally well taken with respect to the justification of epistemic principles. Maintaining such a condition would also seem warranted by the contemporary (and not only contemporary) style of argumentation in epistemology that defends a refined positive

conception by tailoring it to avoid or resolve objections to alternative conceptions or to less refined versions of the same conception, affectionately known as "Chisholming." The unqualified justification of epistemic principles may similarly require having adequate grounds plus insufficient countervailing evidence. The analogue to "cultural isolation" (one of Alston's grounds for objecting to deontological conceptions of justification) at the second-order level of epistemology is unfamiliarity with the relevant issues, arguments, and doxastic practices. It is a simple though very significant stipulation on an "internalist" conception of the justification of epistemic principles that one be familiar with those issues, arguments, and practices. As will be seen, Hegel takes this requirement very seriously indeed.

This point may be focused in the following way. One of Alston's main objections to a deontological conception of justification is that it does not tie justification tightly enough to truth-conducive grounds. Under various conditions of deprivation, one might do all one was capable of doing to justify one's beliefs, and yet have wildly erroneous beliefs. Having adequate grounds for beliefs and properly basing beliefs on those grounds, when these are self-conscious activities of rationally justifying beliefs, requires having access to relevant information, especially to information that would override the justification of what one might otherwise justifiably believe. One strategy for bolstering the warrant for the principle of the reliability of perception would be to examine competing alternative epistemological accounts of perception and perceptual beliefs. If it were possible to show that alternative accounts were inadequate, or at least less warranted than, *e.g.*, the reliabilist principle Alston discusses, this would be strong evidence in favor of that epistemic principle. How much information about empirical knowledge and about epistemology must one have and how many relevant alternative epistemic principles must one eliminate in order to justify one's second-order beliefs about knowledge? On such questions Alston's analysis, even at the first-order level, is silent. These points become especially urgent when the concept of justification is viewed against its background, the activity of critically reflecting on, challenging, and defending beliefs. Alston's view so far as he has developed it does little to resolve either the everyday or the philosophical disputes that generate justificatory regresses. The problem of settling disputes involves settling the question of whether we *know* (or justifiably believe) that we (or others) have some disputed bit of knowledge.¹⁰¹ In making claims about what knowledge is one is involved in propounding an account of knowledge. Account *giving*, however, is a public activity aimed at reaching agreement as well as understanding. Thus the concern with showing that one's claims are justified cannot be shirked. There is no reason to accept an analysis of knowledge, not even for oneself, in the absence of strong supporting evidence.

The relevance of these points to Hegel is manifold. First, Hegel realizes that "Fully Reflective Justification" of knowledge is impossible. This is reflected in his fallibilism and in his recognition of the insufficiency (*N.B.*: not the superfluousness!) of logical proof for epistemology and indeed for philosophy generally.¹⁰² Second, Hegel nevertheless seeks to maximize our reflective justification of our epistemology and, on that basis, of our empirical knowledge. We might call this "maximally reflective justification," in order to leave open for now just how much justification this might be. Third, Hegel recognizes that there are no uncontroversial first principles to which one could appeal in justifying any given claim about knowledge.¹⁰³ The dilemma of the criterion provides a vivid expression of the problem of question-begging in highly disputed domains, and Hegel addresses it accordingly. Part of Hegel's phenomenological program is to consider a series of candidates for a point of departure, to argue that the typical candidates are inadequate for the task, but also to argue that those inadequacies are instructive and help to develop and to

justify a more sophisticated, and ultimately an adequate, account of the grounds and nature of empirical knowledge. Fourth, his phenomenological method centrally concerns how to detect and examine all the relevant alternative accounts of knowledge and its components in order to be maximally aware of relevant but inadequate alternatives. This concern is reflected in the way in which the *Phenomenology of Spirit* reconsiders large portions of the history of philosophy (especially those bearing on epistemology) and certain crucial developments in natural science. Fifth, Hegel's procedure thus gives central recognition to a point stressed by Alston, that second-order knowledge about empirical knowledge is a highly specialized achievement that presupposes large amounts of less reflective first-order cognitive achievement. Sixth, Hegel's method assesses epistemic principles in application to their own putative domains and assesses them in light of how beings like us could apply them. This point recalls Alston's claim about the importance of viewing belief formation concretely as an aspect of human practices. Finally, Hegel's procedure is designed to bring his readers rationally from the state of only practically accepting various epistemic principles to the state of explicitly accepting—and evaluating—them.¹⁰⁴ By grounding a coherence criterion for epistemic principles firmly in a self-critical process of reflection on empirical knowledge and in a critical evaluation and rejection of alternative accounts of knowledge, Hegel proposes to tie his criterion and analysis of the justification of epistemic principles strongly to truth-conducive grounds. How Hegel proposes to carry out these aims is the concern of the remainder of this study.

CHAPTER SIX

SOME BASIC METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF HEGEL'S *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*

I. Review and Summary

Where are we after all this? Sextus Empiricus posed some fundamental challenges to epistemological realism and to the possibility of its defense. Descartes failed to defend epistemological realism. Kant both failed to refute epistemological realism and to defend his own form of "empirical realism." Carnap failed to dissolve the issue of epistemological realism. Alston's proposals for justifying epistemic principles are modest, at best. So far, then, no adequate solution has been found to the problems of justifying epistemic principles and of settling disputes within epistemology. Sextus Empiricus's charges of circularity, question-begging, and dogmatism still remain salient. Worse yet, Hegel has challenged the presumption that transcendental knowledge (second-order knowledge about what empirical knowledge is) is any less problematic or available than empirical knowledge. How could epistemological realism be defended or even examined under such conditions?

As Hegel notes, one may well think that reaching an understanding of knowledge is impossible in such circumstances and is better abandoned than pursued further. Why not just do science and forget epistemology?¹ The problem with this strategy is that claiming to do science, whatever one takes that to be, not only begs the questions of what knowledge is and whether one knows anything against those with a different understanding of science, but also against those who reject science altogether in favor of some other putative form of knowledge. By simply presuming that one can do science, one makes an implicit if not express claim that one knows what one is up to. But each dissenter gives the same kind of assurance about his or her own position, and their assurances are sanctioned by, and are just as legitimate as, those made by self-styled scientists: "One barren assurance counts as much as another."² We're still faced with the task indicated in Chapter One: the task of sorting through the welter of alternative views of knowledge and achieving some consensus about and comprehension of what knowledge is, but without prejudicing the issue.³ The problem is how this can be done, and, once this problem is solved, to determine whether empirical knowledge is knowledge of a world having a structure not constituted by our cognition or language.

What position are we in for addressing this problem? On the one hand, simply accepting various ideas about what knowledge is leads to question-begging, and Hegel has called the trustworthiness of these ideas into question. (One cannot simply accept all *prima facie* claims because various claims contradict one another and so cannot all be true.⁴) On the other hand, simply rejecting all such ideas *tout court* would leave us bereft of terms for even posing the problem, to say nothing of solving it. It is thus apparent from Hegel's discussion that some sort of *prima facie* cognitive abilities and terminology for analyzing these abilities must be granted in order to have a problem and a discussion of it at all. If there are reasons (of question-begging, if none other) for questioning those *prima facie* abilities and terminology, then any solution to these difficulties will have to lie in the possibility of self-critically revising our *prima facie* understanding of knowledge and our

terminology for expressing that understanding. It must be *critical* revision because there are reasons to suppose that our understanding of knowledge is inadequate; it must be *self-critical* revision because there is need to avoid question-begging and dogmatism. Some procedure is needed for sorting through these claims, ideas, and terms in order to determine which, if any, *prima facie* claims (*etc.*) are also true claims (*etc.*). To understand Hegel's procedure for analyzing various *prima facie* claims, one must understand his notions of "forms of consciousness," "natural ideas," "apparent knowledge," the three points of view in the *Phenomenology*, and "observed consciousness." Each of these notions is taken up in turn in the following sections. How these notions allow Hegel to address the problem of the criterion is discussed in the following chapter.

II. Forms of Consciousness

The unit of analysis Hegel adopts in the *Phenomenology* is "shapes" or "forms" of consciousness, "*Gestalten des Bewußtseins*." What is a "form" of consciousness? Why does Hegel investigate them? The answer to the latter question is complex, and will be begun here by answering the first. Hegel adopts the "form of consciousness" as a unit of analysis in order to have a general rubric for conceptual schemes that is neutral on some issues, flexible on some others, and committed on still others. A form of consciousness comprises a pair of basic principles. One of these principles specifies the kind or mode of empirical knowledge of which a form of consciousness presumes itself capable. The other principle specifies the general structure of the kind of object that form of consciousness presumes to find in the world. Taken together, these two principles constitute what Hegel's calls a form of consciousness' "certainty" (*Gewißheit*). Idiomatically expressed, these principles express what a form of consciousness is sure its knowledge and the world it knows are like.⁵ The principles at issue are categorial ones, *e.g.*, whether intuitive (a-conceptual) knowledge is humanly possible, or whether an ontology of *sensa* is adequate. In the body of the *Phenomenology* Hegel specifies a form of consciousness' principles by describing its "certainty." Part of Hegel's point in labeling this pair of conceptions a "certainty" is to argue that certainty is not an infallible, indubitable cognitive starting point, but rather is an end result of cognitive investigation, and a corrigible one at that. The assurance of each form of consciousness that its principles are true is time and again undermined in the course of Hegel's presentation.

The rubric "form of consciousness" is neutral on the question of whether a particular individual's consciousness or a collective group's common outlook is under consideration. Similarly, this rubric is indifferent between historically identifiable views of, and summarily presented possible positions on, knowledge and its objects. The *Phenomenology* is of course rife with allusions to particular historical epochs and to specific philosophical theories. But the accurate identification of these allusions is not the main concern. Hegel's neutrality on the question of who holds a given set of principles allows him to focus attention on the more important issue of the principles themselves in connection with their putative domains of application. If Hegel's account is correct, historical epochs and extant philosophies are variations on, if not instances of, the forms of consciousness he recounts in the *Phenomenology*. This is because both forms of consciousness, as well as historically identifiable positions, devolve from the real characteristics of consciousness. This is one point Hegel makes in claiming that his *Phenomenology* presents a progression through "the series of [the soul's] own formations as ... waystations prescribed by its own nature"⁶ By grasping some aspect of its own nature as a cognizer, each form of

consciousness adopts a particular principle concerning what knowledge is. An epistemic principle implies certain constraints on what the objects of knowledge could be, and so the adoption of an epistemic principle brings with it a concomitant ontological principle. To take examples from the first section of Hegel's book, the form of consciousness designated as "sense-certainty" holds that knowledge is unmediated by conceptions or inferences and that the world contains nothing but sheer particulars that can be grasped intuitively. The form of consciousness called "perception" holds that cognition occurs by perceiving objects and using observation terms and that the world contains multi-proprieted perceptible things. The form of consciousness called "understanding" holds that, in addition to perception, empirical knowledge requires inferences based on judgmental application of laws of nature and that the world contains causally interacting substances structured by forces.⁷

Taking a pair of epistemic and ontological principles as a *form* of consciousness allows latitude for developing from less to more sophisticated accounts of knowledge and its objects based on each pair of principles. These developments occur as deficiencies in less sophisticated versions are discovered. (How such discoveries are made is the topic of Chapter Eight.) Taking a pair of epistemic and ontological principles as a form of *consciousness* is to consider them only as they can be adopted and employed by consciousness.⁸ Because consciousness is fundamentally a cognitive relation to the world,⁹ considering these principles as forms of consciousness means considering them as they can be applied to the world in attempts to comprehend the world, to make the kind of claims sanctioned by a form of consciousness' conception of knowledge about the kinds of objects specified by its conception of objects. Indeed, a form of consciousness' epistemic principle is precisely a principle concerning how to apply its conception of objects to the world in order to comprehend the world.

Hegel implicitly adopts Kant's dictum that "concepts without intuitions are empty" in insisting that only in applying conceptions to the world that can one consider their adequacy or, for that matter, even consider what conceptions *are*.¹⁰ (In order to avoid terminological confusion, the term "conception" will be used henceforth for the usual notion of "concept," a notion belonging to the philosophy of mind. Hegel's notion of "*Begriff*" is first and foremost an ontological notion, and the term "concept" is needed to translate it.¹¹) In more contemporary analytic terms, Hegel doesn't begin his project by trying to give what could at the outset only be an unmotivated, contentious account of what conceptions are. Instead, his phenomenological project takes the notion of *having* a conception as basic, so that the mastery and understanding of a conception is displayed in someone's being able to effectively use it, that is, to effectively apply it to appropriate objects. An exhaustive account of what it is to have a conception would, of course, ultimately include an account of what a conception is. Indeed, this is just what Hegel has in mind. We will be in a position (in the *Logic*) to examine what the contents of conceptions (and concepts) are after we've achieved a mastery of some important conceptions (in the *Phenomenology*). Since mastery of conceptions is achieved and displayed only in applying those conceptions to appropriate objects, coming to master conceptions *ipso facto* involves coming to know something about the objects to which those conceptions apply.

The conceptions Hegel proposes to examine and develop mastery of in the *Phenomenology* include those of subject, object, knowledge, and world. However, these terms are too abstract to specify much of anything. So Hegel proposes to examine particular sets of specific versions of these conceptions through examining their ideal employment by each form of consciousness.¹² Examining the proficiencies and deficiencies of each of these forms of consciousness, and through that of each more specific interpretation of these abstract conceptions, will put us, Hegel's readers, in a position to understand the adequate

specification of these abstract conceptions that Hegel purports to provide by the end of the *Phenomenology*. Hegel's argument is thus a sort of argument by elimination, where he seeks to eliminate the errors but retain the insights of less adequate views through a self-critical process of revision.

III. Natural Ideas

Hegel does not use either of the terms I have used in the preceding sections, "*prima facie* claims" or "conceptions." Instead he speaks of "natural ideas" (*natürliche Vorstellung[en]*) and does so frequently in the Introduction and in the Preface. Among the notions designated as "natural ideas" are "absolute," "knowledge," "object," "subject," "objective," "subjective," "God," "nature," "understanding," and "sensibility."¹³ Among the theses designated as "natural ideas" are the claims that epistemology must precede empirical investigation of the world,¹⁴ that knowledge is an instrument or medium,¹⁵ and that familiarity with the functioning of cognition could allow for correcting its distortions.¹⁶ It is plain enough that *prima facie* claims to know, at least to know what one is talking about, are made or implied by using such terms or asserting such theses, but why call these "natural ideas"?

The point of Hegel's designation is simple. These terms and theses are familiar ones. We recognize them and feel comfortable using them. They come to mind, as it were, naturally when certain topics are considered. Hegel points out that such familiarity or comfort does not, however, insure that we understand these terms or ideas. As he acerbically states in the Preface, "what is familiar is not known simply because it is familiar."¹⁷ Indeed, using such phrases

... to give the impression, partly that their significance is generally familiar and partly too that one has their concept, appears rather like an attempt to avoid the main point, namely, to give their concept.¹⁸

Mistaking familiarity for comprehension is deceptive, both of oneself and of others, for the conversants remain ignorant of the meaning and significance of their ideas and can make only a show of knowing what they are talking about.¹⁹ The shortcoming of such usage is that it undermines the possibility of answering questions posed in such terms. In particular it renders impossible a reasonable execution of the very examination of truth and knowledge which was called for by some of these natural ideas.²⁰ These challenges are at once simple and deep, for with them Hegel calls into question the presumed clarity of ideas and challenges again the presumption that transcendental knowledge (second-order knowledge about what empirical knowledge is) is unproblematic and available—whether it is Descartes's claim to have clear and distinct ideas, Kant's claim to be able to perform the first *Critique* because all that is involved in reason is instantiated in himself, Hume's claim that "impressions of sense" are immediate objects of awareness, or, to look ahead in time, Moore's intuitions of meanings, or the "data" of ordinary language philosophy.²¹ The interest and importance of the shortcomings of such usage is indicated by pointing out what can be done about it. Refusing to use natural ideas is no help because this would leave one bereft of terms or indeed of thoughts. This would eliminate philosophical problems, to be sure, but without resolving them. Basing usage on one's own conviction instead of on the authority of others is no help, for this need not alter the content of one's understanding (though it may alter one's conceit).²²

Rather than wiping the slate clean, Hegel's procedure relies on the historical fact that both philosophical and scientific thinking have been occurring for some time and that we, the readers of the *Phenomenology* who are to achieve a rigorously philosophical comprehension of what knowledge and its objects are, are thoroughly immersed in the ongoing intellectual tradition and are familiar with many of the views that have been propounded in that tradition. Indeed, such familiarity is a matter of being raised and trained in an intellectual tradition. In the Preface Hegel points up this familiarity with our intellectual tradition when he states that "the wealth of [the world's] previous existence is ... still present to consciousness in memory."²³ The kind of "memory" Hegel speaks of here is not necessarily an explicit, articulate memory of particular events, but rather a history of the development of ideas that is implicit in linguistic usage. In the Preface Hegel affirms the social nature of language and thought by describing the "memory" implicit in one's linguistic usage as one's "inorganic nature."²⁴ This "inorganic nature," the ideas implicit in one's inherited linguistic usage, is the source of "natural ideas." Rather than repudiating natural ideas, the task at hand requires coming explicitly to comprehend the appropriate usage of the language and ideas that one has inherited.²⁵ The *Phenomenology* is Hegel's device for facilitating our explicit comprehension of what knowledge and its objects are.²⁶ Rather than putting us on the spot to explain ourselves and ideas, Hegel proposes that we examine how our ideas can be employed by forms of consciousness and to see through that employment the proficiencies and deficiencies of our ideas. Understanding how forms of consciousness can be used in this way, and especially how their employment in this connection can constitute a response to Sextus Empiricus, requires understanding how Hegel combines the notions of forms of consciousness and natural ideas into "apparent knowledge."

IV. Apparent Knowledge

In Chapter One it was noted that Sextus Empiricus countenances talk of how things appear to be but not of how they really are. Hegel's concern with determining what knowledge really is and with avoiding question-begging while sorting through the welter of alternative theories of knowledge addresses Sextus's dilemma of the criterion on the meta-level of epistemological inquiry. At this second level, Sextus would proscribe speaking of what knowledge really is, although he would allow our speaking of what knowledge seems or appears to us to be. This is Hegel's main point of departure in speaking of "apparent" or "phenomenal" (*erscheinend*) knowledge. Knowledge is one of the phenomena of human existence, and it frequently appears to us that we do have knowledge of some parts of the world and that we do have some knowledge of what knowledge is. The epistemological question is, Do we actually have such knowledge, and if so, what is it and how do we have it? In order to avoid question-begging at the second level, Hegel proposes to desist from making any claims about what knowledge is and so to desist from any direct answers to the question just posed. Hegel's meta-level neutrality is crucial in view of the controversial analysis he hopes ultimately to defend.

Hegel's indirect approach to answering the question of whether we have any empirical knowledge and what such knowledge is invokes a triple ambiguity of the phrase "apparent knowledge". One sense of the term is "knowledge of appearances." In this sense, Hegel's phrase alludes directly to Kant and conveys Hegel's vow to take up the skeptical challenge of Kant's first *Critique*. A second sense of the phrase is the one touched on in the preceding paragraph. "Apparent knowledge" is knowledge taken as an appearance, a

phenomenon, as a manifest, obvious feature of human existence, but without commitments concerning whether or not such apparent, putative knowledge is the real thing. A third sense of Hegel's phrase captures the concern that what appears to be knowledge really isn't knowledge at all. Apparent knowledge may be *merely* apparent knowledge, it may be a mere semblance. Hegel's sense of "phenomenology" is the study of the structure of apparent forms of knowledge. Hegel claims that by studying the structure of apparent forms of knowledge, we can come to distinguish between those forms that are merely apparent knowledge and that form (Hegel thinks there is only one) that manifests actual knowledge of the world. To understand how such a study can be conducted requires looking again at Hegel's contention that only in application to their objects can the adequacy of conceptions can be assessed. Reviewing this contention will afford an understanding of the "transcendental" character of Hegel's method.

V. Criticism, Empirical Knowledge, and Transcendental Knowledge

A. CRITICISM AND THE ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

Hegel insists that criticism of conceptions is possible in their application to their putative objects, and only in such application; for only in application to their objects are conceptions what they are and only in such application can they be found to be inadequate. If he is indirect about this point in the penultimate paragraphs of the Introduction, he is quite direct about it in the *Encyclopedia*. As the following passage has been cited in support of another interpretation, it is worth quoting it in full here.

A main consideration of the *critical* philosophy is that, before proceeding to know God, the nature of things, *etc.*, the faculty of knowledge itself should be examined first, as to whether it is capable of such proceedings; one must previously be familiar with the *instrument*, before one undertakes the work for which it is to be employed; if it is insufficient all one's effort would be in vain. This thought has seemed so *plausible* that it has awakened the greatest admiration and assent and has withdrawn the interest of knowledge from its objects and directed its concern onto itself, onto [its] form. If one doesn't want to be deceived by words, it is easy to see that of course other instruments can be investigated and judged in ways other than by their employment in the work for which they are designed. But the investigation of knowledge can only happen as a *knowing*; in the case of this so-called instrument, to investigate it is the same as to know it. Wanting to know before one knows, however, is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, to learn to swim before he ventures into the water.²⁷

Richard Norman interprets this passage as arguing that epistemology, conceived as an effort "to know before one knows" is impossible because epistemology itself is an act of knowledge, and he cites most of this passage to support his attribution of this argument to Hegel.²⁸ A careful look at this passage reveals a more interesting, and no doubt more controversial, objection to disengaged, "beach-side" epistemology. The object of Hegel's criticism here is that the critical philosophy had *usurped* cognitive interest in first-order objects of knowledge ("God, the nature of things, *etc.*") and replaced it with a purely reflexive, transcendental interest in "cognition itself," whatever that is. Hegel's calling this an interest in "form" suggests that he is making his typical complaints about the emptiness of mere forms. In this case, the contents of these forms would be precisely first-order objects of knowledge, the interest in which Kant is said to have deflated.

Against Kant and the main stream of Modern and twentieth-century epistemology, Hegel maintains that we cannot critique our cognitive capacities apart from their actual employment in knowing the world, for the essential nature of cognitive capacities is to comprehend the world, and that only in the course of such application can cognitive capacities be studied. This is Hegel's complaint against "Scholasticus," who attempts to determine whether there is any knowledge and what its character is without investigating any actual examples of it, which alone could make for an informed discussion. This point was suggested in Hegel's third and fourth challenges to traditional epistemology, and it marks Hegel's concurrence with Alston's pragmatic turn to the examination of doxastic practices.²⁹ Hegel's project in the *Phenomenology* is to observe the self-criticism and attendant enrichment of consciousness' cognitive capacities as those capacities are engaged with their putative empirical objects.

True, indeed, the forms of thought should not be used uninvestigated, but this investigation is itself already knowing. Therefore the activity of the forms of thought and their critique must be combined in knowing. The forms of thought must be observed in and for themselves; they are the object and the activity of the object itself; they investigate themselves, they must in themselves determine their own limits and point out their own defects. This then is that activity of thought, which will hereafter be especially considered as *dialectic* and about which now is only to be noticed, that instead of being brought to bear on the categories from without, it is observed to be immanent within them.³⁰

These remarks from the *Encyclopedia* are of a piece with those first expressed in the opening paragraphs of the Introduction. Hegel's response to these difficulties rests entirely on the point that self-criticism is an inherent capacity of thinking, if that thinking will pursue its comprehension of the world thoroughly.

B. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND THE "A PRIORI" CHARACTER OF THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*.

Hegel's contention that only in application to their objects can conceptions be assessed may seem to generate a problem for his project, namely, that it would beg the question against Sextus because it would only be in empirical employment of our conceptions of the world and of our knowledge that we could assess those conceptions. Has Hegel simply abandoned epistemology and adopted naturalized epistemology?³¹ The answer is no. Hegel's negative answer is based on his view that the second-order "transcendental" project he pursues in the *Phenomenology* presupposes a considerable intellectual history and our familiarity with that history. It is Hegel's view, namely, that because all of the possible views of knowledge and its objects have already been taken in one form or another, and because we are familiar with these views (even if we need to be reminded of them during Hegel's recapitulation and examination of them), we can consider each pair of conceptions of knowledge and its objects in their application to their *putative* objects—putative not only in the sense that a form of consciousness claims that there are such objects, but also in the sense that we needn't commit ourselves one way or the other about whether there are such objects, or about what kinds of objects that form of consciousness may discover in uncovering the inadequacy of its conceptions of those objects. We, Hegel's readers, can take the whole exercise as one large thought-experiment. As each form of consciousness comes to recognize an inadequacy in its conceptions, it will appear to it, as it will also appear to us, that there is a kind of object that points up the inadequacy of the conception

in question. Generally these objects are familiar ones. But Hegel's method need not and does not suppose that there actually are such objects. For any apparent kind of object, there is a form of consciousness that assumes that there is a least one object of that kind and that examines the tenability of this assumption. How this examination can be informative to us and how it can avoid question-begging and solve the problem of the criterion requires understanding the distinction between the three points of view Hegel uses in the *Phenomenology*.

VII. Three Points of View

In adopting and using natural ideas, we make putative knowledge claims, both about knowledge and the world. In doing so, we also invite question-begging on both of these points. Hegel is concerned that we avoid such controversy in order to assess our natural ideas and to comprehend what knowledge and its objects really are. In order to disengage us, his readers, as well as himself, from this dispute, Hegel proposes to examine a series of forms of consciousness, each of which adopts one or another set of natural ideas concerning knowledge and its objects. Forms of consciousness comprise a pair of principles, one epistemic, one ontological, taken in their possible application to their putative objects. The source of these principles is the same as our source of natural ideas; in both cases these ideas are inherited from our intellectual tradition. In adopting and employing a pair of principles, a form of consciousness makes putative knowledge claims. That is, what a form of consciousness appears to have is knowledge, both of what knowledge is and of what the objects of knowledge are. Before indicating how Hegel's shifting of cognitive responsibility from himself and us onto forms of consciousness can help address Sextus's challenges, it is important to note that the expository structure of the *Phenomenology* comprises three coordinated points of view: Hegel's point of view as author, our point of view as readers, and the point of view of "observed consciousness." Since Hegel holds that consciousness is capable of self-critically revising its conceptions (see Chapters Seven and Eight), he proposes to present a series of forms of consciousness progressing (roughly) from less to more adequate conceptions of knowledge and its objects (see Chapter Eleven). We, the readers of the *Phenomenology*, are to observe and assess each member of this series of forms of consciousness. Because they employ the same natural ideas that we have inherited, we can come to a comprehension of our own ideas by noting the proficiencies and deficiencies of each form of consciousness and its contribution to an understanding of what knowledge and its objects are.³² Hegel himself, having figured out how this series purportedly works, plays the role of tour guide, introducing each form of consciousness and summarizing its successes and failures for our benefit. In this way we are supposed to reach an understanding of what is at issue in each form of consciousness.

VII. Forms of Consciousness and "Observed Consciousness"

The role assigned to forms of consciousness in the *Phenomenology* is to adopt and ideally employ a pair of natural ideas for our educative benefit. It is in this regard that Hegel speaks of "observed consciousness." The phrase "observed consciousness" designates the central *dramatis persona* of the book. Forms of consciousness are a kind, if only a dramatic, pedagogical kind, of consciousness. But why speak of *observed* consciousness? This designation has to do with the reader's proper attitude toward each form of conscious-

ness as it is described and analyzed in the book. In order to avoid question-begging, we, along with Hegel, are to desist from our own ideas about what knowledge is and just take each form of consciousness at face value as being what it appears to us to be. What forms of consciousness appears to us to be is also what each form of consciousness takes itself to be. This is because forms of consciousness draw conceptions of knowledge and its objects from our intellectual tradition. Because of this shared tradition we can describe forms of consciousness without begging questions against the actual proponents of the principles ideally employed by the forms of consciousness.³³ This again points out the importance of recognizing that the *Phenomenology* is only possible (both as a book, and as a method) after considerable philosophical, cultural, and scientific history has occurred. As has been mentioned, many forms of consciousness considered in the *Phenomenology* have been antecedently developed as actual positions in our intellectual tradition. Thus both Hegel and we, his readers, are already familiar with these forms of consciousness in many regards. Hence we can understand the principles central to each form of consciousness and discuss each form of consciousness in its own terms. It is, of course, always open to us to challenge Hegel's characterization of any form of consciousness, and thus to challenge his execution. The important methodological point is that because we share an intellectual tradition with him, we can be on common terms both with him and the forms of consciousness he describes.

VIII. The Dilemma of the Criterion Revisited

Describing forms of consciousness is not the ultimate aim of the *Phenomenology*. The aim of the *Phenomenology* is to lead us to an understanding of what knowledge and its objects really are. To achieve such an understanding requires not only describing but also assessing various forms of consciousness. How can this assessment be made without begging the question?³⁴ Once the distinction between claim and object is made, and once "knowledge by acquaintance" is relinquished, how is it possible to determine if the two correspond? Who can make this assessment? These are the questions pungently expressed in Sextus's dilemma of the criterion. To avoid question-begging, Hegel proposed to describe forms of consciousness and proposed that we "observe" them.³⁵ Hegel assures us that "a contribution from us becomes superfluous[;] ... what remains to us is only pure observation."³⁶ Hegel argues that this non-didactic approach will succeed, it will provide us with an examination of and insight into what knowledge and its objects are, because consciousness is capable of self-criticism. Consciousness itself tests its own knowledge, "it gives itself its own standard," and it determines whether the object it knows and its conception of that object correspond.³⁷ This contention returns the problem of establishing a criterion for evaluating knowledge to the first-order level of empirical knowledge: How is such self-criticism possible if (observed) consciousness only has access to the object "in itself" via its "appearances"? The whole host of questions developed in Chapter One and earlier in this chapter will have to be met at the ground level, Hegel indicates, if they are to be met at all. The problem of establishing, employing, and evaluating appropriate criteria of knowledge must be faced squarely. Furthermore, if descriptive phenomenology is to be feasible, then these criteria must be forthcoming from observed consciousness. Hegel's solution to this problem is based upon a compressed but incisive analysis of the structure of consciousness. The task of the next chapter is to reconstruct Hegel's analysis of the structure of consciousness as an answer to this problem.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SELF-CRITICISM AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH

I. Introduction

Hegel's defense of the possibility of self-criticism rests on two main points. First, our being conscious is fundamentally a cognitive relation to the world, whether we realize it or not. Second, our fundamental cognitive relation to the world has a certain structure that allows us to critically assess and revise our conceptions of knowledge and of the world. The task of this chapter is to document and analyze these two points. More specifically, in section II, I reconstruct Hegel's analysis of the self-critical structure of consciousness by analyzing four points made in his discussion of commonsense realism (§IIA), noting the problem to which Hegel's analysis responds (§IIB and IIC), and distinguishing eight aspects of cognition as a relation between subject and object (§IID). This background then enables a reconstruction of Hegel's criterial inference, an inference to the correspondence of a form of consciousness' conceptions of knowledge and of the world with knowledge and the world themselves (§III). In section IV, I defend attributing a correspondence conception of truth to Hegel and explain why he has been taken to reject this conception of truth. I close in section V by noting that, even were Hegel's criterial inference sound, it would take further measures to undo epistemically opaque metaphysical distinctions between appearance and reality and that Hegel takes such further measures. Epistemological realism must be a substantive result of his investigation and not a trivial corollary to the criteria he proposes.

II. The Self-Critical Structure of Consciousness

A. COMMON SENSE AND KNOWLEDGE AS A RELATION

Hegel's analysis of knowing as a relation to the world begins with a sketch of a commonsense view of knowledge and its objects.¹ His analysis is nearly as obscure as it is incisive, and so requires careful consideration. He states:

[C]onsciousness *distinguishes* from itself something to which it at the same time *relates* itself; or, as this is expressed, this something is something *for consciousness*. The determinate side of this *relation*, or the *being* of something *for a consciousness*, is *knowledge*. From this being for another, however, we distinguish the *being in itself*; that which is related to knowledge is at the same time distinguished from it and is posited as *existing* also outside this relation. The side of this in itself is called *truth*.²

In this initial description of the structure of knowledge, Hegel attends to the etymology of the German words for knowledge, being, and consciousness. Knowledge is "*das Wissen*." This word is the substantive form of the verb "to know" (*wissen*), which has for a past

participle "*gewußt*." Being is "*das Seyn*." Consciousness is "*das Bewußtseyn*." The prefix of this word (*be-*) indicates transitivity, provision, or thoroughness. Hence "consciousness" according to Hegel is etymologically the "coming to be known of being," "*Be-wußt-seyn*." As he puts it, "the *being* of something for a consciousness is knowledge;" "*des Seyns von etwas für ein Bewußtseyn ist das Wissen*." Even without such an etymological basis, a basis only vaguely discernible in the anglicized Latin "con-scious-ness," Hegel's claim is that common, non-philosophical conceptions of knowledge are naively realist. People ordinarily take themselves to be aware of a world that does not depend upon them for its existence or characteristics. They believe that there is a difference between the world (what is "in itself") and what the world is believed to be (what is "for consciousness"), and that questions of truth concern how the world is: the truth is what is the case, whatever we may believe about it.

Four points turn on these considerations, each of which anticipates further features of Hegel's method and procedure. First, the realism expressed here is to be found in common sense, and precisely this same notion of knowledge as a relation between subject and object is adopted by the first form of consciousness analyzed in the *Phenomenology*, "sense-certainty." According to common sense and to "sense-certainty," the world we know is not concocted by our thought but rather it has its own existence and characteristics, both known and unknown. By beginning his analysis of forms of consciousness with a form of consciousness representing this aspect of realism, Hegel transfers his own first-order realist contentions, made at the beginning of the Introduction,³ to a form of consciousness that is critically scrutinized. Hegel's own epistemological realism will be tenable if, and to the extent that, the ontological realism of common sense is vindicated—even if the common-sense account of that realism is radically transformed—in the course of Hegel's phenomenological investigation of knowledge. Hegel's early mention of his realist orientation therefore does not, of itself, beg the question against other views.

Second, if Kant's was a subjectifying Copernican revolution in epistemology, Hegel's is an objectifying counter-revolution based on a principle first enunciated here, namely, that in being conscious of the world we are inherently cognitively related to the world. This thesis is on the one hand innocently commonsensical, in that this is why science can "take up its work and actually know without any such [epistemological] hesitations,"⁴ and on the other hand philosophically potent and controversial. Viewed against a backdrop of Cartesian, Humean, Kantian, and Classical skepticism, this thesis makes all the difference in the world. Each of these skepticisms results from conceiving of knowledge in a way that implies (wittingly or not) that knowledge of the world is impossible, and they conclude (or, in the case of Descartes, should have concluded) on that basis that we have no knowledge of the world. By highlighting our actual cognitive relation to the world, Hegel attempts to show that any conception of knowledge which results in skepticism is a conception of knowledge which fails to account for our manifest knowledge of the world. How Hegel proposes to show this, and what further philosophical views his attempt entails, is the topic of the remainder of this study.

Third, insofar as the epistemological turn ushered in by Descartes is the attempt to treat epistemology as first philosophy, Hegel here rejects this turn. The epistemological turn involves propounding a philosophical theory of what knowledge is, and then requiring all other philosophical and scientific claims to be formulated in accordance with the principles and terminology of that theory.⁵ This requirement was supposed to be the key to settling substantive disputes in other domains by appeal to epistemology.⁶ However, this requirement leads to one or another kind of subjectivism, as has been shown in three prominent cases in earlier chapters. This result suffices to cast grave doubt on treating epistemology

as first philosophy. But rather than returning to an un- or pre-critical metaphysics or "ontologizing," Hegel's claim is not only that metaphysics and epistemology must be pursued together (a claim often observed if not explicitly avowed in philosophy), but also that these must be pursued in conjunction with the actual cognition of the world pursued by the sciences (natural, social, and historical) as well. This contention marks Hegel's allegiance to naturalistic approaches to epistemology.⁷

Fourth, already implicit in this first bit of analysis of knowledge is Hegel's claim in the Preface that it is possible to know something falsely.⁸ Understanding Hegel's deliberately paradoxical claim requires recalling Hegel's deliberate use of the word "*Wissen*" to bridge the process/product ambiguity between knowledge as an activity of coming to know something and knowledge as the product of that activity, that which is known. "False knowledge" on Hegel's view is a belief that doesn't correspond to its object.⁹ His point in nevertheless calling it knowledge is to emphasize first, that false beliefs result from the same kinds of cognitive activities that also generate true beliefs, and second, that false beliefs can and do have a significant role in generating true beliefs. One aspect of this role may be mentioned here, namely, that according to Hegel a full understanding and justification of a true belief cannot be had without understanding the inadequacy of its false alternatives.¹⁰ A further aspect of the role of false beliefs in generating true beliefs is their role in cognitive self-criticism. (This role is discussed in Chapters Eight and Eleven.)

B. KNOWLEDGE AS A RELATION AND THE CIRCLE OF APPEARANCES

Insisting that knowledge is a relation between subject and object does not seem to help answer problems of skepticism. Indeed, it seems only to highlight the very problem which needs to be solved. If knowledge is a relation between subject and object, how can one tell if the object is as it seems to be? As Hegel notes,

The object of course seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousness seems, as it were, unable to get behind that and therefore seems unable to examine its knowledge by comparing it with the object, *not* as it is *for consciousness*, but as it is *in itself*.¹¹

Because knowledge is a relation, any knowledge of an object will involve at least the conceptual distinction between the object itself and the object as it is taken to be by the subject. This conceptual distinction may well harbor a further distinction between the actual structure or characteristics of the object and the content of the subject's cognitive state: ignorance, if not error. Hence on the face of it, any particular knowledge claim requires validation, but any validation would involve further knowledge and knowledge claims. These further states and claims would involve the same conceptual distinction between object and cognitive state or claim and the same possibility of ignorance or error. So how could any validation of a cognitive state or claim be conducted? We cannot simply compare our own putative knowledge with an unconceptualized "object itself"; we have no "knowledge by acquaintance" and so correspondence cannot be used as a criterion of truth,¹² so what could we do? Are we trapped within an opaque veil of representations? If not, how does insisting on knowledge as a relation between subject and object help to show that we're not? If there is a solution to this problem, it must be one of utilizing apparent or putative knowledge in a virtuously circular manner, and insisting on knowledge being a relation must be part of what makes this apparent circle virtuous.

C. THE "IN-ITSELF" AS THE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE

As Michael Theunissen has noted,¹³ the surprising thing is that Hegel seems to try to solve the problem of the circle of representations by simply reiterating the very problem itself. Hegel states:

[I]n the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all, this distinction is already present: Something is *to it* the *in itself*, but the knowledge or the being of the object *for* consciousness is *to it* still another moment. The examination rests upon this differentiation, which is available.¹⁴

In what sense is this differentiation between the object ("in itself") and the knowledge of it available? As was noted in the previous subsection, this distinction is involved in the conception of knowledge as a relation generally, so that upon reflection one could recognize this conceptual distinction. But this only means that upon reflection one could recognize the conceptual distinction that lies at the root of the problem. Does simply recognizing the problem lead to its solution? It may seem that Hegel thinks it does, for he claims that the examination of one's own knowledge¹⁵ rests upon this distinction and also that this distinction is comprised in the very knowledge to be investigated:

These two moments, concept and object, being for another and being in itself, fall within that knowledge itself¹⁶

What is Hegel claiming here? On the one hand, he may be reiterating his claim that upon reflection one can draw the conceptual distinction between the object of knowledge and one's knowledge of that object. This seems true but entirely unresponsive to the problem. On the other hand, it may appear that Hegel claims here that despite the seemingly ineluctable circle of representations, one can have some sort of direct access to the object that circumvents one's putative knowledge of it so that the two can be directly compared after all. Such a prospect would solve the problem, indeed very quickly, if denying a problem counted as solving it! However, such a denial would be only so much naive, erroneous, wishful thinking and never would have evoked the very sophisticated answer that Hegel develops. A closer analysis of his text is called for.

In the next subsection I argue that there is a crucial ambiguity in Hegel's text between two senses of "in-itself," and that there is an important set of distinctions Hegel marks by using different grammatical cases. Cataloging these distinctions generates a list of four aspects of knowledge as a relation between subject and object. Furthermore, because the "object" of any form of consciousness is a dual object, both the world as an object of empirical knowledge and empirical knowledge as an object of self-knowledge, the initial list of four aspects of knowledge must be doubled into two parallel lists comprising eight aspects of consciousness as a cognitive relation. In §III (and in Chapter Eight), this full analysis of consciousness is shown to ground the possibility of a self-critical examination and revision of second-order "transcendental" knowledge about first-order empirical knowledge.

D. THE EIGHT ASPECTS OF KNOWLEDGE AS A RELATION

Hegel begins explaining how a form of consciousness can provide and revise its own criterion or standard of knowledge by refining and expanding upon the points made above (§IIA) concerning consciousness, knowledge, and truth. He states:

In consciousness, one moment is *for an* other; or, in general, consciousness has the determination of the moment of knowledge in it. At the same time, this other is to consciousness not only something *for it*; it is also [to consciousness] something outside this relation or *in itself*; the moment of truth. Therefore, in what consciousness within itself declares as the *in itself* or the *true*, we have the standard consciousness provides itself with which it measures its knowledge.¹⁷

This passage bears close scrutiny because the ambiguity of "in-itself" and an important grammatical case distinction are found here.

1. *Two Senses of "In Itself."* One sense of "in itself" has already been mentioned in the first quotation of this chapter. It is the sense of the object of knowledge being something unto itself, apart from what may be known about it. The preposition "in" is not important; what is important is the object being what it is, with all of its properties known and unknown. In order to avoid question-begging, Hegel does not make claims about the structure of this object (at least not before the end of the *Phenomenology*). This sense of "in itself" may be labeled as **The Object Itself** (*simpliciter*).

A second sense of "in itself" has also been suggested in the first quotation of this chapter. This aspect of knowledge is crucial to Hegel's project, for it is the standard consciousness gives itself in order to assess ("measure") its own knowledge. Hegel describes this aspect of knowledge as "what consciousness within itself declares as the *in itself* or the *true*" Hegel's inclusion of the word "declares" (*erklärt*) here is crucial, for it necessitates distinguishing this sense of "in itself" from the previous one. If the object itself is something "outside" its relation to consciousness, then that object cannot be something simply "declared" by consciousness, for anything created by a declaration originates from, and so is what it is only within, some relation to consciousness. Furthermore, if the object itself were something created by consciousness' declaration, it would be misdescribed by calling it an "in itself."¹⁸ Now perhaps the world as an object of knowledge is something created by consciousness (subjective idealism cannot simply be ruled out of bounds by linguistic stipulation), but if that were the view Hegel were trying to defend, *starting out* by affirming this kind of doctrine would beg exactly the questions Hegel seeks most to avoid begging. However, I will argue in Chapters Ten and Eleven that Hegel is not himself a subjective idealist at all. Furthermore, the starting point of Hegel's analysis is a commonsense view of knowledge. This view is naively realist, and so does believe that the world it knows is not something it creates by thinking about it. If one is to begin an analysis of knowledge with this commonsense realism, one cannot simply claim that such realism is false in the next paragraph. Even subjective idealism has to acknowledge and account for the apparent duality of our ordinary awareness of the world. Hegel must be doing something else with his talk of "declaring" an "in itself."

What he is doing is quite simple. In the very act of adopting naive realism, common sense adopts a conception of the world as being something unto itself. Consciousness' having a *conception* of its object is signaled by Hegel's phrase "declares within itself." Adopting a conception of the object known is precisely what happens in recognizing that the object known may not be as one "knows" it to be (recall the process/product ambiguity). It is worth noting that Hegel's talk about consciousness "positing" [*wird gesetzt*] the in itself as something existing outside of its relation to consciousness must be understood in this same ordinary way.¹⁹ The object itself cannot be something posited by consciousness and yet be something that is what it is "outside" its relation to consciousness. What consciousness "posits" is the conception *that* the object it knows is what it is regardless of its being known. This conception of the object is to be used as the standard for examining

consciousness' own knowledge. Whether, and if so how, this conception could fulfill this function will be discussed below (§III and Chapter Eight). In order to emphasize that this aspect of knowledge concerns what consciousness takes its object to be, this aspect may be formulated as **The Object According to Consciousness** or, alternatively, **Consciousness' Conception of the Object**.²⁰

2. *Some Grammatical Distinctions of Case.* In the above passage, Hegel distinguishes between those objects or aspects of knowledge that are *for* consciousness and those that are something *to* consciousness. This is a distinction between accusative and dative cases. What is the significance of this distinction?²¹ In the above passage, as in the first quotation of the chapter, Hegel indicates the sense of something's being "for" consciousness: something's being for consciousness indicates that consciousness knows that thing, that consciousness is cognitively related to it. However, this is an *aspect* of knowledge rather than the whole relation. As has been mentioned previously, Hegel agrees with Kant that intuitions without conceptions are blind. Accordingly, there is no knowledge of objects without applying conceptions to them. This aspect of knowledge, the object's being something *for* consciousness, results from the combination of the two aspects distinguished above (as two senses of "in itself"): An object is something *for* consciousness only insofar as consciousness applies its conception of objects to an object itself. To put the same point slightly differently, an object is an object for consciousness insofar as consciousness takes that object to instantiate its conception of it. This aspect of knowledge may be labeled **The Object for Consciousness**.

To understand Hegel's use of the dative case, it is helpful to reexamine part of the passage quoted at the beginning of §C:

[I]n the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all, this distinction is already present: Something is *to it* the *in-itself*²²

Hegel uses a dative construction to specify a relation in which the object known stands to consciousness. Hegel states this dative relation twice in this passage. His German is, "daß es [das Bewußtseyn] von einem Gegenstande weiß," and, "daß ihm [dem Bewußtseyn] etwas das *Ansich* ... ist." The first point to note about Hegel's distinguishing between dative and accusative (grammatical) objects of consciousness is that in general it marks a distinction between levels of explicitness. What is "for" consciousness is something consciousness is explicitly aware of; what is "to" consciousness is something consciousness is aware of, but not explicitly so. The object known, or, as formulated above, **the object itself**, taken as an object *to* (rather than *for*) consciousness would be something intermediate between the object itself (*simpliciter*) and the object *qua* known (or, the object for consciousness). What could this be?

Here in the Introduction Hegel gives hardly a clue, but his procedure in the body of the text allows an important supposition, a supposition borne out by Hegel's discussion in the Introduction of consciousness' self-critical activity.²³ In contrast with the object for consciousness, that is, in contrast with consciousness' explicitly taking an object to instantiate its conception of the object, the object *to* consciousness designates features of the object that are closely related to those features explicitly captured by consciousness' conception of the object, but that are not themselves explicitly captured by that conception. These are parts or features of the object known that consciousness has, so to speak, latched onto without yet understanding them. Consciousness's mis-takings are takings nonetheless. The mis-taken parts or aspects of the object known may fall into two cases. First, there

are parts or aspects of an object of which consciousness is cognizant but that do not figure centrally into its conception of the object. Second, there are parts or aspects of the object of which consciousness is not cognizant, but that are closely related to those parts or aspects of the object captured by consciousness' conception of the object. For expository convenience, the properties of an object of which consciousness is explicitly aware may be called "central" properties. Those properties closely related to, without themselves being, "central" properties may be called "incidental" properties. These "incidental" parts or aspects of an object are the first ones consciousness confronts in discovering the inadequacy of its conception of the object. (How such discoveries occur is the topic of Chapter Eight.) This aspect of knowledge may be labeled **The Object to Consciousness**.

Before proceeding further, it may help to summarily list the four aspects of knowledge as a relation distinguished so far. They are:

- The object according to consciousness.
- The object for consciousness.
- The object to consciousness.
- The object itself.

Please recall that the first of these is, for the sake of expository convenience, sometimes labeled "consciousness' conception of the object."²⁴

3. *Consciousness as Reflexive; The List Doubled.* So far, knowledge as a relation has been treated as a generic relation between subject and object. But of what objects does consciousness have knowledge? In general, there are two: the world as an object of empirical knowledge, and empirical knowledge as an object of self-knowledge. Twice in the Introduction Hegel mentions that the fact that consciousness is reflexive, that it is self-aware, is important for his project:

[C]onsciousness is for itself its own *concept* ...²⁵

[C]onsciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and, on the other hand, consciousness of itself²⁶

The power of reflection is important to Hegel's project because it is important to the possibility of self-criticism that consciousness be able to reflect on itself and its activity. Indeed, consciousness takes on a particular form (and so is a particular form of consciousness) precisely by adopting, if only implicitly, a certain conception of what it, as a cognizer, is. This is one point Hegel makes in claiming that "consciousness is for itself its own concept." Consciousness guides its cognitive efforts in view of its conception of knowledge. Indeed, its conception of knowledge both constrains what its conception of the world can be and it guides the application of that conception to the world. Because the "object" of any form of consciousness is this pair of objects, its own knowledge as well as the object known, the four-fold list of aspects of knowledge developed above forms two parallel lists of four aspects, one list concerning the ontological side, the other list concerning the noetic side, of consciousness' cognition. Each of these four-fold distinctions of aspects of knowledge is generated in a manner precisely parallel to that discussed above by taking "the object" of knowledge to be first the world and then empirical knowledge as itself an object of self-knowledge. Hence there is no need to repeat that derivation again

for these two special cases. The complete list of elements of knowledge as a relation is the following:

1. Consciousness' conception of the world as it actually is:

The World According to Consciousness.

2. The world taken as instantiating consciousness' conception of the world:

The World For Consciousness.

3. Those aspects of the world closely related to but not included in consciousness' conception of the world:

The World To Consciousness.

4. The world as it actually is, with all of its properties known and unknown:

The World Itself.

A. Consciousness' conception of knowledge as it actually is:

Knowledge According To Consciousness.

B. Knowledge taken as instantiating consciousness' conception of knowledge:

Knowledge For Consciousness.

C. Those aspects of knowledge closely related to but not included in consciousness' conception of knowledge:

Knowledge To Consciousness.

D. Knowledge as it actually is, with all of its properties known and unknown:

Knowledge Itself.

I grant that this double four-fold distinction of elements of consciousness as a cognitive relation to its objects is at best only tenuously indicated in the passages considered so far and that, unfortunately, these passages are as explicit as Hegel gets in the Introduction in making these distinctions. However, I maintain that these distinctions are to be found in the passages considered, and I will argue in Chapter Eight that only by making these distinctions is it possible to construe the difficult remainder of the Introduction. This shows that these distinctions are operative in the Introduction. Lest it be thought that too much is being made of a small, incidental point of grammar, it should be noted that Hegel insists on this grammatical distinction six times in the Introduction, and he insists three times that this distinction is crucial to his procedure.²⁷

If I am right that Hegel's analysis of knowledge as a relation is as rich as the above list suggests, then I submit that Hegel has a good deal to work with in dissolving the putative circle of representations and in defending the possibility of self-criticism.²⁸ Two further tasks remain for understanding how this complex relation can ground self-criticism: understanding how self-criticism occurs according to Hegel, and understanding how an internal self-critique can lead to epistemological realism. These two tasks need to be broken down in order to be carried out.

The next section (§III) analyzes Hegel's criterial inference and shows how his criteria can ground second-order realism, that is, can ground claims about what empirical knowledge actually is. Realism at this level, as well as at the first order, requires a correspondence conception of truth. I argue in section IV that Hegel holds this conception of truth. Hegel holds that his criteria can only be employed, whether at the second or the first order, in a process of self-critical revision of conceptions. Hegel's analysis of the process of self-criticism is the topic of Chapter Eight. Determining Hegel's views on these points does not, however, answer questions about epistemological realism, about realism at the first-order level of empirical knowledge. Epistemological realism must be a substantive outcome, rather than a trivial implication, of Hegel's views about criteria and self-criticism if Hegel is to avoid begging the question. I argue that Hegel does hold that there is a "real" world, a world not constituted by our thinking or language, in Chapter Ten. In Chapter Eleven I

reconstruct the structure of Hegel's argument in the body of the *Phenomenology* that a self-critical process employing the criteria he specifies leads to epistemological realism.

III. Hegel's Criterial Inference

Roughly put, the epistemic challenge posed by the dilemma of the criterion is to show that one's conceptions correspond to their objects, even though one has access to those objects only insofar as one applies conceptions to them, and to show this without begging the question. Hegel's answer to this problem can be seen by examining his list of eight aspects of consciousness once again. That list is as follows:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>1. Consciousness' conception of the world as it actually is:
The World According to Consciousness.</p> | <p>A. Consciousness' conception of knowledge as it actually is:
Knowledge According To Consciousness.</p> |
| <p>2. The world taken as instantiating consciousness' conception of the world:
The World For Consciousness.</p> | <p>B. Knowledge taken as instantiating consciousness' conception of knowledge:
Knowledge For Consciousness.</p> |
| <p>3. Those aspects of the world closely related to but not included in consciousness' conception of the world:
The World To Consciousness.</p> | <p>C. Those aspects of knowledge closely related to but not included in consciousness' conception of knowledge:
Knowledge To Consciousness.</p> |
| <p>4. The world as it actually is, with all of its properties known and unknown:
The World Itself.</p> | <p>D. Knowledge as it actually is, with all of its properties known and unknown:
Knowledge Itself.</p> |

The issue here is a criterial one: On what basis, if any, can consciousness infer that its conceptions of its objects correspond to those objects themselves? How can consciousness determine if its conception of the world corresponds to the world itself, if consciousness has no access to the world itself except insofar as the world is for consciousness? Likewise, how can consciousness determine if its conception of knowledge corresponds to knowledge itself, if consciousness has no access to knowledge itself except insofar as knowledge is for consciousness? Hegel's answer to this double question can be seen by examining the eight elements of knowledge as a relation. Since this coincidence is something that consciousness is supposed to be able to achieve, and since it is supposed to recognize this achievement, consciousness must be in a position to recognize this coincidence on the basis of those elements of which it is explicitly aware. The elements of which consciousness is (or at least comes to be through the process discussed in Chapter Eight) explicitly aware are its conceptions of knowledge and of the world and knowledge and the world for it (elements 1, 2, A, and B of the above list). Now it may seem that if these elements are what consciousness has to work with, then its criterion of knowledge must be hopelessly subjective, in that the relevant standard would be "the object itself" and not just what consciousness makes of it.

This objection misses the main insight of Hegel's response to Sextus's challenge. Because the world for consciousness and knowledge for consciousness (elements 2 and B) result from consciousness' application of its conceptions of the world and of knowledge

(elements 1 and A) to the world itself and to knowledge itself (elements 4 and D), the world itself and knowledge itself figure centrally into the world and knowledge for consciousness (elements 2 and B). Because the world itself and knowledge itself figure centrally into the world and knowledge for consciousness, *if* the world and knowledge *for* consciousness coincide with consciousness' conceptions of the world and of knowledge, then these conceptions also coincide with their objects, the world itself and knowledge itself. Conversely, if the subject's conceptions of the world or of knowledge do not correspond to the world itself or to knowledge itself, then the theoretical and practical inferences the subject bases on these conceptions will result in expectations that diverge from the actual behavior of the world or from actual cognitive practices. The experience of defeated expectations makes manifest a divergence between the world or knowledge for the subject and the subject's conceptions of the world or of knowledge, and so between these conceptions and the world itself or knowledge itself. This is how features of knowledge or of the world which are initially incidental features "to" consciousness become explicit for it. What consciousness takes to instantiate its conception of knowledge or its conception of the world would be found *not* to instantiate those conceptions. This is why it is important to Hegel's method to consider principles in application to their putative domains, for so long as principles of knowledge or its objects are inadequate, any examples taken from those domains will be far richer in kind than is allowed by the principles under examination. By thorough and scrupulous application of epistemic and ontological principles, features of objects in their domains unaccounted for by those principles can be brought to light. Such discoveries may only require reconsidering the importance of previously recognized, though discounted, features of knowledge or the world, or they may involve recognizing previously unknown features of knowledge or of the world. This is how categorial features of knowledge or of the world that are initially objects "to" consciousness become explicit central features *for* it. For example, the form of consciousness called "sense-certainty" finds that it is utterly unable to account for its ability to designate the particulars it knows without admitting the use of conceptions, and so must rescind its principle of intuitive knowledge; the form of consciousness called "perception" finds that perception alone cannot determine that the perceived white, cubical, and sour properties all belong to the same bit of salt, and so it must grant that there is more to empirical conceptions than observation terms.

By making previously unrecognized features of the world or of knowledge manifest in this way, defeated expectations supply information that can be used to revise conceptions of the world and of knowledge. The internal coherence of a form of consciousness is only possible if its conceptions of the world and of knowledge correspond to the world itself and to knowledge itself.²⁹ This thesis grounds Hegel's confidence in internal criticism of forms of consciousness. He purports to show time and again that the conditions for the possibility of the kind of experience had by a form of consciousness, based on its adoption of a pair of conceptions of knowledge and of the world, are not given by those conceptions. Moreover, he purports to be able to make the inadequacy of each inadequate form of consciousness manifest to that form of consciousness, so that the criticism and revision of its conceptions of knowledge and of the world are entirely internal. This thesis allows Hegel to emphasize the cognitive transformations on the side of the subject in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Introduction (discussed in Chapter Eight) and still contend that "absolute knowledge" involves the (transcendental or second-order) knowledge that empirical knowledge is knowledge of the world itself.

There is, of course, an important distinction between the actual incoherence of an inadequate form of consciousness and the recognition of that incoherence. Only persistence

in elaborating and applying a pair of epistemic and ontological principles and intellectual integrity in assessing their adequacy can lead to the detection of otherwise unrecognized incoherence and error. Hegel's criterion is thus a *sine qua non* for the truth of a pair of principles, and he adopts fallibilism. However, due to the second-order level of his inquiry, and due to the systematic interrelation of the various categorial features of the objects under investigation (that is, of the philosophically salient features of empirical knowledge and of empirical objects in general³⁰), Hegel can reasonably contend that meeting the negative condition of the absence of detected incoherence in the long run is a very powerful criterion for the positive condition sought, namely, for the correspondence of a pair of conceptions of knowledge and its objects with the actual structure of human knowledge and with the actual structure of the objects of human knowledge.

If Hegel's criterial inference seems implausible, if it seems that the lack of manifest incompatibility between the object for consciousness and the object according to consciousness is too weak a basis upon which to infer that the object according to consciousness corresponds to the object itself, it should be noted just how complex Hegel's criterion is. First, recall that this criterion is employed by a consciousness that is inherently related to the object itself, both to the world itself and to knowledge itself. (Note also that in order for self-criticism to be possible, this thesis only needs to be true, it need not be *known* to be true.) Therefore, even when there is a discrepancy between the object according to consciousness and the object for consciousness (and hence a discrepancy between these and the object itself), the object's being *for* consciousness is nonetheless *the object's* being for consciousness, even if that object is misconstrued, and the object itself is an object *to* consciousness throughout.

Second, there isn't just one correspondence of object and conception to be sought. Consciousness must not only reconcile its conception of the world with the world for it, and its conception of knowledge with knowledge for it (with its manifest cognitive activity), this pair of reconciliations must be mutually compatible. It does not suffice to eliminate discrepancies between one's account of knowledge and one's cognitive activity only to wind up unable to justify claims about the kinds of objects one takes oneself to know. The need to have commensurate accounts of knowledge and of objects of knowledge is the rock upon which most forms of consciousness founder, and the effort to raise a "certainty" to "truth," as Hegel puts it, encounters much of its despair over this demand.

Third, as an aspect of overcoming merely natural ideas on these topics, consciousness must not only have conceptions that are adequate to its manifest practices and objects, it must comprehend that it has adequate conceptions and it must comprehend what these conceptions are. Because one of these conceptions concerns what consciousness itself as a knower is, overcoming merely natural self-conceptions is tantamount to achieving an explicit level of self-consciousness that allows consciousness to account for itself theoretically and practically. Given Hegel's concern to avoid question-begging and his notion of determinate negation, the adequacy of a self-conception and of a conception of the world can only be known through the comprehension of the proficiencies and deficiencies of less adequate conceptions.³¹

Finally, Hegel holds to Kant's dictum that in order to be adequate, a theory of knowledge and its objects must be knowable (or formulable) in accordance with its own principles. These last two points are Hegel's enriched version of Alston's "self-support" condition.

Taken together, these points constitute a set of five criteria:

- 1) No detectable discrepancy between the world for consciousness and the world according to consciousness (between elements 1 and 2).

- 2) No detectable discrepancy between knowledge for consciousness and knowledge according to consciousness (between elements A and B).
- 3) No detectable discrepancy between (1) and (2) (between the pairs of elements 1 & 2 and A & B).
- 4) A matched pair of accounts of the genesis and implementation of the conceptions of knowledge and of the world that indicates how they were generated through the critical rejection of less adequate alternatives.
- 5) An account of how the conceptions of knowledge and of the world and their implementation can be learned, comprehended, and employed on the basis of those same conceptions and implementations.

This set of criteria, to be simultaneously satisfied, makes a formidable set of criteria indeed. They will not of themselves handle the first-order problems of theory selection faced by philosophy of science because they operate at a level of generality at which different conceptions of knowledge require different conceptions of the objects of knowledge, and vice-versa. However, at the transcendental level of inquiry pursued by Hegel, where the issue is one of the truth of a theory of knowledge, these criteria may be plenty. Indeed, it is not at all clear that any theory of knowledge has ever satisfied them, including Hegel's.

IV. The Aim of Knowledge

So far I have described Hegel's criterial inference as if he held a correspondence conception of truth. It is important to see that he in fact does hold this conception of truth, as he first indicates while describing the aim and terminus of self-criticism.

A. THE GOAL OF THE SELF-CRITICAL PROCESS

In stating the goal towards which the process of self-criticism tends, Hegel says

To knowledge ... the *goal* is fixed just as necessarily as the sequence of the progression. It is that point where knowledge no longer needs to go out beyond itself, where it finds itself, and where concept corresponds to object and object to concept.³²

This passage suggests that self-criticism ceases when three factors are concurrently satisfied:

- 1) Knowledge no longer "needs to go out beyond itself."
- 2) Knowledge "finds" itself.
- 3) Correspondence of object and concept.

If the account given in §§II and III of Hegel's criteria and their employment in the critical revision of inadequate conceptions is correct, then the following sense can be made of Hegel's claim that these three factors ultimately coincide. The "need" for knowledge to "go out beyond itself" is a matter of consciousness detecting a discrepancy between its conception of the object and the object for it and revising its conceptions in light of this

discrepancy. Manifest discrepancies are the motor of the dialectic, and hence the source of a "need."³³ As has been argued, there are two regards in which discrepancies might be encountered, and these are specified by the second and third points Hegel lists. First, there may be discrepancies between consciousness' conception of knowledge and its manifest cognitive, claim-making activity. The elimination of such discrepancies is what it is for "knowledge to find itself," for eliminating such discrepancies requires developing a true self-conception, a true conception of oneself *qua* knower. The second kind of discrepancy concerns the world itself and consciousness' knowledge of it. Once again, the sense of "the object" needs to be considered; does it mean "the object itself" (*simpliciter*) or does it mean "the object according to consciousness," that is, consciousness' conception of the object? It seems here that Hegel's phrase is supposed to mean both at once. This is no surprise because Hegel is describing the end-state of knowledge, in which these two elements should coincide. Such coincidence is the "correspondence of subject and object" that Hegel mentions as the third element of the goal of self-criticism. This correspondence implies a correspondence conception of truth.

B. HEGEL'S AVOWAL OF THE CORRESPONDENCE CONCEPTION OF TRUTH

Hegel is widely reputed to have rejected the correspondence conception of truth. I now argue that despite his reputation, and despite passages in which he seems to reject the correspondence conception of truth, Hegel does hold a correspondence conception of truth for any issues concerning our knowledge of ourselves and of the world.

One of the curiosities in Hegel's statement of the goal of consciousness' self-critical revision of its knowledge is his even-handedness in describing the relevant correspondence: "[C]oncept corresponds to object and object corresponds to concept."³⁴ On the face of it, there would seem to be no difference between these two expressions of the point, and so no need for both of them. Yet Hegel insists on both expressions later in a more detailed passage:

If we call *knowledge* the *concept*, and call the essence or the *true* the extant or the *object*, then the examination consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object.³⁵

But if we call the *essence* or the in itself of the *object* the *concept*, and if, on the other hand, we understand by the *object* the object as *object*, namely, as it is *for an other*, then the examination consists in our seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept.³⁶

The only comment Hegel makes on these two expressions of the relevant correspondence is that "one sees of course that these two tests are the same"³⁷ Many commentators have found this coincidence very puzzling, but a bit of care can resolve it. Indeed a close look shows that the curious thing about these two passages is that they seem to retract the even-handedness of Hegel's earlier statement, for in each of these later expressions, the subject pole is taken to correspond with the object pole. The difference between these two expressions lies only in the labels given to each pole. In the first passage the subject pole ("knowledge") is called "the concept," while in the second passage knowledge ("the object as *object*, namely, as it is *for another*") is called "the object." Conversely, in the first passage the truth pole, the world ("the extant" [*das Seyende*]) is called "the object," while in the second passage the world ("the essence or the in itself of the object") is called "the concept." In either formulation, the knowledge pole needs to be adequated to the world pole. This much, at least, is in line with common realism. What is not in line with

common realism is Hegel's indifference as to whether the world is described as an object or a concept.³⁸ This indifference touches on Hegel's idealism, the topic of Chapter Ten.

Hegel's idealism temporarily aside, one could well wonder what is Hegel's point in formulating the correspondence in two nominally different but substantially identical ways. Hegel's point, I think, is a polemical one, insofar as it is an oblique criticism of Kant's Copernican revolution. Kant's revolutionary hypothesis was to suppose that "objects must conform to our knowledge."³⁹ Hegel's rather nasty comment seems to be that, for all of Kant's celebration of his new approach, his "revolution" in philosophy, Kant hasn't changed the grounds of the debate after all. Even if we follow Kant's Copernican revolution we are still left with the question of whether objects as they appear to us correspond to those objects "in" themselves, and we have already seen that Hegel regards any philosophy that cannot answer this question affirmatively as a failure.⁴⁰ So far as the Introduction is concerned, Hegel affirms a correspondence theory of truth, and he continues to do so throughout the *Phenomenology*.⁴¹ In the *Science of Logic* Hegel castigates Kant for dismissing the correspondence conception of truth as a trivial nominal definition. Hegel exclaims to the contrary that this conception of truth is "of supreme importance."⁴²

What, then, is to be made of Hegel's notorious rejection of the correspondence theory of truth? Part of Hegel's notoriety in this regard is simply mistaken. Hegel certainly does reject correspondence between conception and the object as a *criterion* of truth, but he does not reject it as the nature of truth (insofar as epistemological issues are considered). As was noted above, much English-language philosophy of the earlier twentieth century failed to keep the distinction between a nature of truth and a criterion of truth clearly in mind, and many rejected correspondence as an account of the nature of truth due to its untenability as a criterion of truth.⁴³ The British Hegelians and their sympathizers were among this group, and this historical accident has greatly affected English-language Hegel exposition.

C. "CORRESPONDENCE" AND VALUE JUDGMENTS

Nevertheless, Hegel's putative rejection of correspondence as the nature of truth doesn't rest solely on such a simple error. There are many passages in which Hegel does dismiss the notion of truth as the correspondence of conception and object in favor of a notion of truth as the correspondence of a thing with its own "concept" or nature. (Recall the idiom, "a true friend," as someone whose friendship is genuine and abiding.⁴⁴) It is important to notice about this second notion of "truth" first, that it concerns value judgments, and second, that its application presupposes that "truth" in the ordinary sense of correspondence of conception and object is unproblematic. I discuss these points in turn.

It is important to stress that Hegel's second sense of "truth" concerns value judgments in order to reinforce the point that these are two distinct senses of "truth" with two distinct roles to play in Hegel's philosophy. One is not a replacement for the other. As a matter of value, the sense of truth as the correspondence of a thing with itself concerns how good an instance of its kind the thing in question is.⁴⁵ Notice, though, that in order to answer such a question, one would have to know the object in question, the kind to which it belongs, and how well the object meets the standards of its relevant kind. In order to know these, one would have to have conceptions of the object, of its kind, and of the extent to which the object met the relevant standards, and these conceptions would have to correspond with each of these factors. This is to say, engaging in the determinations of value that pervade Hegel's philosophy *presupposes* that truth in the sense of correspondence of conceptions and their objects is available and unproblematic; it does not supplant this more ordinary conception of truth.⁴⁶ If Hegel thinks that determinations of value are the

preeminent philosophical concern, and if he accordingly disparages concern with mere "correctness," it is only because he thinks that he has shown that having "correct" conceptions which correspond with their objects is unproblematic. Indeed, this is the task of the *Phenomenology*: to demonstrate that we're capable of truth in the sense of the correspondence of conceptions and their objects. Reaching this realization is reaching the final standpoint of "absolute knowledge."⁴⁷ This point will be returned to when the course of Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology* is considered in Chapter Eleven.

V. Criteria of Knowledge and Metaphysical Distinctions Between Appearance and Reality

Before taking up Hegel's discussion of the self-critical activity of consciousness, a last methodological question needs to be posed. However powerful Hegel's criterial inference may be, doesn't it handle only epistemological distinctions between appearance and reality, leaving any metaphysical distinctions between appearance and reality (Plato's, if not Locke's or Kant's) untouched? Simply stating a set of criteria won't make a distinction between natural phenomena and their (at best) intelligible basis collapse, would it? Arguments for metaphysical distinctions between appearance and reality depart from different points, and Hegel's replies depend upon the particular style of argument in question. Insofar as such a distinction rests on straightforwardly epistemological grounds, Hegel's criteria, together with some further implications of Hegel's analysis of the structure of consciousness, purport to show that these arguments do not and cannot work. This point is discussed further in Chapter Eleven. Insofar as such a distinction rests on purely metaphysical or on explanatory considerations, the arguments for it need independent treatment. Hegel takes up these sorts of considerations in his chapter "Force and Understanding" and in some Remarks on Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* in the *Science of Logic*. These texts cannot be discussed at length here, though some of the bearing of Hegel's discussion in "Force and Understanding" on these issues is discussed in Chapters Ten and Eleven below. Hegel is confident that he can handle metaphysical objections to epistemological realism, though his exposition recognizes that they require independent treatment.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SELF-CRITICAL ACTIVITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

I. Introduction

Hegel sketches the self-critical activity of consciousness' cognitive efforts in four paragraphs. The first of these (§13) discusses consciousness' self-critical revision of its conceptions in general; the latter three (§§14-16) focus on particular aspects of this process. (In Miller, these are designated §§86—88.) Paragraph 13 seems at first to be clear enough, but a closer look reveals that it is as obscure as the other three tortuous paragraphs. The task of this chapter is to disentangle and reconstruct Hegel's claims in these paragraphs in light of the problems and doctrines discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. First, further evidence will be given for the eight-fold distinction of elements of consciousness as a cognitive relation to the world discussed in the previous chapter. Second, it will be shown how the criterial inference based on the distinction of these eight elements grounds a form of consciousness' critical revision of its conceptions of knowledge and of the world.

Before proceeding, two restrictions of Hegel's discussion should be noted. First, Hegel discusses the subjective aspects of the transition from one form of consciousness to the next because the issues he addresses in these paragraphs are criterial and thus concern elements of the self-critical process of which a form of consciousness can be cognizant. Hegel's emphasis on these subjective factors should not lead one to forget the fuller account of the structure of forms of consciousness that Hegel gives earlier. After all, these paragraphs are introduced as elaborations of particular points in that earlier discussion.

Second, Hegel phrases his concern in terms of "knowledge" and its "object" or "in itself." It is important to recall that the "object" of a form of consciousness is dual, both the world as an object of empirical knowledge and empirical knowledge as an object of self-knowledge.¹ Thus the details concerning the critical revision of "knowledge" about to be discussed hold both concerning the revision of empirical knowledge in relation to the world itself and the revision of self-knowledge in relation to empirical knowledge itself. I will not, however, reconstruct Hegel's discussion in both of these veins. Hegel's terms are most easily read in terms of revising empirical knowledge of the world itself, and the two types of revision are intertwined enough that analyzing this aspect of it will allow comment on the revision of self-knowledge as well.

II. Hegel's First Discussion of Consciousness' Self-Critical Activity

A. SELF-CRITICISM AND THE CIRCLE OF APPEARANCES

In responding to the objection that consciousness seems to have access only to appearances and not to the thing itself and so cannot critically examine its own cognition,² Hegel insists that

Something is *to [consciousness] the in itself*, but the knowledge or the being of the object *for consciousness is to it* still another moment. The examination rests upon this differentiation, which is available.³

In the preceding chapter I claimed that the being of the world for consciousness results from consciousness construing the world itself in terms of its conception of the world.⁴ If this is so, then it would seem that consciousness would conflate the object for consciousness and the object to consciousness; after all, they are supposed to be the same. Yet here Hegel claims that these two moments are distinct moments *to* consciousness. How can this be, and how would it help? More specifically, if I'm right that Hegel signals different levels of explicitness by using dative and accusative cases, how could this distinction matter if it remains less than explicit? Not surprisingly, Hegel claims that this distinction is important precisely because it becomes explicit:

[Consciousness] is conscious of what to it is the true, and conscious of its knowledge of this truth. Since both are *for consciousness*, consciousness itself is their comparison; whether its knowledge of the object corresponds with the object or not is a matter *for consciousness* itself.⁵

Granting for now that there is such a distinction (this point will be returned to shortly [§IIC]), how could this distinction become explicit and hence useful? The enthymeme here is that because consciousness "immediately takes itself to be real knowledge,"⁶ it employs its conception of the world in accordance with its conception of knowledge in efforts to comprehend the world. (The motivation for these efforts is discussed below.) In §IIC it will be shown that and how, in the course of these efforts, discrepancies between the world for consciousness and the world to consciousness, and similarly between knowledge for consciousness and knowledge to consciousness, become manifest *for* consciousness, thereby explicitly generating this distinction for consciousness. Before discussing the details of this process, it is important to recognize some difficulties with some of Hegel's remarks about how this distinction is employed once it is manifest.

B. SOME INTERPRETIVE DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE "OBJECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS" AND THE "OBJECT FOR CONSCIOUSNESS"

Granting the conceptual distinction between the object (whether it be world or knowledge) to consciousness and the object for consciousness is generated, how is it employed? Hegel states that

[S]ince both are *for consciousness*, consciousness itself is their comparison; whether its knowledge of the object corresponds with the object or not is a matter *for consciousness* itself.⁸

Once this distinction enters consciousness, its employment looks simple enough:

If, in this comparison, the two moments do not correspond, then it seems that consciousness must alter its knowledge in order to bring it into accord with the object.⁹

This air of familiarity behooves a closer look. What does Hegel mean here by "the object," and what does he mean by "knowledge"? On the face of it, "the object" means the world itself and "knowledge" means the world as known or as it appears to conscious-

ness, that is, the world for consciousness. A manifest discrepancy between these two moments, therefore, requires revising one's "knowledge" in order to bring it into accord with "the object," that is, with the world itself. On this interpretation of the passage, however, Hegel would simply be *denying* the objection to which he says he responds.¹⁰ If this interpretation were correct, then he has not responded to the objection at all. He has only made a counterassertion, and a naive one at that! Moreover, if this were Hegel's contention, the dilemma of the criterion would be easy to solve by appeal to "knowledge by acquaintance" and there would be no need for the complex discussion that follows. Therefore another reading of the passage is called for.

To reinterpret the above passage requires, I suggest, recalling the ambiguity of the senses of "in itself" discussed in Chapter Seven (§IID1; pp. 104-105). The two senses of "in itself" are "the object itself" and "the object according to consciousness." (Recall that the "object" could be either the world or knowledge, so that two distinctions among four elements are generated in this way.) I suggest that "the object" in the above passage is consciousness' conception of the world, while "knowledge" is "the being of the world for consciousness" generated by consciousness applying its conception of the world to the world itself. Applying a conception to the world is, of course, a central aspect of consciousness relating itself cognitively to the world. I grant that interpreting Hegel's statement with these distinctions is delicate and even tenuous; that this approach is not tendentious is shown, I submit, by the interesting sense it makes of Hegel's discussion.

If this approach to interpreting the above passage is adopted, then Hegel's point is that if efforts to comprehend the world by applying a certain conception of the world to the world don't pan out, consciousness will have to change its conception of knowledge and (partly thereby) its cognitive relation to the world in order to reapply its conception of the world to the world itself and so bring its conception of the world into line with the world for consciousness. This is what it would be for consciousness "to alter its knowledge in order to bring it into accord with the object."¹¹ Further support for interpreting the "object" here as consciousness' conception of the world comes from the fact that in this same paragraph Hegel directly associates "the object" with consciousness' "standard" for assessing its knowledge, and it was argued above that this standard is consciousness' conception of the world.¹² (What sort of cognitive relation consciousness has with the world, what sort of conception of that relation it has, and what sorts of alterations in each are possible would depend on many specifics, some of which will be touched on below.) Now this step is only the first step of a complex process.¹³ Before delving into these further complexities, it is important to consider once again an objection to the kind of "comparison" that would result on my interpretation of the above passage.

It may seem that on my interpretation of the above passage the relevant "comparison" is hopelessly subjective because the comparison should be between the world itself and consciousness' conception of and knowledge of the world (however this might come about), while I have interpreted Hegel as claiming that consciousness compares its conception of the world and its knowledge of the world (the world for consciousness). It is important to respond to this objection because the ambiguity of the term "in itself" runs through the end of the Introduction, and I will make similar arguments below concerning the interpretation of many passages. The objection misses the importance of Hegel's insistence that knowledge is a relation between consciousness and world: What the world is *for* consciousness is not only a function of consciousness' conception of the world and its application of that conception to the world, but also it is a function of the structure of the world to which it applies its conceptions. Because of this, the actual structure of the world is involved in consciousness' "comparing" its conception of the world and the world for it.

The details of this involvement occupy the remainder of this section and the whole of section III.

C. THE "ALTERATION" OF "THE" OBJECT

Hegel's next statement, the sentence following the one discussed in the preceding subsection, is:

In the alteration of the knowledge, however, the object itself in fact becomes altered to consciousness as well. For the available knowledge was essentially a knowledge of the object; with change in the knowledge, the object also changes, since it belonged essentially to this knowledge.¹⁴

Here, too, it must be asked, what sense of "object" is being used? In this case, interpreting "object" as "the world itself" and as "the world according to consciousness" both make important sense. As has been mentioned, Hegel associates the relevant sense of "object" with consciousness' standard for evaluating its knowledge, namely its conception of the world. In this regard, the point Hegel makes in this passage is that, because consciousness' conception of the world is a function of its conception of knowledge (it's pointless to have a conception of objects of empirical knowledge that are unknowable), if consciousness alters its conception of knowledge, it would have reason to alter its conception of its objects of knowledge. Moreover, a reconception of knowledge may well afford insight into the nature of knowledge that would indicate specific ways in which to revise a conception of the objects of knowledge, namely, to revise it in accord with what was only now realized to be knowable.

So far I have emphasized the aspect of knowledge that concerns conceptions, both of the objects of knowledge and of the knowledge of those objects. However, Hegel speaks of "knowledge" in this passage without explicitly distinguishing among its aspects. There is, after all, also the "real" aspect of knowledge as an actual cognitive relation to actual objects. In this regard, Hegel makes an important point in the above passage concerning a change of the world to consciousness. It was suggested above (and will be elaborated below) that "the world *to* consciousness" concerns what were labeled "incidental" properties or aspects of a known object, that is, properties or aspects of a known object that are closely related to those properties or aspects that are explicitly known to be properties or aspects of the known object. (These latter were labeled "central" properties or aspects.¹⁵) Now, if consciousness alters its knowledge *qua* cognitive relation to the world, then two related alterations concerning the world to consciousness occur. First, by altering its cognitive relation to the world, consciousness may become explicitly aware of the centrality of what had been incidental properties or aspects of the known object. These properties or aspects of the object would now be properties or aspects *for* consciousness. Second, insofar as the first change occurs, this would allow different, further properties or aspects of the known object to be (in the specified sense) incidental. "The object to consciousness" would now concern a different, further group of properties or aspects of the known object. This double-sided alteration will be seen to be of utmost importance.

The changes involved in the conception of the object, in the object for consciousness, and in the object to consciousness, can be both small or large. They may concern details or they may be categorical. The dialectic of self-criticism functions by consciousness being as tenacious and clever as possible in retaining and sophisticating its conception of knowledge and its objects, for only by exhausting the points of possible detail can the resources for

devising a more adequate "certainty," a more adequate pair of epistemic and ontological principles, be amassed and the grounds for adopting it be recognized.

D. REVISION OF THE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE

What transpires as consciousness attempts to comprehend the world in certain terms and ways? If those ways are inadequate for actual knowledge of the world, then persistence will show up some of that inadequacy and

[I]t comes to pass to consciousness that what previously was to it the *in itself* is not in itself, or, what was *in itself* was so only *for consciousness*.¹⁶

This point is not too surprising. Consciousness' conception of the world itself is shown to be only consciousness' own notion of the world if its knowledge, if its cognitive relation to the world cannot be brought into accord with it. An important point is lurking here, however, as Hegel indicates in his next statement:

Therefore, insofar as consciousness finds in its object its knowledge not corresponding with its object, the object itself also gives way. In other words, the standard of the examination is changed if that whose standard it was supposed to be fails to endure the examination, and the examination is not only an examination of knowledge, but also of the standard used in the examination.¹⁷

Hegel's philosophical counter-revolution is founded upon giving epistemological priority to the actual relation consciousness has with the world, rather than giving priority to the conceptions consciousness may have of that relation and its relata. Where as Descartes, Kant, and Carnap attempted to analyze the structure of our cognitive (or linguistic) capacities and *upon that basis* to determine and specify the character of the range of objects we could know, as he indicates here Hegel will examine our actual cognitive efforts and show that our explicit conceptions develop in order to account for what we in fact experience. This is possible because consciousness is from the start related to the world in ways not constituted solely by its conceptions of this relation and its relata. Without this thesis Hegel's project is impossible, but so would be self-criticism and a response to Sextus Empiricus, and with it Hegel will attempt to show that and how consciousness comes to have true knowledge of things as they actually are. Some further philosophical implications of Hegel's thesis are considered in Chapters Nine and Ten. What needs to be considered now is Hegel's treatment of the process of self-criticism in the three penultimate paragraphs of the Introduction.

III. Hegel's Second Discussion of Consciousness' Self-Critical Activity

The three penultimate paragraphs of the Introduction (§§14-16) touch on a number of very important issues, including the structure of the transitions from one form of consciousness to the next, the necessity of these transitions, the nature of the "experience" had by "observed consciousness," and the "scientific" character of Hegel's phenomenological method. This is a fantastic range of topics to consider in only three brief paragraphs and these paragraphs are accordingly compressed and obscure. Nevertheless, I attempt to construe them as carefully as possible, reserving all remaining issues not bearing directly on the process of self-criticism for the following chapter. In order to facilitate my analysis

an appendix has been provided containing parallel German text and English translation divided into separate, numbered sentences. (See Appendix II, pp. 197—200.) Reference to these sentences is made by "sentence numbers" (e.g., S7).

A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSITION FROM ONE FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE NEXT

Hegel begins his discussion of the structure of the transition from one form of consciousness to the next by reiterating a now familiar point:

Consciousness knows *something*, this object is the essence or the *in itself*. But this object is also for consciousness the *in itself*; hence enters the ambiguity of this truth. (S3)¹⁹

One might suppose from Hegel's preceding discussion that this distinction had already been disambiguated. Why does Hegel now point to its ambiguity?¹⁹ It seems that he might be warning the reader about an ambiguity he was about to introduce, for he goes on to say:

We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first *in itself*, the second is the *being for consciousness of this in itself*. (S4)²⁰

When is this "now" that Hegel mentions? Apparently it is a "now" occurring after a round of the "dialectical movement" (S1) issuing through the alteration of consciousness' knowledge and object consequent upon comparing the object itself and the object for consciousness, as discussed in §IC. In this passage (S4) Hegel apparently slides from the synchronic distinction between the aspects of consciousness that depends simply on the analysis of knowledge as a relation (recounted in Chapter Seven §IID3 [p. 107]) to a diachronic distinction among earlier and later conceptions and objects of consciousness that depends upon knowing as an activity. Unfortunately, he makes this shift without introducing the terminological refinements that would make his point clear.

The needed terminological refinements can be developed by pursuing the ambiguities of Hegel's expressions systematically through the text of these crucial paragraphs. In sentence 4 Hegel distinguishes two moments of knowing as an activity, "the first in itself" and "the being for consciousness of this in itself." The sense of this second moment obviously depends upon that of the first, but what is this "first in itself"? Following the reference of this phrase back to the preceding sentence (S3) indicates only that it is "the in itself." Above I argued that this phrase is ambiguous between two quite distinct senses of "in itself": "the object itself" (*simpliciter*) and "the object according to consciousness."²¹ Hegel apparently overlooks this distinction here. This may not be surprising, for these two senses of "in itself" are supposed to coincide, and several uses of "in itself" in these paragraphs plainly require this coincidence. However, the structure of the transitions from one form of consciousness to the next concerns how these senses of "in itself" come to be distinct moments within consciousness' experience and how this distinction is overcome. Therefore it is important to determine which of these two senses of "in itself" or, in some cases, of "the object," is operative in those uses of these phrases that are univocal.

I will argue that although reading the univocal uses of "the in itself" or "the object" as "the object itself" (*simpliciter*) may initially seem promising, since it appears to allow smooth reading of these difficult paragraphs and it seems to capture roughly what Hegel says here, reading them in this way cannot do justice either to Hegel's overall project or to his local comments within and about these passages.²² After presenting and criticizing this

interpretation of these passages, I present an alternative interpretation and argue that although interpreting Hegel's univocal uses of "the in itself" as "the object according to consciousness" makes for much more intricate reading, it also makes sense of Hegel's project both in large and in detail, as well as being philosophically illuminating. I hope to show that the care required for reading these passages is repaid by the interest of the resulting views.²³

The passages in which Hegel's use of the phrases "the in itself" or "the object" is univocal, if obscure, are the following:

We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first *in itself*, the second is the *being for consciousness of this in itself*. (S4)

The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. (S5)

But, as already indicated, the first object changes to consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the in itself and becomes to consciousness an object which is only *for it* the *in itself*. Thus the first object is now the *being for consciousness of this in itself*, it is the true, which is to say that this is the *essence* or consciousness' object. (S6)

This new object contains the nothingness of the first; it is the experience made by and about that first object. (S7)

Here, this circumstance presents itself as follows: When that which at first appeared as the object sinks to the level of being to consciousness a knowledge of the object, and when the *in itself* becomes a *being for consciousness of the in itself*, then this is the new object. And with this new object a new form of consciousness enters, a form to which the essence is something different from that which was the essence to the preceding form. (S14)

To simplify the discussion it may be granted that Hegel's principal concern in these passages is with consciousness' knowledge of the world rather than its knowledge about empirical knowledge. The relevant substitution to make on this interpretation, then, is to substitute "the world itself" (*simpliciter*) for "the first in itself" or "the object" in these passages. Performing this substitution results in the following rendition of the passages:

We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is *the world itself*, the second is the *being for consciousness of this world itself*. (S4')

The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the world itself. (S5')

But, as already indicated, the world itself changes to consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the world itself and becomes to consciousness an object which is only *for it* the *in itself*. Thus the first object is now the *being for consciousness of this world itself*, it is the true, which is to say that this is the *essence* or consciousness' object. (S6')

This new object contains the nothingness of the world itself; it is the experience made by and about the world itself. (S7')

Here, this circumstance manifests itself as follows: When that which at first appeared as the world itself sinks to the level of being to consciousness a knowledge of the world itself, and when the

world itself becomes a being for consciousness of the world itself, then this is the new object. And with this new object a new form of consciousness enters, a form to which the essence is something different from that which was the essence to the preceding form. (S14')

The general sense of Hegel's point in these lines according to this interpretation is that the world, initially an unknown "other," becomes known by consciousness, and thus becomes a world *for* consciousness, a process that negates the world *qua* other. Some such process, of course, is very much what Hegel thinks occurs in knowing the world. However, if one examines the details of this interpretation, it is found to be unsatisfactory.

To begin with sentence 4, if the "now" mentioned does refer to the activity of comparison discussed in paragraph 13 and elaborated upon in this paragraph (§14), then consciousness has, according to this interpretation, equal cognitive access both to the world as it is *for* consciousness and also to the world itself. This claim, however, is once again simply the denial of the objection that Hegel himself raises and to which he responds.²⁴ Against this interpretation, it must be insisted that Hegel is not at all suggesting that consciousness can circumvent the being of the world *for* it and have some direct, non-conceptual cognition of the world itself. Instead he is trying to show how "the being of the world for consciousness" can be examined and exploited in such a way that we can come to know what the world itself is, without our ever having to compare our conceptual schemes with "unconceptualized reality."

Indeed, this interpretation of Hegel's text disconnects these passages from the preceding paragraph of the Introduction (§13) in which Hegel sketched the process by which the standard of knowledge can be critically revised. Yet Hegel explicitly introduces these three paragraphs as explications of particular aspects (but only particular aspects) of this process (sentences 2, 8f.). This interpretation makes neither use nor mention of this central issue.

Third, on this interpretation of these passages, the "change" (S6) of the object involved here is that the object becomes an object for consciousness in this process. However, the world already was an object for consciousness, and even one construed by consciousness (S4). What sort of alteration transpires here, on this interpretation? To say that the world becomes more what it really is in becoming known is a view Hegel holds,²⁵ but this doctrine is reserved for the eschatological aspects of his philosophy of absolute spirit. This doctrine presupposes that the world itself can be known, but whether this is possible is precisely the issue of the *Phenomenology*. Therefore an answer to this issue cannot, or at least should not, have been presupposed here in the Introduction to Hegel's investigation of this issue. Furthermore, this interpretation runs directly counter to sentence 13, where the previous form of consciousness is called an "untrue mode of knowledge," and sentence 14, where the previous conception of the world is said to "sink" to the level of being recognized to be a mere "knowledge" of the world (recall that Hegel countenances speaking of false knowledge).

The sense of the new object of consciousness containing the "nothingness" of the world (S7) according to this interpretation is that the world is negated *qua* other than or alien to knowledge. This claim is one Hegel argues for in the *Phenomenology*, but not here. Hegel connects the operative sense of "nothingness" in this sentence with the distinction between abstract and determinate negation (S13); but the interpretation criticized here has no role for this distinction nor for the skeptical issues that motivate it.

The interpretation criticized here may seem to be supported by the italicized clause of sentence 14, "when the world becomes a being for consciousness of the world." However, this again runs afoul of the same problems pointed out concerning sentence 6, especially insofar as it is directly contradicted by the first clause of sentence 14, which mentions the

"sinking" of the world to the level of being to consciousness a knowledge of the world. Worse yet, this interpretation gives no grounds at all for the emergence of a new form of consciousness holding a new conception of the essence of the world. Yet this is precisely the point with which sentence 14 ends.

To state summarily the two principal flaws of this interpretation of the sense of "the first in itself," this interpretation converts the "way of despair"²⁶ into a cheery stroll, and it ignores the transcendental aspect of Hegel's project that focuses on the postulation and critical revision of the criterion of knowledge. For these reasons, the apparent simplicity of this interpretation of these passages must be relinquished.

I propose interpreting the univocal uses of "the first in itself" and "the object" in these passages as meaning "the in itself according to consciousness," or more specifically, since knowledge of the world is at issue, "the world according to consciousness." On this interpretation, the first sentence in question reads as follows:

We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is *the world according to consciousness*, the second is the *being for consciousness of the world according to consciousness*. (S4")

What I take Hegel to be saying here is that in the course of attempting to comprehend the world by applying its conception of the world to the world itself, consciousness moves from an ill-understood, merely natural supposition concerning the structure of the world, through a critical "de-naturing" process involved in the "comparison" and "alteration" discussed in paragraph 13, to an explicit comprehension that its initial conception of the world was only its own conception and a comprehension of at least some of the content of this conception. What this process of explicating its conceptions involves is the topic of Hegel's subsequent statements.

In the next sentence Hegel says:

The latter [the being for consciousness of the world according to consciousness] seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the world according to consciousness. (S5")

The development of this second moment, the explicit comprehension of consciousness' initial conception of the world, may seem to be only the development of some supposition and nothing more. That this only seems to be the case is another reminder of Hegel's early remark that "the presentation of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not merely a *negative* movement."²⁷ Something positive is to be gained from coming to comprehend initial conceptions, but what?

Hegel's next statement emphasizes once again the element of explication involved in this process:

But, as already indicated, the world according to consciousness changes to consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the world according to consciousness and becomes to consciousness an object which is only *for it* [for consciousness] *the world according to consciousness*. Thus the world according to consciousness is now the *being for consciousness of the world according to consciousness*, it is the true, which is to say that this is the *essence* or consciousness' *object*. (S6")

This is to say that during this critical process, the two senses of "the" in itself become distinguished within consciousness' experience, that consciousness comes explicitly to comprehend what it has taken the essence of the world to be, and it comprehends that this

is not the essence of the world after all. This realization is consciousness' "object." Hegel calls this object "the true" and "the essence." This supports my contention that this process of explication concerns the discovery of the error and inadequacy of consciousness' initial conceptions, because he explicitly calls an initial form of consciousness an "untrue mode of knowledge" (S13), and he returns to clarify the point of the above sentence (S6) later (S14). To anticipate that clarification a bit, the discovery of the inadequacy of an initial conception of the world amounts to something new, true, and essential in two distinct ways. First, it's true that the initial conception is inadequate. Second, Hegel contends that the recognition of those inadequacies is only possible insofar as consciousness implicitly adopts a more sophisticated and more adequate conception in its stead. By the time the errors are explicitly recognized, consciousness has implicitly moved beyond them, its new implicit conception accounts for both the proficiencies and deficiencies of its previous conception, and this whole complex (of explicitly criticized initial conception plus implicitly adopted superior conception) is consciousness' "object." It is what consciousness takes the essence of the world to be, as it comes to revise its prior conceptions. These remarks anticipate points Hegel goes on to make. I now return to his own presentation of these points, picking up with his next statement concerning the importance of consciousness' coming to distinguish between the world itself and the content of its conception of the world.

The importance of coming to distinguish between the world itself and the world according to consciousness begins to be brought out in the next sentence:

This new object contains the nothingness of the world according to consciousness; it is the experience made by and about the world according to consciousness. (S7")

To take these two points in reverse order, the new object, the being for consciousness of the world according to consciousness, *is* the experience constituted by construing the world in terms of consciousness' initial conception of the world. That this new object can *be* an experience requires some reconsideration of what "experience" is. This topic is considered in Chapter Nine §II (pp. 129-131). The emergence of this "new object" is a function of construing the world itself in this certain way, and this construal is possible because consciousness is inherently related to the world. This point is emphasized in earlier passages, relied upon in paragraph 13, and not to be forgotten at this stage, even if Hegel here emphasizes the subjective side of this critical process. (Recall that Hegel's criterial concern leads him to emphasize this side of the process, for criteria need to be applicable, and so must concern aspects of which consciousness is explicitly aware.) The "nothingness" that the new object contains is the error involved in construing the world with inadequate conceptions. The nature and significance of this error will be discussed momentarily in connection with Hegel's distinction between "abstract" and "determinate" negations.

Sentence 14 concerns the manner in which the new object contains the "nothingness" of the first through determinate negation (*cf.* S13).

Here, this circumstance manifests itself as follows: When that which at first appeared as the world itself sinks to the level of being to consciousness a knowledge of the world itself, and when *the world according to consciousness becomes a being for consciousness of the world according to consciousness*, then this is the new object. And with this new object a new form of consciousness

enters, a form to which the essence is something different from that which was the essence to the preceding form. (S14")

The two points to be stressed in this statement concern the simultaneity of two processes and their joint product. One of these processes is consciousness' demotion of its conception of the world to a mere way of construing the world—a process in which consciousness learns that it has been an inadequate mode of knowledge. The second, concurrent process is the explication and comprehension of its (inadequate) conception of the world. The completion of these two concurrent processes allows for the introduction of a new form of consciousness holding a new conception of the world. The conjunction between this "sinking" or epistemic demotion of consciousness' initial conception of the world and the introduction of a new, albeit implicit, conception of the world shows that the initial conception was not a pure mistake or wasted effort, if only because it enabled the genesis and development of this more adequate conception. An inadequate conception enables this sort of development by making available for consciousness both those characteristics of the world that the conception grasps and also those characteristics of the world that it inadequately grasped but nevertheless elicited by running afoul of them. Each inadequate conception employed by consciousness is essential to its successor conception because of the information it reveals about the world, the conceptual content it directly contributes to its successor, and the role of its failure in recognizing the legitimacy of that successor. A more sophisticated conception is legitimate only insofar as nothing less sophisticated can adequately account for consciousness' experience of the world. Precisely here, it should be noted, consciousness' relation to the world, in which it applies its conceptions of the world to the world itself, grounds the process of self-critical revision. The fact that consciousness is related to a world that is more than it has conceived it to be, and is cognitively related to the world in ways that it hadn't expressly conceived, is most evident in these transitional episodes.²⁸

B. INVERSION AND DETERMINATE NEGATION

Hegel describes the development of this "new object" as an "inversion of consciousness itself" (S11). This inversion is a matter of consciousness coming to an explicit comprehension of its conception of the world as being *its* conception rather than the way the world itself is. This reflexive component of the process allows for the critical revision of consciousness' conception of the object to be a productive enterprise by funding "determinate" rather than "abstract" negations of this conception.

Hegel stresses the distinction between abstract and determinate negations twice in the Introduction. The first of these passages is the following:

{T}he presentation of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not merely a *negative* movement. ... {T}he result ... is determinate ... [I]t is the nothing *of that from which it results*. In fact, it is only when nothing is taken as the nothing of what it comes from that it is the true result; for then it is itself a *determinate* nothing and has a *content*.²⁹

The way in which a negation is determinate is straightforward. A determinate negation is the negation or rejection of a conception of the world based on a critical appraisal of it, an appraisal that grasps the proficiencies and deficiencies of the conception that have become manifest in the course of applying this conception to its putative objects. The epistemic moral to be drawn from each failure is not simply that one failed, but specifically how one

failed, why precisely *these* shortcomings were met with (whatever they may be) in employing this conception of the world in accordance with its associated conception of knowledge. The comprehension of these details allows consciousness to formulate new conceptions of the world and of empirical knowledge.³⁰

The second passage stressing determinate negation is more explicit on several points. Referring back to the passage just quoted and its context, Hegel states that

[T]he circumstance which guides this way of observing is the same as the one previously discussed regarding the relation between this presentation and skepticism: In each case the result which emerges from an untrue mode of knowledge may not be allowed to dissolve into an empty nothingness, but rather must be grasped as necessarily the nothingness *of that whose result it is*, a result which contains what is true in the previous knowledge.³¹

The presentation Hegel mentions here is the presentation in the *Phenomenology* of "untrue," that is, of cognitively inadequate forms of consciousness. What he makes more explicit here is that failed attempts to comprehend the world contain some element of truth, and that this element must be preserved. There need be no pure misfires either in empirical or in second-order knowledge, Hegel thinks. Even a highly inadequate conception, if astutely employed and analyzed, will turn up some information about the world and about knowledge that needs to be accounted for, even if this information requires, in order to be comprehended, more sophisticated conceptions than have been employed up to that point. Hegel's view is that taking any conception, any principle, and applying it rigorously and thoroughly to its putative objects will teach one both what is sufficient and deficient about that conception or principle and thus what needs to be accounted for in a more adequate conception.³² This sort of effort transforms what the world is *to* consciousness, and what its conceptions of the world and of knowledge are to it, into the world *for* consciousness and its conceptions into conceptions for it. If Hegel has not emphasized the role of the world itself (and of knowledge itself) in these three penultimate paragraphs, it is because he is only discussing certain aspects of the structure of the transition from one form (or sub-form) of consciousness to the next (*cf.* S2, S8f.). The roles played here by the world itself and knowledge itself should be plain enough from considering what would produce a cognitive misfire, and hence a "negation." These negations occur because attempting to comprehend the world and knowledge with inadequate conceptions cannot succeed.³³

C. THE "NECESSITY" OF THE TRANSITIONS

The determinacy of the transitions from one form of consciousness to the next, the emergence of a new form of consciousness as the preceding form achieves an explicit comprehension of its initial conceptions of the world and of knowledge, together with their inadequacies, "guides the entire succession of forms of consciousness in its necessity" (S15). Hegel introduces a curious qualification on this necessity, an element of voluntarism (S13). He says that the results of an inadequate cognitive effort "may not" [*nicht ... dürfte*] be let go of, but rather "must" [*müsse*] necessarily be grasped as results of that which produced them. What sort of "necessity" could be elective in this way? Answering this question requires examining some of Hegel's remarks in the Introduction on skepticism and the nature of experience. (These considerations in turn supply the requisite background for understanding the "scientific" character of Hegel's phenomenological method, discussed in Chapter Nine §VII [pp. 135-136].)

One kind of skepticism Hegel discusses in the Introduction is akin to Pyrrhonism, for it takes the fact that a view has deficiencies as sufficient ground to completely dismiss that view. It abstracts from the fact that a view's defects are particular defects discovered in particular ways and so fails to learn from these shortcomings and their genesis.³⁴ What is problematic about Hegel's remarks on this topic is not that he promises to consider a form of consciousness representing this sort of skepticism (it is a skepticism that he must refute in order to sustain his epistemological realism), but that he says a bit later of just such a form of consciousness that

[t]his conceit, which understands how every truth may be rendered vain so that it may return to itself and feast upon its own understanding, which knows how all thoughts may be dissolved and bereft of all content, finding instead no more than the barren "I;" this is a satisfaction which must be left to itself, for it flees the universal and seeks only being-for-self.³⁵

How can Hegel have it both ways? How can he let a view have its own last word if it is a view he must refute in order to establish his own position? A full answer to this question cannot be given short of analyzing Hegel's chapter on skepticism. However, a briefer answer can be offered here that will help clarify the sort of "necessity" involved in the transitions within and between forms of consciousness.

As was noted above,³⁶ Hegel recognizes that a literal adoption of an axiomatic method in philosophy, the ideal of deducing all knowledge from clear, self-evident principles, is a hopeless pipe-dream. There is no universal calculus by recourse to which we could algorithmically demonstrate each justified claim or settle all disputes. Insofar as the self-evidence of an axiomatic system is required to meet the Pyrrhonian skeptic, such skepticism cannot be met; refuting the skeptic on these grounds and to such a skeptic's own satisfaction is an impossible project. Does this mean that there is no adequate response to skepticism in the *Phenomenology*, or anywhere else for that matter? If not, this is not the reason why. Hegel's phenomenological approach offers philosophical instruction to us, his readers, and we can accept his instruction insofar as we find it cogent. This qualification cuts two ways. On the one hand, we may determine that Hegel's phenomenological presentation is faulty and reject some part of it accordingly. On the other hand, insofar as it is sound, Hegel's presentation is a sustained philosophical morality play, and we may fail to get the morals of his stories. The "necessity" of the transition from one form of consciousness to the next is a necessity to give up one view and adopt another based on the recognition and comprehension of the informativeness and the deformities of the initial view. The "observed consciousness" progresses only insofar as it exemplifies the ideal case of someone thinking through his or her errors thoroughly and learning something from those errors. There is no "compulsion" to advance in the absence of such comprehension. This holds both for "observed consciousness" and for the observing "we," the readers of the *Phenomenology*. Although Hegel holds that there is a collective and individual *telos* of comprehending the world,³⁷ this does not mean that we could not have failed, either collectively or individually. On the contrary, Hegel time and again criticizes a form of consciousness for failing to "bring its thoughts together" in order to recognize their mutual incompatibility.³⁸ Unless it recognizes such inconsistency (or other kinds of inadequacies), a form of consciousness will not recognize that it has grounds for altering its conceptions of knowledge or of the world, much less identify what these grounds specifically are. Insofar as a form of consciousness fails to recognize and act on these grounds, it fails to develop and is free to stagnate. Lack of subtlety, stupidity, obstinacy, or bad faith are always live possibilities. Hegel's answer to the question, *Must*

we mean what we say? is Only if we are going to *know* what we're talking about! And of course, without a resolve and effort to gain at least *this* sort of knowledge it is vain to seek the resolution of any inquiry. This is one of the main points Hegel makes in wanting to supercede merely "natural" ideas by "giving" conceptions themselves, and why he claims that an examination of knowledge cannot be conducted just in terms of "natural" ideas.³⁹ One of Hegel's points against skepticism is that it fails to give a thorough and consistent sense to the terms in which it poses skeptical challenges and criteria for their resolution. Given such behavior, it is no surprise not to be able to answer a skeptic to his or her own satisfaction, and it is no reflection on us that we can't do so. Refusing to be convinced should not be confused with being highly critical. Part of the aim of Hegel's discussion of skepticism is to elucidate some criteria for differentiating these two kinds of behavior.

When a form of consciousness reaches an impasse in which it cannot recognize the inconsistency or other inadequacy of its conceptions of knowledge and of the world, the *Verfremdungseffekt* of phenomenological "observation" is most heavily relied upon. At these stages it is up to us, Hegel's readers, to see what the impasse is, why it has been reached, and what is needed to remedy it. For only with answers to these points clearly in mind can we understand and assess the introduction of the subsequent form of consciousness. This is part of why Hegel takes care at the beginning and end of each section to recount for his readers the principles and manifest inadequacies of each form of consciousness, so that we, his readers, can detect, assess, and comprehend the proficiencies and deficiencies of each form of consciousness. Only on this basis can we comprehend the reasons for advance to the next, and ultimately to the final, form of consciousness—providing Hegel succeeds in displaying such reasons! In this regard Hegel recognizes a point discussed in Chapter Five, that many important justificatory grounds can only be had first-person, such as recognizing the validity of an inference. In order to accept Hegel's reasons for his own epistemological view, we must ourselves understand the reasons for advancing from one form of consciousness to the next, and we must ourselves determine whether the reasons given for this advance are adequate. Any beliefs we may have about knowledge, or about Hegel's theory of knowledge, are not justified unless we have reasoned our way through this kind of self-critical argumentative process.

CHAPTER NINE

SOME FURTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter, certain methodological points Hegel makes in paragraphs 14-16 of the Introduction were set aside in order to focus on the self-critical revision of standards of knowledge. These points are taken up in this chapter and elaborated in view of some of Hegel's other methodological considerations, both those mentioned elsewhere in the Introduction and those presupposed by his method as outlined therein. Section II discusses Hegel's conception of experience. Section III considers certain views about principles and practices implied by Hegel's method. Section IV explores how Hegel's method is sensitive to the *Meno* paradox. Section V examines Hegel's views about the motivations for consciousness' self-critical examination. Section VI discusses Hegel's claim that his phenomenological method is a methodological skepticism. Section VII treats Hegel's claim that his method is a science. Section VIII considers briefly again Hegel's solution to the problem of our begging the question against the forms of consciousness displayed in the *Phenomenology*. Section IX discusses whether Hegel is open to the charge of begging the question against opponents by giving an analysis of consciousness in the Introduction. I close in section X by considering the problem of the completeness of the series of forms of consciousness Hegel presents.

II. Hegel's Conception of Experience

The distinction between there being a need to develop a more adequate form of consciousness, a need Hegel always clues us into, and observed consciousness' awareness of this need (or lack thereof) is central to Hegel's concept of experience. After sketching the process of the critical revision of consciousness' criterion of knowledge generally, Hegel focuses on some details of this process by claiming that

This *dialectical* movement, which consciousness exercises on itself—on its knowledge as well as its object—, *insofar as the new, true object emerges to consciousness* as the result of it, is precisely that which is called *experience*. (S1)¹

Two questions need to be asked here: Which "object" is this "new, true object" that emerges to consciousness, and why is this process called "experience"? Insofar as the critical revision of a criterion of knowledge should issue in a new criterion, this "new object" should be a new pair of conceptions of the world and of knowledge. This interpretation is confirmed in sentence 9, where Hegel notes that the important point at hand is "the transition from the first object *and the knowledge of it* to the other object." The sense of "the first object" is, here again, "the world according to consciousness," and thus the clause I have emphasized here refers to the comprehension of the inadequacies of

the prior conception of the world. The comprehension of these inadequacies results in the postulation of new conceptions of the world and of knowledge of such a world, and these conceptions serve as a new criterion for knowledge. This new conception of knowledge and its objects, therefore, is "the new true object" that "emerges to [sic] consciousness" out of this process. So much, then, for the interpretation of this "new object," but why call this process "experience"?

Hegel notes that there is a divergence between what he calls experience and what is commonly understood by the term. This divergence concerns the transition from one "object" of consciousness to the next (S8, S9). Whereas the common view of experience claims that falsehoods are discovered when a counterexample to a view is found (S9) and that this counterexample is found in an accidental, extraneous way (S10), Hegel insists that the transition from one false conception of knowledge and of the world to its successor comes about by explicitly comprehending the previous conception (S9), and that this explicit comprehension of the previous conception involves an "inversion [*Umkehrung*] of consciousness itself" (S11). What is Hegel doing to our understanding of experience?

Hegel is not using the term "experience" to contrast it with "theory." Rather, he is attending to the experience involved in a sustained effort to comprehend the world in accordance with a certain set of principles. The philosophical interest in this sort of experience is, as Quentin Lauer has put it, that

in the consistently sustained *experience* of the object the object reveals itself more and more as what it truly is. Only in plumbing the depths of what it is *for us* shall we ever attain to what it is in itself.²

An important point about Hegel's concept of experience is the level of generality of this experience. Hegel is not concerned with the experience of discovering a new instance of an already familiar kind of thing (say, a newly discovered kind of fish inhabiting a deep ocean trench). He is concerned instead with discovering discrepancies between sets of fundamental conceptions of knowledge and of the world and the objects to which these conceptions are applied, namely, to knowledge itself and to the world itself. The phenomenological dialectic works only on a broad categorical level, for only at such a level do conceptions of knowledge imply anything about the kind of objects that can be known, and only at such a level do conceptions of objects imply anything about the kind of knowledge we have of them; only at such a level does the experience of a kind of object imply anything concerning what knowledge in general is. There is thus a sustained categorical, transcendental, reflexive level to the issues that Hegel treats in the *Phenomenology*. Because the development and adoption of more adequate conceptions transpires only through the critical revision of less adequate conceptions, and because this process of revision involves consciousness' recognition that its conceptions have been only its own conceptions, the reconceiving of what knowledge is, and with that, the reconception of oneself as a cognizer, is a sustained *self-critical* process. Thus there seems to be a good sense to Hegel's claim that this critical revision of transcendental conceptions involves an "inversion" of consciousness (S11). The "inversion" concerns consciousness' coming to recognize that what it had taken the world and its knowledge of it to be was only its own way of taking the world and knowledge.

Another point concerning experience Hegel insists upon is that humans have been successfully "plumbing the depths" of what the world is "for us" on this applied transcendental level for millennia, but without having been sufficiently self-conscious about the fact that this is what we've been doing. This is part of the point Hegel makes in both the

Preface and in the Introduction about his present day being ripe for the development of the sort of transcendental self-knowledge he proposes to make available to his readers.³ How this process could transpire without our being aware of it will be discussed shortly in connection with Hegel's proposed "science of the experience of consciousness" (S18) (see §VII). It is worth noting this point here because both of these points, the transcendental level of Hegel's issues as well as the lack of explicit awareness about these issues, are responsible for the difference between Hegel's concept of experience and the common notion of experience. Like our historical ancestors, "observed consciousness" can work its way through a series of modifications of a pair of conceptions of the world and of knowledge, but it isn't systematic enough to remember all the ins and outs of its educative history. By providing us his book, Hegel hopes to enable us to come to a full self-awareness as cognizant beings by coming to recognize our place in this purported historical development and to realize that we're now in an historical and philosophical position to recognize that knowledge, socially and historically grounded though it may be, is knowledge of a world not constituted by our thought or language.

Another point of Hegel's appeal to "experience" in discussing the transitions from one form of consciousness to the next is to underscore the fact that it is only by thinking through and comprehending the proficiencies and deficiencies of each form of consciousness that either it or we are able to recognize the grounds and need for advancing to a more sophisticated form of consciousness. There is no axiomatic deduction of epistemological realism. Rather, Hegel provides a sort of argument by elimination, where the elimination of each less sophisticated and less adequate form of consciousness provides material and motivation for introducing and accepting (if only tentatively) its more sophisticated and more adequate successor.

Hegel also emphasizes the role of experience in this process because the reasons he points out for accepting each successor won't be convincing unless we've thought those reasons through with him and with each form of consciousness. This thinking through and becoming convinced is a crucial aspect of the experience Hegel hopes to provide with his book, for it is part and parcel of our experiencing some justificatory grounds that can only be had first-person; *e.g.*, recognizing the validity of certain substantive inferences.

III. Dialectic, Principles, and Practices

Hegel's criteria and their employment reveal that the dialectical episodes that Hegel and his readers observe consciousness pursuing are dialectics of principles and practices, insofar as the application of conceptions is something one does, even as a proto-practice considered from Hegel's transcendental standpoint. This is true even of the very first efforts consciousness makes to intuitively grasp sensible particulars. "Experience" in Hegel's sense involves the attempt to simultaneously satisfy all of the conditions of the criterion set out in Chapter Seven §III (pp. 110-111). In consciousness' process of applying its conceptions of knowledge and of the world to the world itself and to knowledge itself, it is found that the first two conditions of the criterion stated in Chapter Seven are individually very difficult to satisfy and collectively are seemingly impossible, despite all sorts of reconsiderations by consciousness both of its conceptions and of their application. There is thus an affinity between Hegel's arguments and transcendental arguments insofar as consciousness' dialectical episodes make clear time and again that the conditions for the possibility of the experience had by a form of consciousness, the structure and content of its experience of construing the world and its knowledge of the world in accordance with its conceptions of

the world and of knowledge, are not accounted for by those conceptions, thus showing that those conceptions are inadequate. Jonathan Robinson's statement regarding the "Morality" section holds good for the *Phenomenology* as a whole:

The full strength of Hegel's position is appreciated only when it is understood that he is arguing that bad theory makes for bad practice, and that the bad practice shows up the logical difficulties of the theory.⁴

This gives us one sense of the primacy of practice in Hegel's philosophy. Only in practice, Hegel claims, in the application and utilization of conceptions, can we come to understand the contents, implications, proficiencies, and deficiencies of those conceptions. To reject "epistemology" as first philosophy and replacing it with "phenomenology" as first philosophy is to reject the restriction of philosophical attention to conceptions of the world and of knowledge and to expand that attention to include "the world for consciousness" and "knowledge for consciousness," along with the interrelations of these four elements.

IV. Hegelian Phenomenology and the *Meno* Paradox

Hegel's account of the dialectically self-critical structure of knowledge is not only a response to Sextus Empiricus, it is also, together with its deployment in the body of the *Phenomenology*, a sustained meditation on Plato's *Meno* paradox. In that dialogue, Socrates restates Meno's paradox in this way:

[I]t is not given to man to search [for anything], neither for what he knows nor for what he does not know: he certainly would not search for what he knows, for he knows it and there is no need then for any search; nor would he search for what he does not know, for he would not know what to search for.⁵

The paradox presumes that there is a radical dichotomy between what is known and what is not known; without such a dichotomy, ignorance would not entail having no indication of the goal sought in a search for knowledge. Plato partially rejects this presumed dichotomy by promulgating a doctrine of recollection, a doctrine that distinguishes between explicit and implicit knowledge, and by insisting that the order in which one recollects things is important to being able to recollect.⁶ Four other factors figure into Plato's account of recollection: that the slave boy be able to "work things out,"⁷ that he can come to recognize his false "knowledge" [*sic*],⁸ that the recognition of false knowledge produces perplexity,⁹ and that such perplexity generates a desire to know the truth.¹⁰ Each of these factors find significant echoes in Hegel's phenomenological method, as can be seen by considering the episode with the slave boy in this light.

In the recollection episode, the slave boy's immediate, natural ideas concerning the length of the side of a square that is double the area of another square are first that it is double, and then that it is half again as long. Both of these suppositions, these "natural ideas," are brought to recognized failure by working out their implications, that is, by seeing that they result (respectively) in squares having areas twice and nine-eighths the area of the desired square. The slave boy's ideas are brought first to naught and then to success by the ordering of the questions posed and by Socrates's drawing diagrams to order, especially his introduction of the diagonal.¹¹

Hegel's account of the dialectical structure of knowledge and self-criticism presents a much closer connection between the discovery of error and the development of better ideas than does Plato's story. The exclusive dichotomy between knowledge and ignorance is eroded by Hegel's distinction between the object for consciousness and the object to consciousness, a distinction that allows consciousness to interact with features of an object itself that it doesn't yet comprehend. This is fundamental to Hegel's contention that consciousness is able, in effect, not only to develop its own perplexity ("despair"¹²) through employing its conceptions, but also in this process to pose its own questions and seek its own answers. In Hegel's procedure, the proper order of these questions and answers is set on the one hand by the determinate structures of the world and of knowledge that consciousness investigates, and on the other hand by consciousness' restricting itself to the simplest possible explanation at each stage. The attempt to progress only incrementally insures the exhaustive investigation and development of consciousness' conceptions and each aspect of their subject-matter, or so it is proposed. Hegel's interest in the *Meno* paradox converges with his methodological skepticism and his conception of science (see §VII below) in his view that there is no "logic of discovery." There may be systematic features of the situations in which new ideas are thought up, but new ideas are not algorithmic products of those situations.¹³

Hegel even goes so far as to propose a doctrine of learning through "recollection" (*Erinnerung*). Instead of immortality (and a still-unexplained original learning), Hegel's doctrine of recollection requires that consciousness (and especially its observers, that is, we readers) recall the stages and sub-stages of its development of its conceptions of knowledge and of the world, recounting the proficiencies and deficiencies of each stage. This recollection is needed in order to understand why each subsequent set of conceptions has been called for and when (if ever) a final stage is reached, in order to understand why it has been called for and what its content is, for Hegel claims that the content of the final set of conceptions is only the properly sublated (*Aufgehoben*) contents of all the preceding forms of consciousness. Only by recalling how this final stage is reached and adopted will anyone be able to understand whether or how it is justified. Similarly, whereas Plato warns Meno to be ready to catch him if he explains or instructs instead of simply interrogates,¹⁴ we have to watch Hegel's presentation to make sure that consciousness does indeed "examine itself" and that only consciousness conducts the examination.¹⁵

V. Consciousness' Cognitive Motivations

Hegel holds that consciousness has an innate tendency to gain self-knowledge,¹⁶ and he goes so far as to suggest that this is a conceptual truth about consciousness:

[C]onsciousness is for itself its own *concept*, hence it immediately transcends what is limited, and, since this limitedness belongs to it, it transcends itself.¹⁷

I find this statement puzzling. I suggest that Hegel here alludes to his erotic theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness essentially desires its self-identity. This theory is discussed in the introduction to the section on "Self-consciousness" and consciousness' achievement of self-identity occupies the remainder of the *Phenomenology*.¹⁸ His point turns on the idea that for conscious beings, achieving self-identity requires developing an adequate self-conception. Insofar as consciousness begins the process of developing its self-identity with "limited" or inadequate self-conceptions,¹⁹ and insofar as it inherently

applies its conceptions to their objects (in accordance with the structure of consciousness *qua* knower discussed in Chapter Seven §II), then consciousness would apply its conception of itself to itself. In so doing it would discover the proficiencies and deficiencies of that conception and develop an improved, more adequate self-conception.

Since consciousness' self-conceptions are (or at least include) conceptions of itself as a cognizer and because such conceptions would govern its application of conceptions of the world to the world itself, consciousness' critical development of an adequate self-conception and its critical development of an adequate conception of the world are two sides of the same process. Thus its desire for self-identity motivates both consciousness' examination of itself,²⁰ including its examination of what knowledge is, as well as its examination of the world. Hence consciousness has an inherent tendency to gain knowledge, not only about itself, but about the world as well.

For this reason, if for any Hegel gives, consciousness is inherently dissatisfied with any limited or inadequate understanding of itself and of the world, and in rejecting its inadequate conceptions it "suffers this violence at its own hands."²¹ Because consciousness is inherently thought, it cannot remain in "thoughtless indolence"²² and because it strives for a systematic conception (*per* Kant's regulative Principle of Pure Reason) it cannot "secure itself in the sentimentality which assures that everything good in its kind," Hegel claims.²³

Hegel refers to the course of the *Phenomenology* several times as a route or path (*Weg*) traversed by consciousness.²⁴ This phrase is no doubt one of the reasons for the erroneous supposition that there is one single, cumulative development plotted in the *Phenomenology*. Although there is no such single, linear (or curvilinear) development, Hegel says that there is a developmental sequence within each major section, and he even intimates that this sequence may have historical parallels.²⁵ However the ultimate sequence of the *Phenomenology* may be understood, each specific form of consciousness attempts to utilize a particular set of conceptions, and the sustained, critical examination and rejection of inadequate, merely "natural" self-conceptions makes for the "negative significance" and even "despair" of this process.²⁶ However, natural consciousness is "striving for true knowledge" and ridding itself of false self-conceptions, and Hegel alleges that each of its putative though inadequate self-conceptions does concern some one or another of its actual features.²⁷ By sustaining its self-examination consciousness can reveal all of its features. Thus it can complete its "experience of itself" and do so systematically, insofar as consciousness' actual features are systematically interconnected.

VI. Phenomenology as a Methodological Skepticism

The most important of the four kinds of skepticism Hegel discusses in the Introduction is his preferred brand, a "thoroughgoing skepticism" directed at the whole range of apparent knowledge.²⁸ The "thoroughgoingness" of this skepticism is of a piece with Hegel's notion of a thorough refutation. In the Preface he states that if a refutation of a claim or principle is thorough, "it is taken and developed out of the principle itself, and not effected externally by opposite assurances and notions."²⁹ This contention points directly to Hegel's fundamental response to Sextus Empiricus. Although agreeing with Sextus's attempt to criticize views only internally, Hegel contends that actually taking up a view and applying it vigorously and rigorously to the range of objects it purports to cover can reveal the virtues and defects of that view and do so in a way that can enable one to select or generate a better view. Sextus satisfied himself too easily with refutation alone. The role of "observed consciousness" is to adopt, apply, and refine "natural ideas" about knowledge

and its objects. Through sustained, thorough application of these putative principles as they naturally arise, Hegel's phenomenological skepticism

brings about a despair over natural notions, thoughts, and opinions, regardless of whether these notions are said to be one's own or others'.³⁰

This despair is akin to Socratic perplexity, in that only by finding out the defects of one's comprehension can one have grounds and resources for generating a better one.³¹ A more adequate form of consciousness does not follow deductively from its predecessors. Rather, the new form of consciousness arises as the best, the simplest and most adequate, set of principles for explaining both the successes and the failures of the preceding form of consciousness and for systematizing the information about knowledge and its objects that it elicited. In this way, Hegel's phenomenological skepticism is a productive and instructive form of skepticism, as opposed to a skepticism that stops with merely abstract negations, with merely rejecting views as mistakes, and that therefore cannot proceed further on its own account.³² Through the sustained reconsideration of all possible principles of human knowledge and its objects, this phenomenological skepticism can educate the natural consciousness of Hegel's readers up to a rigorous philosophical comprehension of knowledge and its objects, what Hegel calls "science," and thereby render "spirit" able, for the first time, to examine what truth is.³³

VII. Phenomenology as a "Science"

The tricky part of Hegel's view of experience, both in terms of actual intellectual history and also in terms of the idealized, didactic "history" presented in the *Phenomenology*, is that it requires that determinate negations be made and responded to without consciousness recognizing that this occurs, not noticing, at least, until after Hegel points it out by publishing the *Phenomenology*. Hegel explicitly insists on this situation, for he claims that the new criterion of knowledge contains the nothingness of its predecessor (S7), that the new criterion results from the experience constituted by its predecessor (S7, S9, S14), that this process involves an "inversion" of consciousness (S11), that these factors are responsible for the necessity of the progression of forms of consciousness (S15), and yet that this necessary emergence of a new criterion occurs without consciousness' knowing how this happens (S12, S16). How is this possible?

The factors just mentioned are the moments Hegel articulates in order to illuminate the "scientific" aspect of his presentation (S2) in the middle two of the four penultimate paragraphs of the Introduction. Hegel reconciles these factors by drawing a distinction between form and content:

A moment which is *in itself* or *for us* is thereby introduced into the movement of consciousness, a moment that does not present itself for the consciousness engaged in the experience itself. But the *content* of what emerges to us is *for it*, and we comprehend only the formal aspect of what emerges or its pure emerging. *For consciousness*, what has emerged is only as an object; *for us*, it is at once as a movement and becoming. (S17)

This is to say, observed consciousness, in developing a new conception of its object, takes into account the problems with its previous conception and the features of the world revealed through the employment of that conception when it postulates its new conception.

However, it takes its new conception simply to be a response, a reconsideration, to newly discovered aspects of the world (or of knowledge). It does not take the discovery of these newly recognized aspects to have been dependent upon its previous conceptions and hence does not take its new conceptions to have been developed through a determinate negation of their predecessors. In devising new conceptions, consciousness naively takes them to be revelations or inventions *de novo*.

Though this distinction between form and content would need to be exemplified in the body of the text to be fully reconstructed, it is worth insisting upon its mention here, for it helps to settle an issue concerning the locus of the necessity of the transitions within and between forms of consciousness. This distinction allows it to be the case that the transitions consciousness makes are necessary (necessary in the sense that an advance must be made due to manifest inadequacies of simpler views) and yet allows that the explicit recognition of this necessity remains for Hegel and the phenomenological observers, that is, for Hegel's readers.³⁴ The explicit recognition of these necessities is contributed by the "observers" to the proceedings (S12). Hegel's distinction between form and content thus concerns the distinction between the objective adequacy of the criticism of a prior form of consciousness and of the grounds for introducing a subsequent form of consciousness, and the self-conscious, subjective recognition of the adequacy of those grounds. We, Hegel's readers, are charged with responsibility for systematically remembering the proficiencies and deficiencies of each form of consciousness, so that we can understand why each successor form of consciousness is called for (if it is called for) and ultimately, why the standpoint of "absolute knowledge," the thesis that empirical knowledge is knowledge of a world not structured by our thought and language, is justified. Hegel fosters this recollection and recognition in his introductory and concluding remarks to each dialectical episode in the body of his text. In these remarks Hegel summarily states how the present stage was reached, what its principles are, how its efforts fail, and thereby how it generates the introduction of the next stage. The putative presence of these necessary transitions allows forms of consciousness to be arranged systematically in an order of increasing adequacy. This systematic aspect is what makes Hegel's phenomenological study of this series a science, "the science of the experience of consciousness" (S18). The epithet "science" is used to indicate the intended rigor of Hegel's phenomenological demonstration that no account of empirical knowledge other than his own is warranted, where that warrant derives from his purporting to eliminate all alternatives. Hegel is committed to the completeness of the series of forms of consciousness presented in the *Phenomenology*. This point will be returned to in the final section of this chapter.

VIII. Hegelian Phenomenology and "Our Observation"

Because consciousness can systematically see through all of its partial self-conceptions the methodological version of the appearance/reality distinction can be overcome. Hegel claims that the distinction between what consciousness appears to us to be and what it actually is, need not concern his readers. This is because how consciousness "appears" to itself (what it takes itself to be) and how it "appears" to us (what we take it to be) are the same: the forms of consciousness Hegel investigates employ conceptions drawn from our own intellectual traditions. We needn't import our own criteria for judging the adequacy of these forms of consciousness precisely because they establish their own criteria and on the basis of those criteria eventually come to true self-knowledge. When a form of consciousness reaches this point, it cannot claim that we've begged the question against it, because it

has achieved its conception of knowledge by employing its own criteria. Furthermore, we too can understand what this final, adequate form of consciousness is (if we've been paying attention to Hegel's presentation), and since it understands what it really is, and it displays this to us as well, we, Hegel's readers, gain "insight into what knowing" really is.³⁵

IX. Question-Begging and Hegel's Claims in the Introduction

Hegel makes claims in the Introduction about the structure of consciousness from the putative standpoint of "absolute knowledge," from the standpoint of someone (namely, himself) who purports to have been through the whole process of development recounted in the *Phenomenology* and who has thereby achieved the ability to claim to know things as they actually are. Given Hegel's paramount concern to avoid question-begging and to solve the Pyrrhonian dilemma of the criterion, how are we to take his claims in the Introduction? In general, we should take them as introductory, as alerting us (who by being modern Europeans and their descendants have inherited the actual intellectual history which undergirds the *Phenomenology*, but who have yet to comprehend what we've inherited) to what we should watch for as Hegel's phenomenological recounting proceeds. The most pressing worry here concerns the status of Hegel's claims about the self-critical structure of consciousness and cognition. This structure is crucial to the proceedings of the *Phenomenology* proper, for without it Hegel's project is impossible, while with it he may succeed. Has Hegel begged the question in his own favor by merely stipulating this putative structure from the outset? Has he guaranteed his success by building it into his account of the structure of consciousness and its goal?

These are real questions, for according to Hegel's view, his view could not be figured out unless it were true, and apparently Hegel infers from his having figured it out that his philosophy is true.³⁶ This is a colossal transcendental argument, and hardly to be taken lightly. However, the very difficulty in assembling such an argument as this indicates the answer to the second of the above questions. There are far too many difficult transitions for consciousness to make in its alleged self-exploration for its success to have been simply built in from the start. Just because consciousness could only be satisfied by reaching the goal Hegel stipulates does not entail that consciousness ever will be satisfied. The answer to the second question is clearly negative; the answer to the first question is a little more complex.

I think it is not, on the face of it, implausible for Hegel to claim (in effect) that the structure of consciousness he has specified in advance is one that could be "observed" or found to be operative in consciousness' activity, not only as we are to be shown it in the course of the *Phenomenology*, but also as Hegel purportedly detected it operating in our intellectual and cultural history and as we may detect it in our intellectual life. Insofar as this structure can be "observed" in some such way, then it is possible for Hegel to legitimate his introductory claims about consciousness in the course of his phenomenological presentation. Hence his introductory claims need not ultimately be mere assertions, even if this is pretty much their status in the Introduction itself.

This phenomenological route for legitimating Hegel's claims about the structure of consciousness points to the problem of circularity in perhaps its sharpest form. This structure is to be seen to be operative in the phenomenological observation of consciousness' development, insofar as just this structure makes that development possible. Doesn't Hegel simply reconstruct this development to suit his purposes? Why should we believe the alleged results of any of its stages? These questions cannot be answered without

detailed examination of the body of Hegel's text itself. However, in pressing both the reflexive problems of the implicitly skeptical metaphors of knowledge as an instrument or a medium and the threat of Pyrrhonian skepticism in his discussion of criteria and question-begging, Hegel has given us good reasons to take his idea, to take his account of the structure of consciousness, and to do with it what it says needs to be done with any idea or principle: apply it rigorously and thoroughly to its putative objects and see what results. Some such structure of consciousness, one that renders self-criticism possible, is the only way out of the epistemological paradoxes and problems Hegel addresses. This is a good reason to try Hegel's idea seriously, and all the more so because adopting this view of consciousness and self-criticism does not, *pace* Sextus Empiricus,³⁷ guarantee that the whole view will work out in its own favor. Perhaps we'll reach a dead end, perhaps no end at all, perhaps at some point an "abstract negation" is all we're capable of. Rather than trying to answer such concerns in general and in advance, a procedure I hope to have shown, with Hegel, to be hopelessly abstract, we should instead examine Hegel's own deployment of this purported structure of consciousness in the details of the *Phenomenology* itself.

X. The Problem of Completeness

Hegel claims to present the complete series of forms of consciousness, and the success of his defense of his own view depends on critically rejecting all alternatives. Certainly he hasn't considered every logically possible position, and he hasn't provided any proof that he has. What plausibility can Hegel give to his claim to completeness? Three points may be briefly mentioned on this topic.

Perhaps Hegel's main support for his claim to completeness is his teleological philosophy of history, according to which the series of forms of consciousness he recounts is the series required to complete the principal development of the world-spirit. If Hegel could make this part of his philosophy of history independently plausible, then he would have some powerful grounds for his claim to completeness. This topic cannot be explored here, but I, for one, am doubtful.

Setting Hegel's philosophy of history aside, there is still something quite strong that Hegel can say in his defense. He claims that each form of consciousness devolves from some characteristic of human cognition. Part of the import of this claim is that the mere logical possibility of a theory of knowledge doesn't suffice to justify it; an adequate theory of knowledge must also account for what knowledge and its objects are like *for us*. This is central to Hegel's replacing epistemology with phenomenology, and it shows in his criteria as the insistence on what the world and knowledge are for us, in addition to our conceptions of the world and of knowledge.

One may wonder about the problem of interpreting what Hegel explicitly says or argues in the body of the *Phenomenology* in contrast to what he should have been saying or what can be found in his text. This contrast is at the very least extremely difficult to draw, and perhaps untenable. Hegel's phenomenological method is based on *showing*, that is to say, on displaying in concrete examples the incoherences and other inadequacies of a variety of kinds of epistemological views. He often criticizes a form of consciousness for not "bringing its thoughts together."³⁸ But for us, his readers and putative phenomenological co-observers, the advice is no less well taken. In order to grasp his points, we have to bring together the thoughts that an observed form of consciousness fails to bring together. Only then will we understand why an advance is called for. (And, if an advance is not,

pace Hegel, called for, only then would we be in a position to point out why not.) What this requires, then, is that we make the best effort possible, not just to understand the (more or less philologically determinable) meanings of his terms, phrases, or expressions, but also the *connection between* the various statements he makes. Only through such connections can and do his statements amount to making a case against, rather than just a bunch of assertions about, a form of consciousness that Hegel thinks is inadequate. This means that in order to see what Hegel is saying we have to do the best we can to reconstruct his dialectical displays as valid and sound arguments, indeed as ones that succeed in displaying the evidence of inadequacy to (if not for) the form of consciousness itself. On the other hand, the only way to see if Hegel's dialectical examinations fail (and hence if his program falls through) is similarly to do the best we can to reconstruct his displays in as sympathetic a way as possible. Anything less leaves us open to the charge of not having taken his displays for as much as they're worth.

Because Hegel proceeds by showing, where we are supposed to reap the philosophical benefits of those displays, even though often we can only do so by being far more sophisticated about those displays and the principles displayed than the observed form of consciousness itself, the line between what is strictly speaking to be found in his text and what we may only be able to read into or out of it simply may not exist. What matters for Hegel's phenomenological enterprise is that the connections he claims are there *are* to be found in the form of consciousness indicated. How fully articulated those connections are may be quite another matter. If we're now in a position to ask more refined questions or consider more refined views than any of the forms of consciousness, or than Hegel himself, present, it is incumbent on us to see whether the points Hegel makes about these less refined forms of consciousness have telling analogues in the positions that we wish he had considered. At the very least, since the instruction Hegel offers is supposed to be for "us," his readers, we need to be willing to reconstruct what he displays in terms that on the one hand capture what he says and does in those displays, while on the other hand manage to address "our" (contemporary, linguistic, analytic, or hermeneutical) idioms for and approaches to the issues he discusses.

CHAPTER TEN

HEGEL'S IDEALISM AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

I. Introduction

In Chapter Seven Hegel's indifference as to whether the world is described as a concept or as an object was noted, and it was mentioned that his indifference was a function of his idealism.¹ Hegel holds that the world has a fundamentally conceptual structure, not because we constitute the world by thinking about it, but because concepts are structures in the world; only upon that basis can they become conceptions in our language and in our heads. The aim of this chapter is not to defend Hegel's ontology, but only to understand his basic ontological view. This will show that Hegel's brand of idealism is, and is intended to be, fully compatible with epistemological realism. It will also allow a glimpse of the role of his ontology in refuting skepticism. It is important to note that there are three main strands in Hegel's idealism, an epistemological strand, an ontological strand, and a moral strand. These three strands are treated in turn.

II. Hegel's Rejection of Subjective Idealism

The first point to note about Hegel's "idealism" is that it is not any sort of Berkeleian or Kantian idealism, nor is it a phenomenalism. Hegel's idealism is an expression of what any non-skeptical view must hold: our conceptions can capture the way the world itself is. That Kant thought otherwise is Hegel's main complaint against Kant. Hegel regards himself as a defender of the powers of human cognition, not by reducing the objects of knowledge to a set of subjective (or intersubjective) states, but by arguing that our conceptions can be adequate to comprehend the world itself. Hegel makes this contention repeatedly. Here are two such passages from the *Encyclopedia*:

But after all, the objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense, is again to a certain extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary determinations, are *only our* thoughts—separated by an impassible gulf from the thing as it is *in itself*. But the true objectivity of thinking means that thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the in-itself of things, and of whatever is an object to us. Objective and subjective are convenient expressions in current use, the employment of which may easily lead to confusion. Up to this point, the discussion has shown three meanings of objectivity. First, it means what has external existence, in distinction from which the subjective is what is only supposed, dreamed, etc.. Secondly, it has the meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and necessary, as distinguished from the particular, subjective, and occasional element which belongs to our sensations. Thirdly, as has just been explained, it means the thought-apprehended in-itself of the existing thing, in contradistinction from what is merely *our* thought, and what consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists *in itself*.²

Hegel makes it quite clear that this third sense of "objectivity" is his own in the next section of the *Encyclopedia*, where he again points out Kant's subjectivism:

[T]he causal nexus ... is not perceived by sense; it is only evident to thought. Still, though the categories, such as unity, or cause and effect, are strictly the property of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours merely and not also characteristics of the objects themselves. Kant, however, confines them to the subject, and his philosophy may be styled subjective idealism³

One important point in these passages is Hegel's insistence that the contents of our conceptions (when we have true knowledge, at least) and the structure of the world are the same. He stresses this point in the *Phenomenology* when discussing the significance of categories:

The category means ... that self-consciousness and being are the same essence; the same, not through comparison but in and for themselves.⁴

This is to say, the object of knowledge is the world itself. To maintain this does not, however, entail conflating knowledge and the world. There is a difference of form between them, one being self-conscious and the other not, but this difference is epistemically transparent:

[T]his category or *simple* unity of self-consciousness and being possesses *difference* in itself; for its essence is just this, to be immediately one and self-identical in *otherness*, or in absolute difference. The difference therefore *is*, but is perfectly transparent and a difference that is at the same time none.⁵

The "difference within identity" mentioned here will be discussed in Chapter Eleven (§§III and V). What matters for now is noting Hegel's aim of showing that knowledge need not be stricken with an opaque epistemological distinction between appearance and reality, and that this opacity needn't be overcome by conflating the world with our knowledge of it. This is just what epistemological realism holds. Distinguishing this epistemological strand in Hegel's idealism is important, for this doctrine may stand even if the other two strands in his idealism do not.

III. Hegel's Idealism as Ontological Holism

The ontology that supports Hegel's equation of thought and being is hinted at in the last sentence of the Introduction, where he mentions the point at which consciousness' "appearance becomes identical to its essence."⁶ This same equation on the side of the world is hinted at both in the Preface in his remark near the end of the *Phenomenology* that "[t]ime is the concept itself that *is there*."⁷ This comment contrasts markedly with Plato's claim that time is "a moving *image of eternity*."⁸ Rather than relegating universals to a Platonic heaven or to a Kantian constituting ego, Hegel contends that universals are present in the world no less than what are ordinarily called particulars, and indeed that universals and particulars are mutually interdependent for their existence. A sketch of Hegel's view of this interdependence of "universals" and "particulars" ordinarily so called can be gained by assembling some remarks Hegel makes on this topic in the *Encyclopedia*, the *Phenomenology*, and the larger *Logic*.

In §74 of the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel sketches some of the fundamentals of his ontology as part of his critique of Jacobi's theory of "immediate" or intuitive knowledge. Hegel argues that any form of "immediate knowledge" must regard particulars as non-relational or, at most, as related only to themselves. Hegel holds on the contrary that each particular is inherently related to something else outside or apart from the given particular. Hegel uses grammatically reflexive constructions in formulating his claims. These present difficulties not only for translation but also for interpreting the original. It is not clear the extent to which these constructions should be read as mere passives, the degenerate sense of the reflexive construction in German, or if Hegel means to attribute to particulars some kind of activity of relating themselves to one another. For present purposes, this second, stronger reading may be ignored; relatedness is the central issue. A minimal reading of Hegel's reflexive constructions will be adopted here, according to which such constructions are used to indicate essential, as opposed to accidental, relations.⁹

Hegel's statement that "the particular relates itself to an other"¹⁰ provides a point of access to the fundamental sense of his idealism, a point of access that makes clear that Hegel does not mean by "idealism" what it is generally taken to mean in English-language philosophy, namely, that the world is somehow dependent for its existence or characteristics (or both) upon mundane human minds. Rather, Hegel's brand of idealism is a kind of ontological *holism* according to which all parts of the world are fundamentally interrelated, where these interrelations are fundamentally conceptual relations. On his view, concepts are, in the first place, structures in the world. Only on this basis do concepts become, in the second place, conceptions in our language and in our heads as well.

Several conceptions fundamental to Hegel's ontology are implied by the expression "relation to an other," including "appearance," "ideal," and "finite," all of which devolve from one central point: if something is related (essentially, recall) to something else, then it is not self-sufficient. The connection between something's being related to an other and its not being self-sufficient is simple. The central kind of "relation to an other," according to Hegel, is that the ground of one thing lies in something else.¹¹ In contrast to this, self-sufficiency would signify that something contains its own ground. The metaphysical background to this idiom is apparent; on this view, a thing which is essentially related to something else is not self-sufficient. According to the sense of "reality" Hegel adopts from the metaphysical tradition, something is "real" only if it is self-sufficient, that is, ontologically independent.¹² In contrast to this, Hegel holds that something is "ideal" if (and only if) it is ontologically dependent on something else.¹³ In these same passages Hegel indicates that according to his usage, something is "finite" if it is not ontologically self-sufficient, or in other words, if it is ontologically dependent.¹⁴ Something is "infinite," accordingly, if it is ontologically independent. Crucial for understanding Hegel's idealism is the further fact that the Hegelian sense of "appearance" has this same ontological cast:

[T]hat ... objects [*Gegenstände*] are mere appearances [means] that the ground of their being does not lie in themselves, but rather in an other.¹⁵

According to the Hegelian usage just canvassed, the following logical (extensional) equivalences hold:

Self-relation = self-contained ground = ontological self-sufficiency = ontological independence = infinite = real = reality.

Relation to an other = ground in an other = not ontologically self-sufficient = ontologically dependent = finite = ideal = appearance.

This, then, is the sense of Hegelian "idealism:"

The proposition, that the finite is ideal [*ideelle*], constitutes *idealism*.¹⁶

Hegel's idealism is thus an ontological thesis, a thesis concerning the interdependence of everything there is, and thus is quite rightly contrasted with epistemologically based subjective idealism.¹⁷

The pressing question is, What in the world do these terms describe, in Hegel's view? It is a principal thesis of Hegel's philosophy that sensible things, as particular, individual things, are, in exactly the senses just indicated, "finite," "ideal" appearances. This claim means nothing more and nothing less than that the ground of the being of a particular sensible thing lies in something other than itself.¹⁸ To say this, however, is not yet to give a principle governing these putative interrelations. Hegel says that the ground of the being of sensible things lies in "the idea,"¹⁹ but this is unhelpful, at least until an account of "the idea" is given.

Fortunately, one may arrive at an account of "the idea" by examining the principle Hegel thinks governs the interrelations among sensible things. At the end of the third chapter of the *Phenomenology*, "Force and Understanding," Hegel briefly sketches the fundamental conception of his ontology.²⁰ Here Hegel discusses the relations holding among sensible things and presents the principle governing their relations concretely in his examples. After various attempts to understand the necessity of the generation of a thing out of its repulsion from its (first supersensible, then "inverted") "in itself," consciousness finally discovers that the "in itself" of a thing, that which generates and sustains its existence and characteristics, is another sensible thing with contrasting properties:

But in fact, if the one posited thing is a perceptible object and its *in itself*, posited as its inverse, is nevertheless something *sensibly present*, so the sour thing—which would be the in itself of the sweet thing—is a thing no less actual than the sweet thing; a black thing—which would be the in itself of the white thing—is an actual black thing; the north pole—which is the in itself of the south pole—is the north pole *of the same ... magnet*; the oxygen pole—which is the in itself of the hydrogen pole—is the oxygen pole *present* in the same cell.²¹

The "in itself" of a sensible thing, the "other" that grounds its being and characteristics, is thus another sensible thing that has contrasting properties. These simple examples are, according to Hegel, examples of a quite general phenomenon recently emphasized in the physics of his day, namely, polarity:

If, for example, the determination [*Denkbestimmung*] of *force* has become predominant, the category [*Kategorie*] of *polarity* ... has in recent times played the most important role,—[this category is] the determination of a difference in which the differentiated [components] are *inseparably* bound. It is of infinite importance, that in this manner an advance has been made from the form of abstraction, of identity, through which self-sufficiency is ascribed to a determinateness [*Bestimmtheit*], for example as [a] *force*, and that the form of determining [*Bestimmens*], of difference, which at the same time remains as inseparable in identity, has been emphasized and has become an accepted conception.²²

According to this conception of polarity, then, the ground of the being and characteristics of a thing lies in and among other things that have properties opposed to its own properties, and these opposed properties obtain only through their mutual contrast. This fundamental Hegelian thesis is highly problematic, but for present purposes it need only be understood and not assessed.

According to Hegel's conception of polarity, the content of the opposed properties of a pair of opposed things constitutes the content of a law of nature.²³ The content of a law of nature constitutes in turn the content or determinateness of a "determinate concept."²⁴ Due to apparently similar principles of connection through opposition, the various determinate concepts are interconnected, so that the determinateness of a determinate concept constitutes a determinateness or "moment" of the concept.²⁵ In this manner, the logic of conceptual polarity leads to conceptual *holism*. Somewhat as in "holism of linguistic meaning," the content and determinateness of any particular concept depends upon its connections within the total system of determinate concepts. This "total system" of determinate concepts is what Hegel calls "the concept" (*Begriff*).

Now if one takes the relation between things and the (Hegelian) concept as an ontological hierarchy, or as a transition from worldly things to language, one would misconstrue Hegel's view. Hegel clearly holds that this conceptual holism does not constitute some realm of concepts outside of or apart from worldly things. Because Hegel's holistic principle concerns the interrelation of things through the contrast of their properties, Hegel's designating this principle as "the absolute concept" shows that he holds that concepts are, or, when all determinate concepts are taken in their systematic interconnection, the absolute concept is, an ontological structure of the world itself—not some subjective conception by means of which we constitute the world. If "the concept" were abstracted from the world (as universals often are), it too would be merely "ideal"; it would be just one aspect of a complex whole that cannot obtain apart from the other aspects of this whole.²⁶ Thus the basic model of Hegel's ontology is a radical ontological holism. On the one hand, sensible things have their ground only in the whole world-system, insofar as their characteristics obtain only in and through contrast with opposed characteristics of other things and insofar as they are generated and corrupted through their causal interaction with other things. On the other hand, the concept, as the principle of the constitution of characteristics through contrast, obtains only in and as the interconnection of things and their properties in the world. On Hegel's view, "the idea" and "spirit" are to be understood as further (historical and normative) specifications of this one basic ontological structure.

Of course, this structure is one we can know and verbally articulate; to have done so is Hegel's claim for his philosophy. But he says quite clearly that our knowledge of this world-system only adds the moment of the "being for itself" to this system.²⁷ Since we are part of the world-system, when we achieve knowledge of the world, the world-system achieves self-knowledge through us. In this way our knowledge of the world-system does help to realize the "true nature" of things, because on Hegel's view it is part of the nature of things that their nature become known. But our knowledge of the world does not constitute the content or the structure of the natural world.²⁸ On the contrary, "objective thoughts," fundamental structures of the natural world,²⁹ finally enter our heads by our coming to know that the doctrines set out in Hegel's *Logic* are true.³⁰ Hegel's ontology aims to substantiate, not to reject, realism. On Hegel's view, "the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance."³¹ What he rejects, in addition to subjective idealism, is ontological atomism. The difficulties faced by this ontology are tremendous, and needn't be dwelled upon here.³² It suffices for present purposes to understand Hegel's basic ontology and its deliberate consistency with epistemological realism.³³

Why call this ontology an idealism? Three reasons may be noted. First, according to this ontology, the fundamental structure of the world is conceptual, albeit on an unusual analysis of concepts. Second, according to this ontology, particulars are "phenomenal" and "ideal," albeit with equally unusual analyses of these terms. Third, Hegel holds that this ontological structure has an historical teleology, namely, that the world-system develops towards full self-knowledge and freedom. This is the strand of moral idealism in his ontology.

IV. The Role of Hegel's Idealism in Defending Epistemological Realism

Two points may be noted concerning the role of Hegel's idealism in defending epistemological realism. First, if his holism is correct, if things are what they are only through their contrast with and causal relations to other things, then there can be no epistemically opaque metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality. If everything is interrelated, then whatever is "real" is essentially related to what appears. Because the essential interrelation between "appearance" and "reality" would determine the characteristics of each of them, a thorough investigation of appearances would lead one to comprehend "reality" as well. More specifically, Hegel uses his holism to try to show that even if there is a distinction between substances and their properties, it is a "distinction of reason" and there is nothing more to substances than their properties, so one needn't be embarrassed by "a thing I know not what." Similarly, Hegel argues that even if there is a distinction between a force and its manifestations at any given time, there is nothing more to a force than its total set of manifestations. Thus there is (if Hegel were right about this) nothing to the idea that because things are really only powers that produce various sensations in us, those things might be configured in ways wildly at variance with how they appear to us.³⁴ In sum, Hegel's holism would undo any epistemically opaque physical or metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality.

There is a further regard in which Hegel's holism supports his epistemology. In Chapter Seven, a distinction was noted between those properties of things of which one is explicitly aware and those properties of the same things of which one is not explicitly aware but which are closely related to those of which one is explicitly aware. These were labeled "central" and "incidental" properties, and their distinction constituted the distinction between the object for consciousness and the object to consciousness.³⁵ Hegel's holism would insure that there is a close relation between all of the properties of a thing, and thus a close relation between "central" and "incidental" properties. Since this relation is important to Hegel's account of cognitive self-criticism, Hegel's holism would help insure that productive self-criticism is possible.³⁶

V. Objections to Epistemological Realism in Philosophy of Science

Many objections to epistemological realism stem from current philosophy of science. These objections may be placed under three broad headings: skepticism about induction, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, and the under-determination of theory by observation. Although these topics cannot be examined here in detail, it is worthwhile to see that Hegel's analysis of the structure of consciousness and his further views on empirical knowledge have

important implications that directly meet some of the arguments in the philosophy of science against epistemological realism.

A. INDUCTION AND SKEPTICISM

Hegel's treatment of induction is quite brief and remains apparently unchanged between 1808 and 1830.³⁷ He treats induction as simple enumerative induction, recognizes that the completeness of the sample of empirical individuals is usually unobtainable and cannot be guaranteed, duly indicates that inductive arguments rest on analogical arguments, and notes that the strength of analogical arguments depends on how essential the characteristics in question are to the sample and the class of individuals concerned. How Hegel proposes to distinguish between essential and accidental characteristics, and so between essential and accidental correlations, is a complex issue that cannot be discussed here. What is important here is that Hegel quite clearly does not hold that inductive arguments result in knowledge about as-yet unobserved instances of a generalization. Inductive arguments represent the "suspicion" (*Ahnen*) that some characteristic is essential to a kind of thing, and they provide a basis for further investigation.³⁸ That's not nothing, and Hegel explicitly states that such procedures have led to important results. But this is not to say that those procedures themselves generate knowledge; the research they ground is what generates knowledge.³⁹

Part of the upshot of Hegel's rejection of the view that inductive arguments themselves generate knowledge is to introduce a kind of fallibilism into his analysis of empirical knowledge (according to which all empirical scientific claims are open to revision), and to reject the K-K thesis with respect to empirical knowledge. To articulate a tenable fallibilism requires a tenable analysis of the notion of "approximate truth." Hegel held that knowledge could be approximately true, and I believe that he had many of the materials required for working out such a view. One point on this difficult topic should be noticed here. Hegel's account of the self-critical structure of consciousness shows that conceptions of knowledge and of the world are adopted and revised in the course of applying those conceptions to their objects. Hegel also holds that the revision of an inadequate scientific conception (or set of conceptions—Hegel is a holist about meaning) transpires in experimental and cognitive interchange with the objects of those conceptions, and so only on the basis of further knowledge about that kind of object can one have either the reasons or the resources for conceptual revision. To infer a skeptical conclusion from the continual revision of scientific conceptions is to overlook the crucial role of prior conceptions in generating the information that leads to their revision.

B. THEORY CHANGE AND CHANGE OF REFERENTS

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend have offered an argument against realism that has attracted a good deal of attention.⁴⁰ Even if this is not Kuhn's main argument for the "incommensurability" of different theories,⁴¹ and even if few still find it persuasive, it may be worth seeing that Hegel had a reply to it 150 years in advance, especially because it highlights an important feature of his view of knowledge.

Kuhn and Feyerabend's argument takes as a point of departure the rejection of "knowledge by acquaintance," a knowledge untainted by theoretical commitments that would allow one to check a theory's predictions against the bare, uninterpreted observed facts.⁴² Once this way of checking the truth of scientific theories is relinquished, their argument runs roughly like this. Fundamental changes in scientific theory involve fundamental

changes in the senses of key terms within that theory. For example, the equation for gravity involves different variables in Newtonian and in Einsteinian mechanics. The sense of a term or sentence determines its reference, where the sense may be parsed as a description. Thus terms with different senses refer to different things. Therefore, fundamental changes in scientific theory involve changes of the referents of the key terms. Therefore, two supposedly competing theories are not about the same things at all. For example, "the physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no means identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name."⁴³

Hegel's analysis of the structure of consciousness entails that sense (*qua* description) alone does not determine reference; sensory and motor abilities are needed, too. Emphasizing these abilities is fundamental to Hegel's philosophical 'counter-revolution' and to his insistence on analyzing, not only conceptions of objects, but also how those objects are *for* consciousness when construed under those conceptions. Notice that Hegel must be committed to this claim. If "sense determined reference" in the way that Kuhn and Feyerabend suppose, then the distinction between "the world according to consciousness" and "the world for consciousness" could never be made manifest (given that Hegel, too, is committed to the rejection of knowledge by acquaintance, and so to the rejection of empiricist foundationalism). As opposed to this, Hegel's phenomenological dialectic functions by rigorously pursuing the application of conceptions to their objects until the discrepancies between what a conception of an object entails ought to occur and what does occur in the course of that application are apparent. Hegel's view is not that sense *qua* (implicit) description has nothing to do with reference; if it had nothing to do with reference no discrepancy between conceptions and their objects could be experienced, either. It is precisely because there are, on Hegel's view, two partially independent factors involved in identifying and referring to objects that we can learn from their dissonance. Those two factors, again, are one's conceptions of knowledge and of the world (which ought to, and are taken to, correctly describe their objects) and the intellectual and bodily skills and behavior by means of which we apply those conceptions to their putative objects and manipulate those objects in accord with those conceptions and our practical and inquisitive interests. To reinforce this point of interpretation further, notice that the object of a form of consciousness remains the same throughout each major section of the *Phenomenology*, even though the conceptions of that object change radically. Such constancy of reference (or identity of referent) through radical alteration of "sense" or conception shows again that consciousness' cognitive involvement with its objects cannot be solely a matter of descriptionalist reference.⁴⁴ Even if one attended solely to the preservative aspect of Hegel's putative *Aufhebungen* of forms of consciousness, the sense attached to the "preserved" elements is so different as to preclude even the weaker "cluster concept" analysis of how sense determines reference.⁴⁵

In point of philosophical theory, Hegel seems to be right to reject the view that sense determines reference. This was made clear by Keith Donnellan's examples of referring to someone as "the man in the corner with the martini," where the speaker is corrected by a listener because the martini glass (unbeknownst to the speaker) contains water instead of gin.⁴⁶ Donnellan's example highlights Hegel's point about the joint use of conceptual and perceptual abilities (the object according to consciousness and the object for consciousness) in picking out and making claims about objects. Gareth Evans has recently highlighted the sensory and motor abilities presupposed by use of demonstratives.⁴⁷ This duality of abilities, conceptual as well as perceptual and motor, is found in scientific knowledge, too. Ian Hacking has recently emphasized the importance of experimentation for philosophy of science and for scientific knowledge.⁴⁸ One of the points he makes is that a research team

often comprises representatives of not only divergent but logically incompatible theories, each researcher being able to handle certain aspects of the experiment better than the others by using their particular theory.⁴⁹ This point highlights the more familiar one that experiments can be and are reinterpreted in terms of various theories. Therefore, the fact that experimental observations need to be events "for" us in order to theorize about them does not entail that those observations either are merely whatever we conceive them to be or are restricted to use within a single theory. Indeed, it is only because of the distinction between what the experimental phenomena are conceived to be (according to a given theory) and what the predicted observations are *for* the scientist, that scientists can learn anything by experiment. These recent philosophical developments have been mentioned not to claim that Hegel clairvoyantly preempted them, but to show that there is a position to be made out here and that Hegel is clearly committed to it in advance. The development of that position, and especially of Hegel's commitment to it, of course, must wait upon a detailed examination of the body of the *Phenomenology*.

C. THE UNDERDETERMINATION OF SCIENTIFIC THEORY BY OBSERVATION

Hegel's epistemological method does not apply directly to the problems for realism raised by problems of theory selection and the underdetermination of theory by observation because his method functions at a broad categorial level at which conceptions of objects and conceptions of knowledge of those objects have implications for one another. Though Hegel is aware of the problem of the underdetermination of theory by observation, the gist of his view is that forces are exhausted by their manifestations, and that laws of nature ultimately describe manifest natural phenomena. Hegel's views about our knowledge of forces and laws of nature cannot be explored further in this study.⁵⁰ I mention the issue here only to insist that it is a different problem from the one central to the *Phenomenology*.⁵¹ The central problem of the *Phenomenology* is an epistemological concern with our knowledge of the macro world of ordinary phenomena. Typically this issue is taken as settled in the debates about the reality of theoretical entities.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S ARGUMENT IN THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*

I. Introduction

In previous chapters I have argued that Hegel's method generates a second-level realism, that is, that his examination of forms of consciousness purports to result in an account of the real nature of knowledge and its objects. I have also argued that the ontological aspect of Hegel's brand of idealism is a realist account of the world, and thus is compatible with epistemological realism. However, I have only suggested that the form of consciousness purported to result from his examination is itself realist at the first-order level of empirical knowledge, and I have said nothing about the putative social and historical bases of this final form of consciousness. Though substantiating my interpretation of these matters would require a commentary unto itself, I owe the reader some specific indication of how to approach the body of Hegel's text in view of the issues I have emphasized in earlier chapters. This chapter aims to make plausible my contention that there is a unified, sustained, if complex, argument throughout the body of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, an epistemological argument purporting to prove that epistemological realism is true and that empirical knowledge is socially and historically grounded.

In section II, I briefly consider some of the controversy concerning the unity of the *Phenomenology*. My main aim will be to show that there are substantial indications, prior to Hegel's writing the *Phenomenology* in 1806-07, that the full range of issues included in his discussion, especially those on culture, belong in the book. This evidence helps bolster my claim that there is a single, over-arching (if multi-faceted) argument throughout the *Phenomenology*. Section III considers some of the immediate historical context of Hegel's discussion. Much has been made about the purported lineage of German idealism from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel. I think that this lineage has been misunderstood. More specifically, I contend that Hegel rejects the idealism of all three of his predecessors and that the argumentative strategy he adopts in opposing them is based on an important methodological point made by Kant. Noting Hegel's opposition to Fichte and Schelling helps to clarify the epistemological aim of two major sections of the *Phenomenology*. Section IV provides an overview of the structure of Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology* for epistemological realism. Section V then gives a detailed summary of the main methodological and substantive points of Hegel's argument for socially grounded epistemological realism in the body of the *Phenomenology*.

II. The Unity of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*

It is commonly believed that Hegel's *Phenomenology* is not a unitary work, that in the midst of his frantic writing Hegel changed his intentions for the work and drew in a good deal of social and historical material, amounting to half the book's length, extraneous to the original intent of the work. Hegel dropped his original plan to write a "science of the

experience of consciousness" (the planned title for the work) and turned it into a "phenomenology of spirit" instead.¹ Part of the evidence cited for this putative schism is the apparent contrast between the historically oriented Preface and the methodological Introduction that concentrates solely on consciousness and its experience. This contrast is highlighted by the fact that the Introduction was written prior to the rest of the book whereas the Preface was written with several weeks' retrospect.

It is important to note, however, that the last paragraph of the Introduction already mentions the coincidence of the examination of consciousness with "the science of spirit proper"² and claims that only when consciousness realizes that its self-examination converges with the "science of spirit" will the level of absolute knowledge be reached. There is a duality to Hegel's *Phenomenology*, but it is not between the first and second halves of the book, and it is not a conflict between a "science of the experience of consciousness" and a "phenomenology of spirit." The "phenomenology of spirit" is in the plan, at least in outline, from the beginning. The examination of consciousness cannot be concluded without it, and it cannot be concluded before the last chapter of the book, according to Hegel's Introduction. Furthermore, Hegel's previous study, known as the *Jenenser Philosophie des Geistes* (Jena Philosophy of Spirit) of 1805-06, already includes art, history, religion, and ethical life within the realm of spirit. Hegel must have had these topics in mind when claiming in the Introduction that "[t]he experience which consciousness makes of itself can, according to the concept of experience, comprehend in itself nothing less than the whole system of consciousness or the whole realm of the truth of spirit."³ It is important to see that Hegel has both of these projects in mind, both the "science of the experience of consciousness" and the "phenomenology of spirit," and that both are important to his overall project. The two projects are completed once they coincide.⁴

III. The Lineage of German Idealism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel

Part of what has made Hegel's philosophy difficult to understand, and difficult to construe as realism, is the "subject-object" terminology he inherited from Fichte and Schelling. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all found in Kant's first *Critique* many exciting points never intended by Kant and never countenanced by Kant scholars. It is plain that all three played fast and loose with Kant's transcendental deduction, and it would be obtuse to worry whether any of them 'got Kant right.' What is more pertinent is to try to see some central points of Hegel's agreement and disagreement with his predecessors in order to understand his idiom and procedure. Doing so helps clarify Hegel's plan to defend epistemological realism by using quasi-transcendental regressive arguments.

Many of the first readers of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and especially the German Idealists, were deeply troubled by the skeptical character of Kant's distinction between transcendental reality and empirical reality. Fichte and Schelling sought to oppose Kant's skepticism by developing Kant's views on apperception into a model of all knowledge. The attractive feature of Kantian apperception is the identity of the knower and the object of knowledge.⁵ This became the paradigm of knowledge for the so-called "identity philosophy." Fichte, and after him, the young Schelling, attempted to ground the whole of philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics as well) on the principle of self-consciousness, on the alleged fundamental identity of knowing subject and known object found in self-consciousness. This fundamental identity, evident in self-awareness, was to be the indubitable, infallible, and incorrigible foundation of the whole edifice of philosophy.

In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel indicates what a proof of this alleged identity requires, complaining that Schelling had simply presupposed the "indifference of subjectivity and objectivity":⁶

The true proof that this identity of subjective and objective is the truth, could only be brought about by means of each of the two being investigated in its logical, *i.e.* essential determinations; and in regard to them, it must be shown that the subjective signifies the transformation of itself into the objective, and that the objective is such that it does not remain such, but makes itself subjective In doing so, this unity of opposites is not asserted beforehand, but in the opposites themselves it is shown that their truth is their unity, but that each taken by itself is one-sided⁷

Hegel's talk of the "transformation" [*verwandeln*] of the subjective into the objective, *etc.*, is less than pellucid, but part of what he means by this transformation is that what is objective is cognitively accessible to subjectivity, and that subjectivity is capable of cognizing the objective.⁸ This point will be returned to shortly, for Hegel insists on this point against Schelling, though fortunately in greater detail, in a passage from the *Phenomenology* discussed below (p. 164f.). Hegel's point that Schelling's "point of indifference," his principle of "subject-object identity," needs to be demonstrated instead of merely presupposed looks like a fair but unsurprising requirement. However, Hegel's requirement incorporates a fundamental philosophical re-orientation.

Fichte's philosophy was roundly criticized for not being able to get beyond the circle of his own representations and having only the weakest argument against solipsism. Schelling's break with Fichte came with his realization that if the principle of "subject-object identity" were taken seriously, then not only should it be possible to "deduce the object from the subject" (as Fichte had attempted), but it should also be possible to "deduce the subject from the object." This realization led to Schelling's "breakthrough" [*Durchbruch*], his founding of *Naturphilosophie* (philosophy of nature or ontology) as an independent philosophical counterpart to, having parity status with, *Tranzendentalphilosophie* (theory of knowledge). This was the achievement of Schelling's "transcendental idealism" (first announced in his 1799 "*Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*"), and this was the signal advance heralded in Hegel's first serious published work, "The Difference Between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy" (the so-called "*Differenzschrift*" of 1801). The problem with this advance, as Hegel came to recognize, is that Schelling failed to account for how the claims made in his *Naturphilosophie* could be known, or indeed, how it could be known that there are two branches of philosophy, *Naturphilosophie* and *Tranzendentalphilosophie*, and that they have equal status. Schelling's pronouncements were mere assertions, and as such begged the question against dissenters and licensed others to beg the question in return.

In demanding that the putative fundamental identity of subject and object be demonstrated, Hegel is not merely calling for a justification of Fichte's and Schelling's principles. He is rejecting their fundamental philosophical orientation. Those who attempt to trace Hegel's ontology terminologically from his predecessors have gone awry by failing to notice Hegel's *volte face*.⁹ Fichte's orientation supposes that only if the *ratio cognoscendi* and the *ratio essendi* (the reason or cause of knowledge and the reason or cause of being) are exactly the same can anyone have unshakable knowledge of anything. The problem, as Hegel repeatedly points out, is that once they have ascended to their self-positing, self-knowing transcendental ego, neither Fichte nor the young Schelling can do any better than Descartes in deriving knowledge of anything else from their fundamental principle. Indeed, they are in a worse position to do so, insofar as Descartes allowed himself all of his ideas

of simple natures, while Fichte sought to derive the plurality of categories out of the simplicity of the "I think," and Schelling sought to derive them from a fundamental polarity. Schelling finally drops this strategy by promoting *Naturphilosophie* to equal status with *Transcendentalphilosophie*, but in this promotion Schelling disowns any epistemological guidelines for ontology and opens the door to irresolvable dogmatism and question-begging.

Hegel's response to their difficulties is to reject the supposed identity between the *ratio cognoscendi* and the *ratio essendi*. He rejoins Kant by taking up again this medieval distinction and putting it to epistemological use. Indeed, he does so at one of the same points where Kant insisted on this distinction. Hegel contends that self-consciousness is a *result* and not an "unconditioned beginning," as Fichte or the early Schelling would have it. Hegel thus rejoins Kant, who argued in the "Refutation of Idealism" that the simple fact of self-consciousness presupposed among its conditions the awareness of a real world.¹⁰ Because the *ratio cognoscendi* and the *ratio essendi* are not the same, indeed, because they are (in this domain) inverse, Kant can argue that because self-consciousness depends for its occurrence upon awareness of a real world, a proof that we know such a world can be mounted on the bare fact of self-awareness. It is worth recalling Kant's view a bit more fully at this point.

One aspect of Kant's doctrines concerning the transcendental unity of apperception is that each of us can be self-conscious only insofar as we unite within one judgment a number of distinct representations. Uniting a number of distinct sensations into a percept of an object, according to Kant, requires subsuming them under a rule that governs the objective order in which the object causes the given sensations, this being a function of the objective structure of the object perceived. To subsume a set of sensations under such a rule enables us to distinguish between the objective structure of the perceived object and the subjective order of the occurrence of our percepts of the object. Hence by unifying a set of sensations under such a rule we are capable of being aware both of objects in the world *and* of ourselves, for we are only able to be self-aware by distinguishing ourselves from the things we perceive. The conjunction of two factors makes representations into a representation of an object, an extensional factor concerning the actual cause of some sensations, and an intensional factor of taking those sensations to be sensations of that object.¹¹ Something very like this, at least, is to be found in Kant's Deduction, Analogies, and Refutation of Idealism.

When Hegel speaks of consciousness "finding itself in the world," what he is claiming is that the objects consciousness knows have a structure that is fundamentally the same structure as that of consciousness itself, and that this structure of worldly objects is entirely accessible cognitively. According to Hegel, objects just are a unified group of properties, including perceptible properties. Analogously, self-awareness obtains only as the unification of a group of sensations into a cognition *of the object* which caused them. Due to this, the occurrence of self-awareness through the judgmental unification of a diverse set of sensations is only possible because of the ontological unity of the properties in the thing causing those sensations. In this way, the distinction between worldly objects and self-consciousness is not a difference of content, but a difference of "form": Worldly objects aren't self-aware; humans are, and they are aware of worldly objects. Furthermore, we are aware of objects themselves and not merely our representing of them. (Hegel is a direct realist, though not a naive realist, about perception.)

Hegel does not collapse objects into sets of conscious states. Instead, as misleading as his idiom may seem today, he insists in his early writings that this "identity" of subject and known object is an "identity in difference." Subject and object are two distinct aspects in

cognition, but there is no difference of content between them, and the subject obtains only in cognizing objects. The early Hegel speaks of "identity" as a banner heralding his opposition to Kant's skeptical distinction (or "non-identity") between empirical and transcendental reality. As Henry Harris has shown, the badge of "identity" in Hegel's early views marks his affirmation of the correspondence conception of truth in conjunction with a realist ontology.¹² Hegel's early use of "identity" therefore is fundamentally an expression of epistemological realism, and a very optimistic one indeed.

It is important to note, however, that Hegel discards the idiom of "subject-object identity" in the *Phenomenology*. This is because he discards the "abstract" conception of identity on which it rests. "Abstract" identity is two things in the parlance of German idealists: it is numerical identity, and it is the self-identity of mutually independent entities. ("Abstract identity" is thus what is ordinarily thought of as "identity.") Hegel rejects the idiom of subject-object identity because it is misleading as an expression of epistemological realism precisely because it connotes identifying the subject and the object numerically. Mistaking Hegel's special sense of "identity" would lead (and has led) to attributing to him the very subjective idealism he so thoroughly criticizes. Hegel's preferred conception of "concrete" identity would now be expressed as mutual implication, biconditionality, a formula unavailable to him in the term logic of the day. The biconditional relevant here is Hegel's claim that humans can be self-conscious if and only if they are conscious of an independently existing natural (and social) world.¹³ Hegel thus adapts his argumentative strategy from Kant's. However, Hegel recognizes that, because Kant's transcendental idealist account of the categories and their application cannot be sustained, something other than a noumenal ego must be among the noetic conditions of self-consciousness. Hegel replaces Kant's *a priori* transcendental account of the noumenal ego with an account of the social and historical conditions of individual thinkers. In doing so, Hegel also aims to solve the problem of self-knowledge that bedeviled not only Kant, but also Fichte and Schelling. Self-knowledge is gained by retrospectively comprehending one's own history of action, according to Hegel.¹⁴

Having adopted Kant's methodological use of the distinction between the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi*, Hegel employs it throughout the *Phenomenology* to show that alternative accounts of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and of reason, fail and fail precisely insofar as they attempt to elude or deny these historical, social, and natural bases of knowledge and its objects. Hegel's strategic challenge to the presumption of transcendental knowledge¹⁵ shows his agreement with Kant about the relation between the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi*: That we're capable of even inadequate transcendental knowledge entails that we're not only capable of empirical knowledge, but also actually have some. In this way, Hegel deploys a style of argumentation very close to that of Kant's transcendental arguments, arguing that some controversial philosophical thesis in fact expresses a necessary condition of an obvious facet of our experience. Additionally, Hegel's analysis of the structure of consciousness enables him to restrict the range of possible alternative accounts to those which are plausible accounts of actual human abilities and objects. This is part of what is involved in assessing epistemic and ontological principles as well as the fit of those principles with "the world for consciousness" and "knowledge for consciousness."¹⁶

IV. The Structure of Hegel's Argument for Epistemological Realism

A glance at the Table of Contents of the *Phenomenology* reveals that its structure is complicated, not only by division into sections, chapters, and subchapters, but also by two overlapping systems of numbering, the coordination of which is not at all obvious. It is not my purpose here to disentangle Hegel's involuted numbering. Here I indicate only how the major parts of his book form the components of a sustained, complex argument for socio-historically grounded epistemological realism. In the next section I indicate where and how the main theses and a number of the sub-theses involved in Hegel's argument are defended in the course of his discussion. I must issue one caveat: in elucidating the epistemological concerns of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, I do not claim that these are the only concerns of Hegel's book. The *Phenomenology* is nothing if not nuanced and multi-valent. I wish to argue only that there is a central, sustained epistemological argument in his book.¹⁷

One major division in Hegel's argument can be made out by recalling Kant's distinction between an "objective" and a "subjective" deduction, or defense, of empirical knowledge.¹⁸ An objective deduction, in Kant's terminology, aims to show that we can legitimately apply conceptions to objects; a subjective deduction aims to provide a philosophy of mind that explains how this ability is possible. The aim of an objective deduction is two-fold: to show that the world is structured in a way which amenable to being known, and to show that we're capable of having knowledge of the world. These are addressed in the first two major sections of the *Phenomenology*. (Please note that this two-fold aim is the same one Hegel stressed in his criticism of Schelling, quoted above [p. 151].) Due to the indirect style of proof required by regressive, quasi-transcendental argumentation, many, if not most, of Hegel's positive conclusions are reached by attacking the contra-positive position, typically, a view espoused by one of his opponents.

In the first section of the *Phenomenology*, titled "Consciousness," Hegel argues three main points: Our empirical knowledge requires applying conceptions to objects, the structure of the world can be captured in our conceptions, and our consciousness of objects is only possible if we are self-conscious beings. In this section Hegel thus aims to re-establish a number of Kantian views about empirical knowledge without recourse to Kant's transcendental idealism. In the second major section of the *Phenomenology*, titled "Self-Consciousness," Hegel completes his objective deduction by arguing that our self-consciousness is only possible if we are conscious of an independently existing world. This section contains extensive criticism of Fichte.

Hegel's subjective deduction occupies the remainder of the *Phenomenology*. Having defended the possibility of our empirical knowledge in the first two major sections of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel begins to explore the grounds of its possibility in the third major section, "Reason." Here he argues that empirical knowledge is not merely a natural or individual phenomenon. More positively, he argues that our theoretical reason is grounded in practical reasoning, and that our practical reason is socially (as well as naturally) grounded. This section contains extensive criticism of Schelling and also an important passage bearing on the method and structure of Hegel's discussion, revealing the division of his argument into an objective and a subjective deduction. The passage is discussed in detail below (p. 164f.).

Having argued that human reasoning is fundamentally a naturally based social phenomenon, Hegel explores some important structural features of social thought in the fourth major section of the *Phenomenology*, "Spirit." Here Hegel argues that our categories of thought are not constituted merely by custom or fiat, nor are they corrigible merely *a priori*. More

positively, Hegel argues that the corrigibility of categorial thought (whether theoretical or practical) is a social phenomenon. In this section Hegel boldly *identifies* absolute spirit with the human community. This section contains another important methodological passage that stresses the regressive character of his argument. This passage is also discussed below (p. 174f.).

Having argued that human thought and action is fundamentally social, Hegel recognizes that this is hardly a traditional, obvious, or commonsensical view of the matter. If we are such collective beings, we certainly aren't or haven't been conscious of our collective social nature. In the fifth major section of the *Phenomenology*, "Religion," Hegel seeks to interpret religion as part of the development and one of the first manifestations of our self-awareness as collective, social beings. In this section Hegel boldly identifies God with speculative knowledge! (Note that God is identified with knowledge, rather than being identified as the object of knowledge.)

In the final major section of the *Phenomenology*, "Absolute Knowledge," Hegel argues that the proper form of our empirical and philosophical knowledge is presented in his theory of knowledge. Human knowledge is socially grounded, although it has nature itself as (part of) its object. He provides a summary of how his discussion purportedly leads to this conclusion. Most important to my purposes here are his reiteration of his epistemological realism and his own gloss on the "production" of objects of knowledge being their conceptual reproduction.

Before entering into my more detailed summary of Hegel's discussion, I invite the reader to examine the chart on pp. 156-157. The left-hand side restates Hegel's Table of Contents. I have included two bracketed emendations, which are discussed below. The right-hand side states the theses defended in Hegel's argument for socio-historically based epistemological realism. I have included several sub-theses discussed below, and I indicate the locations of Hegel's arguments for these theses and sub-theses. (In this chart I have occasionally substituted shorter labels for Hegel's subsection heads; "t.s." abbreviates "to show.")

V. Summary of Hegel's Epistemological Argument in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*

One purpose of the following summary of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is to indicate where and how Hegel argues for the view of knowledge that I have been attributing to him throughout this study. This occasion will also allow me to fill in further details of the view Hegel defends. I hope also to suggest how Hegel's procedure in the body of the *Phenomenology* exhibits the kind of method I have reconstructed in earlier chapters. In the following summary I thus emphasize Hegel's epistemological argument, indicating also the purpose of those subchapters not directly tied to this overarching aim of his book. I pay special attention to key passages in which Hegel remarks on his own aims and method, and I address passages which may appear to contradict the interpretation of his theory of knowledge that I have offered.

In recounting the structure of his argument, I follow Hegel's own order of exposition, though I do not comment on all his many subchapters individually. Following Hegel's order of exposition is somewhat hazardous, for he inserts explanations of his method and strategy with little warning. These hazards could only be avoided in a full-fledged commentary, so I ask the reader's forbearance. Limitations of space prohibit consideration of alternative interpretations of Hegel's argument and require that quotations be few. Most

A. CONSCIOUSNESS	I. <i>Sense-Certainty; The "this" and meaning</i> II. <i>Perception; The thing and deception</i> III. <i>Force & Understanding; Appearance and the super-sensible world</i>
B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS	IV. <i>The Truth of Self-Certainty [Life & Desire]</i> IVA. <i>Independence & Dependence of Self-consciousness; Master & slave</i> IVB. <i>Freedom of Consciousness</i> STOICISM SKEPTICISM UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS
C. (AA.)	V. <i>Certainty & Truth of Reason</i>
	VA. <i>Observing Reason</i> a. OBSERVATION OF NATURE b. OBSERVATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS I: LOGIC & PSYCHOLOGY c. OBSERVATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS II: PHYSIOGNOMY & PHRENOLOGY
REASON	VB. <i>The Self-actualization of Rational Self-consciousness</i> a. PLEASURE & NECESSITY b. LAW OF THE HEART & THE INSANITY OF CONCEPT c. VIRTUE & THE WAY OF THE WORLD
	VC. <i>Individuality that is Real In & For Itself</i> a. THE SPIRITUAL ANIMAL REALM & HUMBUG b. LEGISLATIVE REASON c. LAW-TESTING REASON
(BB.)	VI. <i>Spirit</i>
	VIA. <i>True Spirit; Ethics</i> a. THE ETHICAL WORLD: HUMAN & DIVINE LAW; MAN & WOMAN b. ETHICAL ACTION: HUMAN & DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, GUILT & FATE c. LEGAL STATUS
[IMMEDIATE] SPIRIT	VIB. <i>Self-Alienated Spirit; Enculturation</i> a. THE WORLD OF SELF-ALIENATED SPIRIT i. Enculturation & its realm of actuality ii. Faith & pure insight b. THE ENLIGHTENMENT i. The enlightenment vs. superstition ii. The truth of the enlightenment c. ABSOLUTE FREEDOM & THE TERROR
	VIC. <i>Self-Certain Spirit; Morality</i> a. THE MORAL WORLD-VIEW b. DISSEMBLANCE c. CONSCIENCE; THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL, EVIL & ITS FORGIVENESS
(CC.)	VII. <i>Religion</i>
	VIIA. <i>Natural Religion</i> a. THE 'LIGHT-BEING' b. PLANTS & ANIMALS c. THE ARTIFICER
RELIGION	VIIIB. <i>Art-Religion</i> a. THE ABSTRACT WORK OF ART b. THE LIVING WORK OF ART c. THE SPIRITUAL WORK OF ART
	VIIIC. <i>Revealed Religion</i>
(DD.) ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE	VIII.

-
- t.s.: Knowledge of particulars requires identifying them by applying conceptions to them.
- t.s.: Observation terms alone are insufficient for empirical knowledge. OBJECTIVE
- t.s.: 1. Statements of laws of nature are conceptual and express actual structures of nature.
2. Consciousness of objects is possible only if we're self-conscious.
-

- t.s.: Biological needs involve classification & entail realism about objects meeting those needs.
- t.s.: The natural world is not constituted at will; a lesson in realism.

DEDUCTION

- t.s.: 1. The contents of consciousness are derived from a public world.
2. Self-consciousness is possible only if we're conscious of objects.
-

- t.s.: Classificatory thought presupposes natural structures in the world which must be discovered.

- t.s.: Classificatory, categorial thought is not merely a *natural* phenomenon.

- t.s.: Categorial thought is not a merely *individual* phenomenon.

Implicit result: Individual thinkers are who they are only within a natural and social context.
Each of the preceding sections have analyzed different aspects of one concrete social whole.

- t.s.: Categorial thought is not constituted merely by *custom* or by *fiat*.

(Analysis of the tension and interaction between individual reasoning & customary practice.)

- t.s.: Categorial thought is not corrigible merely *a priori*.

(Criticism of Kant's theory of moral action.)

- t.s.: The corrigibility of categorial thought is a *social* phenomenon.

-
- t.s.: Religion as the initial, allegorical, premature recognition of the social and historical bases of categorial comprehension of the world.

-
- t.s.: Reflective conceptual comprehension of the social and historical bases of categorial comprehension of the world. (= socio-historically based epistemological realism.)
-

often I can only tie my discussion to Hegel's text by citing page and line numbers in my notes. Also, I organize my discussion following Hegel's own numbering scheme, as presented in Hoffmeister's 1952 edition and in Miller's translation. The following summary is therefore a sketch of an interpretation, and not, by any means, a complete interpretation. Proper exegesis and defense of my interpretation must await a sequel. For the interested reader I have, however, provided references in the notes to the best discussions in English familiar to me of individual chapters and subchapters of the *Phenomenology*.

A. CONSCIOUSNESS

The first major section of the *Phenomenology* is titled "Consciousness," and it examines what is required to be conscious of objects. It contains three chapters, "Sense-Certainty," "Perception," and "Force and Understanding." These chapters loosely parallel Theaetetus's three accounts of knowledge and Kant's three elements of knowledge (intuition, sensibility, and understanding). However, no account of these abilities is given in this section; that is for later sections and, indeed, later books.

I. *Sense-Certainty*. The sense-certainty chapter provides an argument for one of Kant's dicta, that intuitions without conceptions are blind, and against the possibility of non-conceptual cognitive apprehension of objects, more recently known by Russell's phrase, "knowledge by acquaintance." "Sense-Certainty" presents a naive realism, according to which there is a world that is what it is independently of our thought, and that can be known intuitively or "immediately," that is, without applying conceptions to it.¹⁹ By beginning with a form of consciousness that holds this realism, Hegel discharges his own realist contentions in the Introduction. His aim is to retain the realist tenet of this ontology while rejecting a-conceptual empirical knowledge and, with that, rejecting correspondence as a criterion of truth. Hegel argues on internal, phenomenological grounds rather than arguing against a-conceptual empirical knowledge on the basis of a very controversial philosophy of mind, as does Kant. He focuses on the use of singular demonstrative pronouns (tokens of indexical terms like "this," "that," "here," and "now"²⁰) in putative knowledge claims, for use of descriptive terms would either cede or beg the point of the necessity of universal conceptions for knowledge. Hegel argues that even the use of tokens of indexical terms requires understanding indexical type terms and the implicit spatio-temporal coordinate framework they presuppose. Understanding indexical terms as tokens of types that have sense only within an implicit coordinate framework is far too much mediation to count as "immediate knowledge," for it presupposes conceptions of space, time, self, and individuation. Conceptions of identity and individuation are necessary for knowledge, insofar as they are necessary for identifying and individuating objects of knowledge and for identifying and individuating cognitive episodes and subjects of cognitive episodes. These conceptions thus involve or entail a conception of number, or at least of plurality. Hegel's argument shows the necessity of these elementary logical, spatial, and temporal conceptions for empirical knowledge. His argument also shows that these are *a priori* conceptions, insofar as having these conceptions is presupposed by any experience that could serve for learning or defining any *a posteriori* concept. Furthermore, successful use of indexicals indicates that we have the ability to determine the scope or range of time or space designated as relevantly "here" or "now,"²¹ but this obvious ability cannot be accounted for without recognizing our application of universal conceptions to the particulars we designate. Sense-certainty is an inadequate form of consciousness on all of these counts. In refuting this view of knowledge, Hegel refutes any form of epistemologi-

cal foundationalism worth holding.²² The important thing that Hegel sees, unlike many recent critics of foundationalism, is that in giving up foundationalism one needn't give up realism. Realism survives the loss of the myth of the given and the loss of the myth of confronting theories with the brute facts or other unconceptualized reality. How realism survives this is, of course, a complicated story.

II. *Perception.* By refuting "knowledge by acquaintance" Hegel refutes the epistemological grounds supporting phenomenalist, sense-data, and impressions ontologies and also those supporting representational theories of perception. Hence these kinds of theories and the problems they generate are not addressed in this chapter. In "Perception" Hegel examines a problem dealt with extensively in Modern philosophy, how to perceive a single item amidst its multifarious properties. Some kinds of descriptive universals are admitted at this stage, namely, those denoting perceptible properties of things.²³ Important as these abilities are, however, they do not suffice for knowledge of such common particulars as a cube of salt because perception alone cannot account for the unity of its object amidst its diverse properties, and it cannot account for the unity of its judgments about any object. (It's not by sense perception alone that we identify the white color and the sour taste as properties of one and the same grain of salt.) While Locke accounts for the conception of the identity of a perceptible object by "presumption" and "inadvertency,"²⁴ Hume struggles with the realization that the conceptions of the identity and individuation of perceptible objects cannot be wrought from the logical conceptions of unity, number, and plurality.²⁵

Hegel argues that the logical and sensory conceptions introduced in "Sense-Certainty" do not suffice for perceptual knowledge. His argument aims to show several closely related points. First, the conception of unity required for perceptual knowledge is the conception of the identity of one thing with a variety of properties enduring through some period of time. More importantly, this conception cannot be accounted for by appeal to the logical conceptions of unity and number, so that observation and logical terms alone are insufficient for empirical knowledge. (Hegel thus refutes concept empiricism, as defined in Chapter Four.) This establishes that the conception of the identity of a perceptible object is *a priori*, thus showing that epistemic passivism, the thesis that the subject need only passively apprehend its object in order to comprehend it, is false.²⁶ Hence empirical knowledge requires more than mere perception. Observation terms do not suffice for knowledge; a variety of abstract conceptions, inferences, and judgments must be admitted into an account of human knowledge. Moreover, solving the problems of perception lays the groundwork for replacing a passive model of things as substances bearing attributes with an active model of things as forces manifesting themselves in diverse effects. Most important to Hegel is his conclusion that the conception of the identity of perceptible things that emerges from his phenomenological examination of consciousness is an "unconditioned universal" in the sense of a concept combining opposed determinations, *viz.*, unity and plurality.²⁷

III. *Force and Understanding.* The perception chapter shows that concrete or "unconditioned" universals (as Hegel actually calls them) are necessary for perceptual knowledge by deriving one example of such a concept. It remains for the following chapter, "Force and Understanding," to develop these conceptions more generally.²⁸ One main aim of this chapter is to show that the conception of the identity of a multi-propertyed enduring thing requires conceptions of substance and causation because these conceptions are necessary for discerning that some qualities are properties of one thing rather than another. Another main aim of this chapter is to show that the postulation of causally active substances does

not lead either to Locke's "thing I know not what" or to Kant's unknowable "thing in itself." Hegel achieves this aim by defending a phenomenological account of laws of nature, according to which laws of nature formulate the relations among manifest phenomena. This view of laws of nature has roots in Newtonian theory and had its first great historical example in Joseph Black's theory of specific and latent heats. This view was prominent in German physics throughout the nineteenth century, and in the British Isles as well, and it is found most recently in phenomenological thermodynamics.²⁹ Hegel purports to show that nothing more can be attributed to any force or set of forces than precisely the array of manifest phenomena that they are postulated to explain, so that ultimately there is nothing more to "forces" than the conceptual interrelation of manifest phenomena. These interrelations are, on Hegel's view, objective features of those phenomena, and it is precisely the aim of conceiving those phenomena to accurately formulate those interrelations. In this way, there is nothing more to "forces" or laws of nature than what appears in natural phenomena. Because the interrelations among and within natural phenomena are not strictly speaking perceptible, but nonetheless are objective, features of those phenomena,³⁰ those interrelations are conceptual in nature and concepts are in nature. This is roughly how Hegel attempts to introduce the ontology discussed in the previous chapter into the *Phenomenology*.³¹ Part of Hegel's defense of this view is a critique of the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation, in which Hegel gives objections that have only recently become commonplace.³²

At the end of the consciousness section, Hegel indicates that explanation, and with that, empirical knowledge, is possible for us only if we are self-conscious beings. This is one half of the joint thesis he aims to establish—that consciousness of objects is possible for us only if we are self-conscious beings, and conversely, that our self-consciousness is possible only if we are conscious of independently existing objects. The first half of this Kantian thesis has been demonstrated in the consciousness section, which analyzes our awareness of objects. The second half remains now to be argued, starting with "Self-Consciousness."³³

B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

IV. *The Truth of Self-Certainty; Life, Desire, and Struggle.* At the beginning of the self-consciousness section, Hegel reiterates his claim that human self-awareness presupposes the awareness of independently existing objects.³⁴ He aims to establish this thesis by indirect proof, and so he critically analyzes a form of consciousness that claims the opposite. This form of consciousness, called "self-consciousness," claims that self-awareness is its sole aim and object, and that it can be and is aware of itself without relying on any awareness of any independently existing object or world.³⁵ Everything of which it is aware is alleged to be a mode of its self-awareness. (I will call this the "thesis of self-consciousness." Its most prominent proponent is Fichte.) The problem facing this form of consciousness is to reconcile its claim to be aware solely of itself and its patent wide variety of experienced objects. This tension runs through all the forms of self-consciousness. Desire enters Hegel's discussion, both as the most elementary manifestation of this problem and as the desire to reconcile these two facets of self-consciousness so as to achieve self-identity.

Hegel's naturalistic account of thought begins here with his discussion of desire. Desire introduces elementary classification and hence nascent conceptualization of the world, for desiring distinguishes between those objects that do, and those that do not, satisfy a particular, given desire. The experience of desire also teaches a rudimentary lesson in realism: Objects satisfying desires are not conjured up just by desiring them. Those

objects exist and have characteristics (e.g., being nutritive) independently of their being desired and one must work in order to secure and utilize them.³⁶ Desiring self-consciousness is wholly inadequate, for it achieves its end only by destroying its means (the desired object), and so it cannot sustain its own self-consciousness without a steady supply of independently existing objects to destroy.³⁷ Desire is thus shown not to be the essence of self-consciousness (as conceived in accordance with the thesis of self-consciousness).³⁸

Since it remains true that human self-awareness obtains only in relation to objects,³⁹ something must be done to handle the problem of the independence of desired objects. This problem is addressed by finding someone else to grapple with the independence of objects.⁴⁰ The stage is thus set for the struggle and for lord- and bondsmanship. Hegel argues that self-consciousness supervenes on biological existence by arguing from the contrapositive. Fighting unto death shows that neither combatant, as a self-conscious being, can simply be identified with a biological organism; it shows that we as self-conscious beings are not merely natural beings, that pride is a social, not a merely biological, phenomenon. It also shows that we as self-conscious beings are not independent of biological organisms.⁴¹

A. *Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness; Lord and Bondsman.* Hegel several times indicates that his aim in "Lord and Bondsman" is to establish that the conditions for the possibility of human self-consciousness include the conditions for the possibility of our consciousness of others: individual subjectivity presupposes intersubjectivity.⁴² This is how he understood the point of his famous set-piece both before and after writing the *Phenomenology*.⁴³ However, he does not in fact carry his argument through to this point in the *Phenomenology* of 1807. Here he only argues against the thesis of self-consciousness.

The awareness of other self-consciousness beings, of other minds, is an obvious and powerful objection to the thesis of self-consciousness, for being aware of another mind is being aware of something, or rather someone, distinct from oneself and not a mode of one's self-consciousness.⁴⁴ The lord holds the thesis of self-consciousness, claiming that all things are modes of his self-awareness. He is stuck. If he denies the existence of the enslaved bondsman, he faces the problem of the independence of desired objects from his desires. If he recognizes the bondsman as another person, he must repudiate the thesis of self-consciousness. The lord's solution is to employ the bondsman while denying his independence; the bondsman is taken to be merely an extension of the lord.⁴⁵ The lord solves only part of the problem of desire. He overcomes the independence of desired objects from his desires for them. He doesn't solve the problem that desiring depends on desired objects for its satisfaction, or that the satisfaction of a desire terminates that desire. The lord's sense of "being for himself" (his sense of independence or self-sufficiency) thus depends both on the recurrence of desires and on the availability of objects satisfying those desires. (Unrequited desires would threaten the lord's sense of independence.) The lord's sense of self is thus fleeting and dependent, and thus is not a genuine independence at all.

The bondsman, however, by being forced to work on independent objects, is prohibited from directly consuming them and is required to transform them. (Notice, too, that the lord merely gives orders to be fulfilled, he does not instruct; the bondsman must invent techniques for himself.) The formative activity of the bondsman is thus self-directed at the level of technique, and the persisting objects he produces are testimony to his enduring skills and efforts. In this way, the bondsman constructs monuments to his own ingenuity.⁴⁶ The bondsman wins an actual triumph of independence over objects by transforming them and thus destroying their independence. His designs and efforts are permanent, relative to

the transitory character of objects used as raw materials.⁴⁷ He becomes genuinely self-directing by developing and recognizing his control over antecedently independent objects. In the things he has transformed he finds his initial designs actually embodied, while his designs are no less foreign to him for having become embodied. Thus he solves the aim of self-consciousness: to be conscious of oneself in being conscious of objects. However, this success comes at the price of acknowledging, first, the recalcitrance and initial independence of objects as raw materials, and second, that the thesis of self-consciousness is tenable only within a drastically restricted domain of objects, *i.e.*, artifacts one has produced oneself. This destroys the generality and hence the tenability of Fichte's subjective idealism.⁴⁸

B. Freedom of Self-Consciousness. In the first paragraph of this second part of the major section on "Self-Consciousness," Hegel remarks on the general significance of thought about objects. The content of a thought about an object is instantiated in that object, but nevertheless this content is a thought, and thus this object is not a foreign other, but rather is an object thought about by a self-conscious being.⁴⁹ This general feature of thought was first explicitly exemplified in the bondsman's products. The bondsman actualized his design by producing an object, and then found his thought instantiated in his product. The general point holds not only for artifacts, but also for objects around us in general, insofar as we recognize or identify them by applying conceptions to them, the contents of which "correspond" (or refer) to actual features of those objects. Hegel stresses that this point is essential for understanding his ensuing discussion of stoicism, skepticism, and unhappy consciousness.⁵⁰ Hegel's stress warrants an epistemological interpretation of these passages.

Stoicism. The fulfilling of desires failed as a strategy for demonstrating the independence of self-consciousness from other given things. The general feature of thought made explicit by the end of the dialectical demise of desire, that artefacts and other objects instantiate the contents of one's own thoughts, suggests a new strategy for maintaining the claim of self-consciousness to be aware of nothing but modes of itself: stoic autonomy of thought⁵¹ and stoic indifference to desire (*apathia*).⁵² Hegel's criticism of stoicism is brief and oblique. The stoic dictum to "follow nature" capitulates the autonomy of thought because it attempts to derive the proper content of thought from an allegedly given nature.⁵³ Insofar as stoic autonomy avoids this capitulation, it must determine the content of thought wholly *a priori*. In doing so, however, it can at best supply hortatory platitudes. As such it fails literally to come to terms with the details of everyday reality.⁵⁴

Skepticism. Skepticism's advance over stoicism is that it explicitly addresses the details of everyday reality, and it explicitly discounts their essentiality. Thus skepticism actually tries to show what stoicism merely claims in principle: that the world of everyday reality is irrelevant and unimportant.⁵⁵ Skepticism improves on the bondsman because skepticism works against any kind of object, natural or artifactual, and it actively denies their significance. It improves on stoicism because it achieves a genuine independence of thought and certainty of itself as essential and persisting because it is responsible for generating the demotion of everyday reality.⁵⁶ Distinctions (*Unterschiede*) differentiate different things; distinguishing among things is a conceptual ability. Skepticism's ultimate charge, according to Hegel, is that all these distinctions are merely a subjective conceptual affair.⁵⁷

Hegel is unafraid of Sextus's tropes of relativity because those tropes reveal an important truth: Things are not mutually independent; they obtain in mutual interrelation because

their properties obtain only in causal relations and in mutual contrast and similarity.⁵⁸ One problem Hegel sees with skepticism is that, despite its conviction that there is an eternal, immutable truth, and despite its contention that it seeks this truth,⁵⁹ Pyrrhonists continually, repeatedly, and inevitably undermine their own professed project by simply attacking any given view for the sake of attacking it. Making no commitments themselves, Pyrrhonists freely adopt whatever principles may be needed at the moment to criticize the view at hand. Furthermore, in "living by appearances," Pyrrhonists are guided by what they claim least to respect: They officially value truth and actually live by mere semblances. Worse yet, like desiring consciousness, which needs objects to satisfy desires, skeptics require a continuous supply of claims and experiences to attack. Pyrrhonism is caught between its claim to be a dispassionate and healthy way of life and its claim to continue its search for truth.⁶⁰ In either case, neither the activity nor the content of skeptical thought is independent of the world.

The importance of Hegel's emphasis on the difference between abstract and determinate negations becomes apparent here. Pyrrhonists refute for refutation's sake, not for the sake of learning from the defects of the views they attack. Additionally, Pyrrhonists are committed to some positive claims, especially their claim that the equipoise of counterposed arguments induces suspension of judgment. If so, this is a truth about human reason. Hegel, following Kant, rejects their claim about human reason, claiming on the contrary that this suspension is intolerable for human reason, which by nature is committed to the search for truth. If Pyrrhonists retain their consistency by becoming skeptical about these claims or about skepticism more generally, this undermines their own arguments against other views.⁶¹ The form of consciousness that is aware of the tension between its desire for a stable, quiescent self-awareness and the actual hubbub of daily existence is the so-called "unhappy consciousness."⁶²

Unhappy Consciousness. Hegel's proto-Feuerbachian view that religious deities are reified, projected features of forms of human consciousness is first enunciated here. He points out that unhappy consciousness takes these two poles of its experience, the protean changeable variety of experiences and its simple unchangeable self-awareness, to be opposites and that it attributes the qualities of the latter to an alien being.⁶³ Since unhappy consciousness identifies itself with the protean changeable aspect of its self-conception, and it regards this aspect as unessential, it's committed to reconciling its depraved self with the unchangeable. This is how the other-worldliness of Christianity is a strategy for dealing with the problem facing the thesis of self-consciousness, the problem of the ineluctable variegation of everyday reality: deny its importance utterly. This project is doomed from the start because genuine success would involve self-annihilation, and the effort to identify oneself with the unchangeable only underscores one's changeable aspect.⁶⁴

Hegel expresses the epistemological import of this form of consciousness in terms of "pure thought" and "pure consciousness." He claims that unhappy consciousness, even as "pure consciousness," represents an advance over the "pure thought" of stoicism and skepticism insofar as it insists on joining "pure thinking and particular individuality."⁶⁵ This is why unhappy consciousness counts as "pure consciousness" and no longer merely "pure thought": It insists on connecting pure thinking, abstract categories, with specific determinate objects. The application of conceptions to objects constitutes "consciousness," according to Hegel, and this is part of his effort to show that self-consciousness requires consciousness of objects. Hegel's remarks about "pure thought" concern what would now be called (following Fodor) purely computational states lacking semantics (where a semantic dimension would be involved in applying conceptions to objects). His remarks about "pure

consciousness" concern computational states plus semantics, but without yet being developed into a categorical network.⁶⁶ If this interpolation is right, then his critique of stoicism aims to show that there is no conceptual content without semantics. This is an important thesis for a naturalistically based account of thought, such as Hegel's.

However, unhappy consciousness has not yet reconciled these two aspects of thought, "consciousness as a particular individuality" and "pure thought itself."⁶⁷ Unhappy consciousness is thus unstable and transitional.⁶⁸ Unhappy consciousness ultimately resolves the tension between its "changeable" and "unchangeable" aspects by rescinding the thesis of self-consciousness, namely, to be aware solely of itself in any and all objects of consciousness. The form of consciousness called "self-consciousness" thus capitulates by recognizing that it is what it is only within a trans-individual and worldly context. This is tantamount to the thesis of "reason," the next form of consciousness.

C. (AA.) REASON

V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason

As mentioned earlier (§IV), Hegel's epistemological argument in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is divided into two broad phases, distinguished in terms of Kant's distinction between an objective and a subjective deduction. Hegel's objective deduction is given in the first two sections of the *Phenomenology*, while his subjective deduction occupies the remainder of his book. Hegel describes the structure of his argument at the beginning of the third section, "Reason," in a way that makes this plain. Here he summarizes the course and result of the first two sections, "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness," and sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of reason. Reason is a form of consciousness that simply presumes that it is the whole of reality. Exactly what this means is not initially clear, either to the readers of the *Phenomenology* or to that form of consciousness, but Hegel makes plain both here and in the passage discussed above from his *Lectures* that Schelling is being criticized, along with Kant and Fichte. It is worth quoting Hegel at length, for he indicates both the background and the inadequacy of reason's presumption:

But self-consciousness is all reality, not merely *for itself* but also *in itself*, only through *becoming* this reality, or rather through *demonstrating* itself to be such. It demonstrates itself to be this *along the path* in which first, in the dialectical movement of meaning, perceiving, and understanding, otherness as an *in itself* vanishes. Then [second], in the movement through the independence of consciousness in lordship and bondage, through the thought of freedom, through the liberation that comes from skepticism and the struggle for absolute liberation by the consciousness divided against itself, otherness, insofar as it is only *for consciousness*, vanishes *for consciousness itself*. There appeared two aspects, one after the other: one in which the essence of the true had for consciousness the determinateness of *being*, the other in which it had for consciousness of being only *for consciousness*. But the two reduced themselves to a single truth, *viz.* that what *is*, or the *in-itself*, only is insofar as it is *for consciousness*, and what is *for consciousness* is also *in itself*.⁶⁹

The first sentence in this passage notes the distinction between consciousness' simply having the idea of "being all reality" and this idea's being true. (This is the difference between self-consciousness being all reality "merely for itself" and its "*also*" being all reality "in itself.") Needing to make this idea actually true, and doing so by "becoming" all reality, indicates, if obliquely, that there already is some reality that is something other than self-consciousness, at least at this stage. That there are two factors here is further evident from Hegel's "*also*" [*auch*]. These phrases indicate that the sense in which

self-consciousness is all reality cannot be the sense in which a subjective idealist would mean this claim to be taken. That the relevant sense of consciousness' being all reality is not that of subjective idealism is born out by Hegel's further discussion. Indeed his discussion proceeds by noting that subjective idealism is the natural interpretation of the phrase "self-consciousness is all reality," and he then argues that this interpretation is quite wrong. The next two sentences of the passage just quoted encapsulate the course and result of each of the preceding sections of the *Phenomenology*. If Hegel's arguments in the consciousness section are successful, then the world has been found to be cognitively accessible; there isn't anything more to the world than what it manifests. This is what it is for "otherness as an *in itself*" to vanish. It is for the world as an object of knowledge not to be in principle epistemically recalcitrant or opaque. The basic materials for showing that (though not how) the subject can cognize the world are provided in the second section, "Self-Consciousness." The joint result of these two sections is that the world is cognitively accessible, even though it is not reducible to a set of conscious states. This is the point of the last two sentences of the above quotation, and Hegel reiterates the point again several times:

This category or *simple* unity of self-consciousness and being now has difference *in itself*; for its essence is just this, to be immediately self identical in *other-being* or absolute difference. The difference therefore *is*, but is perfectly transparent, and is a difference that is just as much [*zugleich*] none.⁷⁰

Now, because in this way, the pure essentiality of things [*Dinge*], like their difference, belongs to reason, one can no longer properly speak of *things* [*Dinge*] at all, that is, of something which would be for consciousness only the negative of itself.⁷¹

The strict sense of "things" that has been found untenable is a sense according to which things are simply the opposite of consciousness. Instead, Hegel thinks that at least in principle he's shown to us (though not yet to observed consciousness) that things are cognitively accessible and so are not opaque to us. There's a difference between subject and object, but this difference is "transparent" because the categories of the properties of things are the same as the categories of thought.⁷² What needs to be done in order to see that he's right, Hegel says, is to assemble the materials reviewed in the preceding two sections into a single, coherent pair of conceptions. This task is begun in the third section of the *Phenomenology*, "Reason."

Having the materials of epistemological realism on hand does not insure that one would immediately recognize the significance of these materials. Noting this point introduces the issues involved in Hegel's subjective deduction. Reason, as a form of consciousness, explicitly recognizes the interdependence of the contents of consciousness and of the world, but it has no account of the categorial structure of either the world or of its own thought. Hegel claims that reason doesn't realize how these materials have been derived and so doesn't understand their import. Instead, the form of consciousness called "reason" takes the cognitive accessibility of the world to mean that reason "is all reality" in a subjective idealist's sense. Hegel points this out by complaining against the "spurious" idealism that espouses the identity of subject and object while allowing that there is an "in itself" distinct from these, a complaint directly about Kant, but also aimed at Fichte and his "absolute impact."⁷³ A little more excursus into some aspects of Kant's, Fichte's, and Schelling's views will help make plain the bearing and intended results of Hegel's arguments in this section.

One problem for subjective idealism is accounting for the variety of categories of thought. Kant inexplicably borrowed his table of categories from a table of logical judgments. Fichte and the young Schelling tried to derive them from the "absolute ego's" act of positing its own object. When Hegel says that the claim that there is a plurality of categories is even more incomprehensible than the (unexamined) claim that reason is all reality,⁷⁴ he's complaining about Fichte's and Schelling's inability plausibly to derive a variety of categories (and any variety would have been a good start) from the mere act of the absolute ego's positing its own object of thought. Hegel offers the fundamentals of a very different account of the categories of thought in the major sections on "Reason" and "Spirit," offering an alternative to Kant's transcendental account as well.

On Hegel's view, "the category," indeed any category, is what the cognizing subject and the known object share in common. The first subsection of "Reason," "Observing Reason," explores this thesis on the objective side, in terms of categories as characteristics of existing things.⁷⁵ The second and third subsections, "The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its Activity" and "Individuality Which Takes Itself to be Real in and for Itself," explore this thesis on the subjective side, in terms of categories with which a subject conceives itself and its action. One of the points Hegel stresses in "Reason" is that the categories of thought capture the characteristics of things in the world.⁷⁶ However, admitting this does not give an account of how we think categorially. Hegel offers indirect proof in "Reason" that categorial thought is a social phenomenon by arguing that it is neither merely an individual phenomenon nor merely a natural phenomenon. Hegel argues that human thought and action cannot be understood except as individual participation in and reconstitution of social practices. This does not, however, make society super-individual, for there are no social practices without social practitioners; the two aspects are mutually interdependent.⁷⁷

The third phase of unhappy consciousness finally resolved the tension between its own variable, heterogeneous experience and the putative unchangeable "other" that it posits by rescinding the thesis of self-consciousness, namely, the claim to find only itself in any and all objects of which it is aware. In this oblique way, then, self-awareness is shown to require awareness of objects other than oneself. This was the point Hegel claimed at the end of the "Consciousness" section that he would show in this section, "Self-Consciousness." However, unhappy consciousness over-does it. In rescinding itself, it identifies itself with the world on which it is dependent and within the context of which its thought and action occur and make sense. With this, Hegel passes from a consideration of Fichte, who construed the purported Kantian thesis of "subject-object identity," the thesis that all objects of knowledge are merely objects or aspects of self-knowledge, in the way represented by what Hegel calls "self-consciousness," to a consideration of Schelling, identified by the badge "I am I."⁷⁸ Schelling's solution to the problems of Fichte's subjectivism was to reinterpret the thesis of "subject-object identity" as meaning that the individual strictly speaking *is* identical (numerically) with the world as a whole. This identity was alleged to be the basis of all knowledge and was alleged to be manifest in "intellectual intuition." This is the thesis of the form of consciousness Hegel calls "reason." Hegel argues in the section titled "Reason" that although there is something in common between individual self-conscious humans, this commonality is not a numerical identity. It is instead a categorial structure instantiated by the world in terms of which humans can have knowledge of the world. Hegel challenges Schelling's identity claim by having the form of consciousness called "reason" seek to find itself in the world. By doing this, Hegel aims to show that the commonality of the categorial structure of the world and of thought is not a starting point or presupposition of intellectual inquiry, but is rather the result of that

inquiry, and that our intellectual abilities are not natural givens, either of the species or of individuals. Bearing Schelling's view in mind thus reveals the aim and strategy of Hegel's argument in this major section.

Hegel's discussion focuses on "observing" reason because according to the "identity philosophy" propounded by Schelling, Kantian apperception is the model of all knowledge, including empirical knowledge. If this model is adequate, then empirical knowledge of objects should be as automatic as self-awareness. Sheer observation should instantiate the same cognitive structure or activity as apperception. Also, Schelling merely asserted his "identity philosophy." He didn't derive or defend it, and so his view doesn't justify anything more sophisticated than simple observation. Hegel charges that by merely asserting his idealism, Schelling failed to explain and justify his position;⁷⁹ he begged the question against his opponents, and by begging the question, Schelling licensed others to beg the question in return.⁸⁰ The issue of question-begging is one of the points that led to Hegel's break with Schelling.⁸¹ Hegel's solution to this problem is the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which aims to show that the world is rationally intelligible by refuting competing theses.⁸²

The thesis that "reason is all reality" employs the conceptions "reality" and "reason." The conception "reality" is not itself reality; it is a conceptual abstraction, and similarly with "reason." The thesis of reason thus belies an elementary feature of thought: categories. Hegel briefly sketches the philosophical development of a main feature of the analysis of categories from Aristotle, according to whom categories were the essential structures of real objects and who was unperturbed by Kantian questions of whether categories had this metaphysical status or were only creatures of thought; to Schelling, according to whom categories are the structures of an idealist identity of thought and being.⁸³ Hegel insists that this "identity" is not a numerical identity, but rather is an identity of content between thought and reality.⁸⁴

Hegel claims that because Schelling's idealism immediately asserts the thesis of reason, the identity of thought and being, it cannot account for the plurality of categories. He avers that if Schelling had grasped self-consciousness as "the absolutely negative essence," he would not have had this difficulty.⁸⁵ The sense in which self-consciousness is for Hegel a "negative essence" is that self-consciousness is only possible on the basis of consciousness of objects. Self-consciousness thus presupposes its opposite. The route to understanding this insight is to give up making mere assertions. Only then can one begin to comprehend the nature of categorical thought.⁸⁶

Hegel comments rather allusively on the epistemological significance of genre/species categorization of individuals.⁸⁷ His comments are important here, for they underscore Hegel's realism. Generic and specific characteristics constitute individuals, while conceptualizing these characteristics constitutes knowledge of individuals. Hence individuals aren't "things" [*Dinge*] in any sense of "thing" that is opposed to consciousness.⁸⁸ Hegel thus vindicates Aristotle against Kant about categories. With tangled prose Hegel seeks to reach the thesis that individuals, species, and genre are mutually interdependent for their character and existence.⁸⁹ "Pure consciousness" retains its unitary self-awareness in comprehending these mutually interdependent moments, and its awareness has a determinate content in these distinct though interrelated moments. In this way, reason reconciles the two moments that unhappy consciousness failed to unify, the variable and the constant aspects of consciousness and self-consciousness.⁹⁰

Kant, Fichte, and Schelling adopt subjective idealism to serve their rationalist ideals. Hegel contends that the doctrine that things are only representations or ideas,⁹¹ and so are nothing but objects of "my" consciousness, must result in an empiricist bent, for the

multitude of specific contents of consciousness aren't found in pure self-conscious apperception but in something distinct from pure apperception, namely, various sensations. If the model of knowledge is self-knowledge⁹² (as it is for Fichte and Schelling), the source of various sensations must be regarded as an "extraneous impulse"⁹³ (Fichte's *Anstoß*, or Kant's thing in itself), and the pure unity of self-consciousness cannot be reconciled with the vast heterogeneity of experienced objects. Idealism and subjectivism generally are disingenuous, for their accounts of our experience are parasitic on our actual experience of the world. Hegel holds that rationalist ideals can only be fulfilled by adopting realism.

Hegel's strategy for criticizing Schelling's identification of reason and reality is to show, first, that empirical knowledge does not conform to the model of knowledge found in the unity of apperception, and second, that the observation of nature reveals nature's numerical distinction from reason.⁹⁴ Hegel contrasts "abstract" (Schellingian) reason with something he calls "actual reason,"⁹⁵ a view that recognizes that the thesis of reason to be all reality is merely a certainty, a promissory note, which needs to be filled out and vindicated by active empirical investigation. The first subsection of "Reason," "Observing Reason," begins to carry out this two-sided argument.

A. Observing Reason

Observing reason is classifying and experimenting reason. As such, it is concerned with particular objects and perceives them. However, it does not revert to sense-certainty or to perception, for its observation is motivated and informed by classificatory and experimental interests, and these are based on conceptual abilities.⁹⁶ Observing reason is not committed to "knowledge by acquaintance." (Hegel explicitly indicates that only now are sense-certainty and perception superceded "by and for" consciousness itself.⁹⁷) Achieving adequate conceptual knowledge of things is reason's "finding itself" in things.⁹⁸ However, this "finding" oneself in the world requires developing a richer self-concept than that with which reason begins, pure apperception.⁹⁹ (To anticipate, the grounds of apperception must be found in categorial thinking, and the grounds of categorial thinking are in part social.) Hegel makes three points here that underscore his epistemological realism. He insists that "reason is equally the essence of things and of consciousness itself," and that only in consciousness does reason achieve its proper form.¹⁰⁰ He again insists that self-conscious reason presupposes a rationally structured world.¹⁰¹ And he claims that intellectual comprehension of worldly things "transforms their sensuousness into concepts, that is, into a being which is at the same time [*zugleich*] I, and so transforms thought into extant thought, or transforms being into a being which is thought."¹⁰² This expression reiterates Hegel's claim that the identity of thought and being is an identity of content, not a numerical identity.

a. *Observation of Nature.* Description of natural phenomena is prior to generalizing about their regularities. Hegel believes there is a lower bound to such regularities, below which one can describe minutiae but without hope of discerning whether these features are related to other objects or properties. Conceptual comprehension, on Hegel's view, works only with features of objects that do enter into such relations.¹⁰³ Of course things have (and must have) features that do not have relations with other things or properties, but these are inessential and hence may be ignored for purposes of explanation and comprehension. Such abstraction underscores the way in which explanation is aimed at grasping objects as much as it is at furthering our intellectual activity.¹⁰⁴ Making this distinction raises the problem of distinguishing between real and nominal essences.¹⁰⁵

Differentia [Merkmale] are supposed, not only to be essentially connected with cognition, but also with the essential characteristics of things, and our artificial [sic] system is to accord with the system of nature itself and to express only this system. This follows necessarily from the concept of reason

....¹⁰⁶

These points indicate Hegel's realism by distinguishing numerically between thoughts and natural objects of thought. Hegel's realism involves an identity of content between our *artificial* conceptual system and the concrete structures of nature.

Hegel insists again on his ontological holism¹⁰⁷ and claims that such holism provides a basis for determining whether a particular property is a *differentium*.¹⁰⁸ Such contrastive interrelations are, according to Hegel, the fundamental feature of laws of nature, constituting their necessity.¹⁰⁹ He thus holds the unusual view that, because necessity is a conceptual relation and laws of nature are necessary, nature instantiates conceptual structures, where those structures do not depend on the activity or content of human thinking.¹¹⁰ Laws of nature formulate relations between predicates, where it remains an empirical matter to determine which objects instantiate these predicates.¹¹¹ These predicate-instances were (in eighteenth-century science) taken to be "matters" out of which objects were constituted. Such matters, as predicate-instances, are not themselves things, but rather are universals; they are conceptual in form, even though they are instantiated in things.¹¹²

By this stage of his argument, Hegel has made his main points concerning the numerical distinctness of human rationality and nature and the identity of content between thought and natural objects known through formulation and application of laws of nature. He has also refuted the generality of Schelling's claim that apperception is the model of all knowledge by showing that empirical knowledge of inorganic nature doesn't conform to this model. He goes on to consider biology, the "laws of thought," psychology, physiognomy, and phrenology. He has three aims in these considerations: first, to argue that no objects of scientific knowledge conform to apperception as a model of knowledge; second, to argue that, although thought has a natural basis in a rationally intelligible world, rational thought is itself not a merely natural phenomenon; and third, to emphasize that conceptions adequate for comprehending natural phenomena are not merely found or given, but are developed through the activities of observing and experimenting with nature. I only comment on those points especially relevant to Hegel's overall argument for socio-historically grounded epistemological realism.¹¹³

b. *Logic and Psychology*; c. *Physiognomy and Phrenology*. In his criticism of psychology Hegel makes some important points relevant to his theory of action.¹¹⁴ There are two important aspects in understanding human action: how the individual takes in its environment and how the individual acts on its environment. The first aspect includes how an individual is socialized into ongoing social practices ("habits, customs, and ways of thinking") within a specific cultural and natural context.¹¹⁵ This aspect de-emphasizes the individual's individuality; it does nothing to alter the content of cultural and natural givens, but it does give social practices a self-conscious "form" by getting individuals consciously to adopt and employ them. The second aspect concerns the individual exercise of one's freedom to select from among available procedures and materials, making those procedures or materials conform to one's own designs ("inclinations and desires").¹¹⁶ This aspect de-emphasizes an individual's "universality" (i.e., conformity to universal social norms and givens) and modifies the use or content of those norms and givens, if ever so slightly (or perhaps more greatly, as in an act of crime, an outright violation of social norms). Hegel

insists that neither of these aspects has priority over the other. This is the key to his undoing the alleged dichotomy between the individual and the social whole.

Psychological laws would have to specify just what specific influence a particular total situation would produce in just this individual. Hegel argues that such laws are impossible because there are these two aspects to every individual: one is a "universal" aspect of conforming to given circumstances and social practices; the other aspect is one of opposing and transforming given circumstances or practices or, perhaps, displaying simple indifference. What is done is a matter of individual choice.¹¹⁷ This element of free transformation of circumstances and situation is entirely compatible, as Hegel points out, with the thesis that unless historically circumstances had been as they were, this particular individual would not have come about and would not have done what he or she did.¹¹⁸ (The individual freedom to transform socially given practices and materials is important for the assessment and correction of those practices.)

Hegel summarizes this subsection nicely.¹¹⁹ Especially important are the hints he gives about how this subsection on observing reason has criticized abstract Schellingian reason's claim to model all knowledge on the self-knowledge found in apperception and to be identical with nature as whole. (1) Observation of nature reveals that mutually independent perceptible things are not objects of rational comprehension. Rather, the comprehension of perceptible things is a matter of comprehending the relations among them, so that individual things are merely "abstractions" from their concrete causal and contrastive context among other things. In this way, nature instantiates a systematic conceptual structure and so is rationally comprehensible. Nature thus presents concepts as objective structures, but its unity is apparent only to rational thought. It does not present this unity itself as an object, and so does not satisfy (Schellingian) reason's claim that all knowledge is modeled on the apperception of one's unitary self. (2) Observation of organic nature improves in this regard over observation of inorganic nature, in that the unitary interrelation of distinct sub-systems is displayed by each and every individual organism. However (at least before Darwin), individual organisms also display relative independence from each other and from their environs, and so do not display the over-arching unity found in inorganic phenomena. Furthermore, neither organic nor inorganic nature display an explicit relation to their respective "universalities" (causal and contrastive contexts). For these reasons, neither organic nor inorganic nature provide model adequate to abstract reason's model of empirical knowledge, apperception. (This point would hold even after Darwin.)

(3) Observing (abstract) reason thus turns to consideration of human beings in order to find an object the knowledge of which would conform to its concept of knowledge. This effort has several sub-phases. What was missing from the observation of organic and inorganic nature was the explicit, self-conscious aspect of rational conceptualization. The simplest aspect of human beings which might model this are the "laws of thought." However, the "laws of thought" are only abstractions from concrete processes of thinking, and so present neither the essence of thought nor the self-consciousness found in actual thinking. Observational reason then takes individual thinking as an object of empirical psychology and attempts to explain individual activity in terms of environmental influence. This effort fails because the individual determines his or her own response to the environment.¹²⁰ Observational reason then attempts to understand (if not explain) individual character in terms of bodily traits. This effort fails because bodily manifestations are in principle equivocal indicators of character. Seeking to avoid this equivocation, observing reason attempts to understand (if not explain) individual character in terms of fixed features of the human frame. In this way, observing reason reinstates its first claim, namely, to be

able to find its own self-conscious abilities instantiated in a mere thing, a skull.¹²¹ This reveals that observing reason has indeed been seeking to find itself in an objective form.¹²²

Hegel adumbrates the philosophical conclusions to his discussion in a very obscure paragraph. The analysis of observing reason has continued the analysis of self-consciousness.¹²³ The thesis of self-consciousness was rejected when the last version of unhappy consciousness rescinded its claim to independence and identified itself with the world as a whole. The analysis of observing reason refutes this identity by reducing it to an absurdity: self-conscious thought is not identical to a bone, or to any other observable, natural thing.¹²⁴ Hegel insists that thinking rationally with categories is one thing, knowing what rationality is quite another.¹²⁵ Examining the objective instantiation of categories does nothing to explain how individuals wield categories of thought or comprehend objects in terms of them. To know what rationality is requires giving up the idea that categories are simply found and recognizing that categories are produced in the course of purposive activity. Here Hegel claims that the conditions for the possibility of theoretical reason lie in practical reason.¹²⁶

B. The Self-Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness.

Having argued that reason is not a merely natural phenomenon, and having claimed that theoretical reason depends on practical reason, in this and the next subsection of "Reason" Hegel argues that reason is not just an individual phenomenon, but rather is socially grounded. Hegel makes his aim and position plain enough, though much of his argumentation is sketchy. He did not, in fact, work out his social theory of action until *The Philosophy of Right*. Fortunately, it will suffice for present purposes to grasp the purport of his argument.¹²⁷

Hegel claims here that the argument in "Observing Reason" paralleled the argument of the "Consciousness" section, though this time "in the element of the category,"¹²⁸ and that the argument in (what I will call for short) "Active Reason" will parallel the argument in "Self-Consciousness."¹²⁹ The parallel between "Observing Reason" and "Consciousness" is this: By the end of "Observing Reason," Hegel claims to have made explicit for observed consciousness a thesis which he claims to have established by the end of "Force and Understanding," namely, that the world can be comprehended by applying conceptions (in the form of laws of nature) to it.¹³⁰ The parallel between "Active Reason" and "Self-Consciousness" is this: By the end of "Unhappy Consciousness" Hegel claims to have made explicit for observed consciousness the thesis that the contents of individual consciousness are derived from a trans-individual public natural world. By the end of "Active Reason" Hegel will claim to make explicit for observed consciousness the thesis that individual reasoning abilities are derived from a trans-individual social world. Hegel thus purports to refute individualism: "Universal reason" is reason as a naturally-based shared social capacity, which individuals have only as members of a social group.¹³¹ Hegel first claims here what he emphasizes at the beginning of the section on "Spirit:" The previous forms of consciousness are only aspects of spirit as a concrete social group; social practices are the "ground" of these distinguishable but not distinct abilities or forms of consciousness.¹³² Hegel himself thus stresses the regressive character of his argument.

Hegel anticipates the purported result of several paragraphs. He denotes a social group in which individuals mutually recognize their participation in their social practices as "the realm of ethical life,"¹³³ the first phase discussed in the subsequent section on "Spirit." Hegel insists that social practices ("customs") exist only insofar as individuals participate in them. Customs may be *trans*-individual in the sense that they obtain only

within groups, but they are not *super-individual* in the sense of existing apart from groups of individual agents.¹³⁴ He equally insists that all aspects of individual activity are pervaded by social practices; even our "commonest functions" are served by social practices.¹³⁵ Hegel further insists that even the content of individual activities are socially conditioned, insofar as one's activities inevitably employ socially developed and inculcated skills and practices.¹³⁶ Moreover, the social character of individual activity is belied by the pervasiveness of the division of labor and exchange of goods and services.¹³⁷

Hegel claims that insofar as a social group remains merely customary, that is, does not become self-conscious of its structure and of individual roles within it, it cannot persist.¹³⁸ Customary social practice obtains only on the basis of a pervasive implicit trust in society. Such trust can only occur if individuals are not conscious of their individuality. Hegel holds that individuals must become aware of their individuality, and thus their trust in social customs is destroyed.¹³⁹

The "immediate existence" of spirit, of social practices, is in individuals. The point of Hegel's argument is to show that individual agency is socially grounded. Individual agents aim to achieve their ends by transforming given materials to fit their designs. As a practical being, active reason is certain that this can be done; the point is to do it and so to vindicate its claim. Achieving its ends satisfies its aims and so produces happiness. Hegel thus considers an agent who seeks his own happiness. He purports to show that the ends and means of individual action are socially conditioned.¹⁴⁰ Insofar as such an individual does not regard himself as essentially a member of a group (due to the demise of the Greek *polis*), his essential self-conscious concern lies in the satisfaction of natural impulses.¹⁴¹ Hegel aims to show that such impulses are not merely natural,¹⁴² and neither is their satisfaction. This reveals the social character of impulses and the activity they motivate.¹⁴³

a. *Pleasure and Necessity.* This subsection is compressed and obscure, but I believe the gist is relatively ascertainable. Hegel considers a form of "reason," a form of consciousness that claims it is all reality. The analysis of observing reason has shown that this identity claim cannot be taken at face value. Reason itself cannot be found in any and all objects of consciousness, even if their rational structure can be articulated in scientific theory. In this way, self-conscious reason has failed to find itself in its rational comprehension of nature.¹⁴⁴ Active reason tries another strategy for sustaining reason's claim: It takes itself for its object, but this time as (one might say) an objective, an end it consciously adopts and aims to embody in the world.¹⁴⁵ Hegel models the first version of this strategy on Faust's renunciation of erudition for the indulgence of his senses. This form of consciousness is not identical to desire. In desire, the only thing important was the satisfaction of desires. Here, the hedonist not only satisfies desires, but enjoys desires and their satisfaction.¹⁴⁶ Hedonism is a conscious policy involving conceptualizing one's desires and their objects. (Note that there are no gourmet animals; some animals may be picky eaters, but none of them engage in elaborate preparation for deliberate delectation.)

The pleasurable unity of self-conscious want and wanted object sought by this form of consciousness is wholly impossible because the consequences of actions far exceed and diverge from such an agent's intentions. Where what it intended was simply to consume objects and so to enjoy satisfying its desires, what happens is beyond its cognizance, to say nothing of control, because the objects it seeks to appropriate have their own causal properties and relations.¹⁴⁷ The necessary connections among things and an agent's activity appears as pure fate and blind necessity, because this form of consciousness is too naive about agency and about the context of its own action.¹⁴⁸

b. *The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit.* To resolve the problem about innocent enjoyment being crushed by blind causal necessity, this new form of consciousness does not conceive its intentions or aims simply in terms of particular objects that it seeks to appropriate. Rather, it seeks to generate its own necessity, proclaiming that particular acts and aims are required by the universal imperatives it intuitively feels.¹⁴⁹ This is still an "immediate" form of consciousness.¹⁵⁰ The law it seeks to actualize is underived, and its activity is unmediated by others or by the world. To this form of consciousness, the world appears as an inexorable order subjugating the population.¹⁵¹

The important principle for high-minded reformers is obeying only the heart's dictates.¹⁵² But this makes success impossible: Either the reformer fails to reform anything, and so fails to get social reality to conform to proper principles, or else the reformer changes social reality, only to find that his principles are no longer his own but are taken over by society. Since his conception of the status of social norms has nothing to do with social institutions, he cannot acknowledge his own effectiveness.¹⁵³ If others take his lead, they will propound their own conflicting imperatives.¹⁵⁴ The reformer's effort to actualize an imperative reveals that extant ordinances aren't dead obligations in the way he had thought, for those ordinances are effective only because others find their hearts' intentions expressed in them.¹⁵⁵ Successful reform must generate crisis for the romantic reformer, because he then finds himself and his reforming activity implicated in a social order that he regards as hostile to the (alleged) true basis of obligation—sincere avowal.¹⁵⁶ If established as a universal basis of obligation, the law of the heart wouldn't bear the same content in each case. A "public order" resulting from people's heart-felt convictions can only be a universal struggle of power politics in which each maneuvers to get whatever one can. This is the ironic and devastating criticism: "The law of the heart" in fact produces the very "way of the world" that it officially opposes!¹⁵⁷

c. *Virtue and the Way of the World.* The "knight of virtue" attacked by Hegel is a successor to the forms of consciousness just considered.¹⁵⁸ It is an improvement, insofar as it no longer seeks its own self-satisfaction or to proclaim its own imperatives and insofar as it no longer regards the "the way of the world" as inherently corrupt.¹⁵⁹ It seeks only to restore the inherent worth of social practices, and it devotes itself to this service.¹⁶⁰ The problem is that, in abstraction from a determinate, socially constituted concept of virtue (such as in the ancient world), this form of consciousness cannot specify any content to its proclaimed principle, and so can only issue inflated platitudes.¹⁶¹ "The way of the world" is revealed as the joint product of individual activities, where individuals seek to attain what is good for themselves. In so doing they actualize their own good and also contribute to the maintenance of social practices.¹⁶² Hegel insists that of course people act on their self-interest, but this is only part of what they achieve in so acting. Individual actions inevitably contribute to others as well.¹⁶³

C. Individuality that Takes Itself to be Real In and For Itself.

The main advance of this subsection is that these forms of consciousness recognize that they can and do actualize their own intentions by utilizing their gifts and capacities to transfigure some portion of their local situation, and they do this without opposing the extant order of things.¹⁶⁴

a. *The Spiritual Animal Realm and Deceit, or the "Matter in Hand" Itself.* The forms of active reason Hegel now considers are still individualist.¹⁶⁵ The first form of "real agency"

claims that its aim is a function of its natural talents.¹⁶⁶ This romantic form of agency learns from the hazards facing its productions that it is itself ideal, it is dependent upon something else for its being, namely, on its work, and also that its work is ideal, since it depends for its being on the hazards of the public world. These two points show that the romantic's inspired nature is not the independently real being it was claimed to be.¹⁶⁷ The conflict between intentions, their actualizations, and the hazards of nature and society can only be resolved by working on something which is genuinely of common interest, to recognize that an interest in producing something significant is an interest in partaking in a collective effort to produce something of enduring common interest. Hence innate talents alone are not the source of value and specificity of worthwhile productions.¹⁶⁸

b. *Legislative Reason*; c. *Law-Testing Reason*. The next two subsections address responses to the problem of criteria of worthiness developed in the last subsection. Each of these responses is individualist, holding that moral standards can be determined asocially. The allusions to Kant in "Law-giving" and "Law-testing" are unmistakable, but as presentations and criticisms of Kant they are grievously truncated. I would like to believe that Hegel here takes at face value Kant's word that he analyzed common-sense morality. However, Hegel later claims that he here refutes Kant, and not just common Kantian moral sense.¹⁶⁹ Hegel takes these two Kantian themes and puts them into common-sense guise, *sans* social context, examining whether they can do what they're supposed to do, to guide conduct without relying on the social context of the individual. This, Hegel contends, they cannot do. The aim of the subsection on lawgiving is to criticize a sort of commonsense intuitionism about ethical principles, arguing that the only principles which could be simply intuited are too general to be adequate, to say nothing of correct. One point of Hegel's argument in "Law Testing" is that any plausible "intuitionism" in fact incorporates communal norms. One can thus follow one's conscious dictates, inasmuch as those dictates will be in accord with effective principles of right because they are, in fact, socially derived.¹⁷⁰ I believe that Hegel's objections to Kant can, in the main, be sustained, but arguing this point lies far beyond the bounds of the present overview.

(BB.) VI. SPIRIT.

In the section on "Spirit" Hegel argues that the human phenomena discussed in the preceding three sections—the cognitive abilities first noted in "Consciousness" and expanded upon in "Reason," along with the facts about individual self-consciousness examined in "Self-Consciousness"—are all aspects of collective human life and are only possible as aspects thereof. He precedes his argument with some very important methodological remarks that bear examination. Despite the widespread belief that the major sections of the *Phenomenology* are supposed to form a single linear sequence, Hegel says quite clearly that they do not, that instead the first three sections adumbrate aspects of spirit as a concrete social whole. It is worth quoting one such statement at length:

Spirit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstract forms of it. They result from spirit analyzing itself, distinguishing its moments, and remaining for a while with each. This isolating of such moments *presupposes* spirit itself and subsists therein; in other words, the isolation exists only in spirit, which is existence. In this isolation they appear as if they exist as such; but that they are only moments or vanishing quantities is shown by their advance

and retreat into their ground and essence; and this essence is just this movement and resolution of these moments.¹⁷¹

Hegel here makes plain the transcendental, regressive character of his arguments. "Spirit," the collective rational knowledge of the natural world, is shown to obtain because all other forms of consciousness presuppose spirit. Hegel emphasizes this by indicating that the preceding forms of consciousness have each been abstractions, that consciousness can only actually exist as spirit.¹⁷² Hegel reiterates this point in the "Religion" section, and expressly states that the preceding sections, "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness," "Reason," and (immediate¹⁷³) "Spirit," are parallel accounts of different aspects of spirit as a concrete, rational, social collectivity.¹⁷⁴ He thus claims the primacy of social practices for analyzing all of the phenomena previously discussed, including both knowledge and action. He also emphasizes the transcendental, regressive character of his argument, claiming that the grounds for the possibility of each of the preceding forms of consciousness are in fact found only in spirit. Hegel's *Phenomenology* presents a unitary, sustained argument, with several major components, but the *Phenomenology* is not a rational reconstruction of actual history, and the sequence of the first four sections is not a linear, much less chronological, sequence.

The section on spirit presents long, involved meditations on the development and fate of European culture. One main aim of these meditations is to show that the customary life of the Greeks was a cultural high-point that nevertheless had to be superceded, and to urge that the variety of individualisms and other-worldly religious aspirations witnessed after the passing of the Greek world contribute to the development of a reflectively intelligible contemporary collective life.¹⁷⁵ The transition from reason to spirit makes sense if the original target of Hegel's attack is borne in mind. That target was the thesis that human rationality is an individual phenomenon. Active reason fails to sustain this claim because, although it does fund self-awareness in rational activity (the agent enacts his or her own maxims), it fails to generate a content, at least insofar as it is abstracted from its social environment. The criticism of "common Kantian moral sense" is that universal ethical laws cannot be determined independently of a social context because individual maxims cannot be generated independently of a social context. Social (and natural) context provides opportunities, resources, options, and objects for action. The first thing one thinks of for a moral imperative will require qualification, where those qualifications are required by independent natural and social factors. This echoes Hegel's continual complaint about intuitionism: What intuitionism take as basic and unanalyzable is in fact derived through rational social processes and in need of rational, reflective justification.

The form of consciousness here designated as "spirit" is properly speaking "immediate spirit,"¹⁷⁶ because it is a social group that lacks reflective awareness of its constitutive principles. A social group living in a natural environment is what he calls a "substance," indicating by this term that individuals are sustained only as members of groups.¹⁷⁷ He stresses this in the first sentence by claiming that spirit succeeds at what reason merely claimed, namely, to identify individual self-conscious thought with the actual content or structure of the natural and practical (or social) world. He also indicates that the development of the form of consciousness he calls "spirit" is a function of the development of the concept of the category.¹⁷⁸ "The category" was introduced first at the beginning of the "Self-Consciousness" section as what objects and thoughts about them have in common. Hegel's highlighting this theme here again warrants an epistemological interpretation of this section of the *Phenomenology*. The failure of active reason's emphasis on the self over objectivity results in a true view of the category as something that is equally instantiated

and self-conscious,¹⁷⁹ but this view of the category is still abstract; it has no content. This is "the matter in hand" criticized in the last subsection of "Reason."¹⁸⁰

The aims of the "Spirit" section are indirectly related to the demonstration of epistemological realism. Hegel holds that theoretical reason is based on practical reason. In "Spirit" he works out certain themes central to his social theory of practical reason. The first subsection of "Spirit," "Ethical Life," explores the social bases of thought and action as customary behavior. The subsequent two subsections explore various aspects of the Enlightenment critique of custom, its charge that custom is non- if not irrational and its claim that reason is an innate characteristic of individuals. Hegel's critique of the Enlightenment aims to show that reason is a social and historical phenomenon, even after a culture progresses from implicit customs to explicit principles of thought and action.

Two points must be borne in mind to see the epistemological significance of these themes. First, Hegel's phenomenological method makes use of previously developed examples of forms of consciousness for illustrating the issues he examines. Thus it is no surprise that Hegel takes moral and political forms of consciousness to illustrate his points about social practices and practical reason in general. Second, the points Hegel seeks to show about practical reason are general enough to bear on epistemology as well as normative social philosophy. The main themes from "Spirit" that bear on epistemology are these. The implicit result of the preceding section on reason is that individual thinkers are who they are and think what they think only within their natural and social context. Each of the preceding forms of consciousness analyzed different aspects of one concrete social whole. The "Spirit" section then analyzes the interaction and tension between individual reasoning and customary practice. Hegel's analysis of Greek customary ethical life aims to show that categorical thought is not constituted merely by custom or by fiat. His analysis of the process of enculturation (*Bildung*) undergone by "self-alienated spirit" aims to show that despite proclamations of atomistic individualism, humans are fundamentally social practitioners and that categorical thought is not corrigible merely *a priori*.

Hegel sketches the mutual interdependence of the two aspects of spirit as a concrete social context, the "objective" social environment in which individuals find themselves. One aspect of spirit, as an extant social context, consists in social practices, including materials, techniques, and norms that form "the ground and starting-point" of everyone's action. The other aspect of spirit as an extant social context consists in its continual reproduction through any and all individual activities.¹⁸¹ Hegel's view may be put as follows. Human beings are fundamentally social practitioners, and they act only insofar as they participate in social practices. Conversely, however, social practices obtain only insofar as they are practiced and reconstituted by individuals. Hegel cuts the ground out from under the debate between atomistic individualists and monolithic collectivists in the following way. The individualism/holism issue is really two issues. One issue is whether individual human beings are the only agents and bearers of psychological states. The other issue is whether those actions and psychological states can be adequately understood solely in individual terms. Individualists tend to answer both questions affirmatively; holists tend to deny them. Hegel affirms the former and denies the latter.¹⁸² According to Hegel, individuals are the only bearers of psychological states, but the content and significance of those states cannot be understood in abstraction from social context.

Hegel's positive epistemic thesis is argued in the last subsection of "Morality" on conscience and forgiveness. There he purports to show that the corrigibility of categorical thought is a social phenomenon. The importance of the answerability of cognitive claims to appraisal by others lies in the fact that others who acknowledge, act on, and appraise one's claims are often in a position to note and point out the distinction and discrepancy

between one's conception of an object and the object itself. The problem with historicism, the view that truth is relative to a particular age and culture, according to Hegel, is that it is neither historical nor self-critical enough to recognize that social standards of cognitive assessment alter as new insights into knowledge and its objects are gained. The "incommensurability" of different standards of knowledge need not undermine the attempt to establish the superiority, or indeed correctness, of one or another set of standards.

/A. The True Spirit; Ethical Life.

a. *The Ethical World. Human and Divine Law: Man and Woman; b. Ethical Action. Human and Divine Knowledge. Guilt and Destiny.* Hegel insists that the kind of self-consciousness analyzed in "Ethical Life" is not the self-consciousness of individuals who contra-distinguish themselves from their group. The community is the essence of these individuals, and they are aware of themselves as members of the group having specific roles within it.¹⁸³ Hegel bluntly asserts the problem with customary ethical life: "[S]elf-consciousness has not yet appeared in its right as a particular individuality."¹⁸⁴ Hegel's claim that individuals are an historical product is open to easy misinterpretation and unwarranted dismissal. What was Thrasymachus, if not an individual? Two points need to be noted. First, Thrasymachus was a product of the decline of Greek life, a decline brought on, according to Hegel, in part by the development of individualism. The first clear signs of that development Hegel finds in Antigone, Socrates, and Jesus. More importantly, the conception of "individual" of interest to Hegel is a conception of an individual who has the moral ability to reflect on and evaluate normative principles; the kind of individual who, most dramatically, is capable of such acts as civil disobedience. This conception of the individual is not an historical constant. Even less is its instantiation an historical constant. Hegel brings out quite a number of its important historical and conceptual antecedents in his discussion of spirit.

The conflict between divine and civil law is cast because the normative system of a customary community mingles two bases of right, natural law and royal edict, without recognizing their distinction and without coordinating their appropriate authority. Persons acting on behalf of either of them behave on the basis of a legitimate customary authority (the authority of civil leaders is itself constituted by custom). The system is thus inherently unstable, merely awaiting an incident to set these two grounds of authority in conflict.¹⁸⁵ Not just any conflict between communal norms and individual behavior brings out the essential instability of customary authority.¹⁸⁶ A conflict of suitable proportions is generated by the conflicting duties regarding the burial of a dead Athenian soldier, Polyneices.¹⁸⁷ His sister Antigone is bound by traditional familial morality to bury him, but his burial has been forbidden by the new King, Creon, because Polyneices had attacked the city. Antigone defies Creon's edict and ceremonially buries Polyneices. Creon claims the right of positive civil authority while Antigone claims the obligation of natural law to honor her dead brother. Neither claim is justified by anything more than appeal to their respective grounds of obligation, and their conflicting claims can be neither reconciled nor adjudicated because customary authority lacks the resources for doing so.¹⁸⁸ This conflict thus marks the breaking point of "immediate spirit," of customary practices as effective norms. Once the apparent internal consistency of customary practice is broken, customary practices are no longer authoritatively compelling.¹⁸⁹ Hence the (conceptual) advent of individual self-assertion, abetted by the community's very suppression of individuality.¹⁹⁰ Hegel explicitly indicates that the dissolution of the authority of customary practice is due to the "immediacy" with which individuals relate to those practices.¹⁹¹ The immediacy of their

relation is the lack of an explicit rationale that justifies those norms. Individuals are no less immediately related to their natural capacities and interests. In the absence of an explicit justification of communal norms, individuals can just as well pay their allegiance to their own individual proclivities. Thus is generated a population comprising a multitude of mutually distinct "points."¹⁹²

c. *Legal Status.* Hegel points out that the multitude of distinct individuals are, for all their mutual independence, a multitude.¹⁹³ Hegel underscores the mutual independence they claim by calling them "substances,"¹⁹⁴ thereby stressing their putative self-sufficiency. This marks an advance, insofar as these individuals act for their own ends and they act within an expressly articulated context of promulgated law. The irony is that these allegedly self-sufficient, mutually independent individuals are persons, are holders of property, only insofar as they are legally recognized to be persons.¹⁹⁵ Hegel claims that the impact of the emperor on his subjects is to get them to ponder their lack of self-sufficiency and to realize that they are alienated from the universally acknowledged authority.¹⁹⁶ He goes so far as to suggest that this is the genuine political sense of the unhappy consciousness: Christian religious longing for God is the intellectual and affective expression of political impotence and alienation.¹⁹⁷

B. Self-Alienated Spirit; Enculturation

i. *The World of Self-alienated Spirit.* The intervening forms of consciousness are alienated in several distinct ways. In Roman legalism individuals are alienated from their society because they have no self-governance; they are subject to the emperor.¹⁹⁸ This basic form of political alienation underlies the forms of consciousness analyzed in the subsequent several subsections.

a. *Enculturation and Its Realm of Actuality.* Hegel's first sub-subsection considers the alienation involved in two prominent cultural activities prior to the French revolution, civil service and commerce. Aligning oneself with state power requires renouncing one's own interests, and it disallows genuine say in governance.¹⁹⁹ Aligning oneself with wealth allows pursuit of individual ends, and it constitutes a genuine contribution to the activity of others, but it fails to generate a perspective on one's social context (to say nothing of forgoing a voice in governance).²⁰⁰ Participation in governance is crucial for overcoming social alienation.²⁰¹ Furthermore, such participation shouldn't be out of the question, for what Hegel argues with respect to the monarch is true of social institutions and agents generally: They are what the members of a social group take them to be, as is reflected in their avowals and their behavior.²⁰² However, bringing about a republican society requires a systematic grasp of social institutions and the behavior that constitutes them.²⁰³ The beginnings of such a comprehension of society is found in a cynical "disrupted consciousness" that tosses off critical insights into the actual functioning of social practices and false beliefs about them.²⁰⁴

b. *Faith and Pure Insight.* Hegel states explicitly that faith and pure insight are two species of one generic form of "pure consciousness," and that they each represent "return from," or reaction towards, the actual world of (alienated) culture.²⁰⁵ Because the object of religious consciousness is opposed to the actual world, this form of consciousness is faith or belief (*Glaube*). Hegel claims that religion is a product of the social substance and that this pure religious consciousness is alienated from its actual conscious existence.²⁰⁶

Furthermore, the object of faith is, according to Hegel, an alienated reflection of its actual social context and activity.²⁰⁷ He goes so far as to suggest that the Christian trinity is an imaginary projection of state power, one that reflects some of the interdependence of different elements of the executive.²⁰⁸

"Pure insight," on the other hand, has no content of its own beyond the content of apperception, "I think."²⁰⁹ It comprehends the systematic interrelations of the components of the social (and natural) world in universally intelligible terms and it attacks the predominant norms and practices (the "matter in hand").²¹⁰ Pure insight is thus an active intellectual appropriation of its world.²¹¹ Pure insight achieves what reason merely claimed: it conceptualizes everything.²¹²

Conceptualizing everything is a process requiring execution.²¹³ Hegel insists that conceptualizing something gives it the significance of "being for self" or of "self-consciousness." This is not to say that the conceptualized objects are generated by self-conscious thought. Hegel does not lapse into subjective idealism here. Rather, conceptualization is a self-conscious activity (as indicated at the end of "Force and Understanding"), and when conceptualized, a thing is exactly what it is for the comprehending subject. Such is Hegel's cognitive optimism. That Hegel doesn't lapse into subjective idealism is indicated by his claims that the aim of conceptualizing everything is an aim in need of being carried out (if he were a subjective idealist, things would be concepts from the start) and that "the absolute concept has no opposition in any object."²¹⁴ There would be no issue of "opposition," of the epistemic recalcitrance of objects, if subjective idealism were true. It is also important to note his contention that conceptualizing something casts it in universal terms, where universal terms are not only equally applicable to different objects, but also are equally applicable by different knowers.²¹⁵ The universality of "pure insight" is a function of the universality of rational thought among humans. This is a cardinal advance by pure insight over the idiosyncratic creatures of the "spiritual animal kingdom."²¹⁶ The universality of rational thought among humans is, nonetheless, a human phenomenon, a function of the rationality of individual humans. The call of the Enlightenment is thus to exercise one's inherent rational capacities.²¹⁷

ii. *The Enlightenment.* The compilation and promulgation of the best insights tossed off by the "disrupted consciousness," in the form surely of Diderot's *Encyclopédie*, undoes the corrupt world of culture as well as the vanity of the "disrupted consciousness."²¹⁸ These institutions and practices existed only because of social deference, as expressed in language. The corrupt world was held in place by people paying lip-service to it, and the vanity of the social world of the *salons* persisted only because the corrupt world continually provided it material for discussion. The appearance of the *Encyclopédie* undermines the vanity of the *salons* because it undermines the claims to preeminence of individual wits. Having thus established the possibility and actuality of sound knowledge of social conditions, the only remaining object for the aim and activity of pure insight is (Christian) faith.

a. *The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition.* Hegel states:

The diverse ways of negative behavior of consciousness, in part of skepticism, in part of theoretical and practical idealism, are inferior forms compared with this [form] of *pure insight* and its spread, the *Enlightenment*²¹⁹

Notice Hegel's indication that he's been criticizing not only skepticism, but also "theoretical and practical idealism," the transcendental and subjective idealisms of Kant, Fichte, and

Schelling. Notice, too, that he lumps these together as "negative behaviors" of consciousness. They are negative with regard to an independently existing world. "Pure insight" is a superior form of consciousness because it develops genuine knowledge.²²⁰ It overcomes the foreignness of the world, not by denying it, but by cognitively appropriating it. Hegel reiterates that faith has a content that in fact is in the form of thought, though not explicitly conceptualized, while "pure insight" has no content but does display the self-conscious form of explicit conceptual thought.

Hegel points out that insight declares faith to be in error because its objects are intellectual productions.²²¹ Whereas faith emphasizes the content of its religious representations, Enlightenment emphasizes faith's production of those representations.²²² This is where they talk past one another. Hegel claims that the Enlightenment is correct that faith produces these representations, and avers that the error of the Enlightenment is to ignore the content of these representations and their significance, rather than to reinterpret them, as Hegel himself will do. The Enlightenment naturalizes away the content of faith, but Hegel suggests that faith's yearning for something more inclusive than the utility of mutually independent objects is legitimate and re-emerges in the downfall of the Enlightenment.²²³

In attacking the oppressions and delusions of the priesthood and of despots, the real goal of the Enlightenment is to galvanize common sense into rational thought and comprehension of its situation.²²⁴ Rational thought is the genuine element of human self-consciousness. The extent to which the Enlightenment is an alienated reflection of an alienated social reality is revealed in the extent to which it is fundamentally *reactive*: Its main aim and purpose is the elimination of abhorrent social phenomena—ignorance, superstition, oppression.²²⁵ What is its positive replacement and recommendation? Hegel avers that the basic ontology of the Enlightenment is a deistic God, a world of mutually independent, knowable objects,²²⁶ and a human population. All things are useful for human purposes.²²⁷ Human rationality is instrumental,²²⁸ and each person is in turn to be a useful member of society, contributing to the general welfare.

b. *The Truth of the Enlightenment.* This subsection contains numerous reflections on the similarities between the deist and materialist strands of the Enlightenment. Hegel reiterates his view that conceptual comprehension is holistic insofar as it interrelates distinct aspects of a complex object or situation.²²⁹ He claims that *for* the "actual consciousness of pure insight" this interrelation of distinct moments is utility.²³⁰ The target being set up for criticism is not utilitarianism *per se*, but rather Enlightenment "insight."²³¹ Hegel emphasizes the importance of the advent of Enlightenment utilitarianism by looking back to its predecessors.²³² The "disrupted consciousness" introduced self-conscious conceptual thought into matters social, but it failed to make those thoughts universal. Pure insight made self-conscious conceptual thinking a universal ability concerned with universally shared conceptions, but it lacked a determinate content. Faith contained a universal content, but not in self-conscious conceptual form. Neither faith nor pure insight found themselves actualized in the world. Utilitarianism purports to solve the alienation of this whole realm of culture, for utility is an abstract, changeless standard of value that can be applied to particular things (and people and social institutions), and in this application self-conscious individuals can serve their own particular interests and activities, and find that their interests and activities are integrated with those of others. This is to fill out the closing part of this section somewhat more than Hegel does, but this seems warranted, for Hegel assesses the adequacy of Enlightenment rationalism and utilitarianism by examining its deployment in the French revolution and the Reign of Terror!²³³

iii. *Absolute Freedom and Terror.* Absolute freedom comes with the recognition that social institutions are human creations,²³⁴ one of the most important messages of the French Revolution. Each citizen as a rational being has the right and the need to participate directly in democratic decisions, so that the universality of human reason has political expression in an actual general will. Hegel echoes Rousseau's dictum, also adopted by Kant, that each decides the same for all and all decide the same for each.²³⁵ (Notice that this development directly responds to the problem facing the noble consciousness. It suffered because state power was not, at least officially, delegated to it.) What kept the *Ancien Régime* in place was the fact that people stayed within their socially specified roles within their estates and professions or trades. What topples those institutions is people's adoption of a cosmopolitan point of view with regard to society as a whole.²³⁶ (Note Hegel's explicit statement that "... in truth, consciousness alone is the element in which the spiritual beings or powers have their substance."²³⁷ Hegel thus denies super-individual agency.) The main accomplishment of "absolute freedom" is to undo the distinction between individual and general will.²³⁸ The problem with "absolute freedom" is twofold. First, its conception of the general will is so abstract that it precludes establishing distinct legislative and executive institutions of government. Distinguishing these branches of government is necessary because only individual human beings can act—an important point about the ontology of action!²³⁹ Second, its conception of the ends of human action is so abstract that it cannot propound positive programs.²⁴⁰

The philosophical point underlying Hegel's criticism is that Enlightenment rationalism can only propound a principle of utility, but that principle alone is radically insufficient for determining individual actions and social institutions. The contrast with Mill's *Utilitarianism* is instructive. Mill propounds the principle of utility as a criterion for evaluating actions, where what actions are possible is largely a function of given social, natural, and individual circumstance and where we are advised to rely on established rules of behavior. This underscores the target of Hegel's critique being Enlightenment rationalism and not utilitarianism *per se*. Hegel's positive view, not fully developed until the *Philosophy of Right*, is that human institutions are developed historically to meet human needs. The rationale required for reconstructing those institutions must itself be socially and historically grounded.

C. Self-Certain Spirit; Morality.

a. *The Moral World-View; b. Dissemblance.* Hegel's aim to establish a contemporary, reflectively self-aware ethical community requires demonstrating that human action has its ground and fulfillment in the mundane here-and-now. Demonstrating this thesis requires refuting Hegel's great predecessor Kant, who holds the opposite view. Kant's theory of action is predicated on an exclusive disjunction between rational free self-determination and causally determined inclinations, and it is supported by the postulates of noumenal freedom, immortality, and God. Hegel criticizes Kant's theory of action in great detail in the subsections on "Morality" and "Dissemblance." The aim of these subsections is solely critical and makes no contribution to Hegel's argument for socially grounded epistemological realism. Thus I pass over these discussions.²⁴¹

c. *Conscience; The Beautiful Soul; Evil and its Forgiveness.* The subsection on conscience is difficult, both because its argument is studded with allusions to Hegel's romantic contemporaries and because, even after these allusions are deciphered, the argument is compressed.²⁴² Hegel nevertheless gives this section extreme weight and ultimately relates

it back to issues in epistemology. These facts warrant a strong reading of this subsection. Having argued that neither Kant's categorical imperative nor the absolute freedom of the French Revolution can specify any content for normative imperatives, Hegel takes up conscience as an account of the content and justification of normative principles.²⁴³ The central feature of the romantic form of conscience Hegel attacks is conviction,²⁴⁴ where romantic conscience purports to justify an action by reporting its conviction that this is its duty.²⁴⁵ This view makes norms dependent on the individual, rather than obeying independently legitimate norms.²⁴⁶ If Hegel can demonstrate the social bases of normative principles by an internal critique of this extremely individualistic ethical intuitionism, he would have a very powerful argument indeed.

An important part of his argument turns on the fact that romantic conscience is a *normative* view, a view concerning the correctness and legitimacy of normative principles and their application to actions. Thus romantic conscience makes claims on its own behalf about what is right to do for anyone in the given situation.²⁴⁷ Including this tenet may seem to prejudice the issue in Hegel's favor. However, it does not, because such generality is essential to conscience being a view of the legitimacy of principles. If this tenet were dropped, then putative expressions of moral conviction would be empty vocables, devoid of any kind of appropriateness, and so neither offering an assessment of a situation nor itself requiring assessment.

It is appropriate for Hegel to assess conscience with regard to action,²⁴⁸ since claims about duties are claims about obligatory actions.²⁴⁹ An action transpires in a specific situation, the character of which is a function of its antecedents, present relations, and consequences.²⁵⁰ Acting brings conscience into relation with the complexities of the situation,²⁵¹ and these complexities can (and often do) ground a variety of obligations.²⁵² Acting conscientiously would appear to require taking the complexities of the case into account.²⁵³ However, weighing these various considerations would require appealing to independently legitimate principles, while conscience claims that there are no such principles because all legitimacy is a function of individual conviction.²⁵⁴ Accordingly, conscience takes whatever knowledge of the situation it has as sufficient and decides the case as it sees fit.²⁵⁵ This reveals that conscience, as an account of the validity of norms, is empty, because any action can be declared dutiful with conviction, and on this basis no action is any more appropriate than any other.²⁵⁶ (Hegel, too, realizes that self-conscious, mediate justification can be undermined by ignorance or inattention.) Principles of justification are supposed to discriminate between justified and unjustified claims. However, any principle of justification that equally warrants a claim and its negation, which conscience as an account of the ground of normative claims plainly can do,²⁵⁷ is no principle of justification at all.²⁵⁸

Hegel criticizes conviction not only as a principle of action, but also as a basis for assessing actions. He points out that among the complexities of any given situation are a variety of grounds of obligation and a variety of ways in which an agent's interests can be and are served by its action.²⁵⁹ These need not be distinct aspects of the situation. What serves the interests of the individual agent may also serve others.²⁶⁰ These putative facts about action insure that anyone who assesses an action which is justified by appeal to a conviction of duty can always find grounds for charging that the agent was either evil, for having claimed as dutiful an act contrary to duty, or base, for having advanced private interests under the guise of moral behavior.²⁶¹ The issue is, What is the basis and justification of judgments about actions? If assessments are based on nothing more comprehensive than conviction, then issuing such judgments, because they are mere assertions, licenses question-begging and indeed grants legitimacy to the very principle of

conscientious conviction to which it objects.²⁶² No rationale for assessment can be established in this way. Furthermore, judgments of actions can themselves be questioned regarding their correctness and their self-servingness. Agent and judge are on a par,²⁶³ and neither can substantiate the claims they seek to make without appealing to shared principles and shared knowledge of the complexities of any given situation. The unstated import of Hegel's argument is that the factual and moral complexities of any given situation and action must be considered, that the parties to the situation are in a position to correct each other's misapprehensions, and that normative principles are generated and assessed in a temporally extended social setting of mutual assessment.

Hegel returns to issues of epistemology at the end of this last subsection of "Self-Certain Spirit."²⁶⁴ The position he holds regarding normative principles extends directly to epistemic issues. This extension is effected by reading his discussion of claims about duties as a discussion of claims about facts or truths. Indeed, the case of cognitive claims and epistemic principles is simpler, since for many cognitive claims there are many obvious relevant facts of the matter. Not all cognitive claims are obvious, however, and the analog of self-interested action is self-interested or willful belief. All cognitive claims can be assessed in view of their formulation, accuracy, truth, and adequacy for the purposes at hand. The self-critical structure of consciousness is thus augmented by exploiting the distinctions between contexts of assertion, contexts of application or action, and contexts of assessment, where these contexts are occupied by different persons or by the same person at different times. When others assess or adopt and use one's claims, they can generate much important corrective information, distinguishing, where need be, among the various aspects of one's consciousness of the world. In either case, normative or cognitive, action and judgment are part of one concrete social process transpiring in a natural setting. Hegel makes this claim in the following terms:

The *self* that carries out the action, the form of its act, is only a *moment* of the whole, and so likewise is the knowledge, that by its judgment determines and establishes the distinction between the individual and universal aspects of the action.²⁶⁵

The process of social assessment and revision of claims and principles supports Hegel's fallibilism.²⁶⁶ Most important is Hegel's claim that this social process of mutual assessment is absolute spirit! Each individual who charged the other with subjective caprice, relinquishes the principle of conviction and

[t]he word of reconciliation [between them] is the *extant* spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself as *universal* essence in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself as the absolute *individuality* existing in itself—a reciprocal recognition which is *absolute spirit*.²⁶⁷

The "universal essence" Hegel mentions is the knowledge and principles shared in common among the members of a social group.

Four important points in the final, highly obscure paragraph of this subsection are clear. First, Hegel insists that "absolute spirit" is introduced once this collective, social basis of individual thought and action is achieved.²⁶⁸ Second, he claims this is the basis of consciousness,²⁶⁹ that is, of the awareness of worldly objects. Third, this basis of consciousness is not yet explicit for observed consciousness.²⁷⁰ And finally, this collective social self is "God manifest in the midst of those who know themselves as pure knowledge."²⁷¹ These last two points set up the theme for Hegel's discussion of religion, how religion facilitates the human community's becoming self-conscious.

(CC.) VII. RELIGION.

Hegel indicates that the "self-consciousness of spirit" has not been found or discussed in any of the preceding forms of consciousness.²⁷² "The absolute" ultimately on Hegel's view just is the whole world-system that becomes conscious of itself when we achieve knowledge of it.²⁷³ Having this structure makes it "spirit," on Hegel's view. We humans are the homunculi in *Geist*!²⁷⁴ Our achieving knowledge of the world is a social phenomenon, as Hegel obliquely argued in the previous subsection. Having reached that point in his subjective deduction, in the major section on religion he considers the whole range of previous issues from the point of view of "the absolute," sketching how the world-system becomes self-conscious in our becoming collectively conscious of it through our socially becoming knowledgeable about it.

Hegel reviews the manifestations of religion found in the preceding forms of consciousness in several paragraphs,²⁷⁵ structuring his review around a common theme, *viz.*, religious consciousness (as it has previously appeared in his discussion) is consciousness of a "beyond," a realm transcending the spatio-temporal world of the here and now. Hegel traces two points in the "Religion" section. One is how the "beyond" is brought back to earth (whence it came, according to his proto-Feuerbachian projection account of religious transcendence). The other is how the object of transcendent religious devotion, which starts out as a sheer impersonal opposite, is transformed into a "self." This transformation is the key point of Christianity, on Hegel's view,²⁷⁶ but he argues that properly understood, the "self" to which religious consciousness is devoted is in fact the collective "self" of the human community.²⁷⁷ Hegel's disagreement with Feuerbach lies in his belief that the aims and hopes of religious consciousness are legitimate²⁷⁸ and are in fact satisfiable in the here and now of the spatio-temporal world inhabited by the human community. This is Hegel's "gothic heaven-storming."

Hegel claims that the "Religion" section provides the analog for communal consciousness to what the "Self-consciousness" section provides for individual consciousness. In this regard, he says that the three major chapters of "Spirit" provide the analogue to the "Consciousness" section for communal consciousness, though the parallel is general.²⁷⁹ Hegel's issue is clarified by considering the parallel between the transition from "Understanding" to "Self-Consciousness" and the transition from immediate "Spirit" to "Religion." "Understanding" discovered that explanation was a self-conscious activity of conceptualizing the world, but it got carried away and claimed that its conceptualizing activity constituted the natural world. It initially refused to recognize that the content of its thoughts is derived from the antecedent structure of the natural world. In the transition from immediate "Spirit" to "Religion" a similar misunderstanding of the content of thought is found. Religious consciousness is anti-naturalistic and takes the contents of its thought as objects transcending the world.²⁸⁰ According to Hegel, there is a crucial disparity between spirit's actual object of awareness and its professed object of religious self-consciousness. He insists that spirit's "actuality proper," its actual activity and concerns, "falls outside of religion;"²⁸¹ he insists that religion, as a consciousness of a "beyond," of some realm or being beyond the actual natural and social world, must be overcome.²⁸² The parallel with Hegel's project to show that one of the conditions of self-consciousness is the consciousness of an independent world is plain. Hegel holds that the strivings of religious consciousness are to be satisfied in the actual world of communal activity, a world in which religious consciousness lives, yet misrepresents and denigrates.²⁸³

The preceding forms of consciousness, Hegel says, constitute "spirit in its world, or spirit's existence."²⁸⁴ They are none other than the major forms of consciousness discussed

in each of the major sections of the book: Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Reason, and (immediate) Spirit. Taken together, these forms of consciousness constitute the worldly existence of spirit. In the development within "Religion" of self-conscious collective awareness of the structure of spirit, Hegel claims, forms of religious consciousness appear that correspond to various moments within the preceding major sections because the characteristics of religious forms of consciousness derive from taking one or another characteristic of the preceding forms or sub-forms of consciousness to be essential.²⁸⁵ "Religion," as a form of self-consciousness, thus presupposes these preceding forms of consciousness. Hegel again emphasizes the regressive style of his argument in the *Phenomenology*,²⁸⁶ and he emphasizes that this presupposition is not temporal and so cannot be an historical presupposition.²⁸⁷ It is worth emphasizing that in his discussion of religion Hegel feels free to take up both historical religions and parallels with his own earlier discussion in order to lay these phenomena out on his dialectical grid.²⁸⁸ The overall structure of the *Phenomenology* is not an historical narrative, and it is not even a narrative of reconstructed history!²⁸⁹

Hegel's concern in "Religion" is more than the existential one of reconciling humans to the here and now world in which they live. Hegel has an epistemological concern as well. His concern is that if an object of knowledge, especially the world as an object of empirical knowledge, is regarded as something "other" or "alien," then there is something epistemically opaque about the object, threatening Hegel's epistemic optimism.²⁹⁰ This threat is removed if the world is known to be "spirit," for then the world as an object of knowledge is an object of self-knowledge.²⁹¹ We know ourselves in knowing that we are part of the world-system that generates us as knowers and generates nature as an object of our empirical knowledge. In this greatly expanded way, Hegel pays his allegiance to the post-Kantian idealist's model of knowledge as self-knowledge. Hegel's existential concern of overcoming alienation is thus solved in part by solving his epistemological concern. The solution is absolute knowledge of the world, and Hegel boldly *identifies* God with this knowledge:

God is attainable in pure speculative knowledge alone and is only in that knowledge, and is only that knowledge itself²⁹²

Notice that Hegel identifies God with speculative knowledge itself, rather than being identified as the object of speculative knowledge. Developing comprehensive knowledge of the world *is* the process whereby "substance" becomes "subject."²⁹³ The "science of the experience of consciousness" purportedly reveals that human consciousness is collective and that it plays a role in the teleological structure of the world. Our gaining knowledge about the world is the process whereby the world gains knowledge about itself. Thus the "science of the experience of consciousness" is an aspect of the "phenomenology of spirit." It is a major part of the story of how spirit, the whole world-system, becomes aware of itself as spirit, as a developing, self-knowing system. With the advent of Christianity, according to Hegel, religion comes to express this "true content" allegorically. The defect of religion is that it expresses this crucial speculative insight in a representational form, casting this insight in images of transcendent, mutually independent objects. Philosophical comprehension is more adequate because it casts this insight in proper conceptual form.²⁹⁴

One might argue that there is no need to go to such lengths to defend epistemological realism if the arguments of the "Consciousness" section are successful, but Hegel's aim to "swing religious consciousness into full support of a scientific interpretation of human life" is plain.²⁹⁵ In the split between right Hegelians, who held that Hegel had philosophically

reconstructed and defended Christianity, and the left Hegelians, who held that religion should be naturalized away, Hegel himself is a centrist. He holds that religious aspirations for intelligibility and belonging are legitimate and are satisfied in the here and now of the natural and social world—without recourse to theism.

(DD.) VIII. ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE.

Right at the beginning of this final section of his book, Hegel claims that religious consciousness is still alienated and will remain so as long as it retains its representational mode of thought that regards the contents of consciousness as mutually independent objects standing opposite to consciousness. This is to say, religious consciousness will remain alienated so long as it remains religious:

The spirit of revealed religion has not yet overcome its consciousness as such, or what is the same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness ...²⁹⁶

"Actual" self-consciousness Hegel consistently identifies with self-consciousness of one's actual doings and thinking in the here and now. Religious consciousness isn't explicitly directed towards this but towards what it takes to be transcendent divinities.

Hegel makes lengthy remarks about the "externalization of self-consciousness" into its objects, which may sound like he's espousing a subjective idealism, according to which conscious beings constitute the world by projecting objects.²⁹⁷ But there is another, better way of understanding his talk of "self-externalization," namely, in terms of a conscious being searching for objects not within its own ratiocination but outside of itself in the spatio-temporal world. This interpretation of self-externalization is required in order to retain Hegel's consistency, for he insists that, along with the activity of self-externalization,

consciousness must ... have related itself to the object in accordance with the totality of its [the object's] determinations and have thus grasped it according to each of them.²⁹⁸

Such a grasp of an object makes the object itself into [*macht ... zum*] a "spiritual being"; that is, an antecedently extant being that has become for spirit.²⁹⁹ It is included in the social comprehension of the world.³⁰⁰ This claim should not be surprising, in view of Hegel's view, propounded several times in earlier sections, that to comprehend an object requires conceiving it in its interrelations with other things. To do this, on his view, contributes to comprehending the object in terms of its place within the systematic world-whole.

Hegel specifies again his epistemological realism:

The object is thus in part *immediate* being or, in general, a thing—corresponding to immediate consciousness; in part, a becoming-other than itself, its relationship or *being for another*, and *being-for-itself*, [i.e.] determinateness—corresponding to perception; and in part *essence*, or as a universal—corresponding to understanding. It is, as a totality, a syllogism or the movement of the universal through determination to individuality, and as well the reverse movement from individuality through superseded individuality, or through determination, to the universal. Therefore, according to these three determinations consciousness must know the object as itself.³⁰¹

The final statement in this passage is admittedly strange, but it is not a denial of epistemological realism. On the contrary, the passage summarizes Hegel's general analysis of the

structure of objects and insists that it is in terms of their instantiation of this general structure that objects can be known. To "know an object as oneself" is to find the object epistemically transparent (rather than opaque), and thus to be an object one has cognitively appropriated. Hegel's formula recalls his tendentious allegiance to the model of empirical knowledge as self-knowledge and his reworking of this model in view of Kant's thesis that it is only in distinguishing ourselves from objects that we are able to be self-conscious. Hegel quickly reminds us that the body of such knowledge is not itself of present concern: The present concern of his book is achieving and recognizing the ability to have such knowledge.³⁰² This reiterates his concern with the "deduction" or legitimation of empirical knowledge.

Hegel's final chapter is by all accounts the most obscure chapter of the *Phenomenology*, and I will not attempt to disentangle and reconstruct his own compressed overview of his subjective deduction.³⁰³ Instead, please examine again the chart on pp. 156-157 which summarizes my reconstruction of Hegel's epistemological argument in the *Phenomenology*.

There are, however, some important passages in this chapter concerning Hegel's epistemological realism which deserve examination here. Hegel occasionally speaks of consciousness "producing" or "positing" its object, and it is important to see that these expressions, despite appearances, do not deny epistemological realism.³⁰⁴ One important passage in this regard is the following:

[S]elf-consciousness enriches itself till it has wrested from consciousness the entire substance and has absorbed the entire structure of the essentialities of substance into itself. And, since this negative procedure towards objectivity is just as much positive, it is a positing, it has produced [*erzeugt*] them out of itself, and in so doing has as well reproduced [*wiederhergestellt*] them for consciousness.³⁰⁵

This passage gives Hegel's own gloss on the "production" or "positing" of objects of consciousness. His view is that our explicit, self-conscious conceptualizing activity ("self-consciousness") extracts its content ("structure") from our conscious awareness of the world ("consciousness," "substance"), "producing" the essential conceptualization, and in this way conceptually *reproducing* those objects as objects for [*sic*] consciousness. This is our role in the overall process of the world-system achieving knowledge of its own natural and historical structure.³⁰⁶ Achieving such knowledge is the "identity" of thought and being:

Through observation [consciousness] finds, on the one hand, existence as thought and conceptually comprehends it, and conversely, in its thinking it conceptually comprehends existence. ... [I]t has thus expressed the immediate *unity* of thought *and being*, the unity of abstract essence and the self
....³⁰⁷

Hegel's formulation indicates, through its allusion to the ontology espoused in "Observing Reason," that this identity is not a numerical identity. It is an identity of content.³⁰⁸ This is the epistemological realism Hegel sought to defend in the *Phenomenology*, and having reached this conclusion, he has reached the end of his discussion.³⁰⁹

The final recognition on the part of the final, explicitly collective form of consciousness that indeed it does have knowledge of the world as it is marks the advent of what Hegel calls "absolute knowledge."³¹⁰ Hegel's description of scientific knowing affirms the realism I claim he's been defending throughout the *Phenomenology* in terms that reiterate and elaborate the points first mentioned at the beginning of "Reason:" The structure and content of knowledge and of the world are the same, although a difference of "form"

obtains between them; cognizers are self-aware, the world isn't (except insofar as it is known by human cognizers). Achieving the identity of the content of thought and world, or alternatively, overcoming the distinction between appearance and reality, is characteristic of scientific knowledge, according to Hegel. He contends that such knowledge is what issues from his phenomenological presentation:

In knowing, then, spirit has concluded the movement of its formation, insofar as its formation was burdened by the unresolved difference of consciousness [*i.e.*, of the latter from its object]. Spirit has won the pure element of its existence, the concept.³¹¹

Since spirit, therefore, has won the concept, it unfolds its existence and movement in this aether of its life and is *science*.³¹²

Whereas in the phenomenology of spirit each moment is the difference of knowledge and truth, and is the movement in which that difference cancels itself, science on the other hand does not contain this difference and its supersession.³¹³

Insofar as the *Phenomenology* concludes with such a final development in a sound manner, it fulfills Hegel's promise that his "presentation ... is ... an *investigation* and *critical examination* of the *reality of knowledge*"³¹⁴ Furthermore, insofar as Hegel's defense of the powers of cognition succeeds, the path recounted in his book provides "the conscious insight into the untruth of apparent knowledge"³¹⁵ This claim has two senses. One is that knowledge is not merely apparent knowledge; the other is that knowledge is not of mere appearances as opposed to the reality of the world itself. The joint denial of these two views results in epistemological realism: empirical knowledge is knowledge of the way the world itself actually is. This, according to Hegel, constitutes "absolute knowledge."

APPENDIX I

TRANSLATION OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*

The following translation was inspired by the strengths, and ultimately also by the shortcomings, of that by Kenley Royce Dove.¹ I have not capitalized key terms. I consistently use "form" to translate "*Gestalt*," and "appearance" and its cognates to translate "*Erscheinung*" and its cognates. I have rendered more of Hegel's constructions with "*werden*" as passive rather than future tenses. I have preserved Hegel's own emphases and paragraph breaks. I have only hyphenated "in-itself" where Hegel has "*An-sich*" or "*Ansich*." Finally, I have preserved Hegel's grammatical distinctions between dative and accusative case in locutions concerning knowledge or consciousness, at occasional risk of awkwardness. I have noted some of the more critical differences between our translations in footnotes. I have, of course, benefited considerably from his example, as well as from Miller's.

Paginations given in the margins are to *Gesammelte Werke* Vol. 9 (abbreviated "G"), to Dove's translation of the Introduction (abbreviated "D"), and to A. V. Miller's translation of the *Phenomenology* (abbreviated "M"). (Full bibliographical information is given in the Bibliography.) Decimals correspond as closely as translation allows to the line numbers of G. For ease of reference, the paragraphs are consecutively numbered.

INTRODUCTION

1. It is a natural idea that, in philosophy, one must first come to an understanding of knowledge before taking up the real subject matter, namely, the actual knowledge of what in truth is. Knowledge tends to be regarded as the instrument with which one seizes the absolute or as the medium through which one discovers it. The concern seems justified, partly that there may be various kinds of knowledge, one of which might be better suited than another for reaching that end goal, partly that by making an erroneous choice among them one would thus grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth; partly, too, when knowledge is taken to be a faculty of a determinate kind and scope, the concern seems justified that error would be grasped instead of truth unless the nature and limits of this faculty are more exactly determined. Indeed, this concern must transform itself into the conviction that there is an absurdity in the concept of even beginning to obtain for consciousness that which is in-itself through knowledge, and that a strict limit divides knowledge from the absolute. For if knowledge is the instrument to seize the absolute essence, one recalls immediately that the application of an instrument to a thing does not leave the thing as it is, but brings about a forming and alteration of it. Or, if knowledge is not an instrument for our activity, but more or less a passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not obtain this truth as it is in itself, but as it is in and through this medium. In both cases we use a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its aim; or, rather, the absurdity lies in our using a means at all. To be sure, it

G53
D7
M46
.5
D8
.10
.15
.20

- appears that this difficulty could be remedied by familiarity with the way the *instrument* functions. For then it would seem possible to subtract from the result .25
the instrument's part in that representation of the absolute which we have gained D9
through it, and so obtain the pure truth. Unfortunately, this improvement would
only bring us back to our point of departure. If we remove what the instrument
has done from a formed thing, then the thing (in this case the absolute) is to us .30
just as it was before this superfluous effort. Or, were the absolute only brought M47
closer to us by the instrument, without altering anything about it at all, perhaps like
a bird is brought closer by a lime-twig, it would surely ridicule this ruse if it were
not, in and for itself, already by us of its own choice. For in this case knowledge
would be a ruse, giving the impression through its multifarious efforts to do .35
something completely different than merely bring forth a relation which is immedi-
ate and thus effortless. Or, if the examination of knowledge, which we represent G54
as a *medium*, teaches us the law of light-refraction in the medium, it is likewise
useless to remove this factor from the result; for knowledge, through which the
truth reaches us, is the ray of light itself rather than its refraction; and if this be
removed, then no more than an indication of pure direction or empty place would .5
be indicated to us.
2. If concern about falling into error makes one in the meanwhile mistrustful of
science, which takes up its work and actually knows without such hesitations, then
the possibility should not be overlooked of reversing this procedure by placing D10
mistrust in this very mistrust and being concerned that this fear of erring is perhaps .10
itself the error. As a matter of fact, this fear presupposes something, indeed a
great deal, as truth; and it bases its hesitations and inferences on assumptions
whose truth should be examined first. It presupposes, namely, *notions* about
knowledge as an instrument and a *medium*, and also the notion that there is a
difference between ourselves and this knowledge; but above all, it presupposes .15
that the absolute stands *on one side* and that *knowledge*, although it is *on the other side*,
for itself and separated from the absolute, is nevertheless something real. Hence it
assumes that knowledge may be true despite its presupposition that knowledge is
outside the absolute and so outside the truth as well. By taking this position, what
calls itself fear of error reveals itself as fear of the truth. .20
3. This conclusion follows from the presupposition that the absolute alone is true
or that the truth alone is absolute. This conclusion can be rejected by distinguish-
ing between knowledge of the absolute, which is the aim of science, and a know-
ledge which, though indeed it does not know the absolute, might be capable of .25
some other truth. But we are beginning to see that such talking back and forth M48
only leads to an obscure distinction between an absolute truth and a truth of some
other sort, and that "absolute," "knowledge," *etc.*, are words that presuppose a
significance that needs to be determined first. D11
4. One could, of course, simply condemn and reject as accidental and arbitrary all .30
such useless notions and locutions about knowledge as an instrument to take hold
of the absolute or as a medium through which we discover the truth, and so on—
since all these notions of a knowledge separated from the absolute and an absolute
separated from knowledge no doubt lead to some such talk about knowledge as a
relation.² It would similarly be possible to reject the excuses which those who are .35
incapable of science derive from such presumed relations,³ excuses designed to
avoid the toil of science and to give at the same time the impression of earnest and
zealous effort. And, rejecting these notions straightaway, one could, instead of G55

bothering to find answers to all this, even regard as deceptive the use of words bound up with these notions, words like "absolute," "knowledge," as well as "objective" and "subjective" and innumerable others whose significance is assumed to be familiar to everyone. For to give the impression, partly that their significance is generally⁴ familiar and partly too that one has their concept, appears rather like an attempt to avoid the main point, namely, to give their concept. One could on the contrary, with more right, spare oneself the effort of even taking notice of such notions and locutions, by which science itself is to be avoided, since these amount to no more than an empty appearance of knowledge, an appearance which immediately vanishes once science arrives. But science, in its arrival, is itself an appearance; it is not yet science in its fully completed and promulgated truth. It is a matter of indifference whether one thinks that *science* is the appearance because it comes forth *next to another kind of knowledge* or whether one calls that other untrue knowledge the appearance of science. But science must free itself from this semblance, and it can do so only by turning against it. For science cannot simply reject an untrue form of knowledge as a merely common view of things and give assurance that it is a completely different kind of knowledge, for which the other knowledge is insignificant. Nor can it appeal to the intimation within itself of better knowledge. With this *assurance* it would declare that its force resides in its *being*; but the untrue knowledge also appeals to the fact that *it is*, and it gives *assurance* that to it science is nothing—one barren assurance counts as much as another. Still less can science appeal to the intimation of something better which is present in the untrue knowledge, pointing the way to science; for, in the first place, this would once again appeal to a mere being and, secondly, this appeal would be to itself, but as it exists in untrue knowledge, that is, to a bad mode of its own being, and to its appearance rather than to what it is in and for itself. For this reason, then, a presentation of knowledge as an appearance shall be undertaken here.

5. Because this presentation has for its object only apparent knowledge, the presentation itself seems not to be science, freely moving in its appropriate form. But the presentation can be regarded, from this point of view, as the route of natural consciousness which is striving toward true knowledge, or as the route of the soul which is making its way through the series of its formations as through waystations prescribed by its own nature, that it may lift itself to the level of spirit, in that it attains knowledge of what it is in itself through the complete experience of itself.

6. Natural consciousness will prove to be merely the concept of knowledge, or not real knowledge. But since it immediately takes itself to be real knowledge, this route has a negative significance for it, and what is actually the realization of the concept is to it rather the loss and destruction of itself, for on this route it loses its truth. The route may thus be viewed as the path of *doubt*, or, more properly, as the path of despair. For what happens on it is not what is usually understood by "doubt," *i.e.*, casting about in disbelief of this or that presumed truth only to return to that same truth once the doubt has been appropriately dissipated, so that in the end the matter is taken the same way as before. Instead, this route is the conscious insight into the untruth of apparent knowledge, a knowledge to which what is most real is, in truth, only the unrealized concept. Hence this thoroughgoing skepticism is also not that with which an earnest zealot may suppose himself to be prepared and equipped for truth and science: The *resolve*, in science, not to surrender oneself to the thoughts of others, but rather to examine everything oneself

and to follow only one's own conviction, or, better yet, to produce everything by oneself and take only one's own act for truth. Instead, the series of formations through which consciousness passes on this route is the detailed history of consciousness' own *education* to the level of science. Whereas that resolve presumes that education may be treated as a simple resolution, as something immediately disposed of and done, this route, contrary to such an untruth, actually carries it out. To follow one's own conviction is certainly more than to give oneself over to authority; but by the conversion of opinion held on authority into opinion held out of personal conviction, the content of what is held is not necessarily altered, and truth does not necessarily take the place of error. In persisting within a system of opinion and prejudice, the only difference between relying on the authority of others or on personal conviction lies in the vanity inherent in the latter. However, that skepticism which directs itself to the whole range of apparent consciousness makes spirit able, for the first time, to examine what truth is, since it brings about a despair over natural notions, thoughts, and opinions, regardless of whether these notions are said to be one's own or others'. But when consciousness sets about the examination of truth *straightaway*, it is still filled and burdened with these natural notions and so it is, in fact, incapable of what it wants to undertake.

7. The *completeness* of the forms of unreal consciousness will result from the necessity of the progression and interrelatedness of the forms. To make this comprehensible, it may be remarked in advance, that the presentation of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not merely a *negative* movement. Natural consciousness generally has such a one sided view of it, and a mode of knowledge which makes this oneness its essence is one of the forms of incomplete consciousness that occurs on this path and presents itself in due course. It is, namely, the skepticism that only sees in the result a *pure nothing* and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinate, that it is the nothing *of that from which it results*. In fact, it is only when nothing is taken as the nothing of what it comes from that it is the true result; for then it is itself a *determinate* nothing and has a *content*. The skepticism which ends up with the abstraction of nothing, or with emptiness, cannot proceed any further from this but must wait and see whether anything new presents itself to it, and what this is, in order to cast it into the same empty abyss. In so far, on the contrary, as the result is grasped as it truly is, as *determinate* negation, a new form has thus immediately arisen, which in the negation has made the transition which results in its own progress through the complete series of forms.

8. To knowledge, however, the *goal* is fixed just as necessarily as the series of the progression. It is that point where knowledge no longer needs to go out beyond itself, where it finds itself, and where concept corresponds to object and object to concept. The progression toward this goal is thus without halt, and at no earlier stage is satisfaction to be found. What is limited to a natural life is by itself incapable of transcending its immediate existence; but it is driven out by an other, and thus to be uprooted is its *death*. But consciousness is for itself its own *concept*, hence it immediately transcends what is limited, and, since this limitedness belongs to it, it transcends itself. With the positing of something individual, the beyond is also established to consciousness, even if it is only *next to* what is limited, as in spatial intuition. Consciousness therefore suffers at its own hands this violence through which it destroys its own limited satisfaction. Due to feeling this violence, anxiety may well retreat from the truth and try to conserve what is in

danger of being lost. But it can find no rest. Should it wish to remain in thoughtless indolence, thought will trouble the thoughtlessness and its restlessness will disturb that indolence. Or, should it secure itself in the sentimentality which assures that everything is *good in its kind*, this assurance will suffer equal violence at the hands of reason, which finds a thing wanting insofar as it is a kind. Or fear of truth may hide, from itself as well as from others, behind the illusion that passionate zeal for truth itself makes it so difficult, if not impossible, to find any truth other than that of the conceit that despite everything, one is somehow more subtle than any mere thoughts, be they one's own or from others. This conceit, which understands how every truth may be rendered vain so that it may return to itself and feast upon its own understanding, which knows how all thoughts may always be dissolved and bereft of all content, finding instead no more than the barren "I;" this is a satisfaction which must be left to itself, for it flees the universal and seeks only being-for-self.

9. In addition to the foregoing preliminary and general remarks about the manner and necessity of the progression, it may also be helpful to mention something about the *method of conducting* the inquiry. For if this presentation is regarded as a *relation of science to apparent knowledge*, and as an *investigation and examination of the reality of knowledge*, it seems that it cannot occur without one or another presupposition which would serve as the fundamental *standard*. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard and in determining, on the basis of the resulting agreement or disagreement with the standard, whether what is being tested is correct or incorrect. Thus the standard as such, and science too, were it the standard, is accepted as the *essence* or the *in itself*. But here, where science first arrives, neither science nor anything else has justified itself as the essence or as the in itself; and without something of this sort it seems that an examination cannot occur.

10. This contradiction and its removal will become more determinate if the abstract determinations of knowledge and truth are first called to mind as they occur in consciousness. Namely, consciousness *distinguishes* from itself something to which it at the same time *relates* itself; or, as this is expressed, this something is something *for consciousness*. The determinate side of this *relation*, or the *being* of something *for a consciousness*, is *knowledge*. From this being for an other, however, we distinguish the *being in itself*, that which is related to knowledge is at the same time distinguished from it and is posited as *existing* also outside this relation. The side of this in itself is called *truth*. Exactly what might be involved in these determinations does not further concern us here; in as much as apparent knowledge is our object, so at first the determinations of this object are taken as they immediately present themselves; and they present themselves very much as they have been taken.

11. Now if we investigate the truth of knowledge, it seems that we investigate what knowledge is *in itself*. But since in this investigation knowledge is *our* object, it is *for us*. Hence the *in itself* of the object resulting from our investigation would not be the in itself of knowledge but rather its being *for us*. What we would maintain as its essence would not really be its truth but only our knowledge of it. The essence or the standard would lie in us, and that which was to be compared with this standard and decided upon as a result of this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize that standard.

12. However, the nature of the object which we're investigating overcomes this division, or this semblance of division and presupposition.⁵ Consciousness gives itself its own standard, so that the investigation will be a comparison of consciousness with itself; for the distinction made above falls in it. In consciousness, one moment is *for an other*; or, in general, consciousness has the determination of the moment of knowledge in it. At the same time, this other is to consciousness not only something *for it*; it is also something outside this relation or *in itself*; the moment of truth. Therefore, in what consciousness within itself declares⁶ as the *in itself* or the *true*, we have the standard consciousness provides itself with which it measures its knowledge. If we call *knowledge* the *concept*, and call the essence or the *true* the extant or the *object*, then the examination consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. But if we call the *essence* or the *in itself of the object* the *concept*, and if, on the other hand, we understand by the *object* the object as *object*, namely, as it is *for an other*, then the examination consists in our seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept. One sees of course that these two tests are the same; however, it is essential to hold fast to the following throughout the entire investigation: These two moments, *concept and object, being for another and being in itself*, fall within that knowledge itself which we investigate, and hence we do not need to bring along standards or to apply *our* insights and thoughts during this investigation. Through leaving them out, we attain the observation of the subject matter as it is *in and for itself*.

13. But a contribution from us becomes superfluous not only in connection with this aspect of the investigation; that concept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself. We are also spared the effort of comparing these two moments and of making the actual *examination*. Since consciousness examines itself, what remains to us, given this aspect of the investigation too, is only pure *observation*. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and, on the other hand, consciousness of itself; it is conscious of what to it is the *true*, and conscious of its knowledge of this truth. Since both are *for consciousness*, consciousness itself is their comparison; whether its knowledge of the object corresponds with the object or not is a matter *for consciousness* itself. The object of course seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousness seems, as it were, unable to get behind that and therefore seems unable to examine its knowledge by comparing it with the object, *not* as it is *for consciousness*, but as it is *in itself*. But in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all, this distinction is already present: Something is *to it* the *in itself*, but the knowledge or the being of the object *for consciousness* is *to it* still another moment. The examination rests upon this differentiation, which is available. If, in this comparison, the two moments do not correspond, then it seems that consciousness must alter its knowledge in order to bring it into accord with the object. In the alteration of the knowledge, however, the object itself in fact becomes altered to consciousness as well. For the available knowledge was essentially a knowledge of the object; with change in the knowledge, the object also changes, since it belonged essentially to this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass to consciousness that what previously was to it the *in itself* is not in itself, or, what was *in itself* was so only *for consciousness*. Therefore, insofar as consciousness finds in its object its knowledge not corresponding with its object, the object itself also gives way. In other words, the standard of the examination is changed if that whose standard it was supposed to be fails to endure the examination, and the examination

is not only an examination of knowledge, but also of the standard used in the examination. M55

14. This *dialectical* movement, which consciousness exercises on *itself*—on its knowledge as well as its object—, *insofar as the new, true object emerges to consciousness* as the result of it, is precisely that which is called *experience*. In this connection, there is a moment in the just mentioned proceeding which must be further emphasized so that a new light may be cast on the scientific aspect of the following presentation. Consciousness knows *something*, this object is the essence or the *in itself*. But this object is also for consciousness the *in itself*; hence enters the ambiguity of this truth. We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first *in itself*, the second is the *being for consciousness of this in itself*. The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. But, as already indicated, the first object changes to consciousness in this process; it ceases to be the *in itself* and becomes to consciousness an object which is only *for it* the *in itself*. Thus the first object is now the *being for consciousness of this in itself*, it is the true, which is to say that this is the *essence* or consciousness' object.⁷ This new object contains the nothingness of the first; it is the experience made by and about that first object. .15
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D24

15. In this presentation of the course of experience, there is a moment in virtue of which it appears not to agree with the ordinary understanding of experience. This moment is namely the transition from the first object and the knowledge of it to the other object. Although one says that the experience is made in *this other object*, here the transition has been presented in such a way that the knowledge of the first object, or the *being for consciousness of the first in itself*, itself should become the second object. By contrast, it usually seems that we experience the untruth of our first concept *in an other* object, which we find accidentally and in an extraneous manner, so that only the pure *apprehension* of what exists in and for itself is left to us. From the viewpoint of the present investigation, however, the new object shows itself as having come into being through an *inversion of consciousness* itself. This observation of the matter is our contribution, through which the series of consciousness' experiences raises itself to the level of a scientific progression; it does not exist for the consciousness which we observe. As a matter of fact, the circumstance which guides this way of observing is the same as the one previously discussed regarding the relation between this presentation and skepticism: In each case the result which emerges from an untrue mode of knowledge may not be allowed to dissolve into an empty nothingness, but rather must be grasped as necessarily the nothingness *of that whose result it is*, a result which contains what is true in the previous knowledge. Here, this circumstance presents itself as follows: When that which at first appeared as the object sinks to the level of being to consciousness a knowledge of the object, and when the *in itself becomes a being for consciousness of the in itself*, then this is the new object. And with this new object a new form of consciousness enters, a form to which the essence is something different from that which was the essence of the preceding form. It is this circumstance which guides the entire succession of forms of consciousness in its necessity. Only this necessity itself—or the *emergence* of the new object, presenting itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing how this happens to it—occurs for us, as it were, behind its back. A moment which is *in itself* or *for us* is thereby introduced into the movement of consciousness, a moment that does .35
G61
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D25
M56
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- not present itself for the consciousness engaged in the experience itself. But the *content* of what emerges to us is *for* it, and we comprehend only the formal aspect of what emerges or its pure emerging. *For consciousness*, what has emerged is only as an object; *for us*, it is at once as a movement and becoming. .25
D26
16. Due to this necessity, this route to science is itself already a *science*. And, in regard to its content, it may be called the science of the *experience of consciousness*. .30
17. The experience which consciousness makes of itself can, according to the concept of experience, comprehend in itself nothing less than the whole system of consciousness or the whole realm of the truth of spirit. Thus the moments of the truth of spirit present themselves in their proper determinateness, not as abstract, pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as this consciousness itself comes forth in its relation to them. Due to this, the moments of the whole are *forms of consciousness*. Since consciousness drives itself to its true existence, it will reach a point at which it sheds its semblance of being burdened by something alien, something that is only for it and that exists as an other. In other words, at that point where its appearance becomes identical to its essence, consciousness' presentation will thus converge with this very same point in the science of spirit proper. And, finally, since consciousness itself grasps this its essence, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowledge itself. .35
G62
M57
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APPENDIX II

PARAGRAPHS 14-16 OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT* IN PARALLEL GERMAN AND ENGLISH

Paragraphs 14-16 of the Introduction extend from G60.15 to G61.30, from D23 to D26, and from M55.3 to M56.29 (§§86-88). The translation used is that given in Appendix I, though the annotations and paginations are omitted. The sentence numbers given in the left column are used in Chapters Eight and Nine to refer to these sentences.

- | | | |
|----|---|---|
| S1 | Diese <i>dialektische</i> Bewegung, welche das Bewußtseyn an ihm selbst, sowohl an seinem Wissen, als an seinem Gegenstand ausübt, <i>in sofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand</i> daraus <i>entspringt</i> , ist eigentlich dasjenige, was <i>Erfahrung</i> genannt wird. | This <i>dialectical</i> movement, which consciousness exercises on itself—on its knowledge as well as its object—, <i>insofar as the new, true object emerges to consciousness</i> as the result of it, is precisely that which is called <i>experience</i> . |
| S2 | Es ist in dieser Beziehung an dem so eben erwähnten Verlauffe ein Moment noch näher herauszuheben, wodurch sich über die wissenschaftliche Seite der folgenden Darstellung ein neues Licht verbreiten wird. | In this connection, there is a moment in the just mentioned proceeding which must be further emphasized so that a new light may be cast on the scientific aspect of the following presentation. |
| S3 | Das Bewußtseyn weiß <i>Etwas</i> , dieser Gegenstand ist das Wesen oder das <i>an sich</i> ; er ist aber auch für das Bewußtseyn das <i>an sich</i> ; damit tritt die Zweydeutigkeit dieses Wahren ein. | Consciousness knows <i>something</i> , this object is the essence or the <i>in itself</i> . But this object is also the for consciousness <i>in itself</i> ; and hence enters the ambiguity of this truth. |
| S4 | Wir sehen, daß das Bewußtseyn itzt zwey Gegenstände hat, den einen das erste <i>an sich</i> , den zweiten, das <i>für es sein dieses an sich</i> . | We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first <i>in itself</i> , the second is the <i>being for consciousness of this in itself</i> . |
| S5 | Der letztere scheint zunächst nur die Reflexion des Bewußtseyns in sich selbst zu seyn, ein Vorstellen, nicht eines Gegenstandes, sondern nur seines Wissens von jenem ersten. | The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. |

- S6 Allein wie vorhin gezeigt worden, ändert sich ihm dabey der erste Gegenstand; er hört auf das an sich zu seyn, und wird ihm zu einem solchen, der nur *für es* das an sich ist; somit aber ist dann diß: *das für es seyn dieses an sich*, das wahre, das heißt aber, diß ist das *Wesen*, oder sein *Gegenstand*. But, as already indicated, the first object changes to consciousness in this process; it ceases to be the in itself and becomes to consciousness an object which is only *for it the in itself*. Thus the first object is now the *being for consciousness of this in itself*, it is the true, which is to say that this is the *essence* or consciousness' object.
- S7 Dieser neue Gegenstand enthält die Nichtigkeit des ersten, er ist die über ihn gemachte Erfahrung. This new object contains the nothingness of the first; it is the experience made by and about that first object.
- S8 An dieser Darstellung des Verlaufs der Erfahrung ist ein Moment, wodurch sie mit demjenigen nicht übereinstimmen scheint, was unter der Erfahrung verstanden zu werden pflegt. In this presentation of the course of experience, there is a moment in virtue of which it appears not to agree with the ordinary understanding of experience.
- S9 Der Uebergang nemlich, vom ersten Gegenstande und dem Wissen desselben, zu dem andern Gegenstande, *an dem* man sagt, daß die Erfahrung gemacht worden sey, wurde so angegeben, daß das Wissen vom ersten Gegenstande, oder das *für* das Bewußtseyn des ersten an sich, der zweyte Gegenstand selbst werden soll. This moment is namely the transition from the first object and the knowledge of that object to the other object. Although one says that the experience is made in *this other object*, here the transition has been presented in such a way that the knowledge of the first object, or the being *for* consciousness of the first in itself, itself should become the second object.
- S10 Dagegen es sonst scheint, daß wir die Erfahrung von der Unwahrheit unseres ersten Begriffs, *an einem andern* Gegenstande machen, den wir zufälliger Weise und äußerlich etwa finden, so daß überhaupt nur das reine *Auffassen* dessen, was an und für sich ist, in uns falle. By contrast, it usually seems that we experience the untruth of our first concept in *an other* object, which we find accidentally and in an extraneous manner, so that only the pure *apprehension* of what exists in and for itself is left to us.
- S11 In jener Ansicht aber zeigt sich der neue Gegenstand als geworden, durch eine *Umkehrung des Bewußtseyns* selbst. From the viewpoint of the present investiation, however, the new object shows itself as having come into being through an *inversion of consciousness* itself.

- S12 Diese Betrachtung der Sache ist unsere Zuthat, wodurch sich die Reihe der Erfahrungen des Bewußtseyns zum wissenschaftlichen Gange erhebt, und welche nicht für das Bewußtseyn ist, das wir betrachten.
- This observation of the matter is *our* contribution, through which the series of consciousness' experiences raises itself to the level of a scientific progression; it does not exist for the consciousness which we observe.
- S13 Es ist aber diß in der That auch derselbe Umstand, von welchem oben schon in Ansehung des Verhältnisses dieser Darstellung zum Skepticismus die Rede war, daß nemlich das jedesmalige Resultat, welches sich an einem nicht wahrhafften Wissen ergibt, nicht in ein leeres Nichts zusammenlauffen dürfte, sondern nothwendig als Nichts *desjenigen, dessen Resultat* es ist, aufgefaßt werden müsse; ein Resultat, welches das enthält, was das vorhergehende Wissen Wahres an ihm hat.
- As a matter of fact, the circumstance which guides this way of observing is the same as the one previously discussed with regarding the relation between this presentation and skepticism: In each case the result which emerges from an untrue mode of knowledge may not be allowed to dissolve into an empty nothingness, but rather must be grasped as necessarily the nothingness *of that whose result it is*, a result which contains what is true in the previous knowledge.
- S14 Diß bietet sich hier so dar, daß, indem das, was zuerst als der Gegenstand erschien, dem Bewußtseyn zu einem Wissen von ihm herabsinkt, und das *an sich*, zu einem: für das *Bewußtseyn seyn des an sich wird*, diß der neue Gegenstand ist, womit auch eine neue Gestalt des Bewußtseyns auftritt, welcher etwas anderes das Wesen ist, als der vorhergehenden.
- Here, this circumstance presents itself as follows: When that which at first appeared as the object sinks to the level of being to consciousness a knowledge of the object, and when the *in itself becomes a being for consciousness of the in itself*, then this is the new object. And with this new object a new form of consciousness enters, a form to which the essence is something different from that which was the essence to the preceding form.
- S15 Dieser Umstand ist es, welcher die ganze Folge der Gestalten des Bewußtseyns in ihrer Nothwendigkeit leitet.
- It is this circumstance which guides the entire succession of forms of consciousness in its necessity.
- S16 Nur diese Nothwendigkeit selbst, oder die *Entstehung* des neuen Gegenstandes, der dem Bewußtseyn, ohne zu wissen, wie ihm geschieht, sich darbietet, ist es, was für uns gleichsam hinter seinem Rücken vorgeht.
- Only this necessity itself—or the *emergence* of the new object, presenting itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing how this happens to it—occurs for us, as it were, behind its back.

- S17 Es kommt dadurch in seine Bewegung ein Moment des *an sich*, oder *für uns seyns*, welches nicht für das Bewußtseyn, das in der Erfahrung selbst begriffen ist, sich darstellt; der *Inhalt* aber dessen, was uns entsteht, ist *für* es, und wir begreifen nur das formelle desselben, oder sein reines Entstehen; *für es* ist diß entstandene nur als Gegenstand, *für uns* zugleich als Bewegung und Werden.
- A moment which is *in itself* or *for us* is thereby introduced into the movement of consciousness, a moment that does not present itself for the consciousness engaged in the experience itself. But the *content* of what emerges to us exists *for* it, and we comprehend only the formal aspect of what emerges or its pure emerging. *For consciousness*, what has emerged is only as an object; *for us*, it is at once as a movement and becoming.
- S18 Durch diese Notwendigkeit ist dieser Weg zur Wissenschaft selbst schon *Wissenschaft*, und nach ihrem Inhalte hiemit Wissenschaft der *Erfahrung des Bewußtseyns*.
- Due to this necessity, this route to science is itself already a *science*. And, in regard to its content, it may be called the science of the *experience of consciousness*.

APPENDIX III

THE TRIADIC STRUCTURE OF THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*

Hegel states that the order of forms of consciousness is handled differently in his discussion of religion than in the rest of the text (G366.35-6/M414.21-3). He describes this change as follows:

[W]hile ... the previous single series in its advance marked the retrogressive steps in it by nodes, but continued itself again from them in a single line, it is now, as it were, broken at these nodes, at these universal moments, and falls apart into many lines which, gathered up into a single bundle, at the same time combine symmetrically so that the similar differences in which each particular moment took shape within itself meet together. (G367.12-7/M414.37-415.4; Miller, tr.)

This colorful image is hardly pellucid. However, two other hints are helpful in deciphering Hegel's meaning. One is Hegel's claim that religion plays a role in the development of collective consciousness parallel to the role played by self-consciousness in the development of individual consciousness (G364.17-21/M411.28-33). The other is Hegel's claim that the "immediacy" of the natural object of religious consciousness (in the first subsection of "Religion") reflects both the immediacy of sense-certainty and the immediacy of self-consciousness (G371.4-6, 9-11/M419.6-8, 12-5). He makes similar claims about multiple parallels between sub-forms of religious consciousness and previous forms and sub-forms of consciousness throughout his discussion of religion.

Hegel's general remarks about his discussion of religion and the details of his actual discussion suggest the following interpretation of these parallels. Hegel's *Phenomenology* displays a triadic structure. Both major sections and individual chapters are divided into triplets of related sections. Thus the various major sections, chapters, and subsections can be correlated in terms of which members of a triplet occupy a first position, which a second, and which a third. In his discussion of religion, Hegel feels free to draw on these parallels in expounding and evaluating the various sub-forms of religious consciousness. Without a firm grasp of these alleged parallels, one is left at Hegel's mercy concerning which parallels may be considered legitimate, and one is left with little basis for understanding (to say nothing of evaluating) the significance of these alleged parallels.

My own grappling with this difficulty led me to produce the following chart. Hegel's book falls almost without a hitch into a complex triadic structure. The genuine significance of this fact cannot be explored outside of a thorough commentary on Hegel's book. I hope, nonetheless, that readers may find this chart of interest. The one modification to Hegel's contents introduced in this chart is the inclusion of "Desire and Struggle" as the first position under "Self-Consciousness." I believe this modification can be defended from issues of content as well as of symmetry, but I cannot undertake this defense here. Regard it as a hypothesis, if you like.

The following chart simply arranges the contents of the *Phenomenology* in three columns, one for each position. (I have not yet found genuinely useful labels for these positions.) One advances through the contents of the *Phenomenology* as one moves down the chart,

moving from left to right. MAJOR SECTIONS are indicated in large capitals, *chapter titles* are italicized, and SUBSECTIONS are in small capitals. Subsection titles appear immediately following their chapter heading. To conserve space in a complex chart, I have occasionally substituted short labels in place of Hegel's titles and headings.

CONSCIOUSNESS

Sense-Certainty

Perception

Understanding

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

[*Desire & Struggle*]

*Independence &
Dependence*

*Freedom of Self-
Consciousness*

STOICISM

SKEPTICISM

UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS

REASON

Observing Reason

OBSERVATION OF NATURE

LOGIC & PSYCHOLOGY

PHYSIOGNOMY & PHRENOLOGY

Active Reason

PLEASURE & NECESSITY

LAW OF THE HEART

VIRTUE & WORLDLY WAYS

Real Individuality

SPIRITUAL ANIMAL REALM

LEGISLATIVE REASON

LAW-TESTING REASON

SPIRIT

True Spirit/Ethical Life

HUMAN & DIVINE LAW

ETHICAL ACTION

LEGAL STATUS

Self-Alienated Spirit

SELF-ALIENATED SPIRIT

ENLIGHTENMENT

FREEDOM & TERROR

Self-Certain Spirit

THE MORAL WORLD-VIEW

DISSEMBLANCE

CONSCIENCE

RELIGION

Natural Religion

GOD AS LIGHT

PLANTS & ANIMALS

THE ARTIFICER

Religion as Art

ABSTRACT WORK OF ART

LIVING WORK OF ART

SPIRITUAL WORK OF ART

Revealed Religion

ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE

APPENDIX IV

ABBREVIATIONS OF FREQUENTLY CITED TEXTS

This Appendix lists the abbreviations for texts frequently cited in this study. The list is divided by chapters, and the texts are listed under the chapter in which they are most frequently cited. (E.g., both Descartes and Kant are cited in Chapter One, but the relevant abbreviations are listed under Chapters Two and Three, respectively, which concern Descartes and Kant.) The reader is warned that the abbreviation "K" is used twice, once for Kaufmann's translation of the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and again for Kenny's translation of Descartes's letters. However, no confusion should result, since these two uses do not occur in the same chapters, and the context of their occurrence makes quite plain which is meant. A date and addressee appears with each citation of Kenny's edition of the letters, while page references to *Gesammelte Werke* Vol. 9 and to Miller's translation of the *Phenomenology* always accompany a reference to Kaufmann's translation of the Preface. Also notice that "Replies" designates Descartes's to the "Objections raised by several men of learning," while "Replies" designates Carnap's "Replies and Systematic Expositions." Abbreviations used for Hegel's works are explained in the "Note on Citations," p. xii.

CHAPTER ONE

- PH *Outlines of Pyrrhonism.* Rev. R. G. Bury, tr.
- M *Against the Mathematicians.* Rev. R. G. Bury, tr.

CHAPTER TWO

- PWD *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.* 2 Vols. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, trs.
- AT *Oeuvres de Descartes.* Ch. Adam and P. Tannery, eds. Revised edition, Paris: Vrin/C.N.R.S., 1964-76.
- Meditations* *Meditations on First Philosophy.* J. Cottingham, tr. PWD ii, pp. 3-62.
- Objections* *Objections raised by several men of learning against the preceding Medita-*
Replies *tions together with the author's Replies.* J. Cottingham, tr. PWD ii, pp. 66-383.
- Principles* *The Principles of Philosophy.* 4 Parts. J. Cottingham, tr. PWD i, pp. 179-291.

- K *Descartes: Philosophical Letters.* A. Kenny, tr.
- CB *Descartes' Conversation with Burman.* J. Cottingham, tr.
- Rorty *Essays on Descartes' Meditations.* A. O. Rorty, ed.

CHAPTER THREE

- CPR *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.* N. K. Smith, tr.
- Ak *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften.* Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed.

CHAPTER FOUR

The chronology of logical positivism is fascinating, and so I have arranged the following list by date of original publication.

- | | | | |
|-------|-----------|---|----------|
| LSW | Carnap, | <i>The Logical Structure of the World.</i> | 1928 |
| ONL | _____, | 'The Old and the New Logic' | 1930/31 |
| LAW | Waismann, | 'Logische Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs' | 1930/31 |
| US | Carnap, | <i>The Unity of Science.</i> | 1931 |
| PPL | _____, | 'Psychology in Physical Language' | 1931 |
| SP | Neurath, | 'Sociology and Physicalism' | 1931/32 |
| PS | _____, | 'Protocol Sentences' | 1932/33 |
| ÜP | Carnap, | 'Über Protokollsätze' | 1932/33 |
| Erw. | _____, | 'Erwiderung auf die Aufsätze von Zisel und Duncker' | 1932/33 |
| FK | Schlick, | 'The Foundation of Knowledge' | 1934 |
| RPWW | Neurath, | 'Radikaler Physikalismus und "Wirkliche Welt"' | 1934 |
| RLPLS | Carnap, | 'Report of Lectures on Philosophy and Logical Syntax' | Dec. '34 |
| LPTT | Hempel, | 'On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth' | Jan. '35 |
| FP | Schlick, | 'Facts and Propositions' | Apr. '35 |

SRFP	Hempel,	'Some Remarks on "Facts" and Propositions'	Jun. '35
CT	Ayer,	'The Criterion of Truth'	Oct. '35
SRE	Hempel,	'Some Remarks on Empiricism'	Jan. '36
VE	Ayer,	'Verification and Experience'	Apr. '37
TC	Carnap,	'Truth and Confirmation'	1936
T&M	_____,	'Testability and Meaning'	1936/37
ESO	_____,	'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology'	1950
MCTC	_____,	'The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts'	1956
Ayer, ed.		<i>Logical Positivism.</i>	

CHAPTER FIVE

Frequently cited articles by William P. Alston:

LCE	'Level Confusions in Epistemology'
TT	'Two Types of Foundationalism'
IK	'What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?'
EC	'Epistemic Circularity'
IEE	'Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology'
CEJ	'Concepts of Epistemic Justification'
DCEJ	'The "Deontological" Conception of Epistemic Justification'
AIE	'An Internalist Externalism'
DPAE	'A "Doxastic Practice" Approach to Epistemology'

APPENDIX V

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NOTES

EPIGRAMS

1. C. S. Peirce, *Elements of Logic* ch. 3 §191. C. Hartshorne and Weiss, P. eds., *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1931), Vol. 2, p. 111.
2. Carnap, 'Replies and Systematic Expositions' (in: P. A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap* [Library of Living Philosophers; La Salle, Il.: Open Court, 1963], pp. 859-1013), p. 944.

NOTES TO THE PREFACE

1. Those who would appreciate a briefer, more synoptic presentation of Hegel's criterion are referred to my article, 'Hegel's Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion' (*History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5 No. 2 [1988], pp. 173-188).
2. *Philosophical Review* 17 No. 6 (1908), pp. 619-642. He continues these objections and clarifications in his published thesis, *Thought and Reality in Hegel's System* (Cornell Studies in Philosophy No. 8 [New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910; rpt. New York & London: Garland, 1984]), of which the cited article forms the substance of the first chapter. Though there is much in style and approach that I find wanting in his discussion, I find his exposition and criticisms of other interpretations in the main correct. Two shortcomings should be noted. One is that Cunningham fails to address the ways in which his speaking of thought, experience, and reality as "coterminous" (*Thought and Reality*, pp. 74, 79; cf. pp. 71, 113) and speaking interchangeably of experience and reality (p. 79 note 1) invite the very misunderstandings he seeks to combat and to suggest that Hegel avows "subjectivism" (p. 78) after all. (Cunningham used the same term in largely the same way as I do, though I was unaware of this when I adopted the term.) Applying Cunningham's rejection of "undifferentiated identity" (p. 75) to his locutions maintains the correctness of his interpretation. The other shortcoming is Cunningham's contention that Hegel's absolute is a personal being, which he defends by inverting Hegel's stated order of precedence and interpreting the object of philosophy proper—the object and subject of "absolute knowledge"—through the object of religion and the philosophy of religion. This leads Cunningham to miss Hegel's realism. McTaggart's view, which Cunningham states and criticizes (pp. 120, 124), seems much more nearly correct. At this point the weaknesses of Cunningham's vague use of logical terms are most apparent.
3. H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806)* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 302.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. Hegel's realist account of knowledge as a social phenomenon requires a naturalistic philosophical psychology. Hegel propounds his philosophical psychology in the first part of the third volume of his *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, the "Philosophy of Subjective Spirit." This portion of Hegel's philosophy is the topic of Willem deVries's new book, *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). He makes Hegel's naturalism on this topic quite plain.

2. I say "in accordance with" rather than "on the basis of." This desideratum does not mean that a philosophical theory of empirical knowledge must itself be known empirically. It stipulates only that whatever is required to know that theory cannot be inconsistent with the principles that theory stipulates for empirical knowledge.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. G58.13-14/D18/M52.19-20; cf. G25.16-17/K46/M17.7. A key to abbreviations is given in the Note on Citations (p. xii). Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. A complete translation of the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* appears in Appendix I (below, pp. 189-196).

2. See for example Hegel's critical reviews of Schulze in 'Verhältnis des Skepticismus zur Philosophie ...' (*Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* 1 No. 2 [1802]), and of Krug, 'Krug's Entwurf eines neuen Organons der Philosophie' (*Erlanger Literatur-Zeitung* No. 22 [1802]) and 'Wie der gemeine Menschenverstand die Philosophie nehme, dargestellt an den Werken des Herrn Krug' (*Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* 1 No. 1). These essays are reprinted in *Gesammelte Werke* Vol. 4, pp. 197-238, 112, and 174-187, respectively. The first and last of these are translated by H. S. Harris in *Between Kant and Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), pp. 311-354 and 292-307.

3. G53.1-10/D7-8/M46.1-13.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (N. K. Smith, tr. [New York: St. Martin's, 1929], hereafter abbreviated "CPR"), B23. Page references are given in the standard manner; "A" designates the first edition, "B" designates the second.

5. Meditation 1 (J. Cottingham, tr. [*Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. 2 Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), hereafter cited as "PWD"]), Vol. 2, p. 12; *Oeuvres de Descartes* (C. Adam and P. Tannery, eds. [revised ed.; Paris: Vrin, 1964-76], hereafter cited as "AT"), Vol. 7, p. 17.

6. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (A. C. Fraser, ed. [New York: Dover, 1959], hereafter cited as "Essay"), p. 13.

7. G. Berkeley, *Three Dialogs Between Hylas and Philonous*, Preface (D. M. Armstrong, ed. *Berkeley's Philosophical Writings*. [London: Collier, 1965]), p. 133.

8. D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2nd ed. (L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, eds. [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978], hereafter cited as "Treatise"), p. xvi.

9. For an excellent discussion of the philosophically vigorous response to Kant that Hegel addresses, see Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

10. Note Hegel's remark shortly before his death that the *Phenomenology* was written for a time dominated by an *abstract* conception of the absolute. (Hegel's remark is quoted in J. Hoffmeister's Appendix to his edition of the *Phänomenologie* [Hamburg: Meiner, 1952], 'Zur Feststellung des Textes,' p. 578.)

11. G53.11-14/D8/M46.13-17.

12. G53.11-21/D8/M46.17-25.

13. G53.21-23/D8/M46.25-27.

14. G53.23-27/D8-9/M46.28-33. This strategy was Rheinhold's "problematical" method. Richard Norman notes that this strategy was also Schopenhauer's (*Hegel's Phenomenology* [New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981], p. 10).

15. G53.27-31/D9/M46.33-47.2.

16. G53.32-33/D9/M47.4-5. A lime-twig is a branch with a sticky substance on one end used for catching birds. This image introduces a distinct notion of knowledge into Hegel's discussion, a notion according to which we directly and intuitively grasp the object known. This sort of view was propounded by F. H. Jacobi and, in a more complex form, by the young Schelling. I reconstruct Hegel's analysis of Jacobi in 'Hegel's Attitude Toward Jacobi in the "Third Attitude of Thought Toward Objectivity"' (*The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 No. 1 [1989], pp. 135-156).

17. G54.3-6/D9/M47.13-6.

18. W. V. O. Quine makes this suggestion in generic form in *Word and Object* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960), p. 5, and in 'Epistemology Naturalized' (*Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1969], pp. 69-90), p. 83. The form of consciousness Hegel designates as "perception" makes this suggestion in a specific form when it comes to recognize the role of its diverse sensory modalities (G75.21-5, 37-39/M72.9-15, 27-32).

19. G54.11-20/D10/M47.22-34.

20. October 10, 1811; *Briefe von und an Hegel* (J. Hoffmeister, ed. [Hamburg: Meiner, 1952], Vol. 1, p. 389; *Hegel: The Letters* (C. Butler and C. Seiler, trs. [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984]), p. 275.

21. Quentin Lauer, *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), p. 26.

22. Cf. Willem A. deVries, 'Hegel on Representation and Thought' (*Idealistic Studies* 17 No. 2 [1987], pp. 123-132) and, in far greater detail, *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity* (*op. cit.*)

23. Hegel makes this same point in the *Encyclopedia* §§10, 41z (quoted below, Chapter Six, pp. 96, 97). Quine announces his break with this requirement in 'Epistemology Naturalized' (*op. cit.*), though not because he thinks it mistaken in principle, but rather because that program hasn't been made to work. Thus he rescinds the program, accepts the circularity, and helps himself to empirical psychology. Whether he has adequately understood or responded to problems in epistemology cannot be discussed here. I resist interpreting this third point as denigrating Kantian knowledge of appearances because Hegel so plainly alludes to Kant in the paragraph following the one quoted, an allusion which introduces Kant's distinction as an additional issue. This passage is discussed in Chapter Three, p. 44 below.

24. CPR B25; cf. A56=B80. With a slight hedge regarding the "*a priori*" status of such knowledge and its objects, this is the sense of "transcendental" used throughout this study. See Chapter Six §VB (pp. 97-98) for the hedge.

25. I do not phrase this in terms of transcendental knowledge because Carnap specifically sought to eschew epistemology altogether.

26. "In accordance with" need not mean "solely on the basis of;" there may be additional principles concerning transcendental knowledge, but these must be stated and they must be consistent with the stated principles of empirical knowledge. Kant does not state this desideratum explicitly, but it is

plainly operative in his "Refutation of Idealism" and so is central in his reply to Hume and Descartes.

27. G54.30-34/D11/M48.6-11.

28. The basically skeptical orientation of Modern and contemporary foundationalist epistemology has been well argued by Frederick L. Will, *Induction and Justification* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), chs. 3 and 5. That Kant had skepticism up his sleeve is evident from his claim to "have ... found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room for *faith*" (CPR Bxxx). See below, Chapter Three §III, pp. 38-39.

29. G54.19-20/D10/M47.33-4.

30. G54.10-11/D10/M47.21-2.

31. Enz. §246r; cf. §§9, 10, 12.

32. H. F. Fulda, *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik* 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975).

33. This is to say, the sense of "phenomenon" which Hegel draws on is not one which contrasts sensible with intelligible objects, but one which contrasts what is manifest from what is obscure. This contrast is borrowed from the Stoics and Sextus. (See the next subsection of this chapter for discussion.)

34. G58.12-22/D18/M52.17-30.

35. Richard Norman calls this the "dilemma of epistemology." According to Norman, "the intention [of traditional epistemology] was that epistemology should be the starting point, prior to all knowledge. But this is impossible. Any epistemological standpoint, against which all claims to knowledge are supposed to be tested, is *itself* a claim to knowledge" (*Hegel's Phenomenology* [op. cit.], p. 11). He contends that this dilemma "undermines not just Kant's philosophy but the whole enterprise of traditional epistemology" (*ibid.*). Several remarks are in order. First, Norman's dilemma is so severe that no one has fallen into it. Not since Augustine wrote *Against the Skeptics* has there been any serious question about whether we have *no* knowledge whatsoever. Epistemology has escaped Norman's dilemma by distinguishing, in effect, transcendental knowledge and empirical knowledge and relying on the former to investigate the latter. Second, I shall show that Hegel's is a more interesting and complex problem than Norman recognizes. Third, Norman makes no mention of Sextus Empiricus. Fourth, part of Hegel's response includes, to be sure, challenges to transcendental knowledge—but not any that bar it altogether. Finally, regarding Scholasticus's swimming lessons (on which Norman bases most of his interpretation), see below Chapter Six §VA, pp. 96-97.

36. 'Verhältnis des Skepticismus zur Philosophie' (op. cit.); 'Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy' (*Between Kant and Hegel* [op. cit.]); cited hereafter as "*Skepticismus*." (I will refer only to the German pagination of the *Skepticismus* essay, because this pagination is given in the margins to Harris's translation.)

37. See 'Zwei Anmerkungen zum System' (GW vii pp. 343-347), p. 345, lines 12-21. I follow Harris's dating of this fragment (*Night Thoughts* [op. cit.], p. 580).

38. The dilemma of the criterion has only very recently attracted attention in Anglo-American philosophy. It is not so much as mentioned in the article by Philip Hallie on Sextus in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Paul Edwards, ed.-in-chief [N.Y.: Macmillan, 1967]; Vol. 7 pp. 427-28), though it is included in the article by Richard Popkin on skepticism (*ibid.*), p. 450. The dilemma is among the excerpts from Sextus included in *Meaning and Knowledge* (E. Nagel and R.

Brandt, eds. [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965], p. 381). Roderick Chisholm has discussed the problem several times. His first discussion (to my knowledge) is in *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957). He also discusses it in *Theory of Knowledge* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). He discussed it at greater length in his Marquette University Aquinas Lecture ('The Dilemma of the Criterion' [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973]), a revised version of which is incorporated in his recent book, *The Foundations of Knowing* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). It is noteworthy that in the first two of these (*Perceiving*, *Theory*) Chisholm does not formulate the "problem" of the criterion as a dilemma, although in the former he footnotes Sextus's discussion (p. 32 note 2) and notes the problem of circularity (p. 38). The "problem of the criterion" in these works is "that of describing certain of the conditions under which we may *apply* our epistemic vocabulary" and the response to circularity is a kind of "postulate" (*ibid.*, pp. 33, 39). It is not until his Aquinas lecture that he formulates the problem as a dilemma, though he does so without reference to Sextus. That he doesn't discuss Sextus in this connection is surprising given that Sextus's formulation is more incisive than the ones he canvasses and reconstructs from scholastic sources and given that he is familiar with Sextus (see his essay, 'Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism' [*Philosophy of Science* 8 {1941}], pp. 371-384), or consult any of the indices to his books). William Alston has recently criticized Sextus's dilemma. His views are discussed in Chapter Five below. Quite recently, numbers of articles on Sextus have been appearing in the journals, several of which are cited below.

39. Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (R. G. Bury, tr.; *Works* Vol. I. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933], hereafter abbreviated "PH"). Also cited is his *Against the Mathematicians* VII-XI (*ibid.*, Vols. 2, 3 [1935, 1936]), abbreviated "M." (This text is translated by Bury under the titles 'Against the Logicians' I-II, 'Against the Physicists' I-II, and 'Against the Ethicists' I.)

40. As will be noted below, Sextus officially leaves it an open question whether adequate logical and explanatory canons and actual explanations are possible. Robert Turnbull suspects that Sextus might be satisfied with at least some of contemporary physics.

41. Sextus states, "[W]e are unable to say what is the real nature of each of these things, although it is possible to say what each thing at the moment appears to be" (PH I 93, cf. I 59). He is willing to press the apparent transitoriness of things to the Platonic extreme of doubting that things, strictly speaking, exist: "[I]nasmuch as about bodies also there is much controversy as to whether or not they are apprehended, owing to what is called their 'continual flux,' which gives rise to the view that they do not admit of the title 'this' and are non-existent—just as Plato speaks of bodies as 'becoming but never being'" (PH III 54; cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 49de). The point about "momentary appearances" and "continual flux" is to question whether we're able to attribute anything to the nature of ordinary objects and indeed whether they even have a nature to which to attribute anything.

42. See Michael Frede, 'Des Skeptikers Meinungen' (*Neue Hefte für Philosophie*, Hefte 15/16 [Göttingen, 1979], pp. 102-129; recently translated as 'The Skeptic's Beliefs' in his collection, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987], pp. 179-200) and 'The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge' (*ibid.*, pp. 201-222) and Charlotte Stough, 'Sextus Empiricus on Non-Assertion' (*Phronesis* 29 No. 2 [1984], pp. 137-164). Robert Turnbull has reminded me that Sextus could accept an everyday contrast between appearance and reality, e.g., between something's being red but looking lavender.

43. Sextus's terms for these are almost always *enargea* and *adelon* and their variants. "*Enargea*" means resplendently manifest, "*adelon*" means unclear. (At M VIII 143 Sextus uses "*delon*" in a sense of clear and evident.) Myles Burnyeat glosses "the evident" as follows: "The notion of that which is evident ... is a dogmatist's notion in the first instance. Things evident are things which

come to our knowledge of themselves (PH II 97, M VIII 144), which are grasped from themselves (PH II 99), which immediately present themselves to sense and intellect (M VIII 141), which require no other thing to announce them (M VIII 149), *i.e.* which are such that we have immediate or non-inferential knowledge of them, directly from the impression (M VIII 316). Examples: it is day, I am conversing (M VIII 144), this is a man (M VIII 316). Sextus declares that this whole class of things is put in doubt by the skeptic critique of the criterion of truth (PH II 95, M VIII 141-2)." ('Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?' [In: M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes, eds., *Doubt and Dogmatism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 20-53], p. 26 note 9.)

44. This is also to say that the niceties of Sextus's views will not be of concern here. The interested reader is referred to the secondary literature cited in the notes.

45. See note 51 below.

46. PH II 74.

47. Cf. PH II 72-73.

48. Myles F. Burnyeat is right that this problem does not quite constitute the modern "problem of the external world," because the existence of the world is not called into doubt by this objection to representationalist theories of perception (see 'Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed' [*The Philosophical Review* 91 No. 1 (1982); pp. 3-40]). In following Burnyeat's lead and analyzing the transformation of classical into Modern skepticism Michael Williams overlooks a basic reason why classical skeptics did not press the problem of the external world as a stock epistemological problem: pressing this problem as a stock problem requires commitment to a representationalist account of perception, and, in true Pyrrhonian fashion, Sextus would avoid commitment to this doctrine. (See M. Williams, 'Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt' [in: A. O. Rorty, ed., *Essays in Descartes' Meditations*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), hereafter cited as "Rorty"], pp. 117-140.) In a more recent essay, Williams overlooks this problem and again mistakes the relation of Pyrrhonism to Cartesian skepticism. In 'Scepticism without Theory' (*Review of Metaphysics* 41 No. 3 [1988], pp. 547-588), he claims that Sextus and his opponents lack the relevant sense of "external," since they did analyze perception into a physical and a mental component (p. 585). Williams is correct on this last point, but wrong on the first. The Stoic theories of perception offer a sufficient basis for raising this problem, and Sextus challenges them accordingly. Locke is often criticized for failing to see this problem. However, Locke thinks that he has the double correspondence of ideas and things as a *premise* in his argument. The real question is, on what grounds did or could he claim this crucial thesis as a premise?

49. Sextus comments: "[T]he view about the same thing having opposite appearances is not a dogma of the Sceptics but a fact which is experienced not by the Sceptics alone but also by the rest of philosophers and all mankind ..." (PH I 210); "... so that the Heracliteans start from the general preconception of mankind, just as we also do and probably all the other philosophies" (PH I 211).

50. PH II 77-78.

51. The Stoics were anything but unaware of the kinds of difficulties posed by claiming knowledge based on sensory states that convey states of the world. One central Stoic doctrine pertinent to settling problems about the reliability of sensation is that of the "*kataleptike phantasia*," a sensory presentation that is absolutely and manifestly reliable. Although this doctrine is a predecessor of Descartes's doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, it does not bear discussion here because the Stoic notion of perception is decidedly different from Descartes's. The Stoics were materialists through and through and never would have countenanced what Descartes identifies as the strict sense of perceiving in Meditation II, namely, seeming to see, hear, and feel (PWD ii 19; AT vii 29). (See W. Matson, 'Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?' [in: P. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell, eds.,

Mind, Matter, and Method [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966], pp. 92-102].) Also, the Stoics never clearly formulated the distinction between an impression's *being* absolutely reliable and its being *manifestly* reliable, and so never clearly resolved this difficulty. (See J. Annas, 'Truth and Knowledge' [in: *Doubt and Dogmatism* (*op. cit.*), pp. 84-104].) For a very helpful discussion of this doctrine see M. Frede, 'Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions' (in: M. Burnyeat, ed. *The Skeptical Tradition* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983], pp. 65-93).

52. PH I 166-169.

53. PH II 20; cf. I 116-117.

54. Above, p. 11. Curiously, Hegel does not quote Sextus's dilemma in the *Skepticism* essay. It is not certain which edition of Sextus Hegel used while composing this essay, but it is very likely the same edition he came to own, that of Fabricius. This was the very best edition available at the time. It did contain the dilemma, and the dilemma is posed betwixt passages Hegel does discuss. Even if Hegel (somehow) did not read Sextus's formulation of the dilemma, he saw that it was implied by the other tropes, for he reconstructs just as vicious a dilemma from the remaining tropes in the course of the *Skepticism* essay (*op. cit.*, p. 219).

55. See above, p. 4.

56. PH I 170, 178.

57. PH I 203; II 79, 103.

58. Hegel makes this point against G. E. Schulze, whose book he reviews in the *Skepticism* essay.

59. Peter King made this suggestion to me in conversation.

60. Despite wide spread opinion to the contrary, Hegel did not deny the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction. G. W. Cunningham notes that Hegel does not deny the law of non-contradiction (*Thought and Reality in Hegel's System* [*op. cit.*], pp. 40, 44). Hans Friedrich Fulda notes this in 'Hegels Dialektik als Begriffsbewegung und Darstellungsweise' (in: R. P. Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978], pp. 124-174), p. 152. Allen Wood also recognizes Hegel's view on this matter, namely, that Hegel's complaint about the principles of formal logic is their sterility (*Marx* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981], pp. 199-206). If denial of "the" law of non-contradiction seems outrageous, the history of logic shows that exactly what this principle amounts to has been and remains a matter of serious controversy. Michael Wolff sketches his very interesting work of interpreting Hegel's views in the context of Kant and contemporary mathematics in "Über Hegels Lehre vom Widerspruch" (*Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Formation und Rekonstruktion*, D. Henrich, ed. [Klett-Cotta: Stuttgart, 1986], pp. 107-128).

One may ask what is so terrible about question begging and wonder why Hegel insists so much on avoiding it. In 'Towards a Theory of Question Begging' (presented to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, December 28, 1975), William Lycan and George Schumm conclude that the principal defect of question-begging is its dialectical infelicity and wasting of time. Their point may be put in terms of what William Alston has called the "pragmatics" of showing that something is the case ('Two Types of Foundationalism' [*Journal of Philosophy* 72 No. 7 {1976}, pp. 163-185], pp. 179-181). The pragmatics of showing that something is the case to someone who disagrees requires appealing to grounds that are independent of the claim at issue and that are mutually acceptable to the debating parties. Question-begging violates these pragmatic constraints. One may recognize this and still wonder about Hegel's insistence on avoiding question-begging. Two points may be mentioned here. One is that Hegel's concern is to avoid dogmatism, and dogmatism cannot be avoided if one begs the question against someone who disagrees. Secondly, Hegel replaces foundationalist epistemology with a socially grounded epistemology. Within a socially grounded epistemology, and especially within one that seeks to retain realism, communal

agreement and mutually constructive criticism take on a crucial role. The legitimacy of communal agreement as well as the fruitfulness of mutual criticism, indeed their very possibility (if one distinguishes criticism from polemic), rest on the possibility of avoiding question-begging.

61. Another reason for Hegel's interest in classical skepticism may be mentioned. Hegel held that the Skeptical tropes showed that all things appear fundamentally relative. However, rather than taking this to show, as Sextus did, that nothing is knowable as it really is, Hegel took this to reflect the fact that things are fundamentally interrelated and that what things really are is manifest in their interrelations. Adopting a thoroughgoing ontological holism is part of a direct response on Hegel's part to Sextus's skeptical tropes, and it is announced as such in the *Skepticism* essay (*op. cit.*, pp. 215, 220). Hegel's holism is discussed in Chapter Ten below.

62. M VII 278, 294-96. See C. Stough, *Greek Skepticism: A Study of Epistemology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 145. This is not to say that Protagoras was a phenomenalist, but only that he refused to distinguish between appearances and the things that cause those appearances.

63. See G. Vlastos, 'The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*' (in: R. E. Allen, ed., *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1965], pp. 231-263), pp. 245-248. Also see M. Burnyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?' (*op. cit.*), p. 25; and Charlotte Stough, *Greek Skepticism* (*op. cit.*), pp. 142f.

64. PH I 226, 236.

65. PH I 170.

66. PH I 192-93.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. *Replies* V; PWD ii, p. 263; AT viii p. 384; to Hyperaspistes Aug. 1641 (in: A. Kenny, ed. and tr., *Descartes: Philosophical Letters* [Oxford, The Clarendon Press: 1970], hereafter abbreviated as "K"; p. 119). This is closely related to Descartes's denial of scientific knowledge to atheists (*Replies* II; PWD ii, p. 101; AT vii, p. 141).

2. Gassendi indicates Descartes's familiarity with the skeptics in *Objections* V (PWD ii, p. 93; AT vii, p. 277), and Descartes refers to skeptics in *Replies* II and V (PWD ii, pp. 93 and 263; AT vii, pp. 130 and 384) and in his letter to Hyperaspistes, Aug. 1641 (K, p. 119). He refers to Pyrrhonians twice in 'The Search After Truth' (PWD ii, pp. 408, 413; AT x, pp. 512, 520) and once in his letter to Renier (for Pollot), April 1638 (K, p. 53).

3. Descartes formulates the rule twice in *Meditation* IV (PWD ii, pp. 41, 43; AT vii, pp. 59, 62); he calls it a rule in *Meditation* V (PWD ii, p. 49; AT vii, p. 70) and in letters to Clerselier (PWD ii, p. 272; AT ixa, p. 208) and to Gibieuf, 19 Jan. 1642 (K, p. 124). Gassendi uses the term "criterion" in the fifth *Objections* (PWD ii, p. 188; AT vii, p. 269), as does Descartes in a letter to Mersenne, 16 Oct. 1639 (K, p. 66).

4. There is a fair amount of indirect allusion to and confrontation of classical skepticism in the *Meditations* themselves and in Descartes's discussion of them. The demon is introduced in *Meditation* I not only as a counterpoised alternative to Descartes's natural trust in knowledge, but also as one aimed at suspending assent (PWD ii, p. 15; AT vii, pp. 22-23). He mentions the variously round and square appearance of a tower in *Meditation* VI (PWD ii, p. 53; AT vii, p. 76)—a piece of skeptical stock-in-trade. He apologizes for serving up the "precooked material" of classical skepticism in the first *Meditation* (*Replies* II [PWD ii, p. 94; AT vii, p. 131]). His conception of scientific knowledge is supposed to be so strong as to "never be shaken by any stronger

argument" (to Regius, 24 May 1640 [K, p. 147])—a very likely allusion to skeptical contraposition arguments. He also holds that reliance on clear and distinct ideas will avoid conflicting judgments about the same object at different times (Meditation V [PWD ii, p. 48; AT vii, p. 69]), and he is cautious about question begging (to Mersenne, 16 June 1641 [K, p. 104]), both of which are favorite skeptical charges. For extended discussions of the skeptical backdrop to Descartes's program, see Richard Popkin, *The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* (New York: Humanities Press, 1960) and 'The Skeptical Origins of the Modern Problem of Knowledge' (in: N. Care and R. Grimm, eds., *Perception and Personal Identity* [Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1969], pp. 3-24), and E. Curley, *Descartes Against the Sceptics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), ch. 1.

5. Meditation II (PWD ii, p. 24; AT vii, p. 35).

6. More specifically, what is at issue is whether Descartes calls non-inferential knowledge of particular clear and distinct ideas into question. Kenney's, Van Cleve's, and Frankel's defenses of Descartes depend on his not having done so. (See A. Kenny, *Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy* [New York: Random House, 1968], ch. 2 and 'The Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths' [*Journal of Philosophy* 47 No. 19 {1970}, pp. 685-700], p. 690; James Van Cleve, 'Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle' [*The Philosophical Review* 88 No. 1 {1979}, pp. 55-91], pp. 67-69; L. Frankel, 'Reason and Antecedent Doubt' [*Southern Journal of Philosophy* 22 No. 3 {1984}, pp. 331-346], p. 341.) Though this issue cannot be settled quite yet, several relevant points may be made. First, Descartes holds that the *cogito* gives non-inferential knowledge of particular clear and distinct ideas (*Replies* II [PWD ii, p. 100; AT vii, p. 140]). Second, Descartes holds that innate ideas are potentials or capacities to represent certain contents or principles to oneself. Hence innate ideas involve activities, and so perhaps operations, of the mind. Thus it is not clear (as Frankel would have it) that when Descartes calls mathematics into question in the first Meditation he is only questioning inferential knowledge. Rather, his example of adding 2 and 3 or counting the sides of a square are the simplest "operations" he could think of (Meditation I [PWD ii, p. 14; AT vii, p. 21])—and this may not mean that these involve inference. Third, Descartes holds that the knowledge of common notions is knowledge of universals, and such knowledge is not questioned until it is used in knowing existential truths (Principle X [*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 195-96; AT viii, p. 8])). This threatens Frankel's reliance on the distinction between particular and universal truths. Also relevant is Descartes's statement in the fourth set of *Replies* that "... one of the exaggerated doubts which I put forward in the first Meditation went so far as to make it impossible for me to be certain of this very point (namely, whether things do in reality correspond to our perception of them)" (PWD ii, p. 159; AT vii, p. 226). The "things" under discussion are mind and body; they are not formulated as general truths and they do not concern the "meta-level" principle of the reliability of clear and distinct ideas generally. Similarly, Descartes expresses concern about having erred even in that which he thinks he sees "utterly clearly with my mind's eye" (Meditation III [PWD ii, p. 25; AT vii, p. 36]), a category which would include singular claims. Two further Cartesian grounds for doubting the reliability of singular clear and distinct propositions will be noted below (pp. 19, 25 and note 71). Alan Gewirth points out that Descartes's doubt, as expressed in the third Meditation, is unrestricted and distributive, applying to each possible object of clear and distinct perception, and so to particular propositions ('Descartes: Two Disputed Questions' [*Journal of Philosophy* 68 No. 9 {1971}, pp. 288-296], p. 296), a point that holds against Frankel's interpretation.

I have heard it suggested that the problem of circularity is a red herring because the generalization made in the last two sentences of the passage quoted above is Descartes's argument for the truth of clear and distinct ideas, insofar as he offers an argument at all. This surely is not how Descartes understood his argument, for he insists twice in the 'Synopsis' that he cannot and does not prove the truth of clear and distinct ideas before Meditation IV (PWD ii pp. 9, 11; AT vii pp. 13, 15). More plausibly, L. J. Beck contends that the hypothesis of an evil deceiver "breaks on the rock of the *cogito*"; the hypothesis of an omnipotent deceiver is shown to be incoherent once one belief

that cannot possibly be mistaken is discovered (*The Metaphysics of Descartes. A Study of the Meditations* [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965], pp. 143-144). Having gotten this far, Descartes is able to rely on the truth of clear and distinct ideas in order to prove the existence of God, *etc* (*ibid.*, pp. 146-147). Beck holds that the hyperbolic doubt involved in questioning the truth of clear and distinct ideas is only tenable on a "cosmic" scale, overlooking the problem of the semantic relation between Descartes's ideas and their objects. However, severe doubt is not only possible but more plausible on a less than cosmic scale, as a doubt about whether Descartes's ideas correspond to any objects or metaphysical laws of nature. Beck's proposal fails to address any of the five circularities I discuss below.

7. *Replies* II (PWD ii, p. 100; AT vii, p. 141). Cf. *Replies* VI (PWD ii, p. 285; AT vii, p. 422), to Clerselier (PWD ii, p. 271; AT ixa, pp. 205-06), Principle 10 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 195-96; AT viiia, p. 8]), and his *Conversation with Burman* (J. Cottingham, tr. [Oxford, The Clarendon Press: 1976], hereafter abbreviated as "CB") [4] (p. 4).

8. Meditation III (PWD ii, pp. 25, 26; AT vii, pp. 36, 38). Cf. Principles 13 and 30 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 197, 203; AT viiia, pp. 9-10, 16]), CB [81] (p. 50), to Regius, 24 May 1640 (K, p. 74).

9. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 25; AT vii, p. 36). 10. *Ibid.*

11. Descartes states this in Meditations III and V (PWD ii, pp. 25, 45, 48; AT vii, pp. 36, 65, 69), in the third and sixth *Replies* (PWD ii, pp. 135, 292; AT vii, pp. 192, 432-33), in Principle 43 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 207; AT viiia, p. 21]), to Burman (CB [6], p. 6), and to Regius, 24 May 1640 (K, p. 73).

12. Meditation I (PWD ii, p. 14; AT vii, p. 21).

13. The *cogito* is alternatively and apparently equivalently said to be known by clear and distinct perception and by the light of nature (Meditation III [PWD ii, pp. 24, 26-27; AT vii, pp. 35, 38]). The light of nature and clear and distinct knowledge or ideas are used in close connection about the same claims in the third Meditation (PWD ii, p. 29; AT vii, p. 42), *Replies* II (PWD ii, pp. 97-98; AT vii, pp. 134-36), and in Principles 20 and 30 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 200, 203; AT viiia, pp. 11, 16-17]).

14. PWD ii, pp. 28, 29, 32; AT vii, pp. 40, 41, 42, 47. The qualification that the cause must be an actual (rather than merely a possible) entity is added in Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 32; AT vii, p. 47). Cf. *Replies* I (PWD ii, pp. 97; AT viiia, pp. 135-36), Principle 18 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 199; AT viiia, p. 12]), and to Regius, June 1642 (K, p. 132). Descartes's ground for this premise is discussed in §IIE, below pp. 27-28.

15. PWD ii, pp. 31, 47; AT vii, pp. 45, 68. Cf. Principle 22 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 200; AT viiia, p. 13]) and to Mesland, 2 May 1644 (K, p. 147).

16. The sub-argument for this crucial premise is discussed in §IID, below pp. 26-27.

17. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 31; AT vii, p. 45).

18. PWD ii, p. 34; AT vii, pp. 49-50. This is a summary formulation of the logical import of Descartes's claim that any being that could bring itself into existence—that itself being a perfection—would surely give itself all other perfections as well (Meditation III [PWD ii, p. 34; AT vii, p. 50]; *Replies* IV [PWD ii, pp. 167, 168; AT vii, pp. 240, 241]; Principle 20 [*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 199-200; AT viiia, p. 12]]). That a being would have all perfections or none is reinforced by

Descartes's contention that one of the perfections of God is that all perfections are in Him simply one and unitary (*Replies I* [PWD ii, p. 98; AT vii, p. 137]).

19. PWD ii, pp. 31, 35; AT vii, pp. 45, 51. Cf. Principles 22, 24, and 27 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, pp. 200, 201, 202; AT viiia, pp. 13, 14, 15]), CB [33] (p. 22), to Hyperaspistes, Aug. 1641; to Elizabeth, 6 Oct. 1645; for Arnauld, 29 July 1648 (K, pp. 115, 180, 236-37 respectively).

20. PWD ii, pp. 35, 37, 56; AT vii, pp. 51, 53, 80. Cf. to Mersenne, 28 Jan. 1641 (K, p. 94).

21. PWD ii, pp. 37-38, 40; AT vii, pp. 54, 58. Cf. to Elizabeth 6 Oct. 1645 (K, p. 180), Preface to the French edition of the *Principles* and Principles 27 and 30 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, pp. 184, 202, 203; AT ix, p. 10; AT viiia, pp. 15, 16, respectively]).

22. Meditation IV (PWD ii, p. 43; AT vii, p. 62); cf. Meditation V (PWD p. 48; AT vii, p. 70).

23. PWD ii, pp. 43, 48; AT vii, pp. 62, 70. Cf. to Mersenne 27 May 1630, to Elizabeth 6 Oct. 1645 (K, pp. 14-15, 180), *Replies II* (PWD ii, pp. 103; AT vii, p. 144), CB [33] (p. 22).

24. PWD ii, pp. 35, 37; AT vii, pp. 52, 53. Cf. *Replies VI* (PWD ii, p. 289; AT vii, p. 428), to Clerselier, 23 April 1649 (K, p. 255), Principle 29 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, p. 203; AT viiia, p. 16]).

25. PWD ii, pp. 35, 37, 43; AT vii, pp. 52, 53, 62. Cf. Principles 29 and 30 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, p. 203; AT viiia, p. 16]).

26. Meditation IV (PWD ii, p. 43; AT vii, p. 62).

27. Descartes equates having ideas with having concepts in a letter to Mersenne, July 1641 (K, p. 105) and describes innate ideas as capacities in the 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' (PWD i, pp. 303, 309; AT viiib, pp. 358, 366) and in letters to Hyperaspistes, Aug. 1641, and to Mesland, 2 May 1644, (K, pp. 117, 148, respectively).

28. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis attempts to solve the problem of circularity by reducing Descartes's task to one of obtaining a simultaneous intuition of these premises and their conclusion, which suffices to show that "my God-given rational nature cannot err when I conduct it well" ('On the Complementarity of Meditations III and V: From the "General Rule" of Evidence to "Certain Science"' [in Rorty {*op. cit.*}, pp. 271-296], p. 280). I do not see how this constriction of the purported task of the proof of God's existence and veracity in any way touches the problems I raise here and below.

29. Descartes expressly says that the causal principle is needed to explain how we have knowledge of anything external to the mind in the second *Replies* and in Axiom V of the 'Arguments ... Arranged in Geometrical Fashion' (PWD ii, pp. 97, 116; AT vii, pp. 135, 165, respectively).

30. To Gibieuf, 19 Jan. 1642 (K, pp. 123, 124). Cf. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 26; AT vii, p. 37); Axiom V of the 'Arguments ... Arranged in Geometrical Fashion' (PWD ii, p. 116; AT vii, p. 165); and the references given in notes 34 and 52 below.

31. Augustine uses this claim in many places, and argues for it in *De Magistro* (On the Teacher), chs. 11, 12, 13 (G. Leckie, tr.; in: W. J. Oates, ed., *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine* Vol. I [New York, Random House: 1948]), esp. pp. 389, 391, 392.

32. L. J. Beck (*op. cit.*), p. 135. It is worth noting that the Augustinian view does not entirely leave Descartes's thinking, for he grants that God may miraculously reveal Himself directly to us,

although this lies beyond the limits of his philosophy (to Silhon, March 1648 [K, pp. 229-30]). This letter provides, I believe, the crucial evidence against construing Descartes's argument for the existence of God as precisely parallel to the *cogito* argument, where the "argument" for God's existence is alleged to lead to having a direct intuition of God.

33. *Replies I* (PWD ii, p. 75; AT vii, p. 102. *Cp. Meditations*, Preface to the reader (PWD ii, p. 7; AT vii, p. 8), *Replies I*, 'Arguments ... Arranged in Geometrical Fashion' Definition 3, and Objections V (PWD ii, pp. 75, 113-14, 199; AT vii, pp. 102, 161, 285, respectively).

34. Harry Frankfurt attempts to clear Descartes of the charge of circularity by downplaying Descartes's concern with the correspondence of his ideas to reality. In this connection he cites the following passage: "What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged 'absolute falsity' bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest suspicion of it? For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty" (*Replies II* [PWD ii, p. 103; AT vii p. 145]; cited by Frankfurt in 'Descartes' Validation of Reason' [in: W. Doney, ed., *Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays* [N. Y.: Anchor, 1967], pp. 207-226], p. 226, and in *Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen* [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970], p. 179). This is indeed a remarkable passage, but it can only be regarded as back-tracking in an impossible situation. As others have pointed out, often in direct reply to Frankfurt, Descartes's "metaphysical" doubt concerns exactly the problem of whether or not clear and distinct ideas do in fact correspond to their objects. Bernard Williams is particularly succinct on this point: "What appears false to God, God being omniscient, is false, so this possibility would mean that God was, radically, a deceiver. The reference to 'absolute falsehood', in this sense, is not to be taken seriously" (*Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry* [Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978], p. 200). Also see Alan Gewirth, 'The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered' (*Journal of Philosophy* 67 No. 19 [1970], pp. 668-685), pp. 675-76, 677-78; Edwin Curley, *Descartes Against the Sceptics* (*op. cit.*), p. 110; and the text quoted in note 68 below.

35. CB [34] p. 23.

36. *Replies I* (PWD ii, p. 75-76; AT vii, pp. 103-06).

37. *Meditations III and V, Replies I* (PWD ii, pp. 26, 29-32, 47, 83-85; AT vii, pp. 36-38, 43-47, 68, 116-19); to Mersenne, 16 June 1641 (K, p. 104).

38. To Mersenne, 16 June 1641 (K, p. 104). *Cf.* Meditation V (PWD ii, p. 47; AT vii, p. 68), Principle 15 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 198; AT viiia, p. 10]).

39. There are passages indicating that all innate ideas represent eternal essences (Meditation V [PWD ii, pp. 44-45, 47; AT vii, pp. 64, 68], Postulate 4 of the 'Arguments ... Arranged in Geometrical Fashion' [PWD ii, p. 115; AT vii, p. 163], Principle 15 [*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 198; AT viiia, p. 10]]), and there are passages stating that such ideas have "no existence outside our thought" (Principle 48 [*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 208; AT viiia, pp. 22-23]]; CB [52] [p. 34]; *cf.* Principles 49 and 58 [*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 209, 212; AT viiia, pp. 23, 27]] and 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' [PWD i, p. 303; AT viiib, p. 358]). It is perhaps plausible to hold that there are essences or *entia* corresponding to mathematical truths, so that such knowledge is objectual; but it is much less plausible to hold that there is an *ens* corresponding to any of the causal principles Descartes mentions.

40. One can only wish that Descartes had answered Gassendi's question concerning the whereabouts of Plato's essence after death (Objections V [PWD ii, p. 225; AT viii, p. 324]).

41. *Replies V and VI* (PWD ii, pp. 261, 293-94; AT vii, pp. 380, 432-33); Principle 22 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, p. 200; AT viiia, p. 13]); CB [33] (p. 22); to Hyperaspistes, Aug. 1641 (K, p. 116).
42. Principle 23 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, p. 201; AT viiia, p. 14]).
43. *Replies V* (PWD ii, pp. 261, 262; AT vii, pp. 380, 381-82); to Mersenne, 16 June 1641 (K, p. 104).
44. Principle 28 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, pp. 202; AT viiia, pp. 15-16]); to Elizabeth, 6 Oct. 1645 (K, p. 180).
45. Descartes himself makes the distinction between the content and the semantical aspect of ideas. See the Preface to the Reader and Meditation II (PWD ii, pp. 7, 26, 27, 28-29, 29; AT vii, pp. 8, 38, 39, 41, 42).
46. Cf. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 26; AT vii, p. 38). It is worth noting that in the case of material objects, these causes are occasioning causes (see 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' [PWD i, p. 304; AT viiib, p. 359]).
47. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 29; AT vii, p. 42); to Mersenne, March 1642; to Regius, June 1642 (K, pp. 132, 133-34 respectively).
48. For a helpful discussion of Descartes's theory of ideas see Vere Chappell, 'The Theory of Ideas' (in Rorty [*op. cit.*], pp. 177-198).
49. Cf. note 29 above.
50. To Elizabeth, 6 Oct. 1645 (K, p. 180); Principles 24, 28, and 51 (*Principles Pt. I* [PWD i, pp. 201, 202, 210; AT viiia, pp. 14, 15-16, 24]).
51. Divine voluntarism is not explicitly announced in the *Meditations*, but Descartes's "metaphysical doubt" rests on this doctrine, as does the Cartesian priority of metaphysical over mathematical knowledge. (See the Preface to the Reader and Meditation V [PWD ii, pp. 11, 48, 49; AT vii, pp. 15, 69-70, 71].) He is quite explicit about this elsewhere. See *Replies V and VI* (PWD ii, pp. 261, 293-94; AT vii, pp. 380, 435-36) and the following note.
52. On Descartes's mathematical doubts, see Meditation I (PWD ii, p. 14; AT vii, p. 21). Also see *Replies V and VI* (PWD ii, pp. 261, 293-94; AT vii, pp. 380, 435-36); and to Mersenne, 15 April 1630, 6 May 1630, 27 May 1630, 17 May 1638; to Mesland, 2 May 1644; for Arnauld, 29 July 1648; to More, 5 Feb. 1649 (K, pp. 10-11, 13-14, 15, 55, 150-51, 236, 241, respectively). Alan Gewirth examines Descartes's representationalist account of mathematical knowledge in 'The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered' (*op. cit.*], pp. 676-77). Hide Ishiguro has argued that Descartes's views on divine creation of logical and mathematical truths needn't entail that God is capable of creating self-contradictory truths or states of affairs ('The Status of Necessity and Impossibility in Descartes' [in Rorty [*op. cit.*], pp. 459-472]). While I find much merit in her discussion, her conclusion does not reflect what Descartes actually says.
53. George Nakhnikian charges Descartes with misologism, but in so doing ignores Descartes's representationalist account of ideas which leads him to entertain the possibility that God may have made some contradictions true. His objections to Harry Frankfurt's 'Descartes's Validation of Reason' (*op. cit.*) fail due to his leaving Descartes's representationalism out of account. (See 'The Cartesian Circle Revisited' [*American Philosophical Quarterly* 4 No. 3 {1967}, pp. 251-255], esp. p. 254.)

54. *Replies II* (PWD ii, pp. 107-08; AT vii, pp. 150-52), CB [37] (p. 25).
55. Cf. *Meditation III* (PWD ii, pp. 25, 28-29, 32; AT vii, pp. 36, 40-42, 47) and *Replies II* (PWD ii, p. 97; AT vii, p. 135).
56. CB [3] (p. 4).
57. PWD ii, p. 103; AT vii, p. 144. Cp. Principle 29 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 203; AT viiia, p. 16]).
58. See note 18 above.
59. See *Meditations Synopsis and V* (PWD ii, pp. 9, 48; AT vii, pp. 13, 70), *Replies II* (PWD ii, pp. 102-03, 110-113; AT vii, pp. 144, 155-159), CB [17] and [79] (pp. 12, 49), and the Preface to the *Principles* (PWD i, pp. 183-84; AT viiia, pp. 9-11). Exactly what the "analytic" method comes to is obscure, but certainly it involves adhering to the law of non-contradiction. See Edwin Curley's helpful analysis of Descartes's analytic method, 'Analysis in the *Meditations*: The Quest for Clear and Distinct Ideas' (in Rorty [*op. cit.*], pp. 153-176). See note 73 below, *contra* Alan Gewirth's defense of Descartes.
60. This sort of severe demon hypothesis has been hinted at in the literature, but not developed. Harry Frankfurt comes close to suggesting it in 'Descartes' Validation of Reason' (*op. cit.*, note 22). Bernard Williams is more overt about it in *Descartes: the Project of Pure Inquiry* ([*op. cit.*], p. 178). Anthony Kenny comes closest to proposing this hypothesis in 'The Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths' (*op. cit.*, pp. 690-91). Edwin Curley argues that Descartes can and does meet the skeptical contraposition argument (*Descartes Against the Skeptics*, *op. cit.*, p. 121), but he fails to notice that the contraposition argument can be made a good deal stronger by developing the "severe" demon hypothesis which I give here. Additionally, he contends that the equipoised arguments offered by a Pyrrhonian skeptic must be equally compelling in the sense of equally inducing belief. However, I think that Sextus can consistently demur at this interpretation of the relevant equiposition. Sextus grants, of course, that nature compels him to believe many things, and he accepts these beliefs, though he does not, for that (or any other) reason think this gives him grounds for holding those beliefs to be true. Given the special doctrines that Descartes holds concerning how humans cannot but believe what they clearly and distinctly perceive, and the fact that the reliability of human nature is cast into metaphysical doubt by the demon, Sextus could well grant that, if he had a clear and distinct idea, then he would hold the belief while denying that he therefore would have rational grounds to believe it to be true. The relevant equiposition is that the severe demon hypothesis accounts just as well for the putative phenomena and suffices to show that Descartes's argument for the existence of God is not clearly sound.
61. Margaret Wilson points out this feature of Descartes's thesis of divine voluntarism (*Descartes* [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978], p. 136).
62. D. Hume, *Treatise* (*op. cit.*), Bk. I Pt. III §III.
63. Objections VI (PWD ii, p. 278; AT vii, p. 413).
64. To Clerselier concerning Objections V (PWD ii, p. 271; AT ixa, p. 206); Principle 10 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 195-96; AT viiia, p. 8]).
65. *Replies VI* (PWD ii, p. 285; AT vii, p. 422); to Mersenne, 16 Oct. 1639; to Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (K, pp. 65-66, 138-39, respectively); cf. Principle 50 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 209; AT viiia, p. 24]).

66. Principle 10 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 196; AT viiia, p. 8]); to Mersenne, 22 July 1641 (K, p. 108).

67. To Clerselier concerning Objections V (PWD ii, p. 271; AT ixa, p. 206); to Mersenne, 22 July 1641 (K, p. 108).

68. Cf. Meditation III: "... as far as ideas are concerned, provided they are considered solely in themselves and I do not refer them to anything else, they cannot strictly speaking be false [T]he only ... thoughts where I must be on my guard against making a mistake are judgments. And the chief and most common mistake which is to be found here consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, things located outside me. Of course, if I considered just the ideas themselves simply as modes of my thought, without referring them to anything else, they could scarcely give me any material for error" (PWD ii p. 26; AT vii p. 37.). Because of this view about judgment Descartes cannot avail himself of the sort of "direct" justification of perceptual beliefs propounded by Alston (see below, Chapter Five.)

69. CB [6] p. 7.

70. See Principle 10 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 196; AT viiia, p. 8]) and note 29 above. Also see note 34, *contra* Frankfurt's deemphasis of this problem.

71. It should be noted that this plight affects the putative reliability of singular clear and distinct propositions.

72. CB [81] pp. 49-50. When pressed, Descartes claims that we can know the truth of the premises of his argument for the existence of God before knowing the existence of God, so long as we pay attention to those premises (CB [6] and [81] [pp. 5-7, 49-50], Principle 13 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 197; AT viiia, pp. 9-10]).

73. The anchor of Alan Gewirth's defense of Descartes against the charge of circularity is his claim that on Descartes's account it is impossible to form a clear and distinct idea of an omnipotent being who is a deceiver. Thus it is impossible to raise a legitimate reason to doubt the argument for God's existence and veracity ('The Cartesian Circle' [*Philosophical Review* 1 No. 4 {1941}, pp. 388-395; 'The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered', *op. cit.*, pp. 682-83, 388-92; 'Descartes: Two Disputed Questions', *op. cit.*, p. 292). Gewirth, like Frankfurt, Doney, and Curley after him, attempts to undo the skeptic by placing the burden of proof onto the skeptic and showing that on Descartes's grounds the skeptic is in no position to raise considered doubts about the veracity of clear and distinct ideas because even the skeptic must believe these ideas when they occur to him or her and because one cannot form a clear and distinct idea of an omnipotent deceiver. This strategy, however, greatly overplays the commitments made by a skeptic of Sextus's stripe. Sextus only uses principles of reasoning that are employed by his opponents, and it suffices for his skeptical aims to show that his opponents cannot prove what they claim to be able to prove. In the case of Descartes's argument for the existence of God, it suffices to show that the argument is invalid (or, at the very least, not known to be sound) by offering an alternative account of how Descartes could have the idea of God that he has, why he cannot but believe it to be true, and yet the idea be false. This is precisely the point of the severe demon hypothesis formulated above. (See Frankfurt, 'Descartes' Validation of Reason', *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 224; Willis Doney, 'Descartes's Conception of Perfect Knowledge' [*Journal of the History of Philosophy* 8 No. 4 {1970}, pp. 387-404], pp. 399-403; and Curley, *Descartes Against the Skeptics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-17.) Frankfurt follows Gewirth's point about the impossibility of clearly and distinctly perceiving the idea of an omnipotent deceiver, but also restricts his purpose to interpreting rather than evaluating Descartes's strategy (*Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175, 174, respectively).

Bernard Williams suggests that the rule, "Accept as on-going beliefs just those propositions which are at any time clearly and distinctly perceived to be true," is rationally acceptable independent of the proof of God's existence because it is "a minimal structural condition on getting on at all" (*op. cit.*, pp. 203, 206). However, Sextus offers skepticism as a healthy way of life, the cardinal tenet of which is to *relinquish* "getting on" with pointless inquiry. The independent plausibility that Williams finds in this rule is, unfortunately for his defense of Descartes against the charges of circularity, precisely the issue between Descartes and his skeptical opponents, who won't find this rule independently plausible at all. Descartes is still guilty of exactly the circularity or dogmatism that Sextus would allege against him, and the alleged independent plausibility of Williams's proposed rule evaporates when confronted with the severe demon hypothesis.

74. PWD ii, p. 31; AT vii, p. 45. Cf. to Hyperaspistes, Aug. 1641 (K, pp. 114-15).

75. PWD ii, p. 31; AT vii, p. 45. Descartes obliquely allows in the third Meditation that he might be able to compound his notions of power up to infinity (PWD ii, pp. 32-33; AT vii, pp. 47-48), and in a letter to Hyperaspistes, he reiterates his allowing such powers of amplification in his fifth Reply (PWD ii, p. 255; AT vii, pp. 370-371). But as he emphasizes to Hyperaspistes, such a power is only possible because the archetype of the endpoint of such amplification actually exists in God (Aug. 1641 [K, pp. 114-15]). For a very helpful discussion of this issue, see Margaret Wilson, 'Can I be the Cause of My Idea of the World?' (in Rorty [*op. cit.*], pp. 339-358).

76. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 32; AT vii, pp. 46-47).

77. Meditation III (PWD ii, pp. 33-34; AT vii, p. 49). Cf. Principle 21 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 200; AT viii, p. 13]); and to Mesland, 2 May 1642 (K, p. 147).

78. Meditations II and III (PWD ii, pp. 18-19, 27; AT vii, pp. 27-28, 39). Cf. Meditations III, IV, and *Replies* IV (PWD ii, pp. 33-34, 41, 171; AT vii, pp. 49, 59, 246).

79. To Gibieuf, 19 Jan. 1642 (K, p. 124).

80. A. Baier, 'The Idea of the True God in Descartes' (in Rorty [*op. cit.*], pp. 359-388), pp. 363-364. Her suggestion supplements what Descartes claims on behalf of causal principles, but it fits Descartes's method so well that I completely concur with her suggestion. The main point of her essay is to propound and defend an extraordinary and fascinating interpretation of Meditation III according to which Descartes himself *is* an idea of God, and Descartes's idea of himself is an idea of his being an idea of God. On her reconstruction, Descartes's argument for the existence of God is circular, but because it is a "bootstrap" argument, the circle is virtuous. There are, however, some decisive internal difficulties facing her reconstruction. If Descartes is an idea of God, then he is a mode of a divine thinking substance—since all ideas are modes of thinking substances, according to Descartes. Two points follow: Descartes's being a mode of the divine substance would render impossible Baier's account of how Descartes can extract a substance/mode metaphysics from the *cogito*, and it would prove that the crucial causal principle was false! On the first point, Descartes could not extract a substance/mode metaphysics from the *cogito* (p. 384), since he himself according to Baier is a *mode* and his ideas are thus accidents. On her view, then, Descartes has no intuition of a substance and so cannot generate a substance metaphysics on that basis. On the second point, Descartes's idea of himself is an idea of himself as a thinking *substance*. But if in fact (according to Baier) he is a mode, then his idea of himself represents him as having *more* reality than he actually, formally has. Thus the causal principle would be false. Also, her account of how Descartes could count as an idea in a broad sense confuses material and objective senses of "idea" (p. 369).

81. Meditation V (PWD ii, pp. 47-48; AT vii, pp. 69, 70); *Replies* II and IV (PWD ii, pp. 100, 171; AT vii, pp. 140, 245-46); Principle 13 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 197; AT vii, pp. 9-10]); CB [81] (pp. 49-50); to Regius, 24 May 1640 (K, pp. 73-74).

82. PWD ii, p. 48; AT vii, p. 69.

83. See the quotation on p. 19 above.

84. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 48; AT vii, p. 70); *Replies* II and IV (PWD ii, pp. 100, 171; AT vii, pp. 140, 245-46); Principle 13 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 197; AT vii, pp. 9-10]); to Regius, 24 May 1640 (K, pp. 73-74). Harry Frankfurt has established that the central doubts in the *Meditations* do not concern the reliability of memory. See 'Memory and the Cartesian Circle' (*Philosophical Review* 71 No. 4 [1962], pp. 504-511). Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (*op. cit.*) corroborates this point with some careful textual exegesis in her note 37.

85. *Replies* II (PWD ii, pp. 102-03; AT vii, pp. 143-44). Arnauld and Gassendi point out this circularity (Objections IV and V [PWD ii, pp. 150, 194-95; AT vii, pp. 214, 279]). Descartes responds by referring to his discussion of memory in *Replies* II, §§3 and 4 (*Replies* IV and the Letter to Clerselier concerning Objections V [PWD ii, pp. 171, 274; AT vii pp. 246-47, 211]); but he goes on to reiterate the circularity discussed in the same *Replies* IV (PWD ii, p. 159; AT vii, p. 226). The same circularity and evasion occur in conversation with Burman (CB [81], pp. 36, 49-50), and the circularity is stated in the Preface to the *Principles* and in Principles 30 and 43 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 183-84, 203, 207; AT viiia, pp. 9-10, 16-17, 21]) and in especially brief compass in the 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' (PWD i, p. 306; AT viiib, p. 362).

86. Mike Marlies ('Doubt, Reason, and Cartesian Therapy' [in: *Descartes*, Hooker, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 89-113]) and, after him, Lois Frankel (*op. cit.*) have made particularly plain this pedagogical aspect of the *Meditations*. Also see L. J. Beck (*op. cit.*), p. 141; and the Letter to Clerselier concerning Objections V, *Replies* V (PWD ii, pp. 270, 241-42, 260; AT ixa, pp. 204-05; AT vii, p. 348-50, 379); Principles 71 and 72 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 218-220; AT viiia, pp. 35-37]); and to Mersenne, 16 June 1641 (K, p. 104). Frankel grants (in conversation) that on this construal of the project of the *Meditations* Descartes propounds a simple, if covert, dogmatism.

87. *Replies* II and III; 'Arguments ... Arranged in Geometrical Fashion', Postulates 1-3; (PWD ii, pp. 104, 110-113, 114-15, 121; AT vii, pp. 146, 155-159, 162-63, 171-72). Cf. *Replies* VI (PWD ii, p. 286-87; AT vii, pp. 424-425), Principles 1 and 2 (*Principles* Pt. III [PWD i, p. 248; AT viiia, pp. 80-81]), 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' (PWD i, pp. 307-08; AT viiib, pp. 364-65).

88. W. P. Alston, 'Two Types of Foundationalism' (*op. cit.*), p. 179. See Chapter Five, p. 73, for discussion.

89. In a very interesting essay Amélie Rorty suggests that charges of circularity lose their sting once the *Meditations* are read as meditations ('The Structure of Descartes' *Meditations*,' [in Rorty (*op. cit.*), pp. 1-20], p. 2). However, these charges lose their sting because Descartes's conclusions, on the meditational reading Rorty gives them, lose their force, for no attempt is made to derive ontological conclusions from a "phenomenological" investigation of the structure of the meditator's set of ideas. This is to leave Descartes strapped with the semantic circle discussed in §IIb above and also to face the same difficulties as Frankfurt's view that "absolute truth" in the sense of the correspondence of ideas to reality plays no role in the *Meditations* (see note 34). Aryeh Kosman follows Rorty's lead in reading the *Meditations* as meditations and claims that "The central fact is that meditation ... provides the [meditator] ... with a perspective that makes the goal of unimpeachable certainty, like the doubts so earnestly entertained in its behalf, silly—worthy of our laughter and finally of our rejection. ... Skepticism is thus disarmed not by the power of philosophical reason to defeat its arguments but by the power of philosophical meditation to restore a rational (and

reasonable) faith which will reveal the unreasonableness of those arguments" ('The Naive Narrator: Meditation in Descartes' *Meditations*' [in Rorty {*op. cit.*}, pp. 21-44], p. 29). This view of Descartes's response to skepticism is plainly at odds with Descartes's own claim to found "certain science" in the sense of knowledge that cannot be shaken by any stronger argument (cited above, note 4). Descartes is committed to refuting arguments, not dismissing them. Gary Hatfield joins in reading the *Meditations* as meditations, but he does not attempt to rebut the charge of circularity ('The Senses and the Fleshless Eye: The *Meditations* as Cognitive Exercises' [in Rorty {*op. cit.*}, pp. 45-80], p. 55 notes 28, 29).

90. Meditation II (PWD ii, p. 18; AT vii, p. 27).

91. Meditation III (PWD ii, 27; AT vii, p. 38); *Replies* II (PWD ii, pp. 102-103; AT vii, pp. 143-44).

92. *Replies* II; 'Arguments ... Arranged in Geometrical Fashion,' Postulates 5-7; to Clerselier concerning Objections V (PWD ii, pp. 97, 115-16, 271; AT vii, pp. 135, 163-64, AT ixa, pp. 205-06, respectively), Principle 50 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 209; AT viiia, p. 24]).

93. Recall that the whole notion of conservation is presumed to be obvious (Meditation III [PWD ii, p. 33; AT vii, p. 49]). Cf. Principle 20 and 49 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 199-200, 209; AT viiia, pp. 12, 23-24]); and to Renier for Pollot. April 1638 (K, p. 54).

94. G56.7-9/D14/M49.35-8.

95. See Chapter One, pp. 12-13.

96. Meditation II (PWD ii, p. 24; AT vii, p. 35); quoted on p. 18 above.

97. Descartes seems to notice the very important reflexive character of the *cogito*, but to classify it with other clear and distinct perceptions anyway. See Meditation II (PWD ii, pp. 116-17; AT vii, p. 25) and Principles 11 and 49 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, pp. 196, 209; AT viiia, pp. 9, 23-24]). If Descartes's argument for the reliability of clear and distinct ideas is construed on a mathematical model, where what holds good of one idea—provided that it does not hold of it in virtue of any of its specific differences from other ideas—holds good of all ideas, then this reflexive component marks the crucial difference between the ideas involved in the *cogito* and all other of Descartes's ideas.

98. In partial defense of the "radical dissimulation" hypothesis, Louis Loeb attempts to extract a substantive Cartesian epistemology from Descartes that does not rely on divine veracity ('Is there Radical Dissimulation in Descartes' *Meditations*?' [in Rorty {*op. cit.*}, pp. 243-270], esp. pp. 253-264). Loeb overlooks the problem I have just pointed out, namely, that Descartes's main principles and premises, the "output of one's hierarchically ordered set of cognitive faculties" (p. 257), has little to recommend it without a divine origin. Without that origin it is arbitrary and dogmatic. I also think that Loeb seriously underestimates the role of God in the *Principles*. The absence of radical doubt from the *Principles* can be readily explained by Descartes's claim that radical doubt should be entertained only once in a lifetime (Principle 1 [*Principles* Pt. I {PWD i p. 193, AT viiia p. 5}]), a procedure he had already performed in the *Meditations*.

99. The most thorough attempt to replace talk of physical objects with talk of sense data is Carnap's *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (Berlin: Welkreis, 1928), R. A. George, tr., *The Logical Structure of the World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). Quine notes that Carnap didn't even sketch how to translate the connective "is at" in statements of the form "Quality *q* is at *x;y;z;t*" into his initial language of sense data and logic ('Two Dogmas of Empiricism', §5 [in: *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), pp. 20-46], p. 40), and so failed to define temporal predicates in phenomenal and logical terms ('Epistemology Naturalized', *op*

cit., p. 76). The problem is worse than Quine avers. Carnap *can't* supply definitions of temporal specifications in logical and phenomenal terms. The surprising thing is that Carnap saw the difficulty and later in his exposition ignored it. In adopting "recollection of similarity" (Rs) rather than "part similarity" (Ps) as the "basic relation" of his constructional system, Carnap remarks that "... while Ps can be derived from Rs, the opposite is not possible. If the difference in direction is once blotted out through a symmetrical relation, then it cannot be reintroduced by constructional methods. The difference in direction is important for the construction of time order; we shall later on derive time order from Rs without having to introduce a new basic relation. This is the main reason why we chose Rs and not Ps as basic relation" (§78). In §87 Carnap recalls this point while addressing the temporal order. He states, "The question now arises whether the temporal relation between elementary experiences must be introduced as a basic relation. It turns out, however, that it can be derived from recollection of similarity (Rs). After all, Rs includes a temporal relation: from x Rs y , one can conclude that x is temporally earlier than y ." Recollection of similarity, because it involves *recollection*, is inherently temporal. This presents a problem for Carnap's program, for the aim of his program is to formulate all statements of science as purely structural statements containing nothing but logical symbols (§153; *cf.* §121). To do this two problems must be met. One is to relate these "structural statements" to experience; the other is to eliminate the use of basic relations in the formulation of scientific statements. The first problem is met by introducing "founded relation extension" as an undefined logical concept, where relation extensions are "founded" if they "correspond to experientiable, 'natural' relations" (§154). (Carnap's introduction of "foundedness" as a logical concept is absurd, but I won't criticize it here.) The use of basic relations is eliminated from would-be structural statements in science by replacing occurrences of "Rs" with occurrences of "R" (§155), a variable ranging over "derivation relations," relations expressing "how the object is derived from the basic relation" [Rs] (§121). By these means Carnap either has constructed a Trojan horse or else has omitted temporality from his structural scientific statements. He has constructed a "Trojan horse," smuggling temporal determinations into structural statements, if temporal relations are among those relations that can be "founded." In this case, the redefinition of Rs Carnap gives in §155 contains temporal variables or operators among its "logical [*i.e.*, formal] symbols and variables," so that either he's wrong to claim to have shown that it is "possible to express all objects and statements of the constructional system in a purely logical way" (§155) or else he has simply extended the use of logical (*i.e.*, formal) notation to express temporal relations. In either case, these fundamental temporal relations derive from experiences, and can be neither eliminated nor defined by his logical syntax. The basic temporal relations of elementary experiences cannot be defined in the purely relational syntax of his logical notation because those antecedent temporal relations were presupposed by the construction of the logical apparatus to begin with. If Carnap formulates structural scientific statements using derivation relations to replace recollections of similarity and so generates a "purely logical system," as envisioned in his initial discussion of derivation relations (§121), then he has omitted temporality from structural scientific statements. In this case, his purely logical system can be transformed into "the actual system of all empirical concepts" only by substituting occurrences of the basic empirical concept Rs for occurrences of R in the pure logistic of structural scientific statements (§121). But in this case, by Carnap's own reasoning in §§78 and 87, he cannot generate asymmetric temporal relations once these basic temporal asymmetries are "blotted out" by symmetrical, purely logical relations. Thus his proposed reconstruction of science is unable to handle any asymmetric processes (to say nothing of the law of entropy). Which of these horns impales Carnap is unclear due to the fundamental and admitted unclarity of "foundedness" (*cf.* the last line of §155), but one horn or the other awaits his attempt to define temporal terms solely in terms of sense data and logic.

Carnap rejects "part similarity" (Ps) as the basic relation in his constructional system because it is symmetrical and so cannot ground the specification of temporal relations. "Part similarity" need play no role in phenomenalist or sense-data theories. However, the success of such reductionist programs depends on being able to specify temporal and spatial coordinates for elementary phenomena or sense data, and on being able to specify these coordinates solely in logical and phenomenal or sense-data terms. Here the problem crippling Carnap's *Aufbau* recurs. The only way to specify

temporal relations within such analyses are in terms of sequences of sense data or phenomenal appearances. These sequences can only be symmetrical relations, unless "before" and "after" are taken as primitives, in which case the reduction is abandoned rather than completed. The asymmetrical features of temporality are crucial because they are pervasive features of the apparent public macro world in which we live and think. Any claim to reduce talk of physical objects to talk of sense data must account for these asymmetries, but none has and, for the reasons just sketched, none can. As will be seen in the next chapter, this point is central to Kant's refutation of Hume's empiricism and official ontology of impressions. It is no rebuttal to my argument that time itself isn't symmetrical (as may be the case according to current physics) while only our experience of time is asymmetric, because (Russell's neutral monism notwithstanding) impressions, sense-data, elementary experiences, *etc.* are quintessentially *experiences*. (For a helpful overview of temporal asymmetries, see P. Horwich, *Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science* [Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1987], ch. 1.)

100. "... I certainly *seem* to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called 'having a sensory perception' is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking" (Meditation II [PWD ii p. 19; AT vii p. 29]; *cf.* Meditation III [PWD ii p. 26; AT vii p. 37]).

101. This point is argued with great acumen against C. I. Lewis's phenomenalism by E. M. Adams in 'C. I. Lewis and the Inconsistent Triad of Modern Empiricism' (in: P. A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis*, The Library of Living Philosophers [LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1968], pp. 377-393). The general argument is made more briefly by James Cornman and Keith Lehrer in *Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 103-110.

102. William Alston has been especially emphatic about these distinctions ('Varieties of Privileged Access' [*American Philosophical Quarterly* 7 No. 3 {1971}, pp. 223-241]).

103. 'The Cartesian Circle' (*op. cit.*), p. 387.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 394.

105. See Van Cleve (*op. cit.*), pp. 60-61.

106. 'The Cartesian Circle' (*op. cit.*), p. 373.

107. See the first epigram on p. v above.

108. To Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (K, p. 138).

109. See Ishiguro (*op. cit.*), p. 465.

110. Meditation V (PWD ii, p. 46, AT vii, pp. 66, 67); *cf.* to More, 5 Feb. 1649 (K, p. 242).

111. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 34; AT vii, p. 50); *cf.* to Mesland, 2 May 1644 (K, p. 147).

112. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 28; AT vii, p. 40).

113. Meditation III (PWD ii, p. 28; AT vii, p. 40), *Replies* II (PWD ii, pp. 97; AT vii, p. 135), Principle 18 (*Principles* Pt. I [PWD i, p. 199; AT ixa, pp. 11-12]).

114. For [Arnauld], 29 July 1648 (K, pp. 236-37).

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. CPR Bxxxix note.

2. CPR A764=B792.

3. Sextus's 'Dilemma of the Criterion' is quoted in Chapter One, p. 14 above.
4. On Kant's response to Descartes, see M. Wilson, 'On Kant and the Refutation of Subjectivism' (in: L. W. Beck, ed., *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress* [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972], pp. 597-606).
5. With the exception of one article by Giorgio Tonelli, nothing of substance has been written on Kant's relation to ancient skepticism. Tonelli investigates principally terminological affiliations between Kant and ancient skeptics in 'Kant und die antiken Skeptiker' (in: D. Henrich and G. Tonelli, eds., *Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung* [Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967], pp. 93-123). He shows that although Kant likely had little or no first-hand acquaintance with ancient skeptical texts, many points of skeptical method and doctrine were available to him from historians, proponents, and opponents of classical skepticism. Here I point out some similarities of issues between Kant and Sextus Empiricus. Whether these issues were bequeathed to Kant by Sextus, directly or indirectly, is of secondary importance to my concern. What is of interest here are the problems Kant shares with Sextus and the other epistemologists I discuss.
6. *Gesammelte Schriften*, Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. (Berlin, Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1922) Vol. 16, p. 59. (This edition is cited hereafter as "Ak," followed by Roman volume and Arabic page numbers.)
7. *Logik*, Einleitung §IV: Kurzer Abriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie (Ak ix p. 31 [lines 5-10]); 'Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll' (Ak viii p. 226 note [p. 227 lines 25-27]).
8. CPR Ax.
9. CPR A407=B434.
10. CPR A58-59=B82-83.
11. Kant's definitions for these terms must be reconstructed from his various remarks about them, a task to which Henry Allison devotes much effort. He argues for the following senses of Kant's terms: "Taken in its empirical sense, 'ideality' characterizes the private data of an individual mind... 'Reality,' construed in the empirical sense, refers to the intersubjectively accessible, spatiotemporally ordered realm of objects of human experience. ... At the transcendental level ... 'ideality' is used to characterize the universal, necessary, and, therefore, *a priori* conditions of human knowledge. ... [S]omething is real in the transcendental sense if and only if it can be characterized and referred to independently of any appeal to [human sensibility]" (*Kant's Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983], pp. 6-7).
12. Leaving aside the objects of inner experience.
13. Cf. CPR B275-76.
14. Cf. Kant's prefatory remarks to the "Refutation of Idealism" (CPR B274-75).
15. PH II 77-78; quoted and discussed above, Chapter One, p. 13.
16. CPR A197=B242.
17. CPR A198=B243.
18. Recall Kant's examples of perceiving a house (A190=B235), a ship moving downstream (A192=B237), a stove heating a house on a cool day (A202=B247-48), and a ball depressing the surface of a pillow (A203=B248).

19. CPR A215=B263, B219, B233.

20. CPR B243; cf. B219, B226, B219, A194=B243, A201=B246, B257.

21. CPR A198=B244.

22. It should also be noted that Kant does not hold a "two world" view of objects, but rather a double aspect view: phenomena and noumena are the same objects, but "regarded differently." See CPR Bxix note, Bxx, Bxxvi-xxvii, Bxxix.

23. Concept empiricism is the view that every term in a language is a logical term, a term defined by ostending a sensory object, or can be defined by means of these two kinds of terms. See Chapter Four §III, pp. 48-49, for discussion.

24. Cf. CPR A195-96=B240-41; Hume, *Treatise (op. cit.)*, pp. 195-213, 632; and L. W. Beck, 'A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant' (*Essays on Kant and Hume* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978], pp. 111-129).

25. Indeed, my presentation of Kant's strategy is controversial. Karl Ameriks argues persuasively for a more modest view of Kant's project in 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument' (*Kant-Studien* 69 [1978], pp. 273-287). However, this controversy is not important for the following discussion, for the problems I raise against Kant's defense of transcendental idealism all bear on his arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and these arguments are shared by Ameriks's and my interpretation of Kant's strategy.

26. CPR Bxvi. Immediately following this passage Kant models his point here on the Copernican revolution in astronomy.

27. Kant claims that this "hypothesis" announced in his Preface will be proved "apodeictically" in the *Critique* (CPR Bxxii note; cf. Bxviii note). Cf. CPR Bxiv, Bxvii-xviii, and especially B151-152 and the note to B162 on the productive synthesis of transcendental imagination. On Vico, see I. Berlin, *Vico and Herder* (London: Hogarth, 1976), p. 19. I do not claim that Kant knew Vico's writings, which is extremely unlikely, but only that they both hold this same general thesis.

28. CPR A493-94=B522.

29. CPR A490-91=B518-9.

30. CPR A492=B520; cf. A493=B522, A26=B42, A30=B45, B127. When I said above that Kant's view entails that objects are radically different when intuited by us and when not so intuited, this does not entail that we are thus able to infer that objects are not spatial or not temporal when not intuited by us. The passage just quoted insists on speaking of "this" space and "this" time; things in themselves may have other spatial or temporal features or none at all. This we cannot, on Kant's view, know.

31. CPR Bxxx.

32. CPR B306.

33. CPR B307.

34. CPR B308. See also A248=B305, A249=B252, A254=B310, A288=B344.

35. It is a shortcoming of Barry Stroud's otherwise very interesting discussion of Kant and skepticism that he does not recognize the extent to which Kant accepts skepticism. See *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 165.

36. Ivan Soll noted that "Hegel's entire program and conception of philosophy depend upon refuting Kant's limitation of reason" (*An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969], pp. 48-49). Karl Ameriks has recently taken this to mean that only if Hegel's own criticism of Kant is sound is Hegel's positive philosophy itself sound ('Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy' [*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 46 No. 1 {1985}, pp. 1-35], pp. 1, 35.) However, Ameriks overstates the case. Even if Hegel's own criticism of Kant is wanting (though I think that there is more in it than Ameriks finds), if Kant's arguments can be shown by anyone to be insufficient, then those arguments do not stand in the way of Hegel's positive program.

37. *E.g.*, by Henry Allison (*op. cit.*), whose defense I criticize below.

38. Kant's arguments concerning time parallel those concerning space, and criticisms quite similar to those made here against Kant's views on space can be made against his views on time as well. Discussing the "indirect" argument of the first "Antinomy" would, unfortunately, take us too far afield; but I am confident that it can be refuted. Even Henry Allison does not believe that the first "Antinomy" succeeds in supporting Kant's transcendental idealism (*ibid.*, p. 50). Molke Gram provides a reconstruction and defense of this argument in 'Kant's First Antinomy' (in: L. W. Beck, ed., *Kant Studies Today* [LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1969], pp. 210-229). I find much merit in Gram's reconstruction, but as an argument it fails because it relies on an incoherent and unwarranted notion of infinity as a greatest or last member in an unlimited series (*ibid.*, p. 221).

39. *Cf.* CPR B156.

40. Allison (*op. cit.*), ch. 5.

41. Locke, of course, did hold just this view, that our idea of space is derived from perception in his standard empiricist fashion (*Essay* [*op. cit.*], Bk. II Chs. 5, 13 [Vol. I, pp. 157, 225]). I must join the legion of those who have contended that Locke is simply wrong about this. Space itself is not anything that can make impressions on our sensory organs, though the extended objects in space can make impressions on our sensory organs, whence we could upon reflection form an idea of space. As Locke's editor A. C. Fraser notes, Locke simply didn't seem to notice the fine points of the questions that have occupied post-Lockeans so intensely. (See Fraser's note 1 to vol. I p. 158.)

42. *Op. cit.*, pp. 96-97. Allison closely follows H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1936), vol. I, pp. 101f.

43. Kant's views on "formal intuitions" pertain mostly to his views on arithmetical and geometrical knowledge. In criticizing Kant's arguments below, I avoid disputing his claims about mathematics and so can leave his account of formal intuition largely aside.

44. Allison (*op. cit.*), pp. 96-97.

45. And for apodeictic but non-analytic geometrical knowledge. For reasons given in note 43, I do not discuss this aspect of Kant's theory.

46. CPR B167-68; *cf.* Allison (*op. cit.*), p. 110.

47. Ak xx p. 268; quoted by Allison (*ibid.*), note 57 to p. 109 (on p. 347).

48. Allison (*ibid.*), p. 112.

49. Compare Kant's own remarks about void space not being an object of possible experience (A214=B261).

50. Cf. CPR B71.

51. 'Discovering the Forms of Intuition' (*Philosophical Review* 96 No. 2 [1987], pp. 205-248).

52. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

53. CPR A26=B42.

54. CPR B41.

55. *Ibid.*

56. The kind of objection I offer here is not new in the literature. Allison is able to argue against it, I believe, only due to terminological incaution on the part of the commentators. (See Norman Kemp Smith, *Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* [Rev. ed., New York: Humanities Press, 1962], p. 113; H. J. Paton [*op. cit.*], p. 174; Jill Buroker, *Space and Incongruence: The Origins of Kant's Idealism* [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981], pp. 95-96; H. Allison [*op. cit.*], pp. 111-14.) The objectors do not, or at least should not, grant that space is a form of intuition and then claim that it or something analogous to it is also a (transcendentally real) property of external objects. This is to grant Kant's conclusion and then deny it, just as Allison charges. All one need grant is that our modes of intuition are spatial (and temporal), in the sense that we are only sensitive or receptive to spatio-temporal objects, the 'forms' of which are objective (transcendentally real) space and time. If our modes of intuition are spatial and temporal, that may well affect our abilities to imagine in such a way as to give an account parallel (if not identical) to Kant's concerning mathematical presentation and its role in mathematical knowledge, thereby evading Kant's arguments based on geometrical and arithmetical knowledge. For a carefully presented account of spatiality and temporality as forms of representings commensurate with space and time as natural, "transcendentally real" forms of representeds (or, intuiteds, in the terminology used here), see the Appendix to W. Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1968), especially ¶¶16 and 18. Allison's oversight of this naturalistic objection is quite remarkable.

57. On the practical "extension" of the concepts of pure reason, see CPR Bxxi, Bxxv-xxvi, Bxxxvi note, Bxxxviii, Bxxx. This "extension" is crucial for Kant's moral philosophy. Some of its importance is sketched in the second edition Preface to the *Critique* (Bxxvi-xxviii). It is used later in the first *Critique* in analyzing responsibility (A546-A557=B574-B585), in the third chapter of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (H. J. Paton, tr. [New York: Harper and Row, 1964]), and in legitimating the practical extension of reason in the second *Critique* (L. W. Beck, tr., *Critique of Practical Reason* [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956]), especially pp. 52—59, Ak v pp. 51—58. As Kant has moral grounds for denying the powers of cognition, Hegel has moral grounds for defending them: "... assertions such as 'man cannot know the truth but has to do only with phenomena' ... [is a dogma] depriving spirit [*Geist*] not only of intellectual but also of all ethical worth and dignity" (T. M. Knox, tr., *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975], §132 Remark). Hegel's denial of Kant's epistemological strictures requires a rather different analysis and defense of human freedom.

58. Kant makes one remark in the Transcendental Aesthetic that suggests some criteria that his account must meet. Concerning the aims of a "transcendental exposition" of a concept, Kant states that "it is required (1) that such [further *a priori*] knowledge does really flow from the given concept, (2) that this knowledge is possible only on the assumption of a given mode of explaining the concept" (A25=B40). The criteria suggested by this remark are surely reasonable, but stating these general requirements doesn't address the critical questions I have raised here. It doesn't indicate how to determine whether these requirements are met, especially how to determine whether the strong modal condition (2) is met. Moreover, as I have argued above, Kant fails to meet these two requirements anyway.

59. G54.23-25/D10/M47.36-48.1

60. G54.26-27/D10-11/M48.1-3. The second part of Hegel's rejoinder is to call for clarification of the terms used for formulating these issues.

61. WL I p. 40; SL pp. 46-47.

62. Kant argues for this claim in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (*op. cit.*), p. 116 (Ak iv p. 448).

63. Cf. CPR B407, A479=B507 note, A492=B521.

64. John Smith puts the dilemma well: "... we may say that the very process of critical reflection on the categories is itself either a case of knowing or it is not. If it is not, Kant's conclusions are not binding upon us but, instead, take the form of postulates or proposals, a consequence which Kant would, of course, have rejected. If, on the other hand, the critical reflection is a knowing, then reason and the categories are already presumed to have a legitimate status and to be capable of reaching truth and reality" ('The Relation Between Thought and Being: Some Lessons from Hegel's *Encyclopedia*' [*New Scholasticism* No. 38 {1964}, pp. 22-41], p. 34).

65. See Chapter One, p. 8.

66. CPR A261=B317.

67. CPR Axiv.

68. CPR A12-13=B26

69. 'Towards a Metacritique of Reason' (*Essays on Kant and Hume* [*op. cit.*], pp. 20-37), p. 33. Kant's remarks on the *a posteriori*, non-apodeictic status of physiology (CPR A347=B406) do not bode well for Beck's metacritical proposal (*ibid.*, pp. 34f.).

70. CPR B145-46. In the second *Critique* Kant claims that "... human insight is at an end as soon as we arrive at fundamental powers of faculties, for their possibility can in no way be understood and should not be just arbitrarily imagined or assumed" (*Critique of Practical Reason* [*op. cit.*], p. 48 [Ak v, p. 47]).

71. Allison (*op. cit.*), p. 127.

72. See note 70.

73. 'Metakritik über den Purismus der reinen Vernunft,' (1781-1784; published in 1800 [*Sämtliche Werke*, J. Nadler, ed. {Vienna: Herder, 1951}, Vol. 3, pp. 283-289]). For discussion, see Beiser, *The Fate of Reason* (*op. cit.*), pp. 37-43.

74. See SL pp. 190-98, 204-11, 234-37, 489-90; WL I pp. 216-26, 234-42, 271-75, II pp. 135-36. I explain above (p. 39) why I do not treat Hegel's objections to Kant here. Hegel's vehement and continuous opposition to Kant's transcendental idealism and the subjective turn it takes goes quite unnoticed by Robert Solomon, who quite without argument claims:

One must distinguish two very different epistemological problems, one of which Hegel took Kant to have already solved beyond question ... —how do our sensations or 'impressions' become organized into objects? Hegel accepted Kant's answer without qualification: we so organize our experience into objects And so for Hegel, accepting Kant's epistemological arguments so completely that he does not even consider it necessary to repeat them, goes on to provide the ontological counterparts of those arguments [Hegel] does not feel it necessary to restate Kant's theory of 'constitution' or '*a priori* synthesis'. ('Hegel's Epistemology' [*American Philosophical Quarterly* 11 No. 14 {1974}, pp. 277-289], p. 279).

Solomon, like many other expositors of Hegel, completely overlooks Hegel's refutations of Kant's arguments for transcendental idealism contained in the Remarks cited above (which even if unsuccessful, at least count as repudiations of Kant's doctrine), and so has not noticed that with the refutation of transcendental idealism goes the rejection of Kant's accounts of "synthesis" and "constitution."

Overlooking this important point guarantees misconstruing Hegel's own brand of idealism as well as Hegel's social account of knowledge.

75. This strategy can even be applied to reconstructing Kant's own words in the *Analytic of the first Critique*, as Keith Yandell has done in seminars. Barry Stroud unfortunately overlooks the possibility of reestablishing transcendental arguments in this fashion (*op. cit.*, p. 160).

76. See "On the Concept in General" (WL II pp. 254-269; SL pp. 584-595).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. I say that this is a presupposition, and not a doctrine, of Modern empiricism because neither Locke, Berkeley, nor Hume state or explicitly avow it. However, I would contend that they are each committed to it none-the-less, though this cannot be argued here.

2. Epistemological realism, as defined in my Introduction, comprises two tenets: there is a determinate way the world is that is not constituted through our cognitive or linguistic activity, and we can know the way the world is. Opposed to this view on the one hand is skepticism, which may endorse the first tenet but denies the second, and on the other hand subjectivism, which may grant the second tenet but denies the first in holding that the way the world is is a function of our cognitive or linguistic activity.

3. Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' (in: *Mysticism and Logic* [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959], pp. 202-224). Carnap's epistemological program in the *Aufbau* (*op. cit.*) presupposed 'knowledge by acquaintance' for the recognition of "part similarity" and hence for the occurrence of memory traces of part similarity. See also §§67-69, where it is presupposed that pair-lists of elementary experiences are given. Carnap renounced this doctrine by 1932 (*cf.* 'Über Protokolsätze' [*Erkenntnis* 3 {1931-32}], pp. 215-228; hereafter cited as ÜP), and says so while lecturing in London ('Report of Lectures on *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*' [*Analysis* 2 No. 3 {1934}], pp. 42-48; hereafter cited as RLPLS), p. 47). On Schlick, see 'The Foundation of Knowledge' (*Erkenntnis* 4 {1934}, hereafter cited as FK; rpt. in: A. J. Ayer, ed., *Logical Positivism* [New York: Free Press, 1959; hereafter cited as "Ayer, ed."], pp. 209-227), pp. 209-210, and on Ayer see 'Verification and Experience' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 37 [1936-1937]; rpt. in Ayer, ed., pp. 228-243), p. 299.

4. C. D. Broad, *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, 1938). Broad's account is typical of empiricist theories of concept acquisition.

5. C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1946), ch. 8, 'Terminating Judgments and Objective Beliefs.' Were Lewis not committed to knowledge of "phenomena" by acquaintance, such knowledge would be useless for assessing non-terminating judgments in the way he describes.

6. For a thorough discussion and refutation of Broad's theory of concept acquisition, see Robert Turnbull, 'Empirical and A Priori Elements in Broad's Theory of Knowledge' (*The Philosophy of C. D. Broad*, P. A. Schilpp, ed. [The Library of Living Philosophers; New York: Tudor, 1959], pp. 197-231). A position very like Russell's "knowledge by acquaintance" was adopted by F. H. Jacobi, with the difference that Jacobi rejected discursivity altogether. Hegel refuted Jacobi by arguing that knowledge is discursive, i.e., conceptual. Hence his criticism of Jacobi bears on Russell as well. I have reconstructed and analyzed Hegel's critique of Jacobi in 'Hegel's Attitude Toward Jacobi in the "Third Attitude of Thought Toward Objectivity"' (*op. cit.*). Wilfred Sellars thoroughly analyzes the sources of and the confusions in the notion of the non-conceptual apprehension of objects in 'Empiricism and the

Philosophy of Mind' (*Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science* Vol. 1; rpt. in: *Science, Perception, and Reality* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963], pp. 127-196).

7. Waismann was one of the few to voice the verifiability criterion in its strongest form: "If there is no way of indicating when a statement is true, that statement has no meaning at all; for the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification. In fact, anyone who makes a statement must know in what circumstances he would call the statement true or false; if he is unable to do so, he does not even know what he has asserted" ('Logische Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs' [*Erkenntnis* 1 {1930-31}, pp. 228-248; hereafter cited as LAW], p. 229). Max Black took great exception to this statement in his essay, 'The Principle of Verifiability' (*Analysis* 2 No. 1 [1934], pp. 1-6.). (The translation from Waismann is Black's [*ibid.*, p. 1].)

8. This strong claim is based on Kant's proof that human self-consciousness is not possible in a phenomenalist world. I believe that this proof can be made to stand independently of Kant's transcendental idealism, but this is a topic for another occasion.

9. For some discussion of this point see Chapter Three §VI, pp. 43-46.

10. See Carnap, 'The Old and the New Logic' (*Erkenntnis* 1 [1930-31], rpt. in Ayer, ed., pp. 133-146; hereafter cited as "ONL"), p. 139-140.

11. Cf. Neurath: "Apart from tautologies, unified science consists of factual sentences. These may be sub-divided into (a) protocol sentences (b) non-protocol sentences" ('Protocol Sentences' [*Erkenntnis* 3 {1932-33}, rpt. in Ayer, ed., pp. 199-208; hereafter cited as "PS"], p. 202).

12. Neurath, 'Sociology and Physicalism' (*Erkenntnis* 2 [1931-32], rpt. in Ayer, ed., pp. 282-317; hereafter cited as "SP"), pp. 285, 291, 292; PS p. 203; 'Radikaler Physikalismus und Wirkliche Welt' (*Erkenntnis* 4 [1934], pp. 346-362; hereafter cited as "RPWW"), p. 352; Hempel, 'On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth' (*Analysis* 2 No. 4 [1935], pp. 49-59; hereafter cited as "LPTT"), p. 54, and 'Some Remarks on "Facts" and Propositions' (*Analysis* 2 No. 6 [1935], pp. 93-96; hereafter cited as "SRFP"), p. 94.

13. Carnap, *The Unity of Science* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931; hereafter cited as "US"), p. 23; cf. Hempel, LPTT p. 54.

14. Carnap, ÜP p. 216; 'Testability and Meaning' (*Philosophy of Science* 3 [1936], pp. 419-471, and 4 [1937], pp. 2-40F; hereafter cited as "T&M"), pp. 430, 19-20, 26; 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (*Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4 [1950]; rev. ed. in: *Meaning and Necessity* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956; pp. 205-221]; hereafter cited as "ESO"), pp. 207, 214, 215 note 5; 'The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts' (*Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science* 1 [1956], pp. 38-76; hereafter cited as "MCTC"), pp. 44-45; Hempel, SRFP p. 95.

15. T&M p. 2.

16. ESO pp. 214, 218.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 214, 215 note 5.

18. See §VG below, pp. 64-66.

19. On Carnap's view, recalcitrant question begging is a sure sign of a pseudo-problem (cf. ESO pp. 207, 218-220). Hempel infers the dissolution of the problem of the criterion from Neurath's and Carnap's views: "We may say that searching for a criterion of absolute truth represents one of the pseudo-problems due to the material mode of speech: indeed the phrase that testing a statement is comparing it with facts, will very easily evoke the imagination of one definite world with certain definite properties, and so one will easily be seduced to ask for the one system of statements which gives a complete and true description of this world, and which would have to be designated absolutely

true. By employing the formal mode of speech, the misunderstanding which admits no correct formulation disappears, and with it the motive for searching for a criterion of absolute truth" (LPTT p. 55). The same ontological view is also expressed by Carnap in 'Truth and Confirmation' (*Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, H. Feigl and W. Sellars, eds. [New York: Appelon-Century-Crofts, 1949], pp. 119-127; hereafter cited as "T&C"), p. 126 (quoted on pp. 60-61 below).

20. This is not to deny the point emphasized and elaborated by Clark Glymore that 'Testability and Meaning' supplies an instantiatonal account of confirmation that gives much more support to scientific realism than does the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation adumbrated in 'The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts.' See Glymore, 'Relevant Evidence' (*Journal of Philosophy* 72 [1975]; rpt. in: P. Achinstein, ed., *The Concept of Evidence* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983], pp. 124-144). Problems of confirmation are not a topic of the present study.

21. *Logical Syntax of Language*, A. Smeaton, tr. (Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1959).

22. Carnap, RLPLS p. 42; T&M p. 429; Neurath, PS p. 200.

23. Carnap, US p. 22.

24. Carnap, US p. 23; ONL pp. 133, 143-144; T&M pp. 26, 429; Hempel, LPTT p. 54.

25. Carnap, US p. 38; ÜP p. 228; RLPLS pp. 45, 47; Hempel, LPTT p. 54.

26. Carnap, ONL pp. 133, 137; ÜP pp. 215, 228; T&M p. 26; Hempel, LPTT p. 54.

27. T&M pp. 2, 420.

28. T&M pp. 2, 420; MCTC p. 38.

29. MCTC pp. 40, 47.

30. MCTC pp. 59-60. Here Carnap claims to have used a similar approach in T&M regarding the observation language.

31. MCTC p. 60.

32. T&M p. 454.

33. T&M p. 455.

34. *Ibid.*

35. T&M pp. 455-456.

36. T&M p. 9.

37. T&M p. 3.

38. T&M p. 436.

39. *Ibid.*

40. T&M pp. 468-470; cf. US p. 60.

41. See below, pp. 55-60.

42. Carnap explicitly calls these "test sentences" in T&C p. 124. See also MCTC p. 65 and the texts cited in the next note.

43. T&M pp. 425, 434.

44. T&M pp. 432-433, 440. These relations between test sentences and general laws may be sufficiently understood for present purposes without recounting the details of Carnap's discussion of logically and "physically" necessary (or impossible) statements. "Physically" necessary or impossible means necessary or impossible according to the scientific laws of a given language.

45. T&M p. 456. Compare his statement that "We shall speak of 'directly testable statements' when circumstances are conceivable in which we confidently consider the statement so strongly confirmed or else disconfirmed on the basis of one or very few observations that we would either accept or reject it outright. Examples: 'There is a key on my desk.' Conditions for the test: I stand near my desk, sufficient illumination is provided, *etc.* Condition of acceptance: I see a key on my desk; condition of rejection: I don't see a key there" (T&C p. 124).

46. See p. 52 and the previous note.

47. T&M p. 425. This is part of Black's complaint against Waismann. See note 7 above.

48. T&M pp. 9-4. Cf. US pp. 78-79; 'Psychology in Physicalist Language' (*Erkenntnis* 3 [1932-33], rpt. in Ayer, ed., pp. 165-198; hereafter cited as "PPL"), p. 192.

49. The issue of "realism" *versus* "phenomenalism" is a different because much broader one than that of "epistemological realism" as I have defined it. Although the former is generally what Carnap has in mind when discussing "realism," his position on this broader issue (as will be shown) has quite definite implications for the issue of epistemological realism.

50. T&M p. 440.

51. T&M pp. 444-448.

52. Cf. T&M pp. 440-441.

53. T&M pp. 434-441.

54. T&M pp. 33-34.

55. T&M p. 33.

56. T&M p. 34.

57. T&M pp. 34-35. Carnap later liberalizes these constraints to include theoretical postulates that are connected to observation sentences by correspondence rules, but the basic approach remains the same insofar as the theoretical terms are only partially interpreted on the basis of their connection to the fully interpreted observation language. See MCTC pp. 51-52.

58. Recall that the "test conditions" for test sentences are simply the pragmatic conditions adumbrated in specifying the meaning of "observable." This has to do with predicates being introduced without reference to other predicates. See pp. 52, 55 above and T&M p. 456, quoted just below.

59. T&M p. 456; cf. pp. 458-459.

60. T&M p. 456.

61. See note 58.

62. MCTC p. 38, T&M p. 14.

63. Schlick, FK pp. 213-216.

64. Hempel, LPTT pp. 49, 57 note 6. But see §VA below, pp. 56-57, and notes 72 and 119.

65. Hempel, LPTT pp. 56-57.

66. Hempel, LPTT p. 57, cf. p. 54; Neurath, RPWW pp. 352-354; SP p. 286. (This is a year before Tarski developed his semantic definition of truth.)

67. Hempel LPTT p. 57; cf. Carnap 'Erwiderung auf die Aufsätze von Zisel und Dunker' (*Erkenntnis* 3 [1932-33], pp. 177-188; hereafter cited as "Erw."), p. 177.

68. 'Empiricism and Physicalism' (*Analysis* 2 No. 6 [1935], pp. 81-92).

69. Hempel, 'Some Remarks on Empiricism' (*Analysis* 3 No. 3 [1936], pp. 33-40; hereafter cited as SRE), p. 39.

70. Ayer, 'Verification and Experience' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 37 [1936-37], rpt. in Ayer, ed., pp. 228-243; hereafter cited as VE), p. 234.

71. Carnap himself indicates another regard in which a purely syntactical analysis of scientific language is insufficient for analyzing science. Logical syntax, as a combinatorial analysis of sign sequences, does nothing to analyze or even interpret the meanings (Carnap's term) of those symbols. For this purpose a semantics is needed (Erw. pp. 177, 178).

72. "On the other hand if we speak of sentences as physical structures [*Gebilden*] (spoken, written, printed sentences) that occur at a particular time and place, then it's a matter of 'descriptive semantics.' Descriptive semantics is a part of (physicalistic) real science; its sentences are (in general) synthetic, empirical" (Erw. p. 178, my tr.). "The specification of 'actual protocol sentences' is of course not possible in pure semantics, that is, with logical means alone. But it is possible in descriptive semantics, with actual scientific, that is, historical concepts" (*ibid.*, pp. 179-180, my tr.; cf. p. 182).

73. Erw. p. 180.

74. *Ibid.* p. 179.

75. *Ibid.* pp. 178, 180.

76. *Ibid.* p. 179.

77. Carnap, MCTC p. 38; T&M pp. 14, 454.

78. PPL pp. 180-181; cf. PPL pp. 184, 185; Erw. p. 177; ÜP p. 221; Hempel, LPTT pp. 54, 57.

79. Neurath, RPWW p. 359; Carnap, US pp. 43-44; ÜP p. 221; PPL pp. 184, 185; Hempel, SRFp p. 94.

80. Erw. p. 182.

81. Carnap PPL pp. 181, 185.

82. This way of speaking comes from Frederick Dretske, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1981). On this view, information is an objective feature of states of affairs, but for anyone to be informed by the receipt of information requires "decoding" that information. There being information does not, of itself, handle this problem.

83. Carnap also envisages a future science capable of determining the precise states of the nervous system that correlate with specific observable phenomena (US pp. 85-86, ÜP p. 227). I wouldn't want to determine exactly which problems such a science would solve before seeing it actually developed.

84. See note 71.

85. See Frederick Dretske, 'Machines and the Mental' (*Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 59 No. 1 [1985], pp. 23-34).

86. Hempel comes close to this contention (see p. 56 above).

87. T&C p. 124.

88. T&C p. 125. Cf. note 45 above.

89. W. Sellars, 'Empiricism and Abstract Entities' (*The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, P. A. Schilpp, ed. [Library of Living Philosophers, 1963; hereafter cited as "Schilpp, ed."], pp. 431-468), p. 435.

90. Cf. Hempel, LPTT pp. 50-51, 52, 54.

91. Cf. §IVB above, pp. 51-56.

92. *The Scientific Image* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 19.

93. Ayer noticed this shift of attention from the project of the *Aufbau* to Carnap's syntactic program and its implications: "To express this [corrigibility], as Carnap does, by saying that it is a matter of convention what propositions we take as protocols is simply to give the term "protocol proposition" an unfamiliar meaning. We understand that he now proposes to use it to designate any singular proposition, belonging to 'the physicalistic system-language,' which we are prepared to accept without further tests. This is a perfectly legitimate usage. What is not legitimate is to ignore the discrepancy between it and his former usage according to which protocol propositions were said to 'describe directly given experience.' And in abandoning the original usage he has incidentally shelved the problem which it was designed to meet" (VE pp. 236-237).

94. Carnap, T&M p. 420.

95. Connected with this is another feature of Carnap's view. He distinguishes sharply between reasons and motives. Reasons are given for assertions and can result in determining their truth value; motives are given in counseling a decision but have no truth value. This echoes the positivist view about the non-cognitive nature of ethics in that it renders motives non-cognitive. The main idea behind restricting the use of the term "reasons" in this way is the view that reasoning is a matter of deduction. Since deduction can only occur within a formally specified framework, reasons can only be given within such a framework. This aspect of Carnap's view has been pointed out and critically discussed by Frederick Will in 'Pragmatic Rationality' (*Philosophical Investigations* 8 No. 2 [1985], pp. 120-142).

96. ESO pp. 215 note 5, 221; cf. *The Logical Syntax of Language* (*op. cit.*), pp. 51-52.

97. Such, at least, is the general implication of Carnap's discussion of mathematical realism (ESO pp. 218-219).

98. 'Replies and Systematic Expositions' (*op. cit.*; hereafter cited as "Replies"), p. 901.

99. T&C p. 126.

100. T&C p. 126. Cf. MCTC p. 51 on scientific "revolutions."

101. MCTC p. 46.

102. 'The "Political" Philosophy of Logical Empiricism' (*Philosophical Studies* 2 No. 4 [1951], pp. 49-57), p. 50.

103. The example is suggested by Paul Feyerabend's discussion in 'An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* NS 58 [1957-58], pp. 143-170), though I elaborate and use it differently. In that essay Feyerabend attempts a very strong attack on positivism and especially on Carnap. However, his entire argument rests on what he calls the "Stability Thesis," on the claim that the observation language always was, is, and will be applicable. Both Neurath and Carnap reject this thesis as early as 1932 (cf. PS, ÜP), and so Feyerabend's objection to them fails. One of the principal issues to be *decided* is the syntactical form of observation sentences, and that form may be changed as needed. Two other deficiencies of Feyerabend's attack may be briefly noted. First, he fails to see that although Carnap speaks of partially interpreting theoretical terms by syntactically coordinating them with observation terms, Carnap does not hold that theoretical language can be generated out of observation language. What Carnap's "partial interpretation" amounts to is a specification of the empirical, that is, scientifically testable, meaning of a theoretical language. It is on the basis of this aspect of meaningfulness that a theory can be confirmed by observations (Erw. p. 177). (The other aspect of "meaning" is that formulated in the logical and nomological principles [the L- and

P-rules] of a language, later explicated as "meaning postulates.") Second, Feyerabend's charge that positivism surreptitiously relies on a metaphysical ontology while denying the validity of metaphysics ignores Carnap's efforts in ESO to distinguish between the "ontology" or ontological commitments that are internal to a linguistic framework and the external metaphysical question of the reality of any of the items specified within that framework.

104. Distinguishing among those inferences that can be drawn only with the use of a particular proposition and those that cannot is Carnap's method for specifying and distinguishing between the meanings of propositions (MCTC pp. 49-52; US p. 91).

105. Robert S. Cohen charged Carnap's views with being conventionalist and subjectivist. Exactly what these charges came to in his mind is not made entirely clear. His charge of conventionalism rested on a conventional selection of basic truths ('Dialectical Materialism and Carnap's Logical Empiricism,' in Schilpp, ed., pp. 99-158). Carnap replied by claiming that the conventional choice affected the syntax of a language but not its empirical content and by citing his discussion of "confronting" statements with observations from T&C in this connection ("Replies" p. 864). My objections constitute a vindication of Cohen's apparent charges. Carnap seems not to have recalled the radical implications of his own statements in T&C.

106. See the quotation on p. 55 above.

107. See the quotation on pp. 60-61.

108. W. Wick (*op. cit.*), pp. 53-54.

109. *Ibid.* p. 50.

110. *Ibid.* pp. 55-56.

111. Wick does not specify exactly how he thinks that Kant's practical philosophy is directly relevant to the issue. On Hegel's practical philosophy, see M. Hardimon, 'Individual Morality and Rational Social Life; a Study of Hegel's Ethics' (Dissertation, University of Chicago: 1985) and Johnathan Robinson, *Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind* (Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1977). Some aspects of how Hegel's social theory relates to the epistemological issues of this study are discussed below in Chapter Eleven. This is not to forget the very original studies of formal pragmatics by W. Sellars, especially 'Pure Pragmatics and Epistemology' (*Philosophy of Science* 15 No. 3 [1947], pp. 181-202) and 'Concepts as Involving Laws and as Inconceivable Without Them' (*Philosophy of Science* 15 No. 4 [1948], pp. 287-315).

112. Frederick Will, 'The Concern About Truth' (in: G. W. Roberts, ed., *The Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume* [London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1979], pp. 264-284), p. 263.

113. Skeptics generally agreed about what truth is, they just denied that anything we said could be said to be true. (It has been suggested to me that there was a medieval philosopher who worried about what truth is. Suggestions as to who it was are welcome.)

114. Schlick, 'Facts and Propositions' (*Analysis* 2 No. 5 [April 1935], pp. 65-70; hereafter cited as FP), pp. 65-66; cf. Ayer, 'The Criterion of Truth' (*Analysis* 3 Nos. 1 and 2 [1935], pp. 28-32; hereafter cited as CT), p. 30.

115. Hempel, SRFP p. 94.

116. LPTT pp. 50-52, 54. Hempel speaks here explicitly about revising the concept of truth.

117. Will, 'The Concern About Truth' (*op. cit.*), p. 266.

118. *Ibid.* Both sides found this inference compelling.

Neurath:

In accordance with our traditional language we may say that some statements are accepted at a certain time by a certain person and not accepted by the same person at another time, but we cannot say some statements are true today but not tomorrow; 'true' and 'false' are 'absolute' terms, which we avoid. We are prepared to show that a certain theory is more 'plausible' than another theory ... and we may 'corroborate' a theory or 'weaken' it. ('Universal Jargon and Terminology,' [*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* NS 41 [1940-41], pp. 127-148], pp. 138-139. Cf. note 119 below.)

Reichenbach:

Thus we are left no propositions at all which can be absolutely verified. The predicate of truth-value of a proposition, therefore [*sic*], is a mere fictive quality, its place is in an ideal world of science only, whereas actual science cannot make use of it. Actual science instead employs throughout the predicate of weight. (*Experience and Prediction* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938], p. 188 n. 20.)

Hempel:

Science [according to Neurath] is a system of statements which are of one kind. Each statement may be combined or compared with each other statement, *e.g.* in order to draw conclusions from the combined statements, or to see if they are compatible with each other or not. But statements are never compared with 'reality,' with 'facts.' None of those who support a cleavage between statements and reality is able to give a precise account of how a comparison between statements and facts may possibly be accomplished, and how we may possibly ascertain the structure of facts. Therefore, that cleavage is nothing but the result of a redoubling metaphysics, and all the problems connected with it, are mere pseudoproblems.

But how is truth to be characterized from such a standpoint? Obviously, Neurath's ideas imply a coherence theory. (LPTT pp. 50-51)

Schlick:

But what then remains at all as a criterion of truth? Since the proposal is not that all scientific assertions must accord with certain definite protocol statements, but rather that all statements shall accord with one another, with the result that every single one is considered as, in principle, corrigible, truth can consist only in a *mutual agreement of statements*. (FK pp. 213-214)

Ayer:

... it is necessary to investigate more closely the view that in order to determine the validity of a system of empirical propositions one cannot and need not go beyond the system itself. For if the view were satisfactory we should be absolved from troubling any further about the use of the phrase 'agreement with experience'. (VE p. 231).

The mutual implication between foundationalism and a correspondence conception of truth also guides C. I. Lewis's phenomenalism (see 'Professor Chisholm and Empiricism' [rpt. in: R. J. Schwartz, ed., *Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing* [New York: Anchor, 1965], pp. 355-363], pp. 356, 357). In a similar vein, Waismann inferred from the fact that, *e.g.*, the true length of something isn't immediately given, but rather is figured on the basis of averaging a number of measurements containing slight discrepancies, to the claim that the item measured has no true, determinate length (LAW pp. 229-230). The persuasiveness of this fallacy has not abated. For example, it is the crucial enthememe underlying Richard Rorty's dismissal of realism in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Concerning Rorty's professed Hegelianism, Rorty espouses and recommends edifying philosophy, indeed in the name of Hegel, while Hegel sternly condemns this tendency:

Whoever seeks mere edification, whoever desires to shroud the worldly multiplicity of his existence and of thought in a fog to attain the indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity, may look out for himself where he can find this; he will easily find the means to impress himself with his enthusiasm and thus to puff himself up. Philosophy, however, must beware of wishing to be edifying. (G12.30-14.2/K16-18/M5.36-6.2).

119. Neurath affirms a coherence theory of what truth is in SP p. 291; Hempel in LPTT p. 50. Carnap later protests that Neurath didn't mean what he literally said, but he does concur that Neurath rejected the correspondence notion of truth (Replies p. 864; see note 123 below). Neurath shortly repudiated the coherence notion of truth ('Erster Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft in Paris 1935' [*Erkenntnis* 5 {1936}, p. 400]), but did not reaffirm the correspondence notion. Rather, he rejected the notion of truth altogether. This is still to make the crucial inference pointed out and criticized herein. (See the quotation from Neurath in note 118 above.)

120. Russell states: "I respect Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, all of whom employed the analytic method. I do not believe that Kant or Hegel or Nietzsche or the more modern anti-rationalists have contributed anything that deserves to be remembered." Again, "I regard the whole romantic movement, beginning with Rousseau and Kant, and culminating in pragmatism and futurism, as a regrettable aberration. I should take 'back to the 18th century' as a battle-cry, if I could entertain any hope that others would rally to it." Both quotations are from 'Dr. Schiller's Analysis of *The Analysis of Mind*' (*Journal of Philosophy* 19 No. 24 [1924], pp. 645-651), pp. 647, 645; quoted by Will, 'The Concern About Truth' (*op. cit.*), p. 283 note 5.

121. Ayer distinguishes verbally between a criterion and a nature of truth, but goes on to muddle them together again (FK p. 214); he at least stated the distinction. Carnap draws and insists upon this distinction in T&C pp. 119-120.

122. In 'The Two Concepts of Probability' (in: H. Feigl and W. Sellars, eds., *Readings in Analytic Philosophy* [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949; pp. 330-348], p. 345), Carnap endorses Feigl's empirical realism as expounded in the latter's 'Logical Empiricism' (*ibid.*, pp. 3-26). It is not altogether clear to what extent he really agrees with Feigl, for his "realism" is importantly qualified both in 'Truth and Confirmation' and in 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.' See §§VE and VG, pp. 60-62, 64-66.

123. It is worth quoting Carnap's discussion at length:

Now Kaufmann, Reichenbach, Neurath, and other authors are of the opinion that the semantical concept of truth, at least in its application to synthetic sentences concerning physical things, ought to be abandoned because it can never be decided with absolute certainty for any given sentence whether it is true or not. I agree that this can never be decided. But is the inference valid which leads from this result to the conclusion that the concept of truth is inadmissible? It seems that this inference presupposes the following major premise P: 'A term (predicate) must be rejected if it is such that we can never decide with absolute certainty for any given instance whether or not the term applies.' The argumentation by the authors would be valid if this principle P were presupposed, and I do not see how they reach the conclusion without this presupposition. However, I think that the authors do not actually believe in the principle P. In any case, it can easily be seen that the acceptance of P would lead to absurd consequences. For instance, we can never decide with absolute certainty whether a given substance is alcohol or not; thus, according to the principle P, the term 'alcohol' would have to be rejected. And the same holds obviously for every term of the physical language. Thus I suppose that we all agree that instead of P the following weaker principle P* must be used; this is indeed one of the principles of empiricism or scientific inquiry: 'A term (predicate) is a legitimate scientific term (has cognitive content, is empirically meaningful) if and only if a sentence applying a term to a given instance can possibly be confirmed to at least some degree.' 'Possibly' means here 'if certain specifiable observations occur'; 'to some degree' is not

meant as necessarily implying a numerical evaluation. P* is a simplified formulation of the 'requirement of confirmability' ... (T&C pp. 122-123).

Carnap quotes and discusses F. Kaufmann (*ibid* pp. 121-122) and cites the passages quoted above (in note 118) from Neurath and Reichenbach.

124. Carnap ESO p. 215. Cf. 'Pseudo-problems in Philosophy' (R. A. George, tr., published with *The Logical Structure of the World* [op. cit.]).

125. ESO p. 213.

126. See the references given in notes 13-15.

127. ESO pp. 207-208, 213. See note 96 above.

128. 'Empiricism and Abstract Entities' (op. cit.), p. 433. As the title indicates, Sellars goes on to discuss the problem of abstract entities, leaving this pithy comment to stand on its own.

129. ESO p. 208.

130. *Ibid.* p. 213.

131. Carnap, ESO p. 208; cf. MCTC p. 46, Hempel, SRFP pp. 94-95.

132. MCTC p. 46. Cf. T&M pp. 19, 20, 44-45; ESO pp. 207-208; Hempel, LPTT p. 55; SRFP p. 95.

133. Carnap thinks it odd to try first to determine whether or not there is a kind of entity in order to decide whether or not to adopt a linguistic framework containing variables ranging over those entities (ESO pp. 213-214). However, it is no less perverse to adopt, as Carnap would have it, a linguistic framework before determining whether or not there is a kind of entity—only to receive a trivial, analytic answer to our question based on the syntax of the framework we've adopted! The objections I have made to Carnap's position all grant (for the sake of discussion) his distinction between what is "internal" and what is "external" to a linguistic framework. For a concise discussion of objections to this distinction, including Quine's, see Rod Bertolet, 'Merril and Carnap on Realism' (*Southern Journal of Philosophy* 20 No. 3 [1982], pp. 277-287).

134. These objections to Carnap's position have been searchingly developed by Barry Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* (op. cit.), pp. 191-197.

135. Will, 'The Concern About Truth' (op. cit.), p. 273.

136. Enz. §22z.

137. Enz. §28z; cf. §62r.

138. This is to say, the twentieth century is not the first to see epistemological realism be threatened by a holistic social theory of language. I'm confident that Hegel's treatment of language could be brought to bear on the contemporary problem of reconciling epistemological realism with a complex philosophy of language, but this task must be left to another study. I have not appealed to Quine's objections to Carnap's program precisely in order to avoid presenting that study now. For an excellent overview of Herder's thought and its impact on his contemporaries, see Frederick Beiser, *The Fate of Reason* (op. cit.), ch. 5.

139. Enz. §28.

140. G54.8-9/D9/M47.18-9.

141. WL II pp. 265-66/SL p. 593.

142. It is worth emphasizing again that Hegel's philosophy of mind (meaning by that, what is meant by the term in the analytic tradition—Hegel calls it the "philosophy of subjective spirit") is naturalistic

throughout. His main source is not Descartes, but Aristotle. See Willem deVries, *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity* (*op. cit.*).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. "A belief is *mediately* (indirectly) justified provided it is justified by virtue of its relations to other justified beliefs of the subject that provide adequate support for it. In such cases the belief is justified by the *mediation* of those other beliefs. If it is justified in any other way it will be said to be *immediately* (directly) justified" ('Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology' [*Philosophical Topics* 14 No. 1 {1986}, pp. 179-221; hereafter abbreviated "IEE"], pp. 182-183). Cf. 'Two Types of Foundationalism' (*op. cit.*; hereafter abbreviated "TTF"), pp. 166, 168, 173, 173 note 10, 174, 167-177, 178.

2. 'Level Confusions in Epistemology' (*Midwest Studies in Philosophy V: Studies in Epistemology*, P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds. [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980], pp. 135-150; hereafter abbreviated "LCE"), p. 148; IEE *passim*; 'An Internalist Externalism' (*Synthese* [forthcoming]; all page references are to the manuscript; hereafter abbreviated "AIE"), *passim*.

3. IEE p. 181.

4. IEE pp. 191-192.

5. IEE p. 189.

6. IEE pp. 195-196.

7. IEE p. 194.

8. IEE pp. 196, 197, 201; 'Concepts of Epistemic Justification' (*Monist* 68 No. 1 [1985], pp. 57-89; hereafter abbreviated "CEJ"), pp. 64, 65; 'The Deontological Conception of Justification' (*Philosophical Perspectives* 2 [forthcoming]; hereafter abbreviated "DCJ"), *passim*. He suggests that what is chosen in relevant situations of choice is not a belief, but, *e.g.*, an hypothesis, a working assumption, or a policy (CEJ p. 65; DCJ ms. pp. 13-16).

9. IEE pp. 201, 213.

10. IEE pp. 202-203. Alston first points out this kind of regress concerning principles of justification on the model of Lewis Carroll's argument concerning logical principles of inference in 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles' (*Mind* 4 [1895], pp. 278-280) in 'Self-Warrant, A Neglected Form of Privileged Access' (*American Philosophical Quarterly* 13 No. 4 [1976], pp. 257-272), p. 272. Also see IEE pp. 202-203; EC p. 13-14; AIE pp. 10, 19.

11. Alston develops these objections specifically against a version of a deontological conception of justification devised to avoid the requirement that beliefs be under direct voluntary control, but these objections hold against any deontological conception of justification.

12. CEJ pp. 67-68.

13. CEJ p. 68.

14. Alston states the following: "... a proposition, *q*, is adequate evidence for *p* provided they are related in such a way that if *q* is true then *p* is at least probably true. But I *have* that evidence only if I believe that *q*. Furthermore I don't 'have' it in such a way as to thereby render my belief that *p* justified unless I know or am justified in believing that *q*" (CEJ p. 62). I have rephrased this condition because it is formulated here in terms of propositions being evidence or grounds, whereas he makes plain that the occurrence of psychological states or the recognition of logical truths may be the justificatory grounds of a belief (*cf.* CEJ p. 77). To substitute an occurrence of a psychological state for "*q*" in this statement would be to commit the kind of level confusion against which Alston so repeatedly warns.

15. CEJ p. 75.
16. CEJ pp. 75-76.
17. TTF pp. 173, 173 note 10, 174, 176-178; IEE p. 190; cf. CEJ p. 81.
18. Alston catalogs and attacks quite a number of such confusions in TTF, in 'Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?' (*Philosophical Studies* 29, pp. 287-305), in LCE, and in 'What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?' (*Synthese* 55, pp. 73-95; hereafter abbreviated "IK").
19. Provided I have no sufficient countervailing evidence.
20. See Frederick Suppe, *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1977), pp. 717-27, for an overview of the K-K thesis and some of the literature on it.
21. CEJ pp. 78-81.
22. CEJ p. 71.
23. IEE p. 217.
24. TTF p. 179.
25. TTF p. 169, LCE pp. 142-143.
26. TTF pp. 178.
27. IK pp. 85-86 (quoted below, p. 75); cf. TTF p. 182, CEJ p. 57.
28. This is to concur with Alston's discussion of what is required to show that something is the case (TTF pp. 179-181, EC p. 15).
29. 'Epistemic Circularity' (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 47 No. 1 [1986], pp. 1-30; hereafter abbreviated "EC"), p. 2.
30. EC p. 4.
31. EC pp. 4-5.
32. EC p. 6.
33. EC p. 9.
34. EC pp. 9, 10.
35. EC p. 9.
36. Cf. EC p. 16.
37. EC pp. 12-13. It appears that at one point Alston misstates his view. He says "... in coming to believe the premises [of the inductive 'track record' argument] on the basis of sense experience I am 'practically' assuming [the principle of the reliability of perception]. But that by no means implies that I am *justified* in making this presupposition. Hence as far as the epistemic circularity of [the 'track record' argument] is concerned, my belief in [the principle of the reliability of sense perception] might remain unjustified until I bring it into inferential connection with the premises of this argument" (EC pp. 12-13). Alston is right that one's *belief* in the principle of the reliability of sense perception may not be justified until after mounting the "track record" argument, but one's belief in this principle is not identical to one's practical presupposition of that principle's holding true, and one's practical presupposition must *be* justified in order to gather the premises of the argument. Either this, or one's presumption needn't be justified because practical presuppositions aren't the sorts of things that receive or have justification anyway.
38. EC pp. 18-19.
39. EC p. 14; cf. IEE p. 213.
40. EC pp. 9, 15-16. Alston claims that Descartes in the *Meditations* practically accepts the reliability of sense perception and seeks only to validate this reliability theoretically (EC p. 16), and he refers to Van Cleve's interpretation of Descartes as employing this strategy for coming to an explicit affirmation

of the reliability of sense perception based on an implicit acceptance of that reliability (EC p. 13 note 16). As I have shown above (Chapter Two), both Alston and Van Cleve are wrong about Descartes's strategy. Precisely what gets Descartes into hopeless trouble is refusing to grant his senses any reliability at all.

41. EC p. 27.

42. EC pp. 28-29.

43. IK p. 85; cf. TTF p. 182.

44. EC p. 29.

45. Above, Chapter One, pp. 7, 9-10.

46. This last clause is not redundant. The philosophical point of Alston's argument turns on an event (specifically a belief formation or retention) not being voluntary. In legal reasoning, "involuntary manslaughter" may result from a voluntary act, provided that manslaughter was not part of the agent's intention in performing that act. This issue of intent is central to the distinction between involuntary manslaughter and homicide.

47. DCEJ ms. pp. 13-14.

48. Cf. above, p. 67.

49. LCE pp. 147-148.

50. LCE p. 148.

51. EC p. 19. Alston's way of contrasting "justification" and "reliability" in this passage indicates that he does not mean here "direct" justification but must mean some kind of "mediate" justification in terms of demonstrating the truth or warrant of a belief on the basis of other beliefs.

52. Fermat's last theorem states that for sequential natural numbers greater than 2, there are no triples of numbers that satisfy the equation $x^n + y^n = z^n$. He claimed to have had a proof for this theorem, but alas none has been found. This is why I date the reader of the marginalia; the history of failed efforts to establish such a proof could constitute sufficient considerations to override the justification of our reader's belief (whether or not Fermat actually had a proof).

53. This may appear to reflect a shift in Alston's view about basing relations. Certainly his recent essays have been more sensitive to this point, but even in LCE (1980) he lists among the conditions of mediate justification that "S's belief that p was produced by, or is causally sustained by, S's belief that q , in the right way" where one appropriate relation between these beliefs is inference (p. 143). A similar point is made even earlier in TTF (1976; p. 183).

54. See above, pp. 74-75.

55. EC p. 16.

56. EC p. 11.

57. LCE pp. 143-144; cited in this connection in EC (p. 11 note 13).

58. EC p. 9. The conclusion to this argument is identified as "II" on *ibid.*, p. 4.

59. EC p. 18.

60. EC p. 13.

61. *Contra* Alston's insinuation in EC (pp. 13-14).

62. Here I follow Robert Audi's argument in 'Belief, Reason, and Inference' (*Philosophical Topics* 14 No. 1 [1986], pp. 27-65), p. 36. (I thank William Alston for this reference.) For all of his worries about generating regresses of levels of beliefs, at least once Alston grants that some such "connecting

beliefs" as I defend here do play a role in those "basing" relations constituted by explicit inference (AIE p. 2).

63. CEJ p. 77.

64. CEJ p. 78.

65. Robert Audi points this out (*op. cit.*), p. 36.

66. An advance to the level of meta-logic would not improve the justificatory status of one's beliefs based on argument anyway, for the justification of beliefs about meta-logic rest on these same conditions holding. I suspect that the infinite regress levels of epistemic principles that Alston urges against perspectival internalism may be specious, for very quickly in such a regress one would appeal not to epistemic principles so much as to logical principles of valid reasoning. Alston generates a regress of levels of epistemic principles by iterating embedding "that ..." clauses, claiming that each subsequent level of justification requires another epistemic principle because no principle at the previous level has the right content (IEE pp. 202-203). I suspect Alston's regress is specious, for the logical principles of reasoning are the same whatever their level of application, and once logical principles are appealed to for justifying claims about valid inferences, compounding "that ..." clauses won't change the content of the principles in any significant way.

67. EC p. 12.

68. EC p. 15.

69. EC p. 9.

70. 'A "Doxastic Practice" Approach to Epistemology' (in: M. Clay and K. Lehrer, eds., *Knowledge and Skepticism* [Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming], hereafter abbreviated "DPAE"), ms. p. 4. All page references are to the manuscript.

71. DPAE ms. p. 5.

72. Later in this essay Alston says that the initial acceptance of this argument was "too hasty" (DPAE ms. p. 35).

73. EC p. 23.

74. EC p. 8.

75. EC p. 24.

76. EC pp. 25-26.

77. EC pp. 27, 28.

78. EC p. 27; *cf.* above, pp. 74-76.

79. DPAE ms. p. 40.

80. DPAE ms. pp. 9-14.

81. DPAE ms. p. 13.

82. DPAE ms. p. 22.

83. DPAE ms. pp. 22-27.

84. DPAE ms. p. 45.

85. DPAE ms. p. 30.

86. DPAE ms. p. 34.

87. DPAE ms. p. 33.

88. DPAE ms. p. 30.

89. DPAE ms. pp. 35-36.

90. DPAE ms. p. 38.

91. DPAE ms. pp. 24-25.

92. *Cf.* DPAE ms. p. 49.

93. See Chapter Four §VA, pp. 56-57.

94. EC pp. 26, 28.

95. See Chapter Two §§II-IV, pp. 23-33. 96. EC pp. 8, 9.
 97. DPAE ms. p. 33. 98. CEJ p. 63.
 99. CEJ pp. 75-76; EC pp. 12-13; IEE p. 184. 100. CEJ p. 76-77.

101. Alston agrees that such second-level knowledge is required for determining whether or not we know that we have some bit of empirical knowledge. He remarks: "If one thinks that reliability is what converts true belief into knowledge, then the question of how we can determine that perception is reliable will be a crucial part of how we can determine that we have perceptual knowledge" (EC p. 3).

102. This problem is central in Hegel's discussion of the inadequacy of traditional approaches to proof and the need for another approach to philosophy (namely, his own) in the introductory material of the smaller *Logic*. This problem also stands behind Hegel's rejection of the mathematical or axiomatic model for philosophy. (See his criticism of Spinoza in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* [VGP III [Werke 20] pp. 167, 172-173, 187-189; cf. pp. 209, 223/cf. LHP III pp. 263-264, 282-285; cf. pp. 299]. [Note: These German and English editions frequently diverge in this section of Hegel's Lectures.]

103. Hegel notes this problem expressly in his discussion of Sextus in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (VGP II [Werke 19] pp. 386-387, 390-391/LHP II pp. 357-358, 360). The point is quite explicit in the 'Skepticism' essay (*op. cit.*, pp. 218, 219).

104. Compare Alston's account of the use of the "track record" argument "to rationally bring a person from the state of only practically accepting [the reliability of perception] to the state of explicitly accepting it" (EC p. 16).

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. "One could, of course, simply condemn and reject as accidental and arbitrary all such useless notions and locutions about knowledge as an instrument ... or as a medium It would similarly be possible to reject the excuses which those who are incapable of science derive from such presumed relations, excuses designed to avoid the toil of science and to give at the same time the impression of earnest and zealous effort. ... [O]ne could ... spare oneself the effort of even taking notice of such notions and locutions, by which science itself is to be avoided, for these amount to no more than an empty appearance of knowledge, an appearance which immediately vanishes once science arrives" (G54.30-55.12/D11/M48.6-28). As was mentioned earlier (p. 10), "*Wissenschaft*" refers equally to natural and social science and to philosophy, and on Hegel's view philosophy presupposes natural science.

2. G55.23-24/D12/M49.5-6. Hegel makes this same point in the body of the *Phenomenology* concerning "idealism" and especially Fichte's and Schelling's propounding of it: "The idealism that .. starts off with this assertion is ... a pure *assertion* which does not comprehend itself, nor can it make itself comprehensible to others. It proclaims an *immediate certainty* which is confronted by other immediate certainties With equal right, therefore, the assertions of these other certainties, too, take their place alongside the assertion of that [idealist] certainty. Reason appeals to the *self-consciousness* of each and every consciousness ... But in basing itself on this appeal, reason sanctions the truth of the other certainties ..." (G133.34-134.6/M141.15-26; Miller, tr.).

3. See Chapter One, pp. 4-5.

4. F. H. Jacobi propounded a doctrine of "immediate knowledge" according to which there is no conceptual or inferential mediation in our knowledge. On his view, *prima facie* knowledge claims count

as knowledge, indeed, as the basic knowledge upon which any other knowledge depends. Hegel points out that Jacobi's view faces precisely this—among many other—problems. See Enz. §75 and my discussion of Hegel's criticism of Jacobi in 'Hegel's Attitude Toward Jacobi ...' (*op. cit.*).

5. I, for example, am sure that Hegel is in part following Spinoza's definition of certainty, according to which "certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty" (*On the Improvement of the Understanding*; R. M. H. Elwes, tr. [New York: Dover, 1955], p. 13). However, I haven't been able to figure out just what Spinoza means by this, and so I can't figure out what Hegel's doing with it. Suggestions on interpreting Spinoza's point are welcome.

6. G55.36-37/D13/M49.21-24.

7. These forms of consciousness are discussed in more detail below, in connection with the structure of Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology*. See Chapter Eleven §V, pp. 158-160.

8. Hegel indicates this in stating that "... the moments of the truth of spirit present themselves in their proper determinateness, not as abstract, pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as this consciousness itself comes forth in its relation to them" (G61.33-36/D26/M56.33-37).

9. G58.23-31/D18-19/M52.31-53.1. This point is analyzed in Chapter Seven.

10. Hegel argues for the other half of Kant's dictum, that intuitions without concepts are blind, in the first chapter of the *Phenomenology*, "Sense-Certainty."

11. Hegel's notion of "*Begriff*" or "concept" is discussed in Chapter Ten. Ernst Tugendhat almost apologetically introduces the term "Konzeption" into his discussion of Hegel's Introduction ('Kehraus mit Hegel II' [*Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), 14. Vorlesung]). I think the introduction of this term is very helpful, for the perennial question Hegel poses to each form of consciousness is whether its principles are *Begriffe* or only *Vorstellungen*—concepts or only representations—, to borrow terms from Hegel's philosophy of mind. (Hegel's contrast between these two, very roughly, is that representations are inadequate graspings of objects while concepts are adequately grasped objects.) This sort of question is easier to pose and pursue if one uses the term "conception," which can indicate either of these up until the point at which it becomes clear which it is. Also, using the term "conception" keeps the philosophy of mind verbally close at hand because conceptions are products of conceivings, which are acts of conceivers.

12. "Each" does entail "every" here; Hegel thinks he can give an exhaustive list of the forms of consciousness. This problematic claim is touched on again in chapter 9 §X, pp. 138-139.

13. G54.27-28/D11/M48.4; G55.3-4/D11/M48.18; G27.3-4/K48/M18.17-18.

14. G53.1-3/D7/M46.1-4.

15. G53.1, 3-5/D7/M46.1, 4-6.

16. G53.23-27/D8-9/M46.28-33.

17. G26.21/K48/M18.12-3.

18. G55.6-8/D11/M48.20-24.

19. "It is the most common self-deception and deception of others to presuppose something as familiar when it comes to knowledge, and to accept this; but with all its talking back and forth such knowledge, without knowing what is happening to it, never gets anywhere" (G26.21-27.3/K48/M18.13-17).

20. "But when consciousness sets about the examination of truth *straightaway*, it is still filled and burdened with these natural notions and so it is, in fact, incapable of what it wants to undertake" (G56.33-35/D15/M50.31-34).

21. Here are some examples of "natural ideas" culled from the Modern period.

Locke:

[Idea] being a term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the *object* of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking* ... I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *ideas* in men's minds: everyone is conscious of them in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others'. (*Essay [op. cit.]*, Introduction §8).

Hume:

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas. (*Treatise [op. cit.]*, Bk. I Pt. 1 §1).

Descartes:

I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. (Meditation I [PWD ii, p. 12; AT vii p. 17]).

22. "To follow one's own conviction is certainly more than to give oneself over to authority; but by the conversion of opinion held on authority into opinion held out of personal conviction, the content of what is held is not necessarily altered, and truth does not necessarily take the place of error. In persisting within a system of opinion and prejudice, the only difference between relying on the authority of others or on personal conviction lies in the vanity inherent in the latter" (G56.23-29/D14-15/M50.17-26). Hegel's point certainly applies to Descartes, though his sharpness is surely aimed closer to home at Fichte, Schelling, and especially the Romantics.

23. G15.23-25/K22/M7.26-27.

24. "This past existence is property that has already been acquired by the general spirit [*i.e.* culture] which constitutes the substance of the individual and ... his inorganic nature" (G25.8-9/K44/M16.34-36).

25. "Education [*Bildung*], considered from the point of view of the individual, consists in one acquiring what is thus given to one; one must digest one's inorganic nature and take possession of it for oneself" (G25.9-11/K44/M16.36-40).

26. Hegel describes this task in terms of supplying his readers with a ladder with which to reach the level of science (G23.3-4/K40/M14.39-40). In this way, the *Phenomenology* fits into Hegel's vocation as a *Volkserzieher*. (See H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight* [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972], pp. xxvii, xix, xx, 4, 59, on this aspect of Hegel's intellectual development and aspirations.)

27. Enz. §10; cf. Enz. §41z (quoted just below).

28. *Op. cit.*, p. 11; cf. above, Chapter One p. 11 and note 35 (on p. 216). Similarly, Lauer remarks that "in his Introduction to the *Phenomenology* [Hegel asks] the question which no previous philosopher had asked quite so explicitly: how can we start philosophizing at all?" (Lauer [*op. cit.*], p. 23). He is nearer the mark when he states that Hegel's problem is "how are we to get to the point where philosophical thinking can justifiably be called 'scientific'?" (*ibid.*, p. 24).

29. Hegel's third and fourth challenges to epistemology are discussed in Chapter One, pp. 8-10.

30. Enz. §41z.

31. Quine gives up the traditional epistemological problem of justifying knowledge of the external world and opts for an empirical psychology of knowledge in its stead because of the failure of empiricist programs to deduce such knowledge from sensory contents ('Epistemology Naturalized' [*op. cit.*], pp. 71-78).

32. Kenley Dove points out that by playing out our own ideas before us in using forms of consciousness, Hegel employs a direct precursor to Brecht's notion of a "*Vervrendungseffekt*." See K. R. Dove, 'Hegel's Phenomenological Method' (*The Review of Metaphysics* 23 No. 4 [1970], pp. 615-641), p. 627.

33. Johannes Heinrichs has pointed out this problem as well as its solution by describing the three points of view involved in the *Phenomenology* as three points of view of what is at bottom one and the same consciousness (*Die Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes* [Bonn: Bouvier, 1974], p. 13).

34. Hegel explicitly poses this problem in regard of his own procedure in the *Phenomenology*: "Now if we investigate the truth of knowledge, it seems that we investigate what knowledge is *in itself*. But since in this investigation knowledge is *our* object, it is *for us*. Hence the *in itself* of the object resulting from our investigation would not be the *in itself* of knowledge but rather its being *for us*. What we would maintain as its essence would not really be its truth but only our knowledge of it. The essence or the standard would lie in us, and that which was to be compared with this standard and decided upon as a result of this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize that standard." (G58.36-59.3/D19-20/M53.7-16 [¶83]).

35. "For this reason, then, a presentation of knowledge as an appearance shall be undertaken here" (G55.30-31/D13/M49.15-16).

36. G59.27-28, 30/D21/M54.6, 10-11. Actually, Hegel grants that there is something more for us, his readers, to do. What this is and whether it undermines Hegel's effort to avoid question-begging are discussed below, Chapter Nine §§VII-IX, pp. 135-138.

37. G59.4-6, 11-13, 29-30/D20-21/M53.19-20, 26-29, 54.7-8.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. "This contradiction [*i.e.*, the problem of the criterion] and its removal will become more determinate if the abstract determinations of knowledge and truth are first called to mind as they occur in consciousness" (G58.22-24/D18/M52.31-33).

2. G58.24-31/D19/M52.33-53.1. Konrad Cramer, in 'Bemerkungen zu Hegels Begriff vom Bewußtsein in der Einleitung zur Phänomenologie des Geistes' (in: R.-P. Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978], pp. 360-393), devotes detailed attention to interpreting the first clause in this passage, "consciousness *distinguishes* from itself something to which it at the same time *relates* itself." However, when he finally comes to interpreting it in its "philosophical context" (p. 384), he seizes Hegel's claim in the *Encyclopedia* that Kant's philosophy is a phenomenological analysis of consciousness (Enz. §415). This involves two errors. First, it ignores the immediate context of the problem of self-criticism Hegel faces in the Introduction (on which, see below); and second, Cramer quite unwarrantedly assumes that with this remark Hegel adopts Kant's

analysis of consciousness, rather than simply designates the purported domain of Kant's analysis (pp. 384-385). This generates spurious puzzles that occupy the remainder of Cramer's article.

3. See Chapter One, pp. 4-5, and Chapter Eleven, pp. 158.

4. G54.6-8/D9-10/M47.18-19. See Chapter Six, p. 91 and note 1 (on p. 252).

5. Compare Kant's remark explaining the import of his *Critique*: "I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limits—all in accordance with principles" (CPR Axi).

6. See Chapter One, p. 4.

7. Hegel's rejection of the priority of epistemology over metaphysics does not, as many critics have charged, lead Hegel to pursue metaphysics unbridled by any cognitive concerns. On the contrary, Hegel's view is that "speculative" metaphysics is answerable to actual scientific and historical knowledge of the world (see Chapter One, p. 10). However, to be answerable to actual knowledge is importantly different than being answerable to a *philosophical theory* about what that knowledge (or, more currently, what the language for expressing that knowledge) is.

8. G30.36-37/K60/M22.40-23.1.

9. G30.37-38/K60/M23.1-2. See §IV below, pp. 111-114.

10. G30.38-31.5/K60/M23.2-10.

11. G59.35-37/D22/M54.17-22.

12. Hegel argues for this important claim in the first chapter of the *Phenomenology*, "Sense-Certainty."

13. 'Begriff und Realität' (rpt. in: R.-P. Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978]; pp. 324-359), p. 330.

14. G59.37-60.3/D22/M54.22-27.

15. "... das Bewußtseyn sich selbst prüft ..." (G59.29-30/D21/M54.10).

16. G59.21-22/D21/M53.38-40; Hegel's emphases have been omitted.

17. G59.8-13/D20/M53.22-29.

18. H. F. Fulda pointed out this simple but significant fact to me in conversation.

19. See the quotation on p. 100 above.

20. Ulrich Claesges recognizes that consciousness' standard has to do with a view it "maintains" (*behaupten*), but he fails to analyze the relation between consciousness' declaration and the term "*ansich*," and so he fails to see the ambiguity of this term (*Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens* [Hegel-Studien Beiheft 21 [Bonn: Bouvier, 1981]], pp. 76, 86). Thus the richness of the answer to the problem of self-criticism given in the "first phase" of Hegel's discussion escapes Claesges (p. 86). Having misconstrued the first phase, Claesges is in a poor position to reconstruct the second. The very problem that Hegel addresses (roughly, how can consciousness determine if what seems to it to be true is true?) infects Claesges's hypothesis for resolving this problem. His hypothesis is that "the

untruth of phenomenal knowledge lies in that it generally takes (*hat*) its content in a double form, as knowledge and as truth. So long as knowledge is untrue, consciousness must make such a division (*Trennung*), and so long as knowledge makes such a division, it is untrue knowledge" (pp. 92-93). The problem remains of how consciousness is to discern that what may in fact be false but seems to it to be true is in fact false. That there is in fact such a distinction in no way entails that consciousness is in a position to draw it, or if consciousness draws the distinction in abstract reflection, this in no way entails that consciousness is able to apply this distinction in any particular instance in order to test its own knowledge. Consciousness may in fact be untrue knowledge, but how can it tell? Claesges's hypothesis papers over rather than solves the basic problem. I disagree with other points of his analysis, but discussing them here would lead too far afield.

21. The importance of Hegel's distinction between dative and accusative cases has been stressed by M. Theunissen ('Begriff und Realität' [*op. cit.*], pp. 326-330 and note 5) and by Kenley R. Dove in 'Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy' (in: M. Westphal, ed., *Method and Speculation in Hegel's Phenomenology* [N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982], pp. 27-40), p. 30. However, Dove does not notice that there are two different dative objects in Hegel's analysis, he does not notice the ambiguity of the term "in itself," and he does not develop these distinctions into an analysis of the structure of Hegel's notion of a form of consciousness. Also see note 24 below.

22. G59.38-60.2/D22/M54.22-25; quoted above, p. 103.

23. See Chapter Eight.

24. This four-fold distinction of aspects of consciousness (and its subsequent elaboration below) has been developed independently. However, the analysis I offer is similar to that offered by Michael Theunissen in the first section of his essay, 'Begriff und Realität' (*op. cit.*). He notes an ambiguity in Hegel's use of "*Ansich*" and he distinguishes between the object itself and the object for consciousness (*ibid.* p. 326). Furthermore, Theunissen stresses Hegel's point that the object is also an object *to* consciousness (p. 327f.) and he emphasizes that according to Hegel consciousness declares something from within itself as the in-itself or truth (p. 330). Thus he notices each of the four aspects that I have isolated and analyzed above, although he does not, in the confines of one short section, attempt to systematize them. Theunissen also does not analyze this "declaration" as the adoption of a conception and he does not develop the double list of aspects that I discuss below.

25. G57.25-26/D17/M51.28-29.

26. G59.31-32/D21/M54.11-13; cf. 'Bewußtseinslehre für die Mittelklasse', *Philosophische Propädeutik* 4 (1809f.), §1 (*Werke* Vol. IV, pp. 9-302), p. 111.

27. Hegel makes this distinction in the following six passages:

Consciousness *distinguishes* from itself something to which it at the same time *relates* itself; or, as this is expressed, this something is something *for consciousness*. The determinate side of this *relating*, or the *being* of something *for a consciousness*, is *knowledge*. From this being for an other, however, we distinguish the *being in itself*; that which is related to knowledge is at the same time distinguished from it and is posited as *existing* also outside this relation. (G58.25-31/D19/M52.33-53.1)

In consciousness, one moment is *for an other*; or, in general, consciousness has the determination of the moment of knowledge in it. At the same time, this other is to consciousness not only something *for it*; it is also something outside this relationship or *in itself* (G59.8-10/D20/M53.22-26).

These two moments, *concept and object, being-for-another and being-in-itself*, fall within that knowledge itself which we investigate ... (G59.21-22/D21/M53.38-40).

[C]oncept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself. (G59.27-28/D21/M54.7-8)

For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and, on the other hand, consciousness of itself; it is conscious of what to it is the true, and conscious of its knowledge of this truth. Since both are *for consciousness* (G59.31-34/D21/M54.11-15).

[I]n the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all this distinction is already present: Something is *to it* the *in-itself*, but the knowledge or the being of the object *for* consciousness is *to it* still another moment. (G59.38-60.2/D22/M54.22-26)

If the sheer frequency of Hegel's insistence on this distinction among aspects of knowledge were not enough, he says just before the third passage quoted here that "it is, however, essential to hold fast to the following throughout the entire investigation ...," and he emphasizes the first, fourth, and fifth of these passages by citing them as the crux of his response to the problem of the criterion. The grammatical expression of this distinction is explicit in the second, fifth, and sixth of these passages. Hegel's German for these passages follows:

Es ist in ihm [dem Bewußtseyn] eines *für ein* anderes, oder es hat überhaupt die Bestimmtheit des Moments des Wissens an ihm; zugleich ist ihm diß andere nicht nur *für es*, sondern auch außer dieser Beziehung oder *an sich*. (G59.8-10)

Denn das Bewußtseyn ist einerseits Bewußtseyn des Gegenstandes, andererseits Bewußtseyn seiner selbst; Bewußtseyn dessen, was ihm das Wahre ist, und Bewußtseyn seines Wissens davon. Indem beyde *für dasselbe* sind (G59.31-34).

Allein gerade darin, daß es überhaupt von einem Gegenstand weiß, ist schon der Unterschied vorhanden, daß *ihm* etwas das *an sich*, ein Anderes Moment aber das Wissen oder das Seyn des Gegenstandes *für das* Bewußtseyn ist. (G59.38-60.2)

One wrinkle in these passages is whether these two aspects of knowledge are objects *to* consciousness or objects *for* consciousness. Passages two and six indicate the former, while the end of the fifth indicates the latter. Which is it? In fact, the status of these objects shifts from being as yet inexplicit objects to consciousness to being explicit objects for consciousness. This point is discussed on pp. 108-110 and especially in Chapter Eight.

28. Ernst Tugendhat rejects the attempt to understand conscious or intentional relations with "unclarified" notions of "positing" and "subject/object" relations, and he faults Hegel for doing so ('Kehraus mit Hegel I' [*Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung* (*op. cit.*), 13. Vorlesung], p. 303). What Tugendhat misses is the fact that Hegel *agrees* with him on these points. What I have argued shows that Hegel does not leave these notions undeveloped, and indeed that what Hegel presents when all is told covers what Tugendhat suggests as an alternative ('Kehraus mit Hegel II' [*ibid.*, 14. Vorlesung], p. 325)—and then some!

29. Hegel's criterial inference is thus similar to Donald Davidson's view of how "coherence generates correspondence" in 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' (D. Henrich, ed., *Kant oder Hegel?* [Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984], pp. 423-438), except that Hegel's project has a second-order and categorical concern with the truth of theories of knowledge, a concern that plays no role in Davidson's argument.

30. For example, our abilities to use tokens of demonstrative terms is directly related to our ability to apply conceptions of individuation, space, and time (this point is crucial to Hegel's refutation of "sense-certainty"); the occurrent properties of things are directly related to their dispositional properties (this point is crucial to Hegel's transition from "perception" to "force and understanding").
31. Hegel's doctrine of "determinate negation" is discussed in Chapter Eight §IIIB and chapter 9 §VII, pp. 125-126 and 135-136, respectively.
32. G57.18-20/D16/M51.19-22.
33. This point is discussed in Chapter Nine §V, pp. 133-134.
34. G57.20/D16/M51.22.
35. G59.14-15/D20/M53.29-32.
36. G59.15-19/D20/M53.32-36.
37. G59.19/D20/M53.36-37.
38. Hegel mentions this indifference again on G103.16-22/M104.16-23 and G221.31-32/M244.13-14.
39. CPR Bxvi, quoted more fully above, Chapter Three p. 38.
40. Recall Hegel's trenchant remarks on truth and knowledge of "the absolute" at the beginning of the Introduction. (These are discussed above in Chapter One, pp. 4-10.)
41. M. Theunissen notes that Hegel upbraids Kant with his two equivalent formulations of the relevant correspondence ('Begriff und Realität' [*op. cit.*], pp. 325-326), but he too quickly identifies Hegel's second formulation (the object for consciousness' corresponding with the object itself *qua* concept) with Hegel's further conception of value judgments as judgments concerning the correspondence of an object with its own concept (*ibid.*, p. 332). On this point, see the following subsection (§IVC).
42. WL II p. 266/SL p. 593. I do not claim that Hegel provides an analysis of "correspondence" as the nature of truth; only that he is committed to such an analysis. For an excellent analysis of the relevant "correspondence" in terms of reference, see Scott Shalkowski, 'Concepts and Correspondence' (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 47 No. 3 [1987], pp. 461-474), and his reply to Catherine Elgin, 'Correspondence Revisited' (*ibid.*, pp. 481-483).
43. Chapter Four §VF, pp. 62-64.
44. Hegel himself uses just this example to illustrate this second notion of truth in *Enz.* §24z2.
45. I use "correspondence" here to translate Hegel's "*Übereinstimmung*" (*Enz.* §24z2). Miller continues a long tradition of misunderstanding by translating Hegel's term as "consistency."
46. Hegel himself indicates that one can of course have correct (*richtige*) conceptions of deformed objects, conceptions that correspond to their deformed natures (*Enz.* §24z2).
47. G431.36-432.1, 9-19/M490.33-37, 491.6-17.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. This was shown in Chapter Seven §IID3, pp. 106-108.
2. See Chapter Seven §II B and C, pp. 102-103. 3. G60.1-3/D22/M54.24-27.
4. Chapter Seven §IID2, pp. 105-106. 5. G59.32-35/D21/M54.11-17.
6. G56.1-2/D13/M49.29. 7. Chapter Nine §V, pp. 133-134.
8. G59.34-35/D21/M54.14-17. 9. G60.3-5/D22/M54.27-30.
10. See Chapter Seven §IIB and C, pp. 102-103. 11. G60.4-5/D22/M54.29-30.
12. See §D below, p. 119, and Chapter Seven §IIC, p. 103.
13. For example, since consciousness' self-conception is in part a conception of itself as a cognizer, as being cognitively related to the world, altering its conception of knowledge would *ipso facto* alter its self-conception. See Chapter Nine §V, pp. 133-134.
14. G60.5-9/D22/M54.30-34. 15. See Chapter Seven §IID2, pp. 105-106.
16. G60.9-10/D22/M54.34-36. 17. G60.10-14/D22-23/M54.37-55.2.
18. G60.20-23/D23/M55.9-12.
19. M. Theunissen notes that Hegel is hardly clear enough about what this ambiguity is supposed to be ('Begriff und Realität' [*op. cit.*], p. 329).
20. G60.23-25/D23/M55.12-14. 21. See Chapter Seven §IID1, pp. 104-105.
22. No one in the secondary literature has offered exactly the interpretation I criticize, because no one has examined these passages in as much detail as I do here. However, the interpretation I criticize is the best that a very common interpretation of Hegel (one that makes him out to reject epistemological realism) could make of these passages. This view has been set out with the greatest care by Quentin Lauer in chapter 1 of *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (*op. cit.*).
23. The two alternative readings I consider are not, of course, the only possible ones. I leave it to the reader to determine if any other interpretations are plausible in view of the local and wider significance of these passages. I would suggest, however, that the two readings I consider are the most plausible interpretations of these passages insofar as other interpretations quickly lead to simply ignoring the clues Hegel provides for interpreting these passages.
24. See Chapter Seven §II B and C, pp. 102-103.
25. This is Lauer's view of this passage (*op. cit.*), p. 38. See Chapter Ten on Hegel's ontology.
26. G56.6/D13/M49.34.
27. G57.2-3/D15/M50.39-40. See §IIB, below pp. 125-126.
28. In considering the body of Hegel's text, it is apparent that this process is the same both within and between the stages and sub-stages of each form of consciousness.

29. G57.1-12/D15-16/M50.38-51.10.

30. See Chapter Nine §IV regarding Hegel's *Phenomenology* and the *Meno* paradox (pp. 132-133).

31. G61.8-12/D24-25/M56.1-7.

32. The contrast with Popper's falsificationism is striking. On his account, theories are discarded once they are found not to jibe with any set of predictions. Researchers are then left to devise new hypotheses from scratch. Hegel attempts to point out how the inadequacies found in one conception point out what a more adequate successor conception must grasp. This contrast remains, despite the difference between Hegel's second-order, transcendental concerns and Popper's first-order concerns with empirical knowledge.

33. It may be worth recalling at this point the problem that subjective idealism (and some forms of conventionalism) have in accounting for error: If the world is a product of our thinking (or, if the structure of the world is a function of the linguistic categories we decide to apply to it), how could we make so many mistakes and discoveries about the world (and about knowledge)?

34. "[A] mode of knowledge which makes this onesidedness its essence is one of the forms of incomplete consciousness which occurs on this path and will present itself in due course. It is, namely, the skepticism which only sees in the result a *pure nothing* and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinate, that it is the nothing *of that from which it results*. ... The skepticism which ends up with the abstraction of nothing, or with emptiness, cannot proceed any further from this but must wait and see whether anything new presents itself to it, and what this is, in order to cast it into the same empty abyss" (G57.4-14/D15-16/M51.1-14).

35. G58.8-10/D17-18/M52.9-14.

36. See Chapter Five p. 89 and note 102 (on p. 252).

37. See Chapters Ten and Eleven.

38. See, e.g., G81.3-5/M78.33-35, G121.3/M125.21-22, and G136.23-30/M144.28-31.

39. "[W]hen consciousness sets about the examination of truth *straightaway*, it is still filled and burdened with these natural notions and so it is, in fact, incapable of what it wants to undertake" (G56.33-35/D15/M50.31-34). Cf. Chapter Six §III, pp. 94-95.

NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE

1. Numbers prefixed by an "S" are numbers of the sentences of paragraphs 14-16 of the Introduction, as numbered in Appendix II.

2. Lauer (*op. cit.*), p. 37.

3. "The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of it. To contribute to this end—the goal being that it might be able to relinquish the name 'love of knowledge' and be actual knowledge—that is what I have resolved to try To demonstrate that the time has come for the elevation of philosophy to a science—this would be the only true justification of the attempts which have this aim. For this would show the necessity of this aim even while accomplishing it" (G11.24-12.2/K12/M3.30-4.4 [¶5]); "[This] presentation can be regarded, from [the scientific] point of view, as the route of natural consciousness which is striving toward true knowledge, or as the route

of the soul which is making its way through the series of its formations as through waystations prescribed by its own nature, that it may lift itself to the level of spirit, in that it attains knowledge of what it is in itself through the completed experience of itself" (G55.34-38/D13/M49.19-26).

4. *Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind* (op cit.), p. 2.

5. Plato, *Meno* (W. K. C. Guthrie, tr. [in: E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds., *Plato: Collected Dialogues* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1961], pp. 353-384]), 80d. References to this dialogue are given below by standard line numbers.

6. *Meno* 82e.

7. *Meno* 82d.

8. *Meno* 83bc, 83e.

9. *Meno* 84a-d.

10. *Meno* 84c.

11. *Meno* 85a.

12. G56.5-6/D14/M49.34.

13. This is part of Hegel's agreement with Kant about rational thought being "spontaneous," but Hegel holds that such spontaneity is contextual.

14. *Meno* 84d.

15. G59.20-31/D21/M53.38-54.11.

16. G55.35-39/D13/M49.20-26.

17. G57.25-27/D17/M51.28-30.

18. I suspect that this is what Hegel alludes to here because the remark just quoted is Hegel's statement of the distinction between organic and conscious life. He says, "[t]his antithesis of [self-consciousness'] appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness is *desire* in general In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this antithesis is sublated, and the identity of itself with itself becomes [explicit] to it." (G104.21-24, 29-31/M105.29-32, 38-40; I have slightly emended Miller's translation.)

19. "Natural consciousness will prove to be merely the concept of knowledge, or not real knowledge" (G56.1-2/D13/M49.27-29).

20. "[C]onsciousness examines itself ..." (G59.29-30/D21/M54.9-10).

21. G57.29-30/D17/M51.34.

22. G57.33/D17/M51.38.

23. G57.34-35/D17/M52.3-4

24. E.g., G55.35-6/D13/M49.20-21; G56.3/D13/M49.30; G56.6/D14/M49.33; G56.19/D14/M50.12; G57.6/D15/M51.3.

25. "Just as spirit was distinguished from its moments [that is, from the major sections of the *Phenomenology*], so are ... the individual determinations of these moments themselves distinguished from those moments. We saw that each of those moments was differentiated again in its own self into a process of its own, and assumed different forms; as, e.g., in consciousness, sense-certainty and perception were distinct from each other. These latter forms come apart in time and belong to a *particular totality* These exhibit spirit in its individuality or *actuality*, and are distinguished from one another in time, though in such a way that the subsequent moment retains within it the preceding one" (G365.35-366.3, 6-7/M413.15-22, 26-29; Miller, tr.). Thus there is development and

perhaps history within the major sections. For example, the transition from "perception" to "understanding" may parallel the transition from Galilean to Newtonian physics. See Chapter Eleven for discussion of the structure of Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology*.

26. G56.1-6/D13/M49.27-34.

27. G55.34-38/D13/M49.19-26; quoted in note 3 (on pp. 261-262).

28. G56.30/D15/M50.26-27. The other three kinds of skepticism are ordinary doubt, perhaps feigned as a method by Fichte (G56.7-10/D14/M49.34-39), a Cartesian *omnibus dubitandum* (G56.12-17/D14/ M50.4-10), and an extreme Pyrrhonism that denies everything (G57.12-14/D16/M51.4-7).

29. G21.22-24/K38/M13.30-32.

30. G56.32-34/D15/M50.29-31.

31. See §IV on Hegel's phenomenological method and the *Meno* paradox, pp. 132-133.

32. "The skepticism which ends up with the abstraction of nothing, or with emptiness, cannot proceed any further from this but must wait and see whether anything new presents itself to it, and what this is, in order to cast it into the same abyss" (G57.11-14/D16/M51.10-14).

33. G56.31/D15/M50.28.

34. Werner Marx insufficiently appreciates this distinction, and so contends that the phenomenological observers not only collect the different moments of a form of consciousness and of the series of forms of consciousness together, but also that the observers initiate the movement from one form to the next and that they introduce the necessity of each transition (*Hegel's Phenomenology: Its Point and Purpose* [New York: Harper and Row, 1975], pp. 90-92). J. Heinrichs rightly points out this error in Marx's interpretation (*op. cit.*, p. 33).

35. G25.16-17/K46/M17.17; Miller, tr.

36. Compare the following statements: "But as regards the *existence* of this concept, science does not appear in time and in the actual world before spirit has attained to this consciousness about itself. As spirit that knows what it is, it does not exist before, and nowhere at all, till after the completion of its work of compelling its incomplete form to procure for its consciousness the form of its essence, and in this way to equate its *self-consciousness* with its *consciousness*" (G428.16-22/M486.19-25); "Consequently, until spirit has completed itself in *itself*, until it has completed itself as worldspirit, it cannot reach its consummation as *self-conscious* spirit. Therefore, the content of religion proclaims earlier in time than does science, what *spirit* is, but only science is its true knowledge of itself" (G429.39-420.4/M488.16-21; I have slightly emended Miller's tr.). According to these statements, Hegel could not have figured out the "phenomenology of spirit," and so could not have written his book, until a particular, very late stage in the development of the "world-spirit" had been reached. In view of Hegel's statements in the Preface in which he presents himself as the herald of "science," it is hard not to suppose that he actually took himself to have a sort of transcendental argument in mind, inferring from his having composed the book to the truth of the book's contents. (Perhaps his inference is instead *a posteriori* and "cosmological," à la Descartes's first proof of God in the *Meditations*, but if so, it is no less tenuous.)

37. And also Richard Norman, who seems to think that any self-consistent criterion must be viciously circular (*op. cit.*, p. 12).

38. See Chapter Eight note 38 for references (on p. 261).

NOTES TO CHAPTER TEN

1. Above, pp. 111-113.
2. Enz. §41z2. I have emended Miller's translation somewhat.
3. Enz. §42z3. I have very slightly emended Miller's translation.
4. G134.24-29/M142.13-15; Miller, tr.
5. G134.31-35/M142.18-23; I have slightly emended Miller's tr.
6. G62.2-3/D26/M57.1-2.
7. "Die Zeit ist der Begriff selbst, der da ist" (G429.7/M487.16-17); "As for time ... it is the extant concept itself" ("... so ist [die Zeit] der daseyende Begriff selbst") (G34.18-21/K68/M27.8-10).
8. *Timaeus* 37; emphasis added.
9. Hegel did not hold that all relations are essential. On the contrary, he held that there is a range of centrality or superficiality of relational properties. This has been well argued, against the objections to a relational ontology made by Moore and Russell, by Harold Kincaid in 'Hegel on External Relations and Partial Understanding' (*Idealistic Studies* [forthcoming]).
10. Enz. §74.
11. "Real ground is thus *connection to an other* ..." (WL II 105/SL 463). In the chapter titled "Ground," "ground" is treated as a "fundamental connection" [*Grundbeziehung*] between one thing and another. Also, appearances lack self-sufficiency because "they do not have the ground of their being in themselves, but rather in an other" (Enz. §45z). Due to this, any one appearance is connected to others (see note 18 below).
12. The relation between reality and ontological independence can be presented in two steps. Hegel says that "the finite is not the real, but rather the infinite [is the real]" (WL I 164/SL 149) and "this infinite, as ... its relation to itself, is being ..." (WL I 164/SL 148). Accordingly, the real, as infinite, self-related, and being, contrasts with the ideal as neither self-sufficient nor grounded in itself (see note 13), so that the real is grounded in itself, is self-sufficient, or, is ontologically independent.
13. That the ideal is ontologically dependent means that it is neither self-sufficient nor grounded in itself: "...these [things] are not self-sufficient, not grounded in themselves, but rather are posited by an other ... that is, [they are] ideal [*ideelle*]" (WL I 172/SL 155).
14. "[T]he ideal [*Ideelle*] is the finite ... [it is] not *self-sufficient* ... (WL I 165/SL 149-150). "... the characteristic determination of things that renders them *ipso facto* finite, is that they do not have the ground of their being in themselves" (Enz. §45z).
15. Enz. §45z.
16. WL I 172/SL 154.
17. Cf. Enz. §45z, WL I 173/SL 155-156.
18. "According to common sense the objects it knows count in their individuation as self-sufficient and self-supporting [*auf sich beruhend*] It must be maintained, on the contrary, that the objects

we immediately know are mere appearances, that is, that they have the ground of their being not in themselves but rather in an other" (Enz. §45z); "The true relation is in fact this, that the things we immediately know, are not only *for us*, but are *in themselves* mere appearances and that this, the characteristic determination of such finite things, is not to have the ground of their being in themselves" (*ibid.*). Furthermore, the things at issue in the sentence quoted in note 13 are "... things as they immediately present themselves, that is, in sensible individuality ..." (WL I 172/SL 155). Accordingly, sensible things are neither self-sufficient nor grounded in themselves, that is, they are "ideal" (*ibid.*). In "Force and Understanding," Hegel adduces laws of nature to undermine precisely this same "form of sensible self-sufficiency" of sensible particulars (G92.16-26/ M91.30-92.2).

19. Enz. §45z.

20. Hegel says that the explication of the concept of conceptual infinity, which he briefly discusses here, "belongs to science..." (G101.27/M102.13-14). "Science" at the time Hegel wrote this line meant all of the Hegelian philosophy following the *Phenomenology*, that is, the promised "second volume" in which Hegel would discuss logic and the philosophies of nature and of spirit. (See the author's advertisement for the *Phenomenology* [G447.4-6/K5].) Hegel's intention to treat this topic more fully in his sequel, although the intended sequel became several volumes, supports my interpreting Hegel's statements from the "Force and Understanding" chapter in light of his statements on the same topic in the two later *Logics*.

21. G98.10-16/M98.19-27.

22. WL I 21/SL 32-33; cf. Enz. §§119, 248z. As H. F. Fulda has pointed out, although Hegel describes this polarity as a "contradiction" ("... opposition within itself, or contradiction, must be thought" [G98.33/M99.6]), the Hegelian sense of "contradiction" does not deny the Aristotelian law of contradiction. See his essay, 'Hegels Dialektik als Begriffsbewegung und Darstellungsweise' (*op. cit.*), p. 152. See Chapter One note 60 (on pp. 219) for discussion.

23. "This realm of laws is indeed the truth of the understanding, which has, in the difference that is contained in the law, a *content* ..." (G91.31-32/ M91.4-5).

24. The content of a law of nature is a pair of opposed properties of things, considered in their connection (cf. G98.10-16/M98.19-27, quoted above on p. 143). Such unified differences are concepts, according to Hegel: "Both differences obtain, they are *in themselves*, they are *opposed in themselves*, that is, [they are] the opposition of themselves, they have their others in themselves and are only one unity. This simply infinity, of the absolute concept, is ... the soul of the world ..." (G99.26-31/M100.2-7). The Aristotelian roots of Hegel's sense of "soul" should be noted; Hegel uses the word "soul" here to designate the fundamental organizing principle of the world. Cf. the Hegelian sense of "speculative" (WL I 52, 168/SL 56, 152).

25. "[A] concept is on the one hand *the* concept in itself, and this is only *one* and is the substantial basis; on the other hand however, it is also a *determinate* concept, and this determinateness is what appears as the content [of the concept]; the determinateness of the concept is, however, a determinate form [*Formbestimmung*] of this substantial unity, a moment of form as totality, *of the concept itself*, which is the foundation of the determinate concepts" (WL I 29-30/SL 39; Hegel's emphases).

26. "The principles of older or newer philosophies ... are *thoughts*, [they are] universal, ideal [they are] not things as they are immediately found, that is, in sensuous individuality Insofar as the principle is called the universal [or] the *ideal*, it is all the more appropriate to call the concept, the idea, the spirit *ideal* and then conversely [to call] the individual sensible things *ideal*, as sublated, in the principle, in the concept, even more in spirit. Here again the same doublesidedness as was found in connection with the infinite should be noticed, namely that on the one hand the ideal is the

concrete, the truly extant [*Wahrhaftseinde*], on the other hand nevertheless its moments are ideal, [they] are sublated in the ideal; in fact, however, there is only the one concrete whole, from which the moments are inseparable" (WL I 172/SL 155; cf. WL I 178/SL 160). ("Ideal" translates "*Ideelle*" and its cognates throughout this passage.)

27. Enz. §236z.

28. I say "natural" world here because things in the social world are socially reconstituted natural stuffs, according to Hegel, and so depend partly on natural properties and partly on social practices for their characteristics.

29. Enz. §§23r, 24 & r & z, 25.

30. Enz. §19r; cf. §22z, WL I 27, 58/SL 37, 61. Allen Wood continues a long tradition of Hegel misinterpretation by taking Hegel's statement in Enz. §23, that "since the true nature [of the object] comes to light in reflection, and since this thinking is *my* activity, the true nature of the object is a *product of my spirit*," out of context and so attributes to Hegel a subjective idealism (*Marx* [*op. cit.*], pp. 185-186). This is a difficult statement to interpret, but Hegel several times in the immediately preceding and succeeding paragraphs insists on thoughts being objective structures in the world and he insists that the epistemological task is to reconcile this unimpeachable strand of realism with a complex and activist philosophy of mind (see Chapter Four §VI, p. 67). Wood simply ignores Hegel's remarks on these topics, and so continues to interpret Hegel's idealism mentalistically and subjectivistically in his chapter on Hegel's dialectic (*Marx* [*op. cit.*], pp. 189-194). It is, *pace* Wood, positively wrong to associate Hegel's idealism with Berkeley's. Wood comes closer to Hegel's view when he states that a "concept is at once a principle of rational intelligibility inhering in the actual world and the act of thought by which a knowing mind grasps this intelligibility" (*ibid.*, p. 194), but the reader must know that Wood's preceding discussion is wrong in order to be able to interpret this correct statement on his part in the correct way. I show below that Hegel does retain a sense in which we "produce" the objects of knowledge in the *Phenomenology*, but he states explicitly that this means that we conceptually reproduce the objects of knowledge (see Chapter Eleven, esp. p. 187). This doctrine opposes, rather than propounds, subjective idealism. The difficulties involved in interpreting the introductory material to the *Encyclopedia* have been deeply probed by Hans Friedrich Fulda in 'Vorbegriff und Begriff der Philosophie bei Hegel' (in: D. Henrich and R.-P. Horstmann, eds. *Hegels Logik der Philosophie: Religion und Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geistes* [Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984], pp. 13-34). I thank him for supplying me with a copy of his manuscript in connection with my grappling with these difficult passages.

31. WL I 172/SL 155.

32. One difficulty with Hegel's view is that he argues that causal properties are central to the identity of a thing, and that such properties are also to be understood in contrastive terms. Hegel's aim in so doing is to analyze how necessity could be a characteristic of the relations among things in the world, necessity—*causal necessity!*—being a matter of the mutual exclusion of contrasting properties. Understanding causal relations as a kind of contrastive relation is a very difficult project, and it is little surprise that Hegel fared poorly with it. For a very interesting discussion of this issue that makes plain Hegel's difficulties on this point, see Gerd Buchdahl, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Nature and the Structure of Science' (*Ratio* 15 No. 1 [1973]; rpt. in: M. Inwood, ed., *Hegel* [Oxford Readings in Philosophy; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985], pp. 110-136).

33. Hegel's adoption of realism has gone all but unnoticed in the literature. John Findlay once remarked that Hegel has a realist side, but his discussion is so vague as to be inconsequential ('Hegel der Realist' [*Hegel-Studien Beiheft* I {1964}, pp. 141-149]). In a very interesting article, sharply critical of Hegel, Karl Ameriks notes that on Hegel's view the world "would be distinct

from us and yet (in essence) wholly accessible to our mind" ('Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy' [*op. cit.*], p. 7). Ameriks then has trouble understanding what makes his view distinct from ordinary realism, "as Hegel surely takes it to be" (*ibid.*). Hegel's bone of contention is on the one hand with the ordinary *account* of epistemological realism and on the other hand with ontological atomism. M. Theunissen in effect points out Hegel's realism, but does not use this term as such ('Begriff und Realität' [*op. cit.*], pp. 351-352).

34. Hegel argues this point in "Force and Understanding" against one aspect of Kantian skepticism, and this is part of why he thinks the advent and reception of the concept of polarity is so important (WL I 21/SL 32-33, quoted above, p. 143). Hegel's point holds, if it holds at all, just as well against Putnam's recent use of the notion of things as powers to produce sensations in us, as well as against Putnam's Protagorean and Pyrrhonian predecessors. On Protagoras and Pyrrho, see Plato, *Theatetus* 182; Sextus Empiricus, *PH* I 87, II 72-73; and above, Chapter One notes 41 and 61 (on pp. 217, 220, respectively). Given the difficulties facing Hegel's holism, part of the challenge facing a sympathetic interpretation of Hegel is to see how much of his criticism of this sort of skepticism or subjectivism holds without appeal to his holism. This challenge cannot be taken up here.

35. Above Chapter Seven, pp. 105-106, 109-110.

36. It is in this way, I believe, that "the disclosure of the object rests on a self-disclosure of being" (M. Theunissen, 'Begriff und Realität' [*op. cit.*], p. 331).

37. Cf. 'Philosophische Enzyklopädie für die Oberklasse' (1808ff.) §§72-74 (*Texte zur Philosophischen Propädeutik* 1 [Werke Vol. IV, pp. 9-69], pp. 26-27), WL II 384-391/SL 689-695, Enz. §190.

38. "Analogy rightly stands in high regard in the empirical sciences, and very important results have been reached in this way. It is the instinct of reason that affords the suspicion that this or that empirically discovered characteristic is grounded in the inner nature or kind of object, and that proceeds further on this basis" (Enz. §190z). The German I've rendered as "affords the suspicion" is "*ahnen lassen*." This phrase is weaker than "anticipate," which Miller uses in his translation, though either rendering conveys Hegel's view that induction by itself does not generate knowledge. To grasp the sense of Hegel's phrase, consider the following comments by Ralph Farrell in his *Dictionary of German Synonyms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3^d ed., 1982): "*Ahnen lassen* may be used in the sense of 'to suggest as a sensuous experience, particularly in art, the existence of something not fully revealed'" (p. 335). "*Vermuten* requires to be distinguished from *ahnen*, which means to have an inkling and suggests that one regards the thing suspected as real or true, not, as with *vermuten*, only probably true" (p. 337 note 1). "*Ahnung*: inkling, presentiment. It suggests a glimpse, not a prolonged feeling" (p. 336).

39. Frederick Suppe, in his *Afterword* to *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (*op. cit.*), claims that "Hegel's dialectical attempts" to undo "Hume's pervasive skepticism" failed (pp. 718-719). Suppe does not make clear whether Hegel's "dialectical attempts" were directed at solving the problem of induction itself, or were a general attempt to undo skepticism. But it is very hard to construe Suppe's comments as other than implying that Hegel had attempted to solve the problem of induction. Hegel made no such quixotic effort to solve a problem that is in principle insoluble. What Hegel recognized is that Hume's problems required a reconsideration (*NB*: a reconsideration, not a weakening!) of what knowledge is. (On the insolubility of the problem of induction in principle, see Frederick Will, 'Justification and Induction' [*Philosophical Review* 68 (1959), pp. 359-372], pp. 360-363.)

40. I heard Larry Laudan use this argument in objecting to Ernan McMullin's 'A Case for Scientific Realism' when it was presented to the Western (now Central) Division of the American

Philosophical Association in Chicago (April, 1981). McMullin's ultimate response was to omit the criticized portion of his paper from the published version (in: J. Leplin, ed., *Scientific Realism* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984], pp. 8-40).

41. See Gerald Doppelt, 'Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism, An Interpretation and Defense' (*Inquiry* 21 [1978], pp. 33-86).

42. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 207.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

44. I say "radical" alteration on purpose. It's compatible with the notion that "sense determines reference" to have two different, though non-conflicting, descriptions of the same object (recall the morning star and the evening star). However, the notion that sense determines reference cannot allow that the referent be the same for two mutually incompatible descriptions. This is part of how Kuhn draws his radical conclusions out of the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics: the variables in the formulae for gravity in these two theories attribute incompatible properties to gravity.

45. This is a function of Hegel's holism about "meaning." The sense of any partial conception within a conceptual scheme is dependent upon its role within that scheme. Hence partial conceptions do not retain exactly the same meaning through changes in the schemes to which they belong.

46. See Keith Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' (*Philosophical Review* 75 No. 3 [1966], pp. 281-304), p. 199. His point against the notion that sense determines reference survives, even if his analysis of referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions does not. Saul Kripke's exhaustive criticism of descriptivist theories of reference is presented in his 'Naming and Necessity' (D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., *The Semantics of Natural Languages* [Synthese Library No. 40; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972], pp. 251-355, 736-769). Again, Kripke's criticisms of this view stand quite independently of his own positive views about reference and rigid designation.

47. Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982).

48. Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

49. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

50. The best discussions of Hegel's views on these matters are by Gerd Buchdahl. (See the Bibliography for references.) On a related point, G. W. Cunningham's interpretation of the relations between the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* and between the *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Nature* (*Thought and Reality in Hegel's System* [op. cit.], ch. 3) is helpful and largely correct.

51. The most famous and ambitious argument against realism based on the underdetermination of theory by observation is Putnam's original defense of "internal realism." Many objections have been raised against his position, most successfully (in my opinion) by Alvin Plantinga ('How to be an Anti-Realist' [*Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 56 No. 1 [1983], pp. 47-70]), David Lewis ('Putnam's Paradox' [*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62 No. 3 [1984], pp. 221-236]), and Ian Hacking (*Representing and Intervening* [op. cit.], ch. 7. A proper examination of Putnam's arguments lies beyond the scope of the present study. However, it is interesting to view Putnam's argument in light of Hegel's issues, and such a view may be sketched here. First, Putnam plainly relies on the subjectivist fallacy Hegel points out, namely, to infer ontological conclusions from epistemological premises. Second, Putnam shows not the slightest concern with the legitimacy of his second-level epistemological claims. I suspect that his "internal

realism" is self-referentially inconsistent for reasons similar to those I sketch in response to Robert Brandom [Chapter Eleven note 265, on p. 284]). Third, to my knowledge, no one has yet pointed out that Putnam's argument begs two crucial questions. First, Putnam avers that it is not a good idea to ground non-realist semantics on any level of determinate facts ('Realism and Reason' [in: *Meaning and the Moral Sciences* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 123-140], p. 128, cf. pp. 128, 136; 'Models and Reality' [Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 No. 3 (1980); pp. 464-482], pp. 478, 481; *Reason, Truth and History* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981], pp. 52-54). However, this is not only not a good idea: Putnam's non-realist semantics *depends* on there not being any determinate facts. If there were determinate facts, then there would also be the possibility of satisfying a genuine correspondence condition on the truth of sentences, for there would be something to which true statements could correspond. As Dummett has remarked, this is the real controversy between realists and non-realists: Is the world itself fully determinate? (*Truth and Other Enigmas* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978], p. xxix). According to Putnam, the answer is no. However, this thesis is a *presupposition* of Putnam's original arguments for internal realism. Second, Putnam's problem stems from a mistaken application of model-theoretic semantics to natural and scientific language. Putnam analyzes meaning in terms of use, and then analyzes use in terms of formally defined syntax ('Models and Reality,' pp. 481-482). This latter equation is both undefended and absurd. Not surprisingly, it generates problems very like those Ayer points out in Hempel's coherence theory of truth (see above, Chapter Four §VA, pp. 56-57). Putnam simply *presupposes* that model-theoretic semantics is the appropriate way to understand the connotation and denotation of ordinary and scientific language. What is surprising, indeed shocking, is that Putnam saw that his problem stems precisely from trying to analyze ordinary and scientific language with model-theoretic semantics (such, at least, is the implication of two of his remarks in 'Models and Reality' [pp. 466, 473]) but he didn't take this as reason to reject this approach to analyzing ordinary and scientific language!

NOTES TO CHAPTER ELEVEN

1. This view has been most prominently represented by Rudolf Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit* (Berlin: Gaertner, 1857), and Thomas Haering, *Hegel: Sein Wollen und Sein Werk* (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1929). The same view has been more recently defended by Otto Pöggeler in 'Zur Deutung der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*' (*Hegel-Studien* I [1961], pp. 255-294) and 'Die Komposition der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*' (rpt. in: H. F. Fulda and D. Henrich, eds., *Materialien zu Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes** [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973], pp. 329-390.). Robert Solomon has recently condemned the failure of the secondary literature to find a unitary conception of the whole *Phenomenology* (*In the Spirit of Hegel* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983], pp. 211-215), and claims to find it in Hegel's discovery that philosophy is an art (p. 225-226). However, Solomon gets to this impressionistic interpretation only by having previously distinguished "two Hegels," one an academic philosopher, one an historicist (*ibid.*, pp. 14-15). How reliance on *two* Hegels solves the problem of the unity of the *Phenomenology* is not explained.

2. G62.2-3/D26/M57.3. Werner Marx (*op cit.*, pp. 53f.) and Lauer (*op. cit.*, p. 40 note 35) have also noted that this passage casts doubt on the Haering-Haym thesis.

3. G61.31-34/D26/M56.30-33. This significant point was made by Frederick Beiser in his dissertation ('The Spirit of the *Phenomenology*: Hegel's Resurrection of Metaphysics in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*' [Wolfson College, Oxford: 1980], p. 54), along with many more against the Haering and Haym thesis (*ibid.*, pp. 53-59). Even Hegel's own remark in the *Encyclopaedia* that the material on spirit included in the *Phenomenology* could not have been treated properly in its own right in that context (§25) is balanced by his own statement in the same passage that "the stage of philosophical knowledge [achieved and the end of the *Phenomenology*] is the richest in material and organization, and therefore, as it came before us in the form of a result, it presupposed

the existence of the concrete formations of consciousness, such as individual and social morality, art, and religion" (Enz. §25). If the stage of "absolute knowledge" that closes the *Phenomenology* presupposes these other formations, then those other formations needed to be treated within the *Phenomenology*—though for the sake of their contribution to reaching the stage of absolute knowledge, and not for their own sake.

4. "The unification of the two sides has not yet been exhibited; it is this which closes the series of the formations of spirit ..." (G425.18-19/M483.1-3). The "two sides" are the experience of consciousness and the development of spirit. (Cf. G238.3-27/M263.21-8 and *Philosophische Propädeutik* 4, 'Bewußtseinslehre für die Mittelklasse' §4 [Werke IV, p. 112]).

5. The distortions of Kant's views enter early in the doctrines of post-Kantian idealists. Kant firmly denies that apperception involves knowledge, at least not knowledge of any objects or even of oneself as an object (CPR B407-410, 421-422). Fichte and Schelling try to convert pure apperception into the very kind of "intellectual intuition" Kant denies we have, an intuition that creates its objects in knowing them.

6. "What is missing in Schelling's philosophy is thus the fact that the point of indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, or the concept of reason, is absolutely presupposed, without any attempt being made to show that this is the truth" (VGP III p. 435/LHP III p. 525; Haldane and Simson, trs.).

7. VGP III p. 435/LHP III p. 526. I have slightly emended Haldane and Simson's translation.

8. Another part of what Hegel means by this expression concerns his broader "phenomenology of spirit," according to which the world develops in history. Part of the goal of this development is the production of human knowers who come to know the world as it is, so that the world comes to know what it is through them.

9. Most recently, this error has been made by Joseph Flay, *Hegel's Quest for Certainty* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), pp. 174-175. See his note 18 (*ibid.*, pp. 350-351) for references to others whose suit he follows in this regard. These interpreters fail to give due weight to the fact that Hegel rejects this "subject-object" terminology in the *Phenomenology*—with good reason, since it is so misleading!

10. This is to ignore for now Kant's view that this real world was only "empirically real" and "transcendentally ideal," and to pass over Hegel's rejection of Kant's transcendental idealism. On these points, see Chapter Three above. Kant explicitly labels the distinction between the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi* in a note to the Preface to the second *Critique* (*op. cit.*; p. 4 note, Ak V p. 4 note).

11. Please note that I use the word "intension" only to label a phenomenon, not to provide an analysis of it. In particular, this "intensional" component of awareness is not to be understood as being in a relation to an object, namely, a (Fregean or Carnapian) intension, nor is it merely a function of opaque contexts.

12. *Night Thoughts* (*op. cit.*), p. 53.

13. This thesis cannot be expressed in term logic because it expresses a relation between sentences, not terms.

14. Charles Taylor's essay, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man' (*Review of Metaphysics* 25 [1971], pp. 3-51), is largely an exposition of this Hegelian view.

15. See Chapter One above, pp. 8-9.

16. Thus Charles Taylor is largely right in claiming that Hegel uses transcendental arguments, but he has not recognized Hegel's account of the criteria with which such arguments are to be assessed. Indeed, he does not even identify the problem of the criterion to which Hegel is responding ('The Opening Arguments of the *Phenomenology*' [in: A. MacIntyre, ed., *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1976), pp. 151-187]).

17. In particular, I do not wish to deny the ethical, social, and political aims of his argument, nor do I wish to deny the possible parallels between his argument in the *Phenomenology* and his contemporaneous logic and metaphysics. (On this last point, see H. F. Fulda, 'Zur Logik der Phänomenologie von 1807' [H. F. Fulda and D. Henrich, eds., *Materialien zu Hegels »Phänomenologie des Geistes«* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 391-425] and J. Heinrichs [*op. cit.*].)

18. CPR A xvi-xvii.

19. G63.4-8/M1-6 (§90).

20. G63.18-20, 64.29-31, 65.24-25/M58.19-20, 59.40-60.2, 60.40.

21. G67.33-39, 68.22-33/M63.22-30 (§106), 64.18-33 (§108).

22. Hegel's argument in "Sense-Certainty" has often been mistaken for an argument against the possibility of knowledge of particulars—as if Hegel didn't start the next chapter talking about perceptual knowledge of a particular cube of salt! Among those who make this mistake is Ivan Soll, who, thinking that the target of Hegel's attack is reference to (and with that, knowledge of) particulars, notes that definite descriptions, comprising solely universal terms, may successfully pick out particulars (*Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics* [*op. cit.*], pp. 101, 103-104). Soll's point about definite descriptions is true, but beside the point: There is no use of definite descriptions without the use of universal conceptions, and the point of "sense-certainty" was to have knowledge without muddying things up with conceptions. "Sense-certainty" cannot, therefore, use descriptions either. For a detailed refutation of Soll's interpretation of "Sense-certainty," see Katharina Dulckheit, 'Can Hegel Refer to Particulars?' (*The Owl of Minerva* 17 No. 2 [1986], pp. 181-194). Helpful interpretations of "Sense-Certainty" are provided by Willem deVries, 'Hegel on Reference and Knowledge' (*Journal of the History of Philosophy* 26 No. 2 [1988], pp. 297-307), and of the whole "Consciousness" section by Charles Taylor, 'The Opening Arguments of the *Phenomenology*' (*op. cit.*).

Alston's defense of "immediate knowledge" involves defending the claim that beliefs can be justified without recourse to other beliefs. He does not argue, and does not believe, that there is a-conceptual intuitive knowledge of the kind Hegel rejects ('What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?' [*op. cit.*], p. 79). Alston recognizes the plausibility of contending that beliefs cannot be formed independently of other beliefs. For example, believing that $2+2=4$ is impossible in the absence of related beliefs about simple arithmetic (e.g., $1+1=2$); believing that ' x is P ' requires having beliefs about what P 's are; and having beliefs about conscious states may require having beliefs about how those states are manifest in observable behavior. He argues that these sorts of dependence do not, however, undermine the possibility of immediate knowledge because the kinds of dependence just mentioned concern the very existence of a belief, while his doctrine of immediate knowledge holds that the justificatory status of an extant belief is independent of other beliefs (*ibid.*, pp. 78-79). If some form of reliabilism is true, or if knowledge involves discriminating between distinct alternative possible states of affairs, then Alston's argument for the compatibility of his brand of immediate knowledge with the causal dependence of the existence of beliefs on other beliefs fails. If reliabilism is true, then the conditions of belief production are the conditions for belief justification, so that if beliefs are causally dependent on other beliefs for their existence, they are similarly dependent on other beliefs for their justificatory status. This is all the more obvious if knowledge is discriminative, a thesis Hegel certainly holds. (On discriminative aspects of perceptual

knowledge, see Alvin Goldman, 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,' *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 No. 20 [1976], pp. 771-791.)

Robert Audi argues that foundationalism doesn't require the "excess baggage" of indubitability, infallibility, or incorrigibility and defends a "psychological" foundationalism. ('Psychological Foundationalism,' *Monist* 61 [1978], pp. 592-610. His remark dismissing the "excess baggage" occurred during his Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association; Cincinnati, Ohio, April 29, 1988. The substance of his view, though not this remark, is published in "The Architecture of Reason" [*Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 62 No. 1 [1988] Supplement] and in *Belief, Justification, and Knowledge* [Belmont: Wadsworth, 1988].) He retains the term "foundationalism" to suggest the structure of empirical knowledge and to emphasize his opposition to coherentism. His analysis of empirical knowledge is interesting and persuasive, but I find his retention of the term "foundationalism" infelicitous. Foundationalism standardly is internalist; and though Audi does not identify justification with externalist causal factors, the justificatory efficacy of Audi's foundational psychological episodes does depend on externalist factors. Thus Audi is no less opposed to traditional foundationalism than he is to coherentism. Labeling his view "foundationalism" obscures this fundamental shift away from the paradigm foundationalist theories of knowledge in the Modern and contemporary periods. One of the alleged exclusive dichotomies Hegel opposes is that between 'foundationalism' and 'coherentism.' There are other options besides these, including a variety of externalist views. Alston's locution, "an internalist externalism," though less elegant, is far more perspicacious.

Contemporary foundationalists, including Audi, typically grant that the "foundations" of knowledge may be revised in a variety of ways. Earlier foundations may "drop out," due to *e.g.* lapses or fading of memory, or their relevance to various other beliefs may be reassessed so that they come to play a different role in justifying mediately justified beliefs, or perhaps no role at all. Additionally, contemporary foundationalists grant that foundations may be rejected in the light of other, newer foundations or in light of reconsidering the inferential relations among a set of foundations or other beliefs. This last concession to history and to coherentism disguises a difficulty which has not yet been fairly stated, much less addressed, by contemporary foundationalists. The justificatory properties of sensory foundations must be at least in part a function of their *de facto* reliability; rejecting a putative sensory foundation in view of other sensory experience or other indirect evidence implies that that sensory foundation was not reliable after all. What seemed to have been a sensory foundation is considered not to have been or to be a sensory foundation after all. Such revision of putative sensory foundations may affect any sensory foundation. It involves the same distinction which plagued both Descartes and his Stoic predecessors, the distinction between a sensory state's *being* reliable (and hence a genuine foundation) and its *seeming* to be reliable. Neither the Stoics, nor Descartes, nor contemporary foundationalists have resolved how to distinguish these two crucially different epistemic statuses. (On Descartes, see Chapter Three §IVC [pp. 32-33]; on the Stoics, see Chapter Three note 51 [pp. 218-219].) Such discrimination may involve unconscious processes of various kinds, so that we may not need the ability to articulate such discriminative processes in order to perform them in many cases of unself-consciously adopted experiential beliefs. But foundationalists need to articulate them in order to account for what justification is in cases of such unself-consciously adopted experiential beliefs, and even more so for self-consciously adopted beliefs, where these revisions are more overtly self-conscious. I, for one, will be surprised if the resulting analysis can involve "foundations" at all; *externalist* factors, sensory experience, psychological states yes; foundations, no. In any event, until such analysis is provided, the metaphor of "foundations" is little more than a promise of a hope.

23. G71.29-31/M67.34-36

24. More specifically, Locke's account of our simple idea of unity (that it's suggested by each thing we perceive) is inconsistent with his claim that things are unitary, although distinct ideas of each of a thing's perceptible qualities reach us through distinct sense modalities (*cf. Essay [op. cit.]*, Bk. II Ch. 2 §1; Ch. 7 §§1, 7).

25. *Treatise* (*op. cit.*), p. 200. See Robert Paul Wolff, 'Hume's Theory of Mental Activity' (in: V. C. Chappell, ed., *Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays* [Garden City, N.Y.: Double Day Anchor, 1966], pp. 99-128), pp. 120-125.

26. This is the significance of the development of "perceptual understanding" (G80.8, 18/M77.34-5, 78.8-9).

27. G79.18-23, 27-35/M77.1-6, 11-9.

28. G80.34-81.8/M78.33-79.3.

29. This "phenomenological" or "abstractive" account of scientific laws must be distinguished both from instrumentalism and from phenomenalism. Instrumentalism admits "theoretical entities" into formulations of laws of nature, but regards them as calculative fictions. Phenomenalism may lead quickly to a descriptive, phenomenological account of scientific laws, but it is not required by such an account of laws. (These two doctrines tend to be conflated in discussions of Mach.) Ernst Cassirer quotes the Newtonian John Keill defending an entirely descriptive account of natural laws in his *Introductio ad veram Physicam* (Leyden: 1725; p. 15) (quoted in: *Das Erkenntnisproblem* [Hildesheim and New York: G. Olms, 1971], Vol. II, pp. 404-405). On Black's heat theory, see Duane Roller, 'The Early Development of the Concepts of Temperature and Heat' §2 (J. B. Conant, ed., *Harvard Case Studies in Experimental Science* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957], Vol. 1, pp. 119-214), pp. 125-155. The Scottish physicist and engineer W. J. Macquorn Rankine gives an especially succinct statement of the "abstractive" or phenomenological position in the first six sections of his 'Outlines of the Science of Energetics' (*Proceedings of the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow* 3 No. 6 [1855], pp. 381-399), pp. 381-385 (rpt. in W. J. M. Rankine, *Miscellaneous Scientific Papers* [London: Griffin, 1881], pp. 209-228; pp. 209-213). The German physicist Gustav Kirchhoff espouses this descriptive ideal in his *Vorlesungen über mathematische Physik* (2nd ed.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1877), p. 1. I thank Val Dusek for help with these references.

30. Cf. Enz. §42z3; quoted above, p. 141 (first quote on page).

31. For a discussion of the epistemological significance of Hegel's ontology, adumbrated in "Force and Understanding," and on the social dimensions of Hegel's view of thought, which is developed in the remainder of the *Phenomenology*, see Willem deVries, 'Hegel on Representation and Thought' (*op. cit.*). On Hegel's ontology and philosophy of nature, in connection with both "Force and Understanding" and "Observing Reason," see Gerd Buchdahl, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' (*British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 23 [1972], pp. 257-290), 'Hegel's Philosophy of Nature and the Structure of Science' (*op. cit.*), and 'Conceptual Analysis and Scientific Theory in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature (with Special Reference to Hegel's Optics)' (in: R. S. Cohen and M. Wartofsky, eds., *Hegel and the Sciences* [Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science; Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984], pp. 13-36). To correct the myth that Hegel argued that necessarily there were seven planets, see Bernard Beaumont, 'Hegel and the Seven Planets' (*Mind* 62 [1954], pp. 246-248).

32. G95.4-39/M94.32-95.34.

33. Hegel states: "Self-consciousness has at first become *for itself*, not yet *as a unity* with consciousness in general" (G102.6-7/M102.35-37). This is his way of claiming the point he is about to argue, that self-consciousness presupposes the awareness of independently existing objects. Such awareness is what Hegel calls "consciousness." He indicates that his next topic is the analysis of self-consciousness in the following terms: "[T]he knowledge of that which consciousness knows in knowing itself, requires further considerations, the exposition of which is contained in the following" (G102.28-30/M103.27-29).

34. "But in fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the sensed and perceived world, and is essentially the return from *other-being*" (G104.7-10/M105.12-14).

35. G104.12-13, 17-23/M105.18-19, 24-29.

36. Robert Brandom brought this point to my attention. He is not, of course, responsible for how I develop the matter here.

37. G107.33-108.6/M109.23-40 (§175).

38. G107.38-9/M109.31-32.

39. G108.1-2/M109.34-35.

40. G108.7-8/M109.40-110.1.

41. G112.5, 21-22/M114.22-23, 115.4-5.

42. G108.29-31, 34-39/M110.26-28, 31-38.

43. See 'Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes: Vorlesungsmanuskripte zur Realphilosophie' 1805/06 (GW vol. 8), pp. 215.19-223.9 (*Hegel and the Human Spirit*, L. Rauch, tr. [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983], pp. 112-119); the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' from the Summer Term of 1825 §§352-359 (*Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*; M. J. Petry, ed. and tr. [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978]; pp. 328-347); Enz. §§430-437. Frederick Beiser interprets Hegel's argument in "Lord and Bondsman" in light of these other texts in chapter 5 of his dissertation (*op. cit.*), "'Herrschaft und Knechtschaft" Revisited: Hegel's Argument Against Solipsism'. I have learned much from his discussion of this section and its relation to Hegel's predecessors.

44. G110.35-111.3/M113.4-10.

45. G113.10-13/M115.38-39.

46. G115.3-11/M118.10-20.

47. G115.14-19/M118.24-32.

48. G116.3-5/M119.24-25. For a brief but helpful discussion of "Lord and Bondsman" and the "Freedom of Self-Consciousness" see Judith Shklar, *Freedom and Independence: A Study of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), ch. 2, "Independence and Dependence," pp. 57-73.

49. G116.30-117.12/M120.15-37.

50. G117.12-5/M120.37-40.

51. G117.19-23/M121.6-11.

52. G117.27-31/M121.16-19.

53. G118.22-24/M122.18-20.

54. G119.5-8/M123.4-8.

55. G119.12-16/M123.15-18.

56. G119.37-120.13/M124.5-25.

57. G119.22-25/M123.26-30.

58. G119.22-25/M124.20-27. Hegel retains this point from the early *Skepticism* essay (*op. cit.*), pp. 215.26-31, 220.8-27.

59. See Chapter One, p. 15.

60. G120.25-121.22/M124.39-126.5.

61. This difficulty ultimately escapes Michael Williams's notice ('Scepticism without Theory' [*op. cit.*], p. 582). This is not a problem with his account, but rather with Pyrrhonian skepticism, for it introduces a fundamental instability into the basic technique for achieving an allegedly calm life.

62. G121.23-39/M126.6-25 (§206).

63. G122.12-23/M126.40-127.15; cf. G125.18-21/M131.1-4. As Henry Harris notes, "Hegel consistently anticipates Feuerbach in his interpretation of all 'otherworldly' conceptions of the divine as reflections of physical need ..." (*Towards the Sunlight* [*op. cit.*], p. 399 note 1). As I indicate

below, in the *Phenomenology* Hegel holds that the basis of these needs is broader than physical need and is to a large extent legitimate. However, the legitimate answer to these needs, on Hegel's view, is not to be found in theism, but rather in the present natural, social, and historical world.

64. G122.31-123.4/M127.25-39 (§209). As Flay notes, Hegel's analysis of unhappy consciousness parallels Augustine's *Confessions* very faithfully (*Hegel's Quest for Certainty* [op. cit.], p. 103).

65. G125.12/M130.33.

66. There are, of course, Kantian roots to Hegel's distinction between "pure thought" and "pure consciousness." However, Hegel here works with one broad dichotomy, whereas Kant develops a family of distinctions between, e.g., general and special logic (A52=B76), pure and applied general logic (A52=B77), general and transcendental logic (A55-56=B79-80), and formal and real uses of reason (A299=B355). None of Kant's distinctions quite map onto the one basic distinction Hegel wishes to discuss here, a broad distinction between an alleged *a priori* but non-formal use of conceptions and a non-formal use of conceptions in application to experienced objects, though they each bear some relation to it.

67. G125.12-14/M130.34-35.

68. G125.14-15/M130.36.

69. G133.14-26/M140.25-141.2. (I have emended Miller's tr.)

70. G134.31-35/M142.18-22.

71. G135.15-18/M143.3-6.

72. Hegel's use of the word "transparent" (*durchsichtig*) here is striking in view of recent discussions of psychological or "opaque" contexts in which what is believed or asserted is mistaken. I see no reason not to interpret Hegel's phrase as the denial of such opacity in cases of knowledge.

73. "The category ... is this, that self-consciousness and being are *the same* essence; *the same*, not through comparison, but in and for themselves. Only the one-sided, bad idealism lets this unity again come forth as consciousness on one side, opposed by an *in-itself* on the other" (G134.24-29/M142.13-18). For all of Fichte's attempts to make the transcendental ego an absolutely self-positing entity, he found it necessary to shock the transcendental ego into activity with an "absolute impact" (*absoluter Anstoß*).

74. G134.20/M142.27-29. Hegel complains bitterly against Kant's failure to demonstrate the necessity of the categorial structure of thought (G135.12-14/M142.36-143.2).

75. "The category, which is the *immediate* unity of being and [cognitive] apprehension, must run through both forms, and observing reason is just this, for the category presents itself to observing reason in the form of being" (G191.6-9/M208.40-209.3).

76. Cf. G238.14-16/M263.1-17; *Texte zur Philosophischen Propädeutik* 4., 'Bewußtseinslehre für die Mittelklasse' §2 (*Werke* IV, p. 111).

77. Hegel makes this claim in the following terms later in the *Phenomenology*: "Spirit, being the substance and the universal, self-identical, and abiding essence, is the unmoved solid *ground* and *starting-point* for the action of all, and it is their purpose and goal, the *in-itself* of every self-consciousness expressed in thought. This substance is equally the universal *work* produced by the action of all and each as their unity and identity, for it is the *being-for-self*, the self, action" (G239.2-7/M264.3-9; Miller's tr.). See below, pp. 169-170, 171-172, 176.

78. G133.9/M140.18.

79. G133.28-33/M141.5-11.

80. G133.34-134.9/M141.15-30. 81. See above, p. 11.
82. G134.9-12/M141.30-34. 83. G134.24-30/M142.9-18.
84. G134.31-35/M142.18-22; quoted above, p. 165 (first quotation on page).
85. G134.35-135.3/M142.23-29. 86. G134.35-135.9/M142.23-36.
87. G135.15-36/M143.3-29. 88. G135.15-18/M143.3-6; quoted above, p. 165.
89. G135.33-36/M143.27-29. 90. G135.36-136.13/M143.29-144.11.
91. G136.15-19/M144.16-20.
92. Hegel explicitly mentions the "unity of apperception" (G136.36/M144.40).
93. G136.22/M144.23.
94. G137.8-17/M145.14-25 (§239). This second point states the philosophical import of reason's "searching to find itself" in reality; this gives the contra-positive claim attacked by Hegel's indirect proof.
95. G137.13/M145.20. 96. G137.20-32/M145.29-146.4 (§240).
97. G137.25-26/M145.35-37. 98. G137.26-9/M145.38-40.
99. G137.33-138.13/M146.5-21 (§241).
100. G138.17-19/M146.29-32; cf. G138.30-34/M147.5-10. Recall that "consciousness," in Hegel's parlance, means consciousness of independently existing objects.
101. G138.20-22/M146.32-36. 102. G138.31-33/M147.6-9.
103. G139.12-140.18/M147.31-148.39. 104. G140.18-22/M148.39-149.2.
105. G140.22-24/M149.3-5.
106. G140.28-31/M149.11-14. I have slightly emended Miller's translation.
107. G141.8/M149.36-37. 108. G141.34-142.4/M150.29-39.
109. G142.14-15/M151.11-13.
110. G142.18-23, 143.25-26/M151.20-23, 152.30-32; cf. G143.21-25/M152.24-30.
111. G144.18-20/M153.31-34. 112. G144.20-145.3/M153.32-154.24.
113. Hegel's biology is pre-Darwinian, though he'd be pleased by Darwinian explanations. He also argues at length for his own view of proper biological explanation (G147.37-166.35/M157.40-180.3). This discussion is irrelevant to the main purposes of the *Phenomenology*.
114. G168.33-169.14/M182.6-30 (§302).

115. G168.34-169.1, 169.38-39, 170.8/M182.7-12; 183.19-20, 30-31.

116. G169.2-3/M182.15-16.

117. "Therefore, *what* is to have an influence on the individuality, and what *kind* of influence it is to have ... depend solely on the individuality itself ..." (G170.12-14/M183.35-38; Miller's tr.).

118. G170.18-21/M184.4-8; cf. G170.32-171.15/M184.25-185.14 (§§307-308). Although Hegel does not mention it, this thesis is also compatible with the existence of various biological determinants of behavior, though to my knowledge he never considers the thesis that biological factors may completely determine the individual's responses to the environment. (He does argue against Kant's view of psychological determinism, but in a way that doesn't address this issue.) Notice, too, that this issue is not one to be settled, and so not one to be addressed, by "Observing Reason." There is no need for Hegel to consider it here. H. B. Acton gives some of the historical particulars of contemporary psychological theory in 'Hegel's Conception of the Study of Human Nature' (M. Inwood, ed., *Hegel [op. cit.]*, pp. 137-152), §1.

119. G189.11-190.30/M206.34-208.26 (§§341-343).

120. "Spirit in itself alone is the necessity of this relation" (G190.1-2/M207.30-31).

121. G190.11-15/M208.3-8. See Alasdair MacIntyre's helpful discussion of this section, 'Hegel on Faces and Skulls' (*Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays [op. cit.]*, pp. 219-236).

122. G190.15-17/M208.9-11.

123. G190.31-33/M208.27-29.

124. G190.33-191.2/M208.29-35.

125. G191.2-6/M208.36-40.

126. This, I believe, is at least one point of Hegel's oblique remarks at G191.14-24/M209.9-22. Hegel states this claim directly in later passages. See below, p. 171-172, 174-175, 184-185, note 286 (on p. 285).

127. On "Self-Alienated Spirit" and "Spirit Certain of Itself," see Shklar (*op. cit.*), ch. 3, "The Moral Failures of Asocial Men."

128. G193.20/M211.21.

129. G193.22-24/M211.23-25.

130. G193.5-6, 11-13/M211.2-3, 10-11.

131. G193.24-29/M211.25-31.

132. G193.29-34/M211.31-212.5.

133. G194.5-6/M212.13.

134. G194.17-29/M212.28-213.4 (§350).

135. G194.32/M213.7-8. To elaborate a bit, sustenance (range of diet and supply of food) is socially conditioned (to say nothing of the Roman vomitorium); elimination is socially conditioned (think of the alternatives to porcelain toilets); death is recognized and responded to in a wide variety of socially conditioned ways; and procreation is famously conditioned by social practices.

136. G194.34-36/M213.10-13.

137. G195.1-3/M213.15-18.

138. G195.35/M214.16.

139. G196.8-22/M214.27-215.5 (§355).

140. G196.26-197.5/M215.10-30.

141. G197 5-9/M215.30-35.

142. G197.14-16/M216.3-5.

143. G197.18-20/M216.7-10. Hegel concludes with a significant remark about the illustrative character of his examples of forms of consciousness. He states: "Since these moments cannot yet have the significance of being made into ends opposed to the lost ethical order, they count here, of course, according to their unaltered content, and the goal towards which they strive is the ethical substance. But since in our times that form of these moments is more familiar in which they appear after consciousness has lost its ethical life and, searching for it, repeats those forms, they may be represented more in terms of this sort" (G197.24-30/M216.16-24; Miller's tr.). At this stage of Hegel's argument, "ethical substance"—the social grounds of individual activity—has yet to play an explicit role. Hence individual ends cannot be individual *as opposed to collective* ends at this stage of the argument. Hegel claims that more familiar modern forms of individual agency, which in fact do display this opposition, can be taken as illustrations of his points because they repeat the same basic dialectic. This passage emphasizes Hegel's freedom of choice, especially his freedom from chronological order, in selecting illustrations of the forms of consciousness he analyzes.

144. G198.27-31/M217.30-35.

145. G198.19-26/M217.21-28.

146. G199.24/M218.20.

147. G201.21-27/M220.33-40.

148. Hegel offers a much stronger argument for the same conclusion in the *Philosophy of Right*. There he argues that the only needs humans plausibly have by nature are quite general ones for food, safety, shelter, warmth, sex, companionship, and the like. These needs are too general to specify the particular ends of human action; humans always act to obtain particular objects or persons to satisfy these needs, and they conceive their actions in terms of specific ends. However, the specificity of these ends of human action is determined by those objects and persons made available by one's society, and one acts towards those ends in accordance with those practices established in one's society. In this way, then, one's society plays a fundamental role in determining one's character and sense of oneself, since these are a function of one's particular ways and ends of acting.

149. One question about this transition is why Hegel moves from particular pleasures to alleged universal imperatives in this way, rather than first considering intermediate forms of universality, such as individual long-term utility. Hegel considers this rejoinder in the *Philosophy of Right*.

150. G202.11/M221.22-23.

151. G202.19-23/M221.34-39.

152. G203.23-27/M223.2-8.

153. G203.28-204.11/M223.9-40 (§372).

154. G204.12-30/M224.1-23 (§373).

155. G204.31-205.10/M224.24-225.5 (§374); cf. G206.33-207.11/M227.1-21 (§378).

156. G205.11-206.4/M225.6-226.5 (§§375-376). 157. G207.12-27/M227.22-228.2 (§379).

158. G208.3-10/M228.22-31. The phrase "knight of virtue" appears later (G210.25/M231.21).

159. G208.10-16/M228.31-39.

160. G208.22-28, 209.16-19/M229.7-15, 230.5-9.

161. G212.4-6, 212.24-213.11/M233.16-19; 234.1-35.

162. G213.12-32, 214.1-5/M234.36-235.20, 235.32-38.

163. G213.30-34/M235.20-25. This claim is crucial for Hegel's social philosophy, for this is the key to melding classical economic theory into his socially based ethics. Hegel devoted much attention to this point both before and after writing the *Phenomenology*. It receives its most systematic exposition in the *Philosophy of Right*. For a helpful discussion, see Raymond Plant, 'Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philosophy' (in: D. Verene, ed., *Hegel's Social and Political Thought* [Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980], pp. 59-90).

164. G214.9-20 ff./M236.1-15 ff. (§§394-396). Hegel expresses this in terms of this form of consciousness having "the category" for its object. "The category," recall, is what self-conscious thinkers and spatio-temporal objects have in common.

165. G216.4-5/M237.30-31.

166. G216.15-18, 31-33/M238.4-7, 23-25.

167. G221.23-39/M244.3-24 (§406). Hegel does not use the term "ideal" in presenting the demise of romantic agency, but the points he makes about its demise are precisely those characteristic of his special sense of "ideal."

168. G227.20-228.17/M251.17-252.25 (§418).

169. G342.1-2, 9-10/M384.39-40, 385.9-10.

170. G235.19-37/M260.32-261.17 (§436).

171. G239.15-23/H264.19-29. (I have emended Miller's tr.) Haering claims that Hegel's original plan called for a book running only through the "Reason" section, so that the "Spirit" section commences the promised "system of science" and steps beyond the project outlined in the Introduction. He also finds the discussion of natural science in "Observing Reason" to be a weird replacement for Hegel's earlier *Naturphilosophie* (*Hegel: Sein Wollen und sein Werk* [op. cit.], Vol. II, pp. 481-486). However, Hegel explicitly states that the aspects treated prior to the major section on "Spirit" are only aspects of spirit and can only exist as such. Hegel also states that the major section "Spirit" treats only "immediate spirit" (see below, note 173). The "certainty" of immediate spirit does not yet equal its "truth," so more dialectical development is necessary. Hegel also explicitly states in the Preface (G30.5-12/K68/M21.40-22.9) and in his advertisement for the *Phenomenology* (op. cit.) that "speculative philosophy," or the "system of science," is a separate undertaking forthcoming in a second volume. The discussion of natural science in the *Phenomenology* is not a replacement for his earlier *Naturphilosophie*, and the discussion of spirit in the *Phenomenology* is neither a system, nor even a discussion, of "absolute spirit." Instead, these sections concern our abilities as cognizant subjects and a social account of those abilities; the spirit discussed in the *Phenomenology* is *objective* spirit—human collective life—up until the chapter on religion, where the phenomenon of human collective life is put into an historical and teleological context. Only then is the topic of absolute spirit broached. (See below, pp. 183-184.)

172. G240.5-7/M265.15-18; cf. G365.18-28, 33-35; 366.10-13; 367.20-21/M412.35-413.6; 413.13-15, 30-35; 415.8-9.

173. G240.1-4/M265.11-15. Hegel reiterates this important qualifier when he reviews the section on "Spirit" at the beginning of the section on "Religion" (G365.23/M413.1). See below, p. 184.

174. See below, pp. 184-185.

175. On "True Spirit" and "Self-Alienated Spirit" see Judith Shklar (op. cit.), chs. 2, pp. 74-95, and 4, "The Life Cycle of a Culture."

176. See note 173.

177. Part of the shift from the last subsection of "Reason" (§C "Individuality That is Itself Real In and For Itself") to "Spirit" is reflected in a terminological shift from something's being "real" to it's being "actual," a frequent term in Hegel's discussion of spirit and action. Something's being "real in and for itself," in Hegel's metaphysical parlance, would connote its being what it is independently of anything else and it's not needing any process of development. In contrast, Hegel's discussion of action in "Spirit" plays heavily on the medieval sense of "actual" (as contrasted with potential) and something's being "real in act." Hegel's oblique suggestion is that human nature and self-consciousness is act-ualized in action, and that the social practices that make action possible are also act-ualized in action. Miller obliterates this point by repeatedly and incorrectly translating "*Wirklichkeit*" (actuality) and its derivatives as "reality" and its derivatives. Fortunately, he only very rarely translates "*Realität*" as "actuality." Thus the occurrence of "actuality" in his translation almost always indicates a cognate of "*Wirklichkeit*." For a discussion of the weakness of the English translations of the *Phenomenology*, see Howard Kainz, 'Some Problems with the English Translations of Hegel's »Phänomenologie des Geistes«' (*Hegel-Studien* 21 [1986], pp. 175-182).

178. G238.3-7/M263.1-6.

179. G238.16-17/M263.16-17.

180. G238.17-23/M263.18-24.

181. G239.11-14/M264.3-18.

182. On Hegel's social ontology, see Richard DeGeorge, 'Social Reality and Social Relations' (*Review of Metaphysics* 37 [1983], pp. 3-20). DeGeorge sets out Hegel's view without once mentioning Hegel.

183. G242.3-17/M267.18-34 (§447). The term Miller translates as "nation" is "*Volk*"—people or (in this context) tribe, "nation" in the sense of the 'Cherokee Nation.'

184. G251.9-10/M279.2-3; cf. G376.23-25, 31-33/M425.13-15, 25-27.

185. G252.15-254.36/M280.10-283.10 (§§466-468).

186. Oedipus, who in ignorance slays his father and marries his mother, still identifies himself with his community and is destroyed by fate and his recognition of his error. The violated order destroys the violator (G255.1-256.14/M283.11-284.37 [§§469-471]).

187. This conflict of duties arose from the conflicting claims of the two brothers who were heirs-apparent to the throne. Polyneices and Eteocles kill each other in their battle over their inherited rights to the Athenian throne. Creon succeeds to power, orders a proper burial for the deceased king Eteocles, and denies burial to Polyneices, who attacked the city.

188. G256.15-258.18/M284.38-287.21 (§§472-474). See Patricia Mills's excellent critical discussion of this subsection, 'Hegel's Antigone' (*The Owl of Minerva* 17 No. 2 [1986], pp. 131-152). Curiously, had Hegel taken into account those aspects of the play that Mills critically points out, he could have strengthened his presentation and resolution of the conflict between civil and natural law.

189. G258.19-260.6/M287.22-289.20 (§475).

190. G259.15-19/M288.26-29. Hegel inexplicably blames these tendencies on "womankind" (G259.3/M288.9). (For the explanation, see Mills [*op. cit.*].)

191. G260.7-9/M289.21-24.

192. G260.23/M289.40.

193. G260.26-29, 261.12-15/M290.1-5, 24-28.

194. G260.29/M290.5.

195. G261.12-13/M290.24-25. 196. G263.36-264.3/M293.37-294.2.
197. G263.32-37/M293.32-37.
198. G263.18-26, 31-32; 263.37-264.6/M293.12-23, 30-32, 37-39; 294.1-5.
199. G272.7-8/M303.29-30.
200. G270.21-35, 272.10-15, 26-29/M301.30-302.9, 303.34-40, 304.14-18.
201. Hegel remarks that the "state power" he discusses is not government (G275.13-14/M307.24), and he shortly thereafter states the requirement of a genuine resolution to the problem of alienation: "What consciousness lacks is the *actual* transference to it of state power, not merely in the form of *honor*, and what is lacking in state power is that it should be obeyed, not merely as the so-called 'general good,' but as will, or that it be the self who decides" (G277.26-29/M310.16-20; Miller, tr.). This is a very frank assertion of republicanism, especially for an alleged totalitarian—republicanism, because every individual faces the problem of alienation Hegel sketches, and Hegel knows this. This republicanism is not merely an aside; it is required to solve the problem of alienation enunciated at the beginning of this section on culture. That problem was that individuals couldn't recognize themselves in the very social environment they produce and sustain. Since they are selves, agents, solving this problem requires incorporating their agency into the exercise of state power. Hegel may not yet have worked out how to do this, but his aim is plain as day. This is one crucial political idea that escapes Shklar's analysis.
202. G277.14-278.25/M310.28-312.35 (¶¶511-513).
203. G282.32-37, 283.17-20/M316.26-32, 317.15-19.
204. G283.20-32/M317.19-35. 205. G289.21-23/M324.29-31.
206. G287.35-37/M322.33-36. 207. G288.5-8, 289.30-31/M323.6-9, 325.1-2.
208. G289.38-290.10/M325.11-25.
209. G288.34, 288.36-289.1/M324.1, 3-5. Concerning pure insight's lack of content, recall the Encyclopedists' repudiation of innate ideas and their claim that all mental content is derived from experience. See A. M. Wilson, 'Encyclopédie' (Paul Edwards, ed.-in-chief, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [New York: Collier MacMillan, 1967], Vol. 2, pp. 505-508), and Crane Brinton, 'Enlightenment' (*ibid.*, pp. 519-525) for brief backgrounds on this period and these issues.
210. G288.9-21/M323.10-25. 211. G288.31-32, 289.15-20/M323.37, 324.22-28.
212. G291.6-11/M326.31-37. 213. G291.12-16/M326.38-327.5.
214. G291.18-19/M327.7-8. 215. G291.21-23/M327.11-13.
216. G291.23-37/M327.13-31. 217. G292.8-10/M328.3-5.
218. G292.27-293.20/M328.26-329.19. 219. G293.24-27/M329.22-25
220. "[F]or [pure insight] is born of the substance [and] it knows the pure *self* of consciousness as absolute and takes it up with the pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all actuality" (G293.27-29/M329.25-28). The following statement may appear to contradict the main thesis

defended in this book: "In *insight* as such consciousness so grasps an object that it becomes to consciousness the essence of consciousness or an object which it penetrates, in which consciousness preserves itself, in which consciousness remains by itself and present to itself, and in that consciousness is thus [the object's] movement, it produces the object" (G297.22-28/M334.7-12). This statement is puzzling, but less so if one notices that Hegel describes how insight alters the being of an object *to* consciousness. "Grasping" an object presupposes an antecedently extant object to grasp; the subsequent remarks concern the intellectual appropriation of an object. Though I'd be happier if Hegel had explicitly called this "production" of an object its intellectual reproduction, this production nevertheless concerns the production of the object's *relation to consciousness*. (I would also be happier if Hegel had put this in the accusative, rather than the dative, case.) This issue will be discussed at greater length below when it arises again in Hegel's chapter on "Absolute Knowledge," where he in fact speaks of the conceptual *reproduction* of objects. See below, p. 187.

221. G297.20-298.24/M334.4-335.18 (§549). 222. G306.28-308.6/M344.26-346.13 (§§565-566).

223. G310.22-311.6/M349.5-34 (§573). 224. G294.4-296.15/M329.40-332.31 (§§542-545).

225. G302.29-304.22/M340.6-343.3 (§§557-560).

226. Notice Hegel's insistence on the epistemological realism of the Enlightenment (G303.29-37/M341.8-18).

227. G304.24-25/M342.9.

228. G305.5-7/M342.27-29.

229. G311.16-19/M350.7-11. It is worthwhile, perhaps, to point out that when Hegel argues that Enlightenment deism and Enlightenment materialism are in fact the same view, he does not argue for subjective idealism. His argument turns on showing that neither camp understands its main category, viz., the *être suprême* and *matter*. Each of these conceptions are pure abstractions, with opposite starting points but the identical result. Hegel states that these two Enlightenment camps "... have not arrived at the thought that *being*, *pure being*, is not concretely actual, but rather is a *pure abstraction*, and conversely that pure thought, self-identity or essence, in part is the *negative* of self-consciousness and hence *being*, [and] in part as immediate simplicity is nothing other than *being*; *thought* is *thinghood*, or *thinghood* is *thought*" (G313.26-31/M352.34-40). It is important to note that, while Hegel does not distinguish here between an identical content and a distinct form (as he does when discussing thoughts about extant objects), he is not discussing extant objects *at all*. His argument concerns *thinghood*, not *things*. He argues that "pure being" is not an extant object, and indeed, isn't extant at all. What there is are specific concrete things; "pure being" is an abstraction from extant things. As such, "pure being" is a conception, and is produced by thinking. Similarly, deism's "pure thought" is undifferentiated, whereas contentful thought involves distinctions (G314.1-4/M353.10-14). As undifferentiated, the deistic conception of the *être suprême* is intensionally and extensionally identical to the conception of "pure being." As the mere opposite of self-consciousness, as an (intentional) object of thought, this conception is also the same as "being." Nevertheless, each of these conceptions suggests one thing the other disguises. The deistic conception of the *être suprême* disguises the element of being present, which the conception of "pure being" suggests (G313.13-14/M352.20-21). The materialist conception of "pure being" disguises the element of being thought (G313.20-22/M352.27-29), which the conception of the *être suprême* suggests. Neither party recognizes that these conceptions are their own creation, and so neither finds its individual self-conscious activity reflected in them.

230. G314.7/M353.18.

231. G314.10f./M353.21-24f.

232. G315.12-316.8/M354.28-355.28 (§581).

233. Notice Hegel's mention of "pure insight" in the midst of his criticism of "absolute freedom" (G321.5/M361.10-11).

234. G317.14-318.6/M356.34-357.32 (§§584-585).

235. While it is true that many of the leading Enlightenment figures demurred from direct democracy, this was conservative back-sliding on their part. Their principles commit them to direct participatory democracy.

236. G317.33-318.6/M357.18-32.

237. G317.28-30/M357.12-13 (Miller's tr.). "Beings" here translates "*Wesen*," in a plural form apposite "powers."

238. G323.11-12/M363.25-26.

239. G319.20-23/M359.16-19.

240. G320.34-321.12/M360.40-361.19 (§592).

241. For discussion, see Judith Shklar (*op. cit.*), ch. 5, "Beyond Morality: A Last Brief Act."

242. See Moltke Gramm's excellent essay, 'Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel's Critique of "The Moral World-View"' (*Clio* 7 No. 3 [1978], pp. 375-402). I offer two *caveats* about his discussion. First, he suggests that Hegel doesn't successfully criticize Kant's ethics because Hegel asks about the character of moral action, whereas Kant asks about the conditions for moral experience. Gram recognizes that the moral experience we justify by answering the latter question "may not be the moral experience we have" (p. 379), as discerned by answering the former question. Gramm fails to notice that any such result fails to justify the moral experience of beings like ourselves, but this is what we need and sought to begin with. Second, he suggests that the order of the forms of consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology* is not set by deductive entailment, or by some sort of conceptual development of earlier into latter forms, but is rather a mere function of the historical sequence of the views Hegel criticizes (pp. 380-381). He's right on the first count, and wrong on the second. As he himself remarks, latter forms of consciousness purportedly solve problems not solved by earlier forms (*cf.* pp. 379, 380, 383). Why he doesn't see that such problem-solving relations constitute "dialectical connections" I don't understand.

243. G342.1-3, 347.16-18/M384.38-385.1, 391.10-11.

244. G346.32-34, 351.34-37, 352.6-7, 352.17-20/M390.21-22; 396.19-22, 29-30; 397.3-6.

245. G338.8-10; 351.30-32, 34-37; 424.28-30/M392.3-7; 396.15-16, 19-22; 482.11-12.

246. G344.17-8/M387.28-30.

247. G344.33-35, 345.5-10/M388.8-11, 18-25.

248. G355.9-10/M400.20.

249. G357.36-37/M403.28-30.

250. G346.14-17/M389.36-39.

251. G346.25-26/M390.11-13.

252. G346.28/M390.15-16.

253. G346.4-7/M389.24-27.

254. G349.7-9; *cf.* 346.29-30/M393.10-12; *cf.* 390.16-18.

255. G346.7-9, 17-23/M389.27-30, 389.39-390.9. Hegel avers in Kantian terminology that conscience in fact bases its willful decisions on "natural impulses and inclinations" (G346.39-347.1, 347.22-23, 349.20/M390.29-30, 391.16-17, 393.25-26).

256. G346.34-36, 347.22-23, 352.35-36/M390.23-25, 391.16-18, 397.26-28.

257. G347.27-348.7/M391.22-392.3.

258. In the conceptual preliminaries (*Vorbegriff*) to the *Encyclopedia* Hegel makes a similar criticism of Jacobi's doctrine of "immediate" or intuitive knowledge, a view with many parallels to "conscience." I discuss Hegel's criticism of Jacobi in 'Hegel's Attitude Toward Jacobi ...' (*op. cit.*).

259. G358.7-9/M403.38-404.2.

260. G348.32-349.3/M392.36-393.5. Hegel in fact holds that this is quite commonly the case. This is the key to his appropriation of classical economic theory for his communitarian social philosophy. See Plant, 'Economic and Social Integration in Hegel ...' (*op. cit.*).

261. G356.4-10, 358.14-16/M401.24-29, 404.8-12.**262.** G357.9-14/M402.35-39.

263. G359.9-13, 360.31-34/M405.8-14, 407.10-14.**264.** G362.22-25/M409.16-19.

265. G361.1-4/M407.18-22; Miller, tr.. Robert Brandom develops some of these themes in 'Freedom and Constraint by Norms' (*American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 No. 2 [1979], pp. 187-196). I have found his discussion both stimulating and vexing. His view that "objective kinds" are socially constituted is not Hegel's and cannot, I suspect, meet Hegel's reflexive criterion of adequacy discussed above. In this article Brandom contends (unobjectionably) that what things are is a function of what kinds they belong to, and (objectionably) that what kind something belongs to is socially constituted (pp. 190, 192). (Though he claims to have argued for this claim [p. 192 note 11], no such argument is to be found in his essay.) One problem with his view is that if all kinds are socially constituted, then what it is to be a social kind is itself socially constituted, and whatever kinds of abilities a social group has to constitute itself as a social group and to constitute social kinds are socially constituted. This implies that social kinds constitute themselves, the members of the Ur-social group, and also constitute the kinds of abilities those members have to constitute kinds socially. Either this rope-trick is impossible, because nothing can constitute itself *ex nihilo*, or else we are (or the Ur-group was) God, God being the one being who could constitute himself (if constituted He was) *ex nihilo*. As I have tried to show, Hegel's views on the self-critical structure of consciousness seek to explain how the objective structure of the world "strains" (Brandom's word) our conceptual scheming to the point where we can and do correct it.

266. Hegel's emphasis on the cognitive importance of socially-based mutual criticism comes very close to the kinds of considerations Tyler Burge has urged in opposition to individualistic conceptions of the mental. Mutual criticism is productive in cases of partial ignorance, and Burge's original essay opposing individualism focused on the correlative (if not identical) phenomenon of partial understanding. See 'Individualism and the Mental' (P. French, T. Ueling, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI: Metaphysics* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979], pp. 73-121.) Burge explores some of the normative bases of cognitive judgments in 'Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind' (*Journal of Philosophy* 83 No. 12 [1986], pp. 697-720). Like Hegel, Burge recognizes that these social dimensions to linguistic usage and social correctives to categories of thought do not entail that society is the ultimate arbiter of the content or the truth of thoughts, that for many cognitive states the natural world is the ultimate determinant of these matters (*cf. ibid.*, p. 707).

267. G361.22-25/M408.6-10. Hegel's German is: "Das Wort der Versöhnung ist der *daseyende* Geist, der das reine Wissen seiner selbst als *allgemeinen* Wesens in seinem Gegentheile, in dem reinen Wissen seiner als der absolut in sich seyenden *Einzelheit* anschaut,—ein gegenseitiges Anerkennen, welches der *absolute Geist* ist."

268. G361.26-27/M408.11-13.

269. G362.14-15/M409.7-8.

270. G362.15-16/M409.8.

271. G362.28-29/M409.24-25. Hegel's German is: "Das versöhnende JA, worn beyde Ich von ihrem entgegengesetzten *Daseyn* ablassen, ist das *Daseyn* des zur Zweyheit ausgedehnten *Ichs*, das darin sich gleich bleibt, und in seiner vollkommenen Entäusserung und Gegentheile die Gewißheit seiner selbst hat;—es ist der erscheinende Gott mitten unter ihnen, die sich als das reine Wissen wissen" (G362.25-29). "Es" in the final clause refers back to "das versöhnende JA," and "ist" expresses the identity of this "versöhnende JA" with "Gott."

272. G363.3-8/M410.1-7.

273. Cf. G412.15-19/M467.32-37.

274. "[S]elf-consciousness ... remains the subject of substance ..." (G400.24-28/M453.36-38).

275. G363.9-364.32/M410.8-M412.6 (§§673-677).

276. Jesus reveals that "the divine nature is the same as the human, and it is this unity that is beheld" (G406.8-10/M460.15-17; Miller's tr.).

277. Cf. G408.17-18, 30-36; 417.6-7; 418.25-28; 420.9-16/M463.4-5, 20-27; 473.25-26; 475.17-21; 477.17-27.

278. Cf. G407.79/M461.22-24. The "hopes and expectations of the world" are hopes Hegel shares.

279. G364.17-21/M411.28-33.

280. G364.23-26/M411.36-40.

281. G364.34-36/M412.9-13.

282. G364.39-365.5; cf. 369.23-28, 408.19-29, 414.16-30, 420.36-37/M412.13-19; cf. 417.23-27, 463.7-19, 470.14-31, 478.11-12.

283. On Hegel's civil conception of religion, see Raymond Plant, *Hegel* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), ch. 1, "Civil Theology and Political Culture."

284. G365.19/M412.36.

285. G367.24-26/M415.13-16. The basis of these parallels is set out in Appendix III, pp. 201-203.

286. "If, therefore, religion is the perfection of spirit, in which its individual moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—return and **have returned as into their ground**, they together constitute the *extant actuality* of the totality of spirit, which is only as the differentiating and self-returning movement of these its aspects" (G366.9-13/M413.30-35, Miller's tr. emended, main emphasis added).

287. G365.28-30/M413.6-8.

288. G366.35-36; 367.6-10, 12-17/M414.21-23, 32-35; 414.37-415.4. (The last of these passages is discussed in Appendix III). If there is anywhere that Hegel's dialectic is an "interpretive" strategy (as Charles Taylor contends in *Hegel* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], ch. 8) rather than a method for regressive argumentation (as I have argued above), it is within the chapter on "Religion." For a helpful discussion of this chapter, see Quentin Lauer (*op. cit.*), ch. 8, "Religion" §A f. (pp. 234-255).

289. Hegel does aver, however, that there is some temporal sequence within each of the major sections (G365.37-366.3/M413.18-22, 27-28). For example, the transition from "Perception" to "Understanding" may parallel the transition from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics. Moltke Gramm ('Moral and Literary Ideals', *op. cit.*) traces a number of actual historical parallels to which Hegel alludes in his discussion of "Conscience."

290. G405.25-27/M459.26-28.

291. G405.27-30/M459.28-32.

292. G407.1-3/M461.13-15; Miller's tr.. Hegel's German is: "Gott ist allein im reinen speculativen Wissen erreichbar, und ist nur in ihm und ist nur es selbst"

293. G419.28-30/M476.30-34; *cf.* Hegel's Preface, G18.3-5/K28/M10.1-2.

294. G408.17-29/M463.4-19 (§765); *cf.* G407.14-18/M461.30-35.

295. This is Henry Harris's statement, quoted more fully above, p. x.

296. G422.3-5/M479.1-3.

297. G422.10-15, 18/M479.10-18, 22.

298. G422.23-25/M479.29-32; Miller, tr..

299. G422.25-28/M479.32-480.4.

300. G428.2-8/M486.1-9.

301. G422.29-423.5/M480.5-16 (I have slightly emended Miller's translation).

301. G423.5-9/M480.16-22.

303. G423.17-427.27; *cf.* G430.16-28/M480.31-485.28 (§§790-797); *cf.* 488.36-489.13.

304. G424.2-3 (but *cf.* 424.6-9 *contra*); *cf.* 427.19-20/M481.16 (but *cf.* 481.21-25 *contra*); 485.19-20.

305. G428.37-429.4/M487.6-12.

306. G429.25-31, 431.13-31, 433.8-11/M487.38-488.5, 490.3-26, 492.9-12. Hegel has the gall twice to infer that because, according to his view, his view couldn't be articulated until after "spirit" had achieved its basic historical development, his view must be true (G428.16-22, 429.39-430.2/M486.19-25, 488.16-18).

307. G430.16-20/M488.36-489.1.

308. *Cf.* his earlier remark: "[T]he content is conceptually comprehended only insofar as the I is by itself in its other-being" (G428.11-12/M486.13-14; emphasis added).

309. G431.36-432.1, 432.14-19/M490.33-37, 491.11-17.

310. This, together with the putative explicit comprehension of world history as developing towards this goal. Hegel's historical teleology is extremely problematic and cannot be explored here.

311. G431.36-432.1/M490.33-37; I follow Miller's interpolation.

312. G432.9-10/M491.6-7.

313. G432.14-19/M491.11-15.

314. G58.12-13/D18/M52.18-20.

315. G56.10-11/D14/M50.1-2.

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION OF THE INTRODUCTION

1. Dove's translation appears in M. Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 7-26.

2. Dove renders the end of this line as "... talk about the conditions of knowledge" (D11). Presumably he thinks that Hegel must be thinking principally of Kant here. However, the word Dove renders as "conditions" is "*Verhältnisse*," which means "relations," and Hegel's syntax has this word referring back to the notions of knowledge as an instrument or a medium (G54.30-34). Also, Dove misses Hegel's point about what leads to what here.

3. Here again, Dove renders "*Verhältnisse*" as "conditions" instead of as "relations."

4. Dove here renders "*allgemein*" as "universally." I have opted for "generally" in order to emphasize the casually presumptive character of the claim Hegel discusses.

5. *I.e.*, the distinction between what is "in itself" and what is "for us."

6. Dove renders "*erklärt*" here as "designates." His translation is not incorrect, but it invites confusing Hegel's claims with spurious problems about demonstratives. For this reason I use "declares."

7. Hegel did the utmost to create difficulties for the translator as well as the interpreter here. The last two sentences attempt to render the following:

Allein wie vorhin gezeigt worden, ändert sich ihm dabey der erste Gegenstand; er hört auf das an sich zu seyn, und wird ihm zu einem solchen, der nur *für es* das *an sich* ist; somit aber ist dann diß: *das für es seyn dieses an sich*, das wahre, das heißt aber, diß ist das *Wesen*, oder sein *Gegenstand*. (G60.27-30)

Dove's rendering implies too strongly that Hegel has clearly distinct premises and conclusions here.

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HEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

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The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to interpret Hegel's theory of knowledge and reality in a new manner. Hegel's view, some think, is considerably in the line of skepticism and modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with other views and the criticisms they face. Writing Hegel's *Phenomenology* in the context of both skepticism and the otherwise *unworkable* one is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his views, arguments, and views. Accordingly, this is an *interpretive* study. Hegel's text is analyzed by placing it in the context of various arguments, including Kant, Schopenhauer, and William Abbot.

This study provides a complete, detailed analysis and reconstruction of an important portion of one of Hegel's most important works. The portion considered, principally the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, concerns Hegel's philosophical aims and method in the *Phenomenology*. Thus the purpose of this study is to provide a detailed and accurate reading of the procedure in the *Phenomenology* in order to understand it, intended to facilitate an exact and philosophically secure reading of Hegel's very interesting text. The majority of the present work will be in its subject. It is a study of the aim and method of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and not an exhaustive treatment of its whole text.

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